# SOCIETY AND ITS SURPLUS

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

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## A STUDY IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION

BY

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# PREFACE

Any complex body of phenomena is subject to multiple definition. As many valid definitions of it may usually be formulated as there are important elements in its nature. Thus, for instance, religion is a complex phenomenon and has been defined in no end of ways as various factors in its make-up have been focussed upon and emphasized. The phenomenon of social life, similarly complex, lends itself to much the same sort of treatment. Hence, it is altogether natural that students of the subject should look at it from many different angles and describe it in various terminologies. So no apology is needed if in this work we undertake a new way of approach, or rather an old way newly emphasized, and try to suggest a conception of sociology somewhat different from the ordinary.

The statement just made may incline the reader to think that a systematic treatise on sociological theory has come into his hands, but such is not the case. The work is intended to be mostly descriptive of the social process of change or evolution. Nevertheless, in the course of presentation an endeavor is made to unfold and demonstrate the particular theory which we wish to advance.

Before passing the threshold of the work proper it may be well to indicate, in so far as a mere statement will do it, just the point of view entertained and to propose a definition of sociology in terms of the basic notion of this viewpoint. Let it be said, then, that the basic notion in our thinking is that society is essentially a physical phenomenon. This being so, an understanding of the operation of

physical law in the social realm is the great object to be sought. That means that the primary concern of the sociologist is energy—the energy of social aggregates, and more especially that energy in what we shall call its surplus manifestations. Hence, sociology may be described as the science of the cosmic process in the social order or, more definitely, the science of group energy and power, treating specifically of the genesis, development, extent, modes, distribution, integration, conservation, dissipation, degradation, elevation, direction, general influence, and behavior of energy manifest in social forms.

We are not conscious of breaking altogether new ground here, for both the father and grandfather, so to say, of sociology attempted physical interpretations of society. Comte spoke of social statics and dynamics, and Spencer, following him with the first real attempt at a systematic sociology, wrought it out in terms of universal physical processes. Properly speaking, Spencer's work was little more than a physical philosophy of society. Stimulating though it has proved to all subsequent students in this field, it did not give direction to the main line of development. Those who since Spencer have striven to make of sociology a science have shifted it to other grounds. They have delivered it into the hands of the vitalists or those who hold that social energy is independent of mechanical law. And perhaps it is not far from the truth to say that the farther away from the grounds chosen by Spencer the shifting has trended, the less the scientific prospects have become. Wherefore, it may be well to hark back to the work of the beginning of this science. That in principle is what we have endeavored to do in treating of social surplus.

Important advantages are to be gained by viewing society as a physical entity. In the first place, it seems possible thus to get a more simple, and consequently a more

satisfactory, explanation of many elemental facts of social relations and conduct than has been obtained otherwise, especially by the vitalists. Again, a larger synthesis of much social knowledge is facilitated. A vast body of data difficult to coördinate can by this means of approach be more readily unified and comprehended, for more basic principles of organization become available.

The value of this approach can of course be tested only by applying it. But whatever the success with which it is applied in the following chapters, the viewpoint itself is probably more valid than this effort at demonstrating it will reveal.

Our study deals with social surplus on the assumption that surplus is the most significant thing with respect to group energy. The use of this term may involve the implication that the work is particularistic, but as particularism is ordinarily understood it can hardly be so characterized. On the contrary, it is essentially generalistic, for, as already shown, an all-embracing factor of interpretation has been sought. Wherefore, the phases we have stressed, the explanations we have offered, and the analyses we have made are to be looked upon as something more than mere variations on a single note of the harp of social life; they are generally to be thought of as constituting an effort to run the whole gamut.

The inspiration of this book in so far as it can be traced to any direct sources at all outside the author's own mind came in a measure from the writings of the late Professor Simon N. Patten, especially from certain chapters of *The Theory of Social Forces* and *The New Basis of Civilization.* It came also from a germinal idea found in an essay of Professor Alvan A. Tenney on "The Genesis of Individual and Social Surplus."

The materials of the work have been gathered and used for classroom instruction. Out of them have grown two

or three essays, previously published, which reappear here in newly organized form.

The writer acknowledges his indebtedness for helpful criticisms and suggestions especially to Professor F. Stuart Chapin of the University of Minnesota, and to his colleagues of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, Mr. Hubert Yount and Professor John Phelan. To his wife appreciation is also due for constant aid in the preparation of the manuscript for publication.

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# PART I

# SOCIAL POWER

*For the first time in the history of civilization mankind has reached a point where the means of satisfying its needs are in excess of the needs themselves.*

PETER KROPOTKIN

# SOCIETY AND ITS SURPLUS

## CHAPTER I

### SOCIAL ENERGY

It was the philosopher Lotze, I believe, who held that a thing is known by its activities. To determine how it acts through and through is, he declared, to arrive at a complete understanding of what it is. It would seem, however, that, contrary to the Lotzean view, the energies of a thing, provided they can be separately determined, furnish a better criterion of its nature than do its mere activities. If, for instance, we could thoroughly test and fully measure its energies, our understanding of society would be comparatively thorough. But this we cannot do as yet with entire satisfaction, and, desirable though a sociology written in terms of energy might be, its complete realization lies largely beyond the horizon of the present in the realm of future effort. Howbeit, nothing hinders and much invites an attempt to subject the energy that human society embodies to whatever analysis and measurement is possible, and so to reveal the materials of sociology.

### Source of Energy

Whence is social energy, is the first and fundamental question. Herbert Spencer traced it to solar radiation.[1]

[1] *First Principles* (5th Ed.), pp. 189, 190.

In so doing, he merely accepted the physicist's hypothesis, which attributes all cosmic energy to the sun's activity. This explanation of the source of all the energy of our sphere still stands. As Professor Soddy says, men live "by sunshine."[2] If we inquire beyond, we soon confront the ultimate fact that energy is one of the two impelling, molding agency and ether particles, elastic but inert."[3] As one of the "indestructible and uncreatable fundamental physical existences" energy occurs everywhere in conjunction with matter. Whether the cosmic supply has come directly or indirectly from the sun or is partially inherent in the structure of cosmic matter itself is for our purpose of little moment. Of more concern to us, perhaps, is the fact that energy has several modes of manifestation.

The modes of energy so far recognized are heat, light, chemical affinity, electricity, and radioactivity. If there are other forms, they have not been identified; and it is generally assumed that there are no others. The thermic, lumic, chemic, electric, and radioactic are, however, specifically manifested through inorganic substances, and when we pass to the organic an old question which will not down rises in the query: Do these forms also constitute the energy which is called "vital force"? Is life just heat, light, chemical affinity, electricity, and radioactivity, some one or some combination or complex of these forms and nothing more?[4] We do not know, but it is a safe assumption that no new form appears in the organic. Indeed, the physicists have been inclined to scoff at the notion that there are any forms other than those found in the inorganic realm. However, certain scientists working in the chemi-

[2] Frederick Soddy, *Cartesian Economics: the Bearing of Physical Science upon State Stewardship*, p. 32.

[3] J. M. Macfarlane, *The Causes and Course of Organic Evolution*, p. 4.

[4] "Is Man an Electrical Organism?" *The Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. 75.

cal, biochemical, and biological field think the physicists are too dogmatic. They, in turn, would consider the question an open one, and in some instances even go so far as to suggest that vital force is really another distinct form of energy. One has contended that there are more perfect and condensed modes operative in and peculiar to the whole life series.[5] This writer has tried to demonstrate that there are four specifically organic modes of energy, namely, biotic, cognitic, cogitic, and spiritic. The first of these he identifies with *protoplasm*—vegetative or biotic substance in general. The second belongs to *chromatin* substance, which confers upon organisms "a quickened sense perception and response," and in the last analysis sex reproduction. The third is associated with *neuratin* substance which is inherent in "nerve ganglia" and enables "the organisms to form more complex and interlinked impressions of a mental kind." The fourth is found probably within some unidentified "complex material substance, located probably in some layer or area along the frontal sinuses of the cerebral substance," and confers upon man his most exalted powers of thought, aspiration and idealization.[6] As highly fanciful as this analysis of organic energy seems in the light of present knowledge, it may nevertheless roughly define forms which may eventually be identified. And should some such organic energy series finally be recognized, the subject of social energy would appear in a new light. As it is, however, there is no alternative but to think of social energy in a generic and physical sense, and to think of it, moreover, regardless of any of its particular modes whatsoever.

If, then, social energy is not to be distinguished from physical energy in general, the law of the transformation of energy is obviously applicable. Herbert Spencer dwelt

[5] J. M. Macfarlane, *op. cit.*
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 799-805.

much upon this law, and tried to show how the transformation from one medium to another takes place in exact equivalences.[7] He contended that a given amount of physical energy is changed into an equal quantity of organic; the latter into just so much vital energy, and so on through the whole range of mental and social activity. The law is that "every physical and psychical change is generated by certain antecedent forces, and that from given amounts of such forces neither more nor less of such physical and psychical changes can result."[8] Spencer based this theory upon the principle of the persistence of force, insisting that it was a necessary corollary of the same. This must be conceded, he argued, on the ground that "either mental energies, as well as bodily ones, are quantitatively correlated to certain energies expended in their production, and to certain other energies which they initiate; or else nothing must become something and something must become nothing."[9] The transformation of energy is an unquestioned fact, but, though there may be a presumption in favor of it, the theory of equivalence has not yet been established as true. Social energy cannot, therefore, be measured in exact physical quantities.

The physicists' terms, potential and kinetic, may be conveniently employed in describing social energy. By potential energy is meant that which is stored up, and in society this includes the people themselves, economic goods, culture or tradition, social structure and organization. Kinetic signifies motion or action, and in society this embodies all endeavor, activity, and effort of whatever sort such as work, play, worship, etc. Instead of using the terms potential and kinetic, we might more properly speak of social energy as capital and current.

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[7] *First Principles,* Chapter VIII.
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 192.
[9] *Ibid.,* p. 192.

From the foregoing it is suggested that social energy implies something more and other than the combined force of the individuals composing the aggregate. This it includes, but much more besides. All the elements that go to make up group energy we shall attempt to describe; but the task will not be easy, for the living, growing organism which we call society is so complex that it can with difficulty be adequately analyzed and characterized. Did we have to deal with organic bodies and personalities alone as do the biologists and psychologists, it would be sufficiently hard; but sociologists have to consider besides super-individual matters and extra-personal data, to comprehend a whole, many-sided, complex unity, and finally to combine this knowledge into a science. The difficulties of describing the energies of society are therefore apparent, but we shall essay the task nevertheless. If success, even in a crude way, shall attend our efforts, it will then become evident wherein social energy transcends individual energy.

## Vital Energy

Individual energy, or that form of social energy embodied, combined and manifested in the human organisms comprising the social aggregate, gives the starting point for this analysis. Social energy is primarily vital or organic —a matter of the physical force of the people making up the group. An ancient saying, still current and held to be sound in many political circles runs: "In a multitude of people is the king's glory" or strength—the implication in this being that the more numerous the members of the group, the greater its power. As a general principle it may be laid down as true that social power is proportionate to numbers, since each unit represents a bundle of more or less available energy, and the greater the number of units the more the energy. A small group, obviously, can-

not match a large one in vital strength. In quantity of energy, for example, Canada with 9,000,000 people or Mexico with 15,000,000 people cannot equal the United States with 110,000,000 members. It scarcely follows, however, notwithstanding the race suicide alarmists and the big family advocates, that population multiplication is the means of indefinitely increasing the group's power; for the effectiveness of organic units is contingent upon other factors. There is, in consequence, an undoubted limit in the case of any group beyond which it cannot profitably multiply. Passing this, added units mean diminishing strength rather than enhanced power. Every addition of a normal individual then apparently swells the volume of organic energy, but it does so at the expense of the average vitality and force. If not this, it prevents the accumulation of material energy or social capital and the generation of other forms of social strength. The overpopulous societies of the Far East, notably China and India, have certainly long passed the point where additions mean gain. In their case, growth in population has come to signify a positive curtailment of group energy. Centuries of constant breeding up to the limit of bare subsistence for her people have doomed China to a state of relatively degraded impotency. As a reservoir of social energy, China, with her 400,000,000 units, multiplying more rapidly than any other civilized nation, is probably much inferior to America with one-fourth the number. This is not, of course, exactly tantamount to saying that organically it takes four Chinese to equal one American in energy, but it is intended to convey the idea that the vital powers of the two groups, all things considered, stand in some such relation. Other factors besides numbers enter in to make the difference.

One conditioning factor is the quality of the stock. Man for man, one group may be inferior, equal, or superior to

another in physical stamina. The inequality of societies in this respect is generally recognized. Comparisons on this point are commonly made in this day of wide contact between groups, and some are always taking account of their marked superiority over others. No doubt it is well that this is being done, for brute force is fundamental. Just what determines superiority in the case of individuals, and makes, in consequence, some societies mightier than others, is a question of first-rate importance, that no people can well ignore. The superficial and popular explanation is that differences are all due to race. But this no longer satisfies the critically minded, for too often we have seen here in America on this great common meeting-ground of the races of mankind all physical inequalities disappear. Natural selection is, perhaps, the most potent factor in producing vigorous peoples, for Nature's discriminations are for the most part in favor of the bodily fit. However, natural agencies do not necessarily so act. In a particular environment they may select a highly specialized type, which, in comparison with general types of mankind, may be relatively weak. From an *a priori* viewpoint, as a rule, primitive people ought to be the stronger, for they live far more directly under the reign of natural law than do civilized groups. "The effectiveness of natural selection varies inversely as the height of civilization."[10] Selection thus playing more fully and freely tends to eliminate the weaklings and leave a uniformly strong stock, a homogeneous, close-conforming type group. The less primitive, the more variable; and the more primitive, the less variable, seems to be the rule among racial stocks. The negro, for instance, shows but little physical or mental variation compared with other stocks.[11]

[10] A. J. Keller, *Societal Evolution*, p. 67.

[11] *Cf.* Ellsworth Huntington, *World Power and Evolution*, pp. 167-170.

However, Herbert Spencer believed civilized man to be physically superior. After canvassing the data relative to the stature and muscular development of primitive people, which fails to show them inferior on these points to civilized man, Spencer continues: "There is evidence that, apart from stature and apart even from muscular development, the uncivilized man is less powerful than the civilized man. He is unable to expend suddenly as great an amount of force, and he is unable to continue the expenditure of force for so long a time."[12] The facts seem to substantiate Spencer's position, and to prove that the uncivilized compared with the civilized are indeed "deficient in corporeal strength." While the civilized group permits greater variation in the physical type, and fails to eliminate the weaklings, it compensates for this loss by providing other means conducive to an average physical energy which surpasses that of the primitive group. This it does by providing a more regular, stable, and abundant food supply, greater in variety and better in quality, so that men are enabled to energize to a much higher level and more persistently than is possible for uncivilized people. On this ground it was that Spencer based his argument in the main for civilized man's bodily superiority. He added, however, another cause; namely, that primitive man has "a relatively smaller nervous system"; but this is fanciful and contrary to fact. The nutrition theory is sufficient to explain the difference between the two types.

If natural selection favors those of corporeal vigor, social selection may favor unduly the physically weak and degenerate. Of this it is seriously accused in Western society to-day. Where for a long period the birth rate is kept but slightly in excess of the death rate, the average age of the group tends to be raised far above that of more

[12] *Principles of Sociology* (3rd Ed.), Vol. I, p. 47.

prolific societies, with probably lowering of per capita energy as a result. Therefore, of two equally numerous societies where the average age differential is, say, five to ten years, all other things equal, the younger group will be the possessor of more energy. What is more significant than this is the preservation of defective stock. Whatever the humanitarian gains—and let us admit some—the fostering of the weak overburdens the group with the physically incompetent, thus subtracting from its normal energy and lowering its physical prowess. Facts brought to light by the Great War revealed the prevalence of defective and diseased manhood in the nations of the Western world to an alarming degree. Data concerning 2,425,184 of the recruits of the United Kingdom in the age group of 8 to 42 years showed that but 36 per cent of them could qualify for the first grade. The other 64 per cent were below par. In the United States, of 2,225,000 men measured and examined physically by the local draft boards 29.1 per cent were rejected on physical grounds. The Official Bulletin of the United States Government [13] says, however, that many of the disabilities were of but little importance in civil life. This would reduce to 15 per cent the proportion of males twenty to thirty years old "who carry a serious handicap against normal activity in civil occupations." [14]

Social selection through war is another means of depleting group energy. A case in point was France of the Napoleonic era. Her official recruiting statistics give the data.[15] The males born during the twenty-year period of war were found when called up as conscripts to be shorter in stature than the youth of former periods or of subsequent years. The average height of those born during the

[13] No. 11, March, 1919.

[14] Sir Arthur Newsholme, "The Increasing Socialization of Medicine," *The Survey*, Jan. 3, 1919, p. 359.

[15] See *Social Hygiene*, December, 1914, on Professor Vernon Kellogg's study.

wars was 1.625 mm. compared with 1.655 mm. for those born after that time. With decrease in height went deterioration in size also. After the Restoration (1818) it was found that the number of conscripts rejected because of undersize was so great that certain departments of France could not fill their quotas. Correlated with diminished height and size were found an added number of infirmities. Exemption for this cause increased by one-third in twenty years, and for undersize and infirmities together doubled. That France had degenerated physically and was a nation of greatly reduced vigor is an obvious fact. This was due directly to the removal from the breeding population of her most able-bodied youth to be cannon fodder. "Feeble-bodied youth and senescent maturity" were left at home to beget the new generations.

Many others, from the pursuit of a militaristic policy, have experienced periods of physical decadence. Rome, Spain, England, and Germany of past generations have unquestionably weakened themselves not unlike France; and had they preserved records as did the latter the fact could be as readily demonstrated. And now, out of the Great War, emerge the belligerent nations of Europe bearing in their arms a degenerate race of infants. Offsprings of unfit fathers and half-fed mothers, starved and stunted by under-nourishment, disease and hardship, this impoverished breed promises for these nations a period of degradation and low energy. Truly has Havelock Ellis said: "The warlike nation of to-day . . . is the decadent nation of to-morrow."

Social selection acts in other respects in a way most favorable to corporeal energy. This is the case where groups result from colonizing or migration. Migration movements are great sifters of peoples, sorting out only the finest physically. The voluntary, unassisted immigration into new lands, of which the modern age has seen much,

has been made up of the variable, vigorous and energetic. Sluggards, weaklings and defectives have stayed at home. New societies founded in the Americas, Australia and South Africa have, in consequence, been remarkably endowed with physical stamina. They have exhibited a degree of energy higher than that of the motherlands and fatherlands of Europe. Professor E. A. Ross thinks that those societies which have been planted farthest removed from their ancestral homes have been the most vigorous. He says: "Of the Mongols that borrowed the old Babylonian culture, those who pushed across Asia to the Yellow Sea have risen highest. The Arabs and Moors that skirted Africa, and won a home in far-away Spain, developed the most brilliant of the Saracenic civilizations. Hebrews, Darians, Quirites, Rajputs, Havas, were far invaders. No communities in classic times flourished like the cities of Asia created by the overflow from Greece. Nowhere under the Czar are there such vigorous, progressive communities as in Siberia. By the middle of the century, perhaps, the Russian on the Yenesei or the Amur will be known for his push and hustle as is to-day the American on Lake Michigan or Puget Sound. It is, perhaps, on this principle that the men who invaded their way to the British Isles have shown themselves the most masterful and achieving of the Germanic race; whilst their offshoots in America and Australia, in spite of some mixture, show the highest level of individual efficiency found in any people of the Anglo-Saxon breed."[16]

Organic or vital energy is manifested not alone in physical stamina but in mental vigor as well. The psychically alert and mentally capable are certainly more dynamic, and must be considered more fully supplied with energy than the stolid and unresponsive. Psychic energy is a matter

[16] *The Foundations of Sociology*, pp. 360, 361.

of desires, wants, will, reason, imagination, and constructive thought. Lester F. Ward put it in the following words: "Desire is the social force, and where there is no desire, no will, there is no force, no social energy. Civilization is the product of active social energy, or, to use Ratzenhafer's terminology, there must be a lively interest or there can be no achievement. It is this minute interest that makes men fight and conquer and struggle. It is the same which makes them undertake voyages of discovery in search of Golden Fleeces, or El Dorados, or Northwest Passages. Interest impels mankind to explore, to migrate, to invent, to labor, to produce wealth, to seek knowledge, to discover truth, to create objects both of use and beauty —in a word, to achieve." [17]

In respect to mental quality or psychic energy manifested societies differ more or less widely. Sir Francis Galton in one of his works [18] attempted to determine the comparative worth of different races. He did this on the basis of the number and grade of their eminent men. The ancient Greeks were accorded first place as the ablest race of history. This applies especially to the Athenians during the period from 530 to 430 B. C. He says that "on the lowest possible estimate" they rank practically two grades higher in average ability than modern Englishmen. The Lowland Scotch and the English North Country men are put down "decidedly a fraction of a grade superior" to ordinary English. Fully two grades inferior to the English are the Africans; and the native Australians occupy a place one grade yet lower than the African race. Thus, the primitive Australians stand five degrees below the Athenian Greeks in average mental ability. According to Galton's figures there are 250 men of superior talent out of every 1,000,000 Englishmen; *i. e.*, one to each 4,000.

[17] *Pure Sociology*, pp. 33, 34; *cf.* pp. 103, 569.
[18] *Hereditary Genius*, Chapter XX.

Those of lesser talent he believed to be 450 per million. Lester F. Ward in a very thoroughgoing study concluded that there is one person of talent to every 500 people in modern society. Ward probably came nearer the truth than Galton. To what extent modern nations really differ in ability is uncertain, though probably some differences exist. However, such conclusions as Galton reached throw no true light upon the subject, for his method of comparison was thoroughly fallacious. If the English and the Greeks were to be compared at all, both should have been taken at their best. But this Galton failed to do. He took Greece at her greatest florescence in the Periclean Age, but England at a time when her brilliancy was not at its maximum. The Elizabethan Age and the Periclean should have been compared, and then would Galton have dared to say the Greeks were superior? I think not, for the fact would have shown that the educated class of Elizabethan England was no larger than the 90,000 aristocrats of Athens nor in the least degree less fecund of men of talent.[19]

Attempts at grading the mentality of races and nations do not amount to much; for as yet students of the problem have not succeeded in separating original nature from acquired culture. But unless these are clearly distinguished in the lives of men there can be no certainty in any case about the extent of ability. The biologists are peculiarly blind when it comes to this question. From Galton to the present day they have persisted in identifying the cultural state of people with their inherent qualities. They have insisted that culture is only the expression of innate nature. Hence, we have been told, for instance, that the Aryan race, and especially the Anglo-Saxon branch of it,

[19] See C. H. Cooley, "Genius, Fame and Comparison of Races," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* Vol. 9, pp. 1-42.

by virtue of its dominant civilization and position in the world, is the race of supreme ability. Of late there has appeared a new American version of this fairly old dogma. The superior stock has been narrowed down to a single type of Aryan, namely, the long-headed blonds or Nordics, as they are being called.[20] So it is now the fashion to assign to the Nordics the place of first rank in ability, and to account for all cases of distinction among European societies on the assumption that there was Nordic blood in the veins of the people. All this is most absurd in the light of facts which show that racial superiority may be partly accounted for on the basis of culture, that culture may be and is commonly borrowed, and that people attaining the highest culture may not be of superior ability at all, but only fortunately situated for acquiring culture, good borrowers or first-rate exploiters of numerous equally originative peoples.

There may, indeed, be real differences in the innate abilities of peoples, though conclusive proof is thus far wanting.[20a] Admitting such differences, it may be assumed

[20] See Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race,* 4th Ed. This work only repeats the speculations of certain French and German anthropologists and ethnologists whose theories were in vogue two generations ago. Among these men were Chamberlain, Schemann, Vacher, de Laponge, and De Gobineau. Most noticeable was the last mentioned, Arthur De Gobineau, whose work, *The Inequality of Human Races,* was published in 1853. The following from the author's dedication as given in Adrian Collin's translation, published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915, reveals the burden of his theorizing. "I convinced myself at last that everything great, noble and fruitful in the works of man on this earth in science, art and civilization, derives from a single germ and the result of a single thought; it belongs to one family alone, the different branches of which have reigned in all the civilized countries of the Universe." This family is the Aryan white stock or what Grant calls the Nordics. His Nordics are fully described, but when you search for the living specimens they are as elusive as the canals on Mars and no more real. In fact, one is impressed with the notion that the Nordics are figments of the imagination of racial egotism and purely mythological beings.

[20a] For a fair discussion of this question see *Individual Differences and Their Significance for Social Theory,* by F. H. Hankins,

further that the ability of no society remains a fixed quantity. It will vary from generation to generation. Sometimes so patent a slump in mental energy may possibly occur that the society can be put down as a stagnant, decadent or degenerate one.

The eugenists are greatly alarmed lest such a slump in mental energy is about to overcome the industrial nations of to-day. A vicious social selection, they hold, is causing the races of the west to be recruited from the lower strata or the "under men" of the population rather than from the prudent and capable classes. The high birth rate of the poor and unsuccessful and supposedly inferior stock, in contrast to that of the successful and well-to-do, who are not reproducing themselves, is believed to be swamping society with incompetents. The only outcome, as the eugenist sees it, is a constant lowering of the average ability of the groups. There can be no gainsaying the facts as to what classes are supplying the greater part of the population of industrial society. Nor, if the prolific stock is indeed inferior, can we doubt that decadence is ahead. Error probably lurks in this reasoning, however, because it assumes that quality of stock is associated with social and economic status. The touchstone of equal opportunity and advantage must first be applied before dogmatic conclusions concerning classes is justifiable, for it may well be, as M. Odin exclaimed, that "Genius is in things, not in man." At any rate, the potential mental energy of all modern groups is surely far greater than the kinetic energy. There is probably no modern nation that cannot greatly enhance its kinetic mental energy merely by giving opportunity to vast stores of latent talent. And the group which succeeds in doing this is certain to surpass in power the one which does not. This it could do even in

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a purely negative way through elimination by restricting marriage among the incapable and mentally defective. For, by cutting off in time a large element of this stock, the average of the group would be in a measure somewhat raised. Surveys in various sections of our own country reveal the fact that probably as high as two to four per cent of the population is clearly subnormal.

Society makes no great effort to utilize latent mental energy. The modern tendency to provide free universal education indirectly aims at it, but so far has accomplished little. There is no such thing as free opportunity for the exercise of talent. Society fosters only certain ranges of it, and suppresses the rest. Groups are accustomed to energize, as a result, at mediocre levels with more inclinations to cast themselves down to lower planes than to rise to higher reaches of average mentality. Now and then orgies of social suppression of ability break out, and groups do themselves violence and emasculate themselves until they become but shadows of their former selves. A notable instance was that of Spain. For three centuries, 1471 to 1781, this nation persecuted and destroyed her most vigorous intellects at the rate of 1,000 per annum. Thus, 300,000 were eliminated during that period. This destruction of the most capable, together with the more indirect method of elimination by means of the church's vicious policy of capturing all the capable men of the nation for the innocuous profession of the celibate priesthood, Galton thought quite sufficient to account for the decay of Spain and her present day impotency.[21] Similarly, France of the seventeenth century destroyed some three to four hundred thousand Protestants in prisons, on the scaffold, and in various ways, and drove out of her realms an equal number.[22] It is not unlikely that the low state of French

[21] *Hereditary Genius*, pp. 358, 359.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 360.

society for two generations preceding the Revolution resulted from this elimination of mental energy from her midst. Policies of political persecution such as are coming into vogue in our western nations today, especially in America, are ominous signs. They court decay, and are fraught with the utmost danger for the future power of the nations pursuing such policies.

Social selection by migration tends often to endow new societies with superior mental energy even as it operates to give them exceptional physical vigor. It is apparently true, as Patten states, that the changing of abode and the influence of the newly entered land are important factors. "Character is formed by the long series of environments in which a race has lived. Each change to a new environment brings out new traits by creating new motor adjustments, but it does not of necessity destroy the earlier traits. Many of them abide and are brought out more clearly by the new conditions." [23] The brainiest and most eminent do not emigrate as a rule, but those who do go out to new seats are of a high average, thus making the new society established by them of higher average mental energy than the old. Galton even attributed much of the ability found in so old a land as England to the Huguenot and Flemish refugees which she received during the seventeenth century in such large numbers. Apropos of this, he adds a most striking statement when he says: "It is very remarkable how large a proportion of the eminent men of all countries bear foreign names, and are the children of political refugees,—men well qualified to introduce a valuable strain of blood." [24]

In summation, the quantity of organic energy of a group is a matter of the physical and psychical quality of the units nearly as much as of numbers.

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[23] S. N. Patten, *Development of English Thought*, p. 80.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 360.

The organic energy of a group is further conditioned by the physical environment in which it dwells. The quantity of its energy depends ultimately upon what the environment contributes. Needless to say, environments are differently endowed; some being rich in energy and others being poor. Those abundantly endowed, that is, full of available and transformable energy, which can readily be changed into organic forms, give rise to populous and powerful societies. Those, on the contrary, meagerly supplied, support but a small and feeble folk.

Food supply is the foremost aspect of the environment, and its most important contribution to organic energy. What a group is depends greatly upon the nature and amount of food. As the Germans have it, "Man ist was er iszt." Allusion has already been made to the superiority of civilized groups both in quality of corporeal stamina and size of the aggregate over primitive societies on account of the difference in food supply. But both primitive and civilized groups differ among themselves in this respect and from the same cause. Tierra del Fuego, barren and inhospitable, supported a wretched group of savages numbering not more than a few thousand. In contrast, the favorably endowed islands of the South Seas, such as the New Hebrides or the Fiji Archipelago were veritable warrens of fairly vigorous men. Among the civilized peoples the group that Alaska can support stands in contrast to that found in Argentina, that of Spain to that of Germany, and that of Siberia to that of the Transvaal. If the presence of other factors is also remembered, it is a fact of universal validity that lands flowing with milk and honey have ever been, by nature of that abundance, the seats of great and vigorous societies. The fertile valleys and alluvial plains of the earth, overflowing with plenty, have produced the most powerful nations of the earth.

Sir Henry Thomas Buckle gave attention to the influence of food in his *History of Civilization in England.* He attempted to prove that the nature and the quantity of the food supply afforded by various environments was a large factor in determining the quality of society there formed. He cited India, for instance, as a land producing a cheap, abundant supply of rice. This easily procured vegetable diet, he argued, had given rise to a teeming population, but for all that Indian society remains less powerful and progressive than the societies of western lands. Europe, in contrast to India, has a scarcer and dearer food, chiefly of an animal nature. Her groups are, therefore, less populous, but more vigorous and far greater in the civilization they have achieved. Buckle sums up his argument thus:

"Among nations where the coldness of the climate renders a highly carbonized diet essential there is for the most part displayed even in the infancy of society, a bolder and more adventurous character than we find among those other nations whose ordinary nutriment, being highly oxidized, is easily obtained, and indeed is supplied to them by the bounty of nature gratuitously and without a struggle." [25]

The gist of Buckle's argument is that Asia and Africa have abundance of food, easily procured, and, therefore, large but inert vegetative societies; whereas Europe, having less food and food which is hard to get, shows smaller but more energetic groups. This ingenious explanation of differences due to food, in Buckle's particular casting of it, fails to take into account far more important factors, and is largely fallacious. Nevertheless, the food yielded by any environment qualifies the organic energy of the social aggregate essentially as we have stated. Spencer emphasized this fact,[26] pointing out how "the social organism

[25] See T. N. Carver, *Sociology and Social Progress,* p. 145.
[26] *Ibid.,* pp. 189, 190.

grows larger, more complex, and more active'' with bountiful harvests, and, conversely, diminishes in population and vivacity with deficient yields. There is probably a fairly close correlation between the birth rate and the food supply of a group. New and rich lands like the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentine, etc., where food is abundant, develop populous societies in a relatively short time. Growth in these cases has come from immigration as well as genetic sources, but it is not unlikely that the colonial groups would have produced as many people had immigration been eliminated. At least such was the contention of Francis A. Walker, with respect to the United States.

Perhaps environmental endowment matters less to-day to nations in an industrial and commercial stage of culture, for there are instances where the size and quality of the groups far outstrip the sustaining power of their immediate habitats. A plentiful food supply is brought from the ends of the earth in exchange for their manufactured goods. England, for example, developed such a manufacturing and transportation system that she has been enabled to grow to a size vastly overreaching the direct food-producing or sustaining power of her islands. Richly endowed to begin with, and most favorably situated with respect to other groups for trading purposes, she has been able to draw energy from elsewhere, chiefly because she first evolved an economy whereby this could be done. Her supremacy, the first established and the first acknowledged in this new economy, permits her great society still to flourish. In 1841 her indigenous agriculture was feeding twenty-four and one-half millions out of her total population of twenty-six millions. In 1914 it was feeding but seventeen and one-half out of forty-six millions.[27] She ex-

[27] E. H. Starling, *The Feeding of Nations*, p. 103.

ports one-third or more of her manufactured goods, and imports more than half of her food supply. How long England can continue to exceed the limitation of her environment remains to be seen, for no economy, not even our much vaunted industrialism, can in the end abrogate the law of environmental limitations. Other lands of the world, equally or not even as well endowed, rivaling or surpassing England's superiority in industry and trade, had already begun to set metes and bounds to her prowess before the Great War. If all lands were to evolve industrial societies, none would hardly be able to develop a group larger than the immediate sustaining power of its habitat. And to the extent that other nations to-day enter the field will sharp and sharper limitations be encountered, and the tendency for the influences of environment to assert themselves become more and more pronounced. As things are at present, a society may spring up and wax strong through industry and trade in a seat that is relatively fruitless and infertile if accessible to lands of plenty or to good markets; but such developments are against the law of localized environmental energy as an ultimate fact. It takes energy for the group to import its food, and whenever in competition with others the energy outlay exceeds the returns, the organic energy of the group will wane, and in the course of time the more favorably situated, that is, the group that does not have to expend so much to get food, will drive it back closer and closer to the energy margin of its locality.

Environmental sustaining power in terms of food supply is not, of course, by any means a fixed quantity. Cultural stages make a difference, though each stage may be said to have pretty strict limitations. Primitive huntsmen find available food resources sufficient only to sustain small aggregates at best. The Indians of the United States in 1825, helped, moreover, by the Government, required one

and one-fourth square miles per capita to give them food. The Hudson Bay Indians in 1857 required ten square miles of territory per capita. Herdsmen can evolve somewhat larger groups on the same territory, for they require about one square mile per capita. Agriculturists at their best, or rather in the most intensive stage, develop very large groups, for one to two acres of land suffice to sustain an individual. Thus, Asia, mostly agricultural, has an average population density of 566 per square mile. Certain sections vastly exceed the average, as, for instance, Shantung, China, with 700 per square mile, or Anhwei with 1,200 to the square mile.[28] Such populous groups press the environmental possibilities to the utmost limit.[29] Many agricultural groups are enabled to greatly enhance their organic strength by the introduction of new crops and better methods. Java affords a notable instance, where, under Dutch rule, from 1825 to 1910, the population rose from 5,000,000 to 28,500,000.

The conclusion of the matter is that food is the sustaining source of organic energy, and, according as the environment affords much or little, societies are great or small, powerful or weak.

Environmental endowment involves besides food another factor, directly influencing organic energy. This is the climatic element. Buckle dwelt upon it, and since his day, a school has risen which would account for the energies of societies chiefly on climatic grounds. Climates are said to be either dynamic or static, imparting force to social aggregates or sapping their strength as the case may be; or. if too energetic, undoing the organism through overstimulation. The climate of optimum energy is, according to Ellsworth Huntington,[30] one having the following quali-

[28] E. A. Ross, *The Changing Chinese*, p. 105.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 302.
[30] *Civilization and Climate*, Chapter VII.

ties: (1) a mean temperature of around 64 degrees, ranging from about 30° or 39° in winter to 60° or 65° in summer, or with a maximum of 70° at midday and about 55° at night; (2) a relative humidity of about 80 per cent. This is the temperature most desirable for physical activity, whereas that most favorable to mental effort is somewhat lower—a mean of perhaps 40° instead of 64°. (3) Moderate changes in temperature from season to season, month to month, and day to day, together with frequent storms. The most salubrious and favorable climatic environment for society is thus one neither too hot nor too cold, too wet nor too dry, too monotonous nor too variable. Salubriousness is, as indicated, essentially a matter of the condition of the air for this, says Huntington,[31] "is the great variable in man's environment. Its variations, not only from place to place and season to season, but also from day to day, have far more effect upon his health and work than any other factor or perhaps all other factors combined. These variations are at the root of all sorts of differences in the capacity of different countries, and also of all sorts of changes in the course of business and hence in politics and other great affairs." The tropics, because of extreme heat, too much humidity, and lack of frequent storms, not only fail to furnish energy, but what is worse, tend to sap vitality, to render lethargic, to deaden activity, and to bring about degeneration. Dowd, writing on the negroes of Africa, accepts the geographic explanation of racial development. He speaks as follows, citing a quotation from Semple:

"The backwardness of the Negro in Africa is not due directly to lack of mental capacity, but to unfavorable environment. Natural selection has adjusted the mental capacity to the conditions. If any other race had peopled Africa in early neolithic times, and remained there until

[31] *World Power and Evolution*, p. 106.

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now, it would have advanced no higher than the present cultural level of the Negro. 'The map of isotherms,' says Ellen Semple, 'shows Africa quite enclosed between the two torrid lines of 20° centigrade, except for a narrow subtropical belt along the Barbary Coast in the north and in the south an equally narrow littoral extending east and north from the Cape of Good Hope. At first glance, the large area of South Africa, lying on the temperate side of the Tropic of Capricorn, raises hopes for a rich economic, social and cultural development here; but these are dashed by the examination of the isotherms. Excessive heat lays its retarding touch upon everything, while a prevailing aridity (rainfall less than ten inches), except on the narrow windward slope of the eastern mountains, gives the last touch of climate monotony. The coastal belt of Cape Colony and Natal raises tropical and subtropical products like all the rest of the continent, while the semi-arid interior is committed with little variation to pastoral life. Climatic monotony, operating alone, would have condemned South Africa to poverty of development, and will unquestionably always avail to impoverish its national life.' '' [32] Likewise, the extremely cold regions through low temperature, excessive dryness, monotony, or it may be too much storm, are overtaxing, and therefore depressing and devitalizing. Generally speaking, the temperate zones are the only invigorating environments where stimulation is productive of sustained and what amounts to maximum effort, and only parts of these zones approach the ideal.

According to Huntington's estimates, the areas of greatest climatic energy are substantially the following: [33] (1) An area embracing western Europe generally; (2) southern Canada and the northern section of the United

[32] J. Dowd, *The Negro Races*, Vol. II, pp. 277, 278. Semple's *Influence of Geographical Environment*, p. 623 quoted.
[33] E. Huntington, *Civilization and Climate*, pp. 142, 143.

States, especially that lying northeastward; (3) Japan; (4) New Zealand and a small portion of Australia; (5) the Central Pacific coast region of North America; (6) southern South America. From these regions, environment shades off into the less favorable everywhere. Passing eastward, for instance, from western Europe, there is a constant diminution of energy across the Eurasian land mass.[34] From the invigorating Baltic provinces Russia stretches away through monotonous reaches to the unstimulating and even benumbing areas of Siberia. Turkestan, Mongolia, and Tibet are still less favorable than Siberia. China, generally monotonous, with extreme winters in the north and "debilitatingly hot" summers elsewhere, falls far short of being a dynamic climate. The farther southward the line is drawn from Europe across Asia, the more unfavorable the climate. Southern Italy, Greece, Turkey, Syria, Persia, India, all fall in the low energy zones. More specifically, the lands of maximum or optimum energy, beginning with the highest, run about as follows: England, France, Germany, northern United States and southern Canada, the central Pacific coast of the United States, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Lower Scandinavia, northern Italy, Austria and the Baltic provinces of Russia, the coast of British Columbia and neighboring territory, much of Serbia and Roumania, Japan, New Zealand, Chile, and Patagonia, etc. The European area of greatest energy embraces about 1,100,000 square miles or two per cent of the surface of the globe;[35] the American area about the same amount, the Asiatic about one-tenth of the European, the New Zealand-Australian some 300,000 square miles. The total area of maximum climatic energy does not exceed one-twentieth of the earth's surface.[36]

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 144*ff.*
[35] J. Dowd, *op. cit.*, p. 251.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 252-257.

Incidentally, it should be remarked that the geographers contend that climatic conditions have undergone great changes, and that the present areas of greatest energy are not those of antiquity. Some three to four thousand years ago the lands of greatest energy over all the earth lay several degrees south of those of to-day, the chief centers being Mesopotamia, China, India, Egypt, Crete, Greece, southern Italy, Mexico, Central America, etc.

It will be seen at once that these regions of optimum climatic energy are the lands occupied by the greatest and most powerful peoples and societies of the earth. Other lands support relatively less virile and enterprising groups.[37] These highest energy lands are those where vitality is highest; that is, the lowest death rates and least amount of ill health; where talent most abounds; where achievement and activity reach their utmost levels; and where modern civilization at its best has its seat. The societies of these maximum energy areas are not the most populous, for they count only about one-fourth of the world's people. The groups run in part as follows: England and Scotland, 45,000,000; Canada, 8,000,000; France, 39,000,000; Scandinavian countries, 17,000,000; Switzerland, 3,500,000; Belgium, 7,000,000; Holland, 7,000,000; Italy, 16,000,000; Germany, 72,000,000; Austria, 18,000,000; New Zealand-Australia, 6,000,000; Japan, 50,000,000; United States, 60,000,000.[38] Huntington asserts that Germany is the largest single society lying wholly within the most stimulating energy zone. While these groups are smaller than several others, such as China, India, Russia, etc., they nevertheless dominate the larger part of the world politically, socially, and commercially. The European groups alone control 60 per cent of the earth's sur-

[37] *Ibid.*, Appendix B.

[38] E. Huntington, *World Power and Evolution*, pp. 236-238, and *Civilization and Climate*, Chapter XII.

face. To these groups the bulk of the human race looks for its lessons in progress and civilization. In the light of these facts, it would seem that the geographer's contention that organic energy, even social energy in general, and climatic energy are directly correlated as cause and effect is fairly well grounded. It is possible, however, that it may yet be shown that the amount of potential organic energy possessed by a group is not at all contingent upon climatic conditions, but, on the contrary, is only the manifestation or way of expending that energy that is due to climate. For instance, it may be that the organic energy of a group under tropical conditions is potentially equal to a like group in the temperate or colder zones; whereas, in the former, lack of stimulation fails to call for energy expenditure as in the latter. However, if it is really a fact that races in the tropics degenerate, it must be something more than mere expenditure of force from stimulation that is involved. But it has not been demonstrated that races indigenous to the tropics or other unfavorable energy areas do degenerate, though it does appear that they fail to progress, and to become powerful enough to cope with rivals elsewhere.

While the theory that climatic energy is a direct source of organic energy is thus far little more than a rough empirical judgment awaiting more scientific grounding, its reasonableness gives it much validity. And if it shall eventually become accepted truth, we may deduce from it that the fate of nations is substantially decreed by the cosmic order, or the climatic endowment of their respective seats. All other factors making for or against social energy will then be counted subordinate to this one of climate. Economic, moral, religious, political, social, and every other doctrine of determinism will have to give way to the fact of climatic determinism, and the "manifest destinies" of peoples hitherto accounted largely matters

of volition, will be regarded as courses fixed by the inexorable law of weather influences.

The geographic or climatic factor in relation to vital energy may resolve itself largely to a question of the presence or absence of certain endemic diseases fostered or precluded by climatic conditions. Climates which enable parasitic life of disease carrying or producing types to flourish and prey upon the human organism are thus indirectly responsible in part for the vital status of groups subject to their influence. Some regions of the earth are infested by dangerous parasites, while others are practically free from them. Consider, for instance, the range of two parasitic diseases whose geographic distribution has been fairly well mapped, and it at once becomes apparent that societies may be favorably or unfavorably located from a health standpoint according to whether or not they lie without or within the infected zones. According to Dr. Wm. H. Deaderick's study,[39] malaria prevails all over the tropics and in parts of the temperate zone. Following Binder's summary of this study,[40] malaria regions appear as follows: the southeastern United States together with the Gulf states and much of the Mississippi Valley and scattered places elsewhere; Mexican lowlands; the Atlantic side of all Central America; South America for the most part, except Argentina, the plateaus of Peru, Ecuador, Chile, and other highland regions; the Isles of the Greater and Lesser Antilles; Europe, with the exception of Germany, Great Britain, much of France, and the highlands generally, with Holland, Austria, Hungary, Spain in part, Portugal, Russia, and Bulgaria being more or less infected, and all Greece, Italy, Sicily and Sardinia showing high infection; Asia in general; Africa; and the coastal parts of Australia. In all these regions there are localities which

[39] *A Practical Study of Malaria.*
[40] R. M. Binder, *Health and Social Progress,* pp. 88-91.

are uninfected. Bermuda, New Zealand, the Hawaiian Islands, Canada, and the Scandinavian countries, in addition to the exceptions noted above, are exempt from this disease.

Hookworm prevails pretty generally in a wide zone extending over 66 degrees of latitude, from 36 degrees north to 30 degrees south. In Hungary, Wales, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Spain, miners chiefly are infected. In 46 other countries the disease is general and widespread. Africa in large part is infected. A great deal of Asia is infected; such countries as Ceylon with 90 per cent of the people, India with 60 to 80 per cent, China with 25 to 75 per cent, Korea with 50 per cent, Burmah, Siam, Borneo, and Java, all with high per cents. Japan is less afflicted with the disease. Many of the South Sea islands and parts of Australia suffer from it. In South America it is found in Paraguay, Brazil, the Guianas with 50 per cent of the population infected, and in British Honduras with 70 per cent subject to it. All the Central American states and Mexico suffer from its ravages. Of the territories of the United States, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, together with eleven southern states of the Union, are in the infested area. All in all, the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission estimates 940,000,000 out of the 1,600,000,000 of the world's population lie in the zone of the hookworm.[41]

Besides malaria, hookworm, yellow fever, typhus, and such parasitic diseases as are now known, there may yet be discovered others which are due, in the last analysis, to climatic and geographic conditions. Enough is already known, however, to justify our counting them an important factor in the vital power of society. How far what has been hitherto thought a matter of variable temperature and

[41] R. M. Binder, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-128.

humidity may finally be reduced to the more indirect effects of climates upon parasitic life, which in turn qualifies human life, remains to be seen. Whatever rôle is finally assigned to climatic disease, it is certain that the factor can be easily overworked in any calculation respecting the vital power of a nation. Human fascination for particularism readily leads to the exploitation of every newly discovered social force for the explanation of history. Thus, we have the malaria theory of the fall of Ancient Grecian and Roman civilization as the latest addition to the endless series of particularistic solutions of that problem.[42] While it is not improbable that malaria may have had something to do with it, numerous other agencies of equal and far greater significance were also present, and helped to determine the destiny of the classical world. And likewise to-day certain endemic diseases are assuredly playing a part in curtailing the vital energies of many nations, but they are not the sole, nor, in so far as yet shown, the predominant cause of national impotency.

The sources of organic energy so far enumerated would seem to give a complete account of it. And yet William James advanced the notion that there are hidden and almost inexhaustible springs of it to be tapped at will. In his essay on *The Energies of Men*[43] he had much to say about these unusual reservoirs of power upon which men draw, especially under the stress of great determination of will, and at times of extraordinary stimulation or great emergencies. He cites instances where, as he interpreted them, men have called upon reserves of strength they knew not of, and were enabled, far beyond their wonted mental or physical ability, to accomplish unbelievable works and heroic tasks without suffering equally great reactions to

[42] See W. H. S. Jones' *Malaria and Greek History*; R. M. Binder, *op. cit.*, etc.

[43] *Memories and Studies*, Chapter X.

the opposite pole of inefficiency. James did not attempt to account for this display of energy, save on the theory that individuals are not accustomed to energize to the limit of their ability, except under extraordinary excitement or circumstances. Then, they simply muster a reserve of force, and surpass themselves and all their former physical or mental efforts by doing astonishing things. In other words, a higher "efficiency equilibrium" is attained and indefinitely sustained. The implication in his essay is that this energy is stored somewhere in the human anatomy in readiness for emergencies, but otherwise never available. Potentially present at all times, it may forever remain unused, except some exigency give the open sesame thereto. This practically reduces organic energy to an act of will, and forces the conclusion that it is a variable, incommensurable, and unknown quantity, independent of any physical basis. Granting that it is somewhat fluctuating, and not an absolutely fixed quantity, even that "men habitually use only a small part of the powers which they actually possess," it yet seems absurd to go to the length James inclines, and to make it little short of an unlimited variable. For this conflicts with all our other knowledge of energy, which views it as a measurable factor. It is, moreover, reasonable to think that the normal manifestations of organic energy, that is, what James calls the ordinary "efficiency equilibrium," are the real measures of its amount.

If what James thought was true of the organic units of society is really a fact, it ought to hold good of the aggregate as such. This would give to the group reservoirs of power for critical times. Perhaps, now and then, groups are spurred to great efforts, and are led to display unusual power, though it would be hard to cite many authentic instances. But if such cases there are, it would probably be easy to point to a period where a compensating reaction

followed in which the organic energy of the group took a great slump or fell to a subnormal level. It has been suggested by recent observers of our industrial life that the period of the Great War, which first developed unusual activity, was succeeded by an aftermath of extraordinary slump in the energies of labor. Friday has calculated that a 20 per cent gain in production over any time previous took place in the years 1915 to 1917. After that spurt, labor efficiency rapidly declined, until in 1920 the cost of production had increased to 50 per cent more per unit of output than before the war.[44] If these estimates are correct or approximately so, they only verify our contention with respect to the manifestation of vital energy. Nor was the slump just mentioned only physical; there was brain fag also. The period of hard thinking, idealization, and exhausting brain tension has been followed by one of lagging interest and sluggish application to thought, until, as one has put it, "in the larger life of the world at the present time all sensible men are craving for a period of rest."[45] For, unless such reactions do characterize groups and individuals alike, organic energy is indeed a creation of will, almost unlimited and to a considerable degree ungoverned by physical factors. Contrary to this, it is reasonable to assume that individuals and groups alike are energy units of fairly definite quantities at all times, and that the real sources and determiners of power are those already indicated rather than mere acts of will, laying under tribute hitherto unknown reservoirs of power.

James, believing that few men live "at the maximum of energy" and "that any one may be in vital equilibrium at very different rates of energizing," asserted that a problem of national economy was here constituted. For a nation filled with men who energize below maximum is

[44] David Friday, *Profits, Wages, and Prices*, pp. 154, 163, 237.
[45] E. F. Scott, *Recent Developments in New Testament Study.*

inferior to one "run at high pressure." "The problem is, then, how can men be tuned up to this most useful pitch of energy? And how can nations make such training accessible to all their sons and daughters?"[46] "Let no one think," he continues, "that our problem of individual and national economy is solely that of the maximum of pounds raisable against gravity, the maximum of locomotion, or of agitation of any sort, that human beings can accomplish."[47] For by energy maximum he warns us that *quantity* alone is not meant, but "a higher qualitative level of life" also; that is, human energizing must include "that sum total of activities, some outer and some inner, some muscular, some emotional, some moral, some spiritual"[48]

In shifting from a quantitative to a qualitative basis, the problem is greatly mystified, and the real question of energy is lost to view; for if it is not quantitative, it is not anything. After all, James' whole contention seems far-fetched and on the wrong tack. Given men as they are under such environmental conditions as surround them, and there is no valid ground for thinking that their energies are not substantially fixed over considerable periods of time, and that they do not on the whole live up to what is in them. The problem, therefore, of enhancing national power is not, as James considered it, chiefly one of psychology or education, but one of breeding a more powerful race of physical and mental beings. Producing a generation of organic units of greater potency rather than striving for any higher pitching of the wills of those now composing society, is the only means of increasing national power in this line that has foundations in reality.

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[46] William James, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 235.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

### Tradition Energy

A second form of social energy far more important than any save vital energy is tradition, culture or the social heritage. It is energy, since it represents effort once expended, and because it is equivalent to toil that would be necessary for the existence of any society in the condition in which it finds itself. Tradition is in large measure the thought expenditure of the past, which, being handed down to the present, spares the present whatever exertion would be entailed in producing it. No single generation of living men could, of course, possibly accomplish the stupendous work represented in the body of tradition. If, for instance, the tradition of any civilized nation could be reduced to energy units and the vital energy of the living generation be calculated in commensurable terms, and a comparison of the two be made, tradition would be found immeasurably greater, even greater than the combined energies of all living races of men. Tradition or culture means the arts, processes, technical methods, acquired knowledge, accumulated group experiences, and all that is embraced in the term "human wisdom." Taylor defined it as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." [49] It includes everything that Lester F. Ward called achievement-methods, ways, principles, devices, arts, systems, institutions, either inherited from the past or produced by the living generation. "It is chiefly mental or psychical, but it may be physical in the sense of skill." [50] All that exploration, discovery, experimentation, investigation, invention, scientific method, philosophy, and contact with

[49] E. B. Taylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I, p. 1.
[50] L. F. Ward, *op. cit.*, pp. 25, 26, 31.

other peoples have given goes to make up traditional energy. Thus, it embraces all thought systems, ethical principles, religions, ideals, beliefs, habits, expedients, superstitions, social policies, legal codes, and practices, along with all the practical and technical knowledge of environmental control possessed by the race.

Tradition is of two rather distinct types. One is of a spiritual nature having embodiment only in thought, belief, custom, law, etc., being transmitted by word of mouth or by written records. The other is called material, since it becomes embodied in more or less durable material objects. This is the form in which art, mechanical invention and numerous discoveries pertaining to structures appear. Transmission in this case is in part by the preservation of the created forms in which it is embodied. In either case the ultimate fact is, of course, the idea, and so in the final analysis difference of type amounts only to a difference in form or possible degree of materialization.

Benjamin Kidd went so far as to declare social tradition to be the first essential of power in any people. He said, "It is the nature of its social heredity which creates a ruling people. It is what it lacks in its social heredity that relegates a people to the position of an inferior race." [51] He argued that the superior groups of history have been made dominant and ruling, not because they surpassed others in their inborn qualities, but because of a superior body of tradition. This claim tends to ignore other factors and is extreme; nevertheless, tradition is a form of social energy of almost equal merit with vital force, and of even greater importance than material resources. Group power is manifestly qualified even by the more subtle phases of it, such as ideals and beliefs, since all peoples, either for better or for worse, are more or less under the regency of these particular elements. Islamic faith and Christian be-

[51] Benjamin Kidd, *The Science of Power*, p. 304.

lief, no doubt, have been factors in national power. The idea of progress or its absence unquestionably has been an agency of strength or weakness. Withal, tradition is so significant that the status of a people may be wholly changed in a generation, simply by altering its social heritage. It is indeed hard to overestimate its weight in reckoning social prowess. Sweep away all the wealth of a nation, strip it bare of its material creations, leave it naked and empty handed, but if its traditions remain, it will in time restore everything. But sweep away the traditions of a people and you destroy that people, especially if it has climbed far up the heights of progress. Wallas thinks nine-tenths of the inhabitants of London or New York would perish in a month and 99 per cent of those remaining would die in six months. "They would," as he strikingly depicts their dilemma, "have no language to express their thoughts, and no thoughts but vague reveries. They could not read notices, or drive motors or horses. They would wander about, led by the inarticulate cries of a few naturally dominant individuals, drowning themselves, as thirst came on, in hundreds at the riverside landing places, looting those shops where the smell of decaying food attracted them, and perhaps at the end stumbling on the expedient of cannibalism. Even in the country districts men could not invent in time to preserve their lives methods of growing food or taming animals, or making fire, or so clothing themselves as to endure a northern winter. An attack of constipation or measles would be invariably fatal. After a few years mankind would almost certainly disappear from the northern and temperate zones. The white races would probably become extinct everywhere. A few primitive races might live on fruit and small animals in those fertile tropical regions where the human species was originally evolved, until they had slowly accumulated a new social heritage. After some thousands of

generations they would probably possess something which we should recognize as a language, and perhaps some art of taming animals and cultivating land. They might or might not have created what we would call a religion, or a few of our simpler mechanical inventions and political expedients. They probably would not have recreated such general ideas as 'Law' or 'Liberty,' though they might have created other general ideas which would be new to us."[52]

Such energy, even when relatively small in amount, is, as we have noted, mostly the slow acquisition of ages. However, some groups have borrowed a vast body of tradition from others, and thus in a few years possessed themselves of a store of energy which took others millenniums to accumulate. Occasionally a people has been exceedingly inventive and in a relatively short space has, as if by magic, transformed itself from weakness to puissance. Like all spiritual things, social tradition passes from one people to another without impoverishing in the least the original possessors. Notwithstanding this fact, tradition has not become equally diffused among the nations of the earth. While there is a very marked tendency for this diffusion to take place in most vital traditions among the great western groups, it is by no means a universal process. Tribal societies remain with their primitive culture, frail children of the dust, indeed, for the want of the traditions of civilized man. Then, too, there are the teeming groups of the Orient, bound by an ancient culture which brooks little or no change, nor much, if any, importation of foreign tradition which might enhance their power many fold. Even among the western industrial nations, possessing virtually the same body of tradition in so far as their subsistence mores are involved, there exists considerable difference in manifest power. No doubt, however, in the

[52] Graham Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*, pp. 16, 17.

last analysis such difference is due essentially to vital disparity.

Tradition energy is too subtle a thing to permit of any exact measurement; at least, this is the case at present, and will so remain until some one is able to reduce it to foot-pounds or some other unit for measuring energy. Only by comparing groups are we able to discover its relative amount. The rank any people hold on what we call the scale of culture or civilization is a crude estimate of their tradition. This, rather than material resources, is indeed the essence of civilization and power.

A better index of the total social energy than that afforded by the rate of growth of the national dividend is found in the growth of tradition, since upon the latter the former may largely depend. In truth, it is through tradition energy that the social energy in other respects is most readily increased. A group can alter the nature and amount of its organic energy but slowly, it can enhance its material energy with difficulty, but tradition offers the line of least resistance to rapid increase of power. More depends upon this than any other factor. "Tradition," says S. N. Patten, "often determines men's progress or their failure more decisively than the forces rising from direct relation to nature."[53] We may go farther, and say that tradition largely determines whether there shall be any progress whatever in the enhancement of other social energy. For upon the nature of the tradition nearly everything else turns. It may conduce to stock depletion and degeneration, and thus decrease the organic energy of the group. Examples of vicious selection, social self-enslavement, race suicide, etc., could perhaps be cited in proof. On the contrary, race improvement through eugenics is possible only as tradition dictates it.

Tradition energy probably becomes most effective where

[53] *New Bases of Civilization*, p. 33.

two or more cultures come into direct contact, and afford each other stimulation. Under such circumstances there takes place what Lester F. Ward called the "cross-fertilization of cultures." The results, according to Ward, are very like the crossing of two different racial stocks or breeds; they give an increase of potential in the offspring. Thus, the difference in the potential energy of two cultures gives an increased potential energy in the resulting tradition. If the analogy is true to fact, and there be indeed such a product, the explanation of much development of social power in the course of human history is clear. And the facts generally appear to bear out Ward's thesis. Stagnation, depletion, and dissipation of energy-tradition have undoubtedly overtaken many an isolated group. However, the present age of almost universal communication and contact of peoples virtually precludes such decadence any longer, and makes a general increase of tradition energy probable. What has just been said is not generally applicable in the case of contact between two cultures too widely separated on the scale of social evolution. The contact of civilized and primitive peoples has usually proved harmful to the one and disastrous to the other. Civilization simply overwhelms and destroys savagery. "The virtues and arts," says Sumner, "of civilization are almost as disastrous to the uncivilized as its vices. It is really the great tragedy of civilization that the contact of the lower and higher is disastrous to the former, no matter what may be the point of contact, or how little the civilized may desire to do harm." [54]

There is still another factor, suggested by Ross, that may contribute to the stimulation of tradition. I refer to the wandering of peoples far from their old seats. This enables them to throw off the incubus of the dead past and to enjoy such freedom as may conduce to great fruitfulness of mind.

[54] Wm. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 111.

The development of New England and Australian civilizations seems to be fairly illustrative of this point.

### Material Energy

Social energy is not all comprehended in its organic and traditional forms. These embrace only two phases of it. There is another form almost as important as tradition. This is wealth or economic goods. It represents very largely the work of past generations, the energy they invested and locked up in various material substances. This energy is a deposit like the coal, oil, and plant growths with which past ages of sunshine have stored our globe. Through wealth the living generation has its power multiplied by all or nearly all the preceding ones did. Every society draws a large part of its power from what has become latent human energy—the works of the dead. Under this are included all accumulated stores, such as all kinds of foods, clothing, houses and all buildings, structural materials, metals, household furniture, domestic animals, mined ores, tools, machines of every kind, instruments of production, preservation, transportation, communication, fuel, raw materials of diverse sorts, improvements on lands which render them more productive of crops and minerals, etc., etc. Perhaps it is going a bit too far to designate all wealth or even all economic goods as belonging equally under the category of social energy, for many things are merely decorative and ornamental, for vain show or hurtful gratification, without the semblance of benefit or significant utility. How can jewels or works of art, for instance, be classified as energy forms? Strictly speaking, they cannot be, for their utility at best is of such a highly sublimated nature that it is all but negligible. Nevertheless, such goods, if not directly, then indirectly and relatively, are customarily assigned to the class of accumulated

stores. This is because they represent expenditure of labor in their production, gratify wants, and have power in exchange. But, even if for a string of glass beads or a handful of red feathers, the South Sea Islanders could be induced to sell a whole cargo of useful wood or an archipelago of islands, it does not follow that in the transaction anything had happened save the giving of nothing in return for something of use. From the strictly practical standpoint it must be said that all labor expended on the production of such goods is squandered force, for when produced they represent no really potential energy, since it is not transformable. Much as society prizes this class of goods, the labor that goes into them is, as it were, very like the reduction of wood to ashes.

Needless to say, groups differ greatly in the kind and amount of their stores of goods. Some in the lowest stages of savagery live from hand to mouth without accumulated goods of any kind, save at most a few rude trinkets or simple weapons. Those at the topmost levels of the scale of civilization have vast wealth. Between the two extremes, groups of every degree of wealth may be found. This wealth or stored up energy is fairly easy to measure, and all modern states attempt to do it by taking inventory of their possessions. Not only are these actual goods on hand counted, but the natural resources controlled are also included, for the latter are potential goods. And any comparison of the relative strength of nations rightly estimates not only those things which have been transformed into useful forms, but things which are readily available for transformation. For a people having raw materials easily accessible, other things being equal, have relatively greater social energy than those not so fortunate. Modern nations count not only raw materials and their control among their chief economic assets, but the energy resources of the physical environment as well. The latter are mainly coal,

petroleum and water power. Of particular importance are the following animal, mineral and vegetable raw stuffs: hides, silk, wool, antimony, chromite, copper, graphite, iron ore, lead, magnesite, manganese, mineral oils, molybdenum, nickel, platinum, quicksilver, silver, tin ore, tungsten, vanadium, zinc, iodine, nitrate, phosphate, potash, sulphur and pyrites, salt, asbestos, china clays, lime, mica, camphor, castor beans and castor oil, gutta percha, hemp, henequen, jute, kapok, resin, rubber, shellac, sisal, turpentine, and vegetable oils.[55]

The available energy resources of the world can be estimated quantitatively with some degree of approximation. The following table gives such an estimation, and shows the distribution of these resources among the chief nations.

Energy Resources *

| Country | Coal (Millions of horse power years.) | Petroleum (Millions of horse power years.) | Waterpower (Millions of horse power years.) |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States ..... | 500,000 | 400 | 37 |
| China ..... | 200,000† | 60 | 20 |
| Germany ..... | 48,000 | 2 | 2½ |
| Canada ..... | 40,000 | 40 | 22½ |
| Great Britain .... | 27,000 | (?) | 1 |
| Australasia ..... | 19,000 | (?) | 4 |
| Russia ..... | 17,000 | 280 | 16 |
| Poland and Czechoslovakia ..... | 14,000 | 45 | 1 |
| India ..... | 11,000 | 70 | 27 |

* W. S. Culbertson, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

† Based on estimate of coal resources given in *Coal Resources of the World* by International Geological Congress. Later estimates appearing in *China Year Book* credit China with very much smaller amount of coal.

[55] W. S. Culbertson, "Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 112, p. 9.

History bears witness as to how feeble have been the groups that were wanting in the material enginery of modern nations. In any test of strength they have been as chaff before the wind; they have quickly fallen and vanished from the earth. Consequently, perceiving their strength to be superior in comparison with that of others, civilized peoples have been wont to count material things and resources above all else as the measure of their social energy. And it is not improbable that many a group far superior in organic strength to its competitors has perished because the latter were more powerful by virtue of material instruments and resources alone.

It can easily be assumed that superiority in accumulated material energy on the part of any group implies organic superiority as an antecedent condition. That, however, is not necessarily true, for two groups equally endowed organically might become disparate by virtue of the fact that the environment of one was richly endowed with natural resources while that of the other was poorly endowed. Again, with a like organic outfit and an equally well endowed environment, inequalities in material wealth might arise if one were more accessible than the other to sources of foreign wealth and means of advancement. The great western nations have been much inclined to attribute their material greatness to an inherent organic superiority over all other peoples on the earth. Perhaps their estimate of themselves in this is correct, but possibly too the conclusion is unwarranted, for it may be that the advantage has been wholly a matter of a better endowed environment. The real situation may not be unlike the conditions which obtained in the western hemisphere with respect to the Indian societies which the white man found. Those of South and Central America had reached relatively high development, while those of North America were far inferior in social achievement. Yet the North American

Indian was, if anything, organically superior, and the difference then in material energy must have been due to superiority in environmental endowment alone. It is significant in this connection to note as a matter of fact that North America had no domesticatable animals to serve for beasts of burden, nor any free iron ore from which to make tools, while South America afforded these or other superior means of progress. Still, as a general rule, it may safely be assumed that there is a pretty close correlation between the amount of organic energy and the accumulated material energy of a people.

The material energy of a group is measured not exclusively by what it has stored up, but by the rate of income or accumulation. Strictly speaking, the rate of income is a resultant factor dependent upon organic energy, environmental endowment, and several other agencies. Nevertheless, any comparison of social aggregates must take this into account. The dividend the nation declares and adds to its capital each year is on the whole a very good measure of the total social energy. Whether the rate of accumulation is increasing or decreasing signifies much, since it may indicate social progress or decline.

### Structural Energy

A fourth kind of social energy is found in organization or structure. Organization signifies established relations and forms through which collective activity takes place. Better stated, it is the definitely coördinated and relatively permanent modes of social life. For the most part, it represents past adaptations to the environment and adjustments of people to one another. Strictly speaking, this is perhaps only one phase of tradition, and should be treated as subordinate to it, but its importance is such that for emphasis at least it may be considered separately. Organ-

ization represents accumulated experience and power. It is an achievement just as valuable to the group as machines or stores of goods. Effort expenditure throughout the lapse of ages may be embodied in it, and at any given moment it is a body of energy available to the group. Without it, a social aggregate would be as impotent as a carpenter without tools. It is, of course, impossible to imagine human society without at least rudimentary organization. The very effort to imagine it serves to show how great its significance is. Without immense systems and structural growths such aggregations of peoples as are found in modern societies could not exist, much less act in unison for common ends. Great cities and nations are possible because of systems of transportation, communication, business, manufacture, commerce, sanitation, education, policing, regulation, and coöperation in a thousand and one ways.

Social effectiveness depends much upon the nature and extent of organization. There is, however, really no measure of this form of energy, save the relative effectiveness it confers. The various forms of organization might be arranged on a scale to show their comparative energy values. This would be a work of more or less arbitrary judgment. It is easy enough to see that there is a vast difference in power between a simple tribal organization and the modern state, but when a comparison of various forms of states is assayed, the differences are harder to determine. What kind of organization is the most powerful? For a general criterion let us say: that organization is the most powerful which gives maximum opportunity for the fullest and freest functioning of the organic energy units, which utilizes most advantageously its material energy, allows the utmost development of its tradition energy in general, and so combines the whole as to eliminate all friction that is possible, foster the greatest amount of harmony, and elicit

the highest degree of coöperation in all group enterprises. According to this criterion the democratic state, that is, the one where social energy is distributed equitably, ought to be the most powerful. It does not follow, however, that any of the existing so-called democratic commonwealths have had more energy because of these organizations than have the autocratic states. If, as some are wont to assert, the autocratic state has demonstrated itself to be the more efficient, the democratic state is not thereby proved a failure; it is only the particular kind of makeshift democracy which has been thus far constituted and which differs from autocracy chiefly in name that has been shown to be less powerful. A real democracy has yet to be tried before a final valuation can be made.

On closer analysis, the power of organization will be seen to revolve about two poles; namely, individuation and unity. Primitive groups have what Emile Durkheim called a mechanical unity or solidarity. They are weak because there is scarcely any individuation among the organic units, little differentiation of function, and a lack of flexibility and adaptability in the structure. Advanced societies have what this author calls organic unity resting on division of labor and mutual dependence of parts. The more complete this becomes, the more flexible and adaptable, and consequently the more powerful, the organization.

A group may not develop any kind of organization at will. There are conditioning factors. Of these, the social composition is primary. An extremely heterogeneous population can hardly be otherwise than coercively and autocratically organized. The elements are too unlike to act concertedly. The few will readily dominate and exploit the many, amid much rebellion and turmoil. Such states, of which Mexico is a good example, are weak in organization energy. Subordinate social groups such as great cities, on account of a too heterogeneous citizenship,

especially here in the United States, are pretty sure to develop autocratic organization in certain respects. The United States as it has grown in heterogeneity has developed many thoroughly undemocratic and autocratic features in its organization. A homogeneous society, on the contrary, can be democratically organized without so much difficulty, and is, in the matter of organization, most likely to become the more powerful group.

Organization is further indirectly conditioned by the nature of the physical environment. A diversified, accessible, and richly endowed environment will attract a mixed population, and the resulting group heterogeneity means coercive and rigid organization. In contrast, areas with few resources will develop a homogeneous society, whose organization will incline to the flexible and democratic. However, the fact that tradition itself does much to modify and even to override these conditioning factors should not be forgotten.

Any group may enhance its organization energy to the extent that it endeavors to approximate the standard of power indicated above. All policies of liberty, efficiency, equality, and unity based upon them, if rightly furthered, make for the increase of organization energy.

From the foregoing, it appears that the elements of social energy are *organic, traditional, material,* and *organizational.* These in combination and interaction make up the total power of a group, or the social energy. It should now be clear that the last is more than the sum of energies of the individual members of society. The organic energy of any society is probably no greater than the sum of the energies of its units. But material energy is something entirely apart and in addition to the organic element. Tradition, likewise, is partially if not wholly extra-individual. This, at least, is true of the more advanced societies of the world; for even though in a given instance

all the members of a group were exterminated, much of the tradition would remain in records. Far from all the arts, science, knowledge would be destroyed. Again, obviously, the tradition energy of a living group is more in the aggregate than the sum of the tradition carried in the minds of the individuals of the group. Organization energy, being a phase of tradition energy, is similarly, to a considerable extent. extra-organic and -individual. There are, however, certain subtle aspects to it as to all other forms of tradition energy, which would unquestionably be lost, however complete records of it might remain, if the organic units were swept away. A society may conceivably be killed, and much social energy will survive, but social energy as such has no real and practical existence apart from the living social organism itself. The surviving forms of a dead society are bereft of much of their power when the people who held and handled them are no more.

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## CHAPTER II

### SOCIAL SURPLUS

The preceding chapter was devoted to an analysis and description of social energy. The fact that groups differ in power was noted, and the fundamental differences were pointed out. It has thus become obvious that some groups relative to others have more energy, ofttimes a vast overplus. The idea of social surplus is thereby suggested; and to a consideration of this subject we now turn.

How much of the social energy is surplus? Are there any groups wanting a surplus? And what, indeed, really constitutes social surplus? These are some of the questions that immediately arise. In answer to the last question, Professor A. A. Tenney has defined individual surplus as "the amount of energy available for life processes which is possessed or obtainable by any organism, over and above the amount which is necessary for survival at any given time." Of social surplus, he says, the meaning follows directly from surplus energy and "is merely the sum total of surplus energy existing in the individuals composing a social group or immediately available to such individuals."[1]

Couched in somewhat different terms, social surplus may be more exactly defined as that residue of social energy possessed by any group after its mere existence demands have been provided for or satisfied. In other words, it is

[1] Alvan A. Tenney. "The Genesis of Individual and Social Surplus" in *Popular Science Monthly*, December, 1912. The writer is indebted to this article for the germinal idea of this and the preceding chapter.

the marginal energy over and above the minimum required for survival at any given level of culture. By "mere existence" or "survival" is meant group continuance at the lowest level possible for a human aggregate. This level we may call the existence base line. There is, of course, no such thing as an absolute base line of existence applicable alike to all groups everywhere; it is always relative at least to the environment. For an Eskimo tribe it would necessarily be higher than for a tribe in equatorial Africa. Moreover, the existence line of any given group will depend somewhat upon the type of culture or the economic stage to which it has attained and become accustomed. A group used to a highly developed agricultural economy would scarcely survive if suddenly thrust back upon a hunting economy. Its base line of existence would be somewhat above the requirements of people at the latter stage. Husbandmen reduced to huntsmen conceivably might perish altogether. Likewise, the existence level of an industrial society is not so low as that of a people in a less advanced economic stage. Social surplus, therefore, will have to be spoken of generally in relative rather than in absolute terms.

There are two senses in which social surplus may be designated. In one sense it may refer to the cultural or evolutionary stage of a group. In this case any human aggregation which has passed beyond a strictly "natural" mode of existence may be properly called a surplusful society. For human society is essentially a work of art, an achievement, in all that this signifies; it is a mode of living above mere animal existence, or above a "natural" state. Achievement, used here in the broadest sense, of whatsoever sort, is, therefore, the conclusive evidence of surplus. The earliest stage of human society has been called a luck economy, or the stage of merely finding things; and at that level, society is without any surplus,

except in so far as language, habits, and a very limited range of accumulated experiences which aid the group in its struggle for existence are possessed. Above this level the hunting, pastoral, agricultural, handicraft and industrial economies represent successively surplus stages. For each stage of the series marks a greater degree of achievement in control of the physical environment,—group organization, accumulation of goods, preservation of tradition, and the conservation of energy of all kinds whatsoever.

The other and more important sense of the term, social surplus, relates to the overplus of energy which a group may possess with respect to itself, at any cultural stage. All that remains over and above the needs for subsistence and reproduction at a given stage of culture is surplusage. This is the meaning our definition intended to convey at the outstart, and to this it will be profitable to adhere as a rule throughout the discussion.

## Forms of Surplus

The energies of society as classified in the preceding chapter are of four kinds: the organic or vital, the traditional or cultural, the material or economic, and the organizational or structural. This classification follows substantially that marked out by Professor Tenney in the article cited above, when he says: "Surplus energy . . . assumes many forms. Bodily vigor and long life are not the only manifestations of it. Such material goods, also, as are immediately available for restoration of depleted bodily vigor come under the general heading. Moreover, any structural or other changes in an organism which improve its chances of survival, increase the surplus. The development of useful instincts and the discovery of useful methods of controlling nature and producing wealth—

these, too, increase the surplus. Bettered social organization plays its part as well. In fact, in close analysis, every trait and every act of any unit of a group in some way affects the surplus.'' Let it be made clear what is meant by and included under surplus with respect to each class. The organic pertains both to the physical and psychical powers of a people. Psychically considered, surplusage connotates chiefly foresight, originative and inventive ability, and the power of abstract reasoning and speculative thought. In its physical aspects it means the excess of births over deaths, increasing tenure of life, and heightening of endurance. A second form is leisure, such as idle time and that given to play; it is freedom from the necessity of expending vital energy in the effort to win the material means of subsistence. Not all idle hours nor all playtime can, of course, be considered surplus, for a certain amount of loafing, amusement, and recreation is needful to maintain health and vigor. As a third form, all activity which goes to the amassing of fortune or storing of capital over what can be efficiently consumed may be counted. In the fourth place, all or nearly all strictly philanthropic or altruistic activities, especially of the extra group sort, indicate organic surplus. In the fifth place, most nonproductive expenditures of effort of whatsoever nature properly belong to organic surplus. They take the form of ceremonials and formalities of many kinds—marriage, birth, and funeral rites and commemorations, religious worship and magical cults or practices, effort given to decorative, pictorial, dramatic, musical, and all other types of art which aim only at serving purely æsthetic ends, all or a large part of the time spent on personal adornment, all organized combat, preparation for warfare, almost all the effort given to the gratification of the social instinct through secret orders, fraternities, clubs, and the round of events styled in the modern world ''social functions,'' etc.,

and what time is devoted by savage or civilized man to the satisfaction of the roving disposition or wanderlust. In all these activities assigned to surplus due allowance must always be made for a mead of the necessitous, in order that man may be normal. For example, take religious worship, which, though wholly nonproductive expenditure, may not be altogether futile if, indirectly, through inspiration, peace of soul, or other satisfaction derived therefrom it conduces to mental or physical efficiency. Similarly, perhaps, other surplus activities may need to be slightly discounted in behalf of the necessitous, but in no case would such deduction involve significant diminution.

Tradition surplus, if measured from the absolute subsistence base, embraces nearly all of human achievement—invention, discovery, art, science, philosophy, literature, and music. It includes whatever goes under the name of knowledge and wisdom—"tools of the mind," such as reading, writing, calculating, and the symbols and systems thereof, and acquired skill and technique of all kinds. In a relative and more refined sense, surplus tradition is that portion of achievement in the possession of a group which can be dispensed with and yet not jeopardize present or future existence and essential well-being, however much it may lessen ease, curtail freedom, and impoverish the manner of life. It is not altogether easy to specify what or just how much can be relegated to the limbo. There are two classes of tradition to be distinguished, one called secondary or spiritual, and including such things as beliefs, superstitions, philosophies, theologies, cults, conventions, fine arts, music and literature; the other we will call primary or practical and put under it science, inventions, useful processes and practical arts, techniques, skill, and whatever gives mastery of nature, ability to create wealth, or the means to human welfare and progress. The distinction commonly made is between what takes tangible

form and what does not. Under this classification the one is sometimes called nonmaterial and the other material culture. The one type of tradition is in a sense unreal and the other real, since one gives little or no social power, while the other is the key to stores of extra-vital energy. Most of the tradition of primitive people is unreal, and likewise very much of that possessed by the backward civilization of to-day. Such tradition is always surplus, and could be cast aside without serious loss. Thus, all notions of magic, most theologies, religious beliefs and dogmas could be spared, since social existence here and now in any society is not only not really dependent upon them, but is often more or less hindered and harmed by them. No better example of this sort of thing can be cited among Western peoples than the authoritative "tradition of Christendom" or what Santayana has called the "Christian Epic" in so far as it involves negation of reason and scientific research. Moreover, nearly all of the thought systems, world-views, and speculative philosophies could be eliminated without harm. Again, not a little of that which passes for practical tradition or knowledge to which the group is accustomed represents surplus. Dead languages, history and legend, many scientific theories, literary traditions whether sacred, fictitious, classical, or something else, and much in every way that is known about the heavens above, the earth beneath, and all that they contain, in so far as such knowledge serves no utilitarian ends, may be allocated to surplusage. In like manner, fine art tradition in all its forms—poetry, drama, music, sculpture, carving, decoration, and painting—can readily be discarded. Practically all military invention and the knowledge of warfare, a good part of the tradition of statecraft and government, systems of jurisprudence, and in a large measure the legal codes or bodies of judicial customs, are superfluous. A good deal of scientific invention

and discovery, useful and revolutionizing though it be, if it conduces mainly to the engrossment of group power, mobility, freedom, release from labor, ability to conserve energy, or in general to the further enhancement of its surplus, as so often it does, rather than to any survival necessity, is essentially surplusage. This is illustrated, for instance, in the discovery of radioactivity, wireless telegraphy, the invention of the flying machine and the submarine, and a long and ever-growing list of other modern day marvels. The tradition of the scientific method itself in contradistinction to the trial and error method is, one is almost tempted to say, surplus for the greater majority of the groups of the world. Lastly, there is more or less of a surplus element in the ethical, social, and political mores of most peoples not otherwise specified in the above catalogue. This element ranges from the indifferent to the positively detrimental. It includes Utopian and ineffectual ideals, futile loyalties and enmities, erroneous policies, superstitions, and many harmful but rigidly enforced customs. Illustrations abound in such things as the reform and success policies of America, the white-man's-burden doctrine, together with the prohibition against a man marrying his deceased wife's sister in England, the foot-binding ideal and ancestor reverence of China, the race pogroms of Russia or Turkey, and the saber worship of central European countries.

At almost every cultural stage tradition can be found that no longer functions or that has been discarded and superseded by something new. Thus, western society does not make fire by rubbing sticks together, go to war with cross-bows, send news by couriers, teach the Ptolemaic cosmology or believe in demoniac possession. These antiquated beliefs, customs, processes, techniques, etc., have not been lost, but just retired to desuetude or stored in the subconscious memory of society. Such tradition or

cultural survival, as it is usually called,[2] looked at in one way is surplus, or perhaps it would be better to say superfluous. In a truer sense, however, all tradition that has superseded earlier forms is the real surplus, while the survivals or superannuated forms serve only to measure the amount and degree of surplus.

Economic surplus when taken in the absolute sense means the sum total of agencies, instruments, devices, structures, stores and accumulation of goods, and everything produced by the labor of man's hands that gives him such mastery over nature. This includes much that we call wealth, such as buildings and structural works of all kinds, land improvements, the man-made arteries and agencies of communication, machines, vehicles and tools of every sort, manufactured goods, stores of food and provender for man and beast, domestic animals, art creations, books and papers, ornaments and jewels upon which labor has been lavished, articles of clothing, precious metals and other minerals including coal, petroleum, etc., that have been mined, and raw materials into which effort has gone. Not all that is classified as wealth, nor even all that comes under the head of economic goods in the technical sense can fairly be assigned to absolute surplus, since there are some things which represent no labor, and which are valueless for any existence-serving purpose.

In a relative sense, economic surplus means the amount of goods and capital above what is demanded for immediate consumption and continuance of production by the group living at the lowest standard consistent with health and efficiency. The surplus appears in many forms. It is manifest where an excess of foodstuff, clothing, tools or other useful merchandise is exchanged with another group for luxuries such as trinkets, jewels, intoxicants, art, etc.,

[2] See E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture,* and R. R. Marett, *Psychology and Folklore,* for further discussion.

or where one group buys such things of another in return for money metals. All foreign investments signify to the investing nation so much surplus. It is evident where money is spent on the maintenance of armies, navies, and in the making of armament of every sort. For the most part, what is spent on the institution of religion, the business and pursuit of amusement and public celebration must be set down to surplus; likewise, what is devoted to philanthropy abroad and to globe-trotting. All that goes for art, for jewels, for ornaments of every kind, and for the mere gratification of personal whims and hobbies in the collection of curios, the junk and treasures with which museums are stored, and the museums and art galleries themselves must be counted. Palatial houses and monumental structures, ornamental and ostentatious, public edifices where display value outshines utility, mortuary structures, luxurious furnishings and equipages also belong to surplus. Even public libraries and the books with which they are filled in considerable measure are clearly surplusage. Most of that which is spent by civilized peoples on the prevention of cruelty to animals, for the protection of birds and wild life, for the maintenance of botanical and zoological gardens, and the preservation of natural scenery falls to this category. All additions to the permanent capital or the "national dividends" of a people from year to year, either in the form of private or common wealth signify surplus. Finally, it is always shown when there is frequent change of fashion, and where there is a rising standard of living in a group.

It may be objected that, strictly speaking, no such thing as an economic surplus is possible, since human wants are insatiable, and no group has ever yet had goods that it could not in some manner utilize for the satisfaction of the wants of its members. True, there is apparently no limit to human wants; yet, human needs are quite a differ-

ent thing, and the margin between needs and wants is a wide one. And the difference between need satisfaction and want gratification is just what gives surplus.

Organization, like all other social energy, is merely one form of tradition or achievement, and may be considered wholly surplus if a universal base line of existence is assumed; otherwise, only so much of it as any group possesses and can dispense with and still maintain a complete group life. There are essential and nonessential associations in almost every large society or nation. The essential ones are those given to functions upon which the coherent life and conduct of the group depend.[3] In an absolute sense, organization may then be considered nonessential or superfluous when forms are performing only secondary functions or when they are excessive and needless. Again, in a relative sense they are truly surplusful when of such a nature as to give in comparison with other societies greater economy of energy, more impetus to creative effort, larger production of wealth and superior facilities for more individuals to act together coherently and harmoniously in a greater multiplicity of ways. In other words, surplus may be discovered in relative efficiency.

When we take stock of social organization to find the superfluous, most of the military, perhaps much of the religious, and nearly all of the amusement, recreational, fraternal, and secret order machinery appears unnecessary. Again, political parties, philanthropic and reform societies, art associations, and social clubs of all descriptions are either surplus organization or nearly so. Then, too, a by no means insignificant part of the business organization of every commercial and industrial nation is mere duplication and a needless burden. In the matter of government itself, there is great overloading in most social aggregates. A

[3] G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory*, pp. 74, 75.

good share of the agencies, judicial, administrative, and legislative, of every land could well be junked. The useful is almost everywhere so enmeshed in the ponderous wheels of redundant form that it functions, if at all, with great delay and difficulty. In the last place, viewed absolutely, all organization for the purpose of fostering or perpetuating class distinctions is entirely of the surplus variety.

From a relative viewpoint instances of surplus organization are to be seen in the case of a tribal confederation compared with the simple tribe, in the case of the state compared with the tribal confederation, in the case of the federal state compared with the unitary one and in the case of the imperial type compared with the federal. For each succeeding type mentioned represents organization under which larger and larger aggregates of people are bound together and enabled to act as a unit.

There is a tendency among some to reduce these several forms of social surplus to a single one. The biologist would subsume all under the vital, the economist under the material, and the idealist under the traditional; but to the sociologist, who recognizes that interdependence is everywhere present, group energy appears not in a single, but in several forms, or more exactly as a totality, an organic whole. Due to the particularism just mentioned, it has been customary to refer especially to social surplus as a purely economic matter; and to describe peoples as being in a pain, a pleasure, or a creative economy, as Patten put it, according to their command over material wealth. Material things are tremendously important, to be sure, but even though we accord them primary place in the life of mankind, it is not in agreement with the true order of things to measure social surplus in these terms alone. The several classes of energy separately and together must always be taken into account.

A careful or even approximate measurement of group

surplusage would give information both illuminating and highly useful. But such measurements are at this stage of knowledge impossible. Facilities for gathering the necessary data are not now in existence, nor are they likely soon to be. The material wealth of nations can be roughly estimated, but how much of it belongs to surplus is difficult to calculate. When, however, either vital or traditional energy is to be surveyed, insuperable difficulties are met. At best, therefore, about all that can be done is to describe social surplus in qualitative terms, except where certain quantitative facts are available, as in the case of economic goods. Still, although fully appreciating the limitations under which we labor, we need not be wholly discouraged from further inquiry as to the social surplus at the disposal of groups.

No existing society, nor any of which there is historic knowledge, has been entirely surplusless, though some have hovered close about the base line of existence. The Tierra del Fuegians were one of these, and the now extinct Tasmanians were another. Darwin thought the former the lowest of all known races in the social scale. The latter, ranking perhaps next, were somewhat more advanced. In either case, these savages lived a hand to mouth existence in an absolute sense; they were practically devoid of arts, possessed of very few tools, and roamed about naked and unsheltered in small hunting bands or hordes. The Fuegians are described as hunting and fishing people of the most primitive sort, scarcely rising above a luck economy in many respects. The region they inhabit is as poorly endowed as any that man occupies; it is cold, inhospitable, wind and rain swept, supporting very meager animal life, affording the most miserable plant diet, and scarce wood for fire or other use. The people themselves have ever been a feeble folk, numbering, perhaps, not over 15,000 in the three tribes of the Yaghans, Alacalufs, and

Onas. Their numbers have remained small owing to an excessive mortality. Organically, the first two tribes are pygmies, apathetic and lacking in all but meager mental capacity, while the Onas are large in size, enduring in power, and keen of sense. Evidence of the lack of vital surplus appears in the practice of abandoning the old when their keep becomes a burden, and in the general absence of unselfish conduct. On the other hand, vital surplus is suggested in the time they devote to body painting and decoration, to the making of ornaments of shells, feathers, and skins, to at least a simple ceremony over the dead, and among the Onas to recreation in the form of mimic fighting and hunting, to footracing, and to the simple ceremonial of initiating adolescent boys. Economic energy is much more limited than organic. The Fuegians have no houses, their only shelters being what nature provides; and they are destitute of clothing save as the skins of animals may be hung about the shoulders as shields against the wind. Their food is rarely sufficient, necessitating a strictly hand to mouth existence, with periods of awful starvation. They have sometimes resorted to cannibalism. Food is mostly eaten raw, and consists of shell fishes, dead animals cast up by the sea, such live game and fish as they are able to capture, and certain fungus plants. Of the Yahgans Keane says "Now and then a whale is stranded on the coast, and then there is a great gorge, after which the remains of the feast are buried in a big hole and the place is then forgotten, which shows an intelligence almost inferior to that of the dog, who never forgets his bone."[4] Their wealth consists of a few crude tools and weapons, limited to the bow and arrow and devices for catching fish, rough canoes made from the bark of trees, and simple baskets of rushes, bark or blubber. If any surplus is here, it is no more than an intimation in the

[4] A. H. Keane, *The World's Peoples*, p. 305.

baskets or other tools with which they might possibly dispense.

There is a great poverty of tradition among them, for they have no folklore, no religion whatsoever, practically no laws, the most meager subsistence mores, little knowledge of arts save fire-making, and the manufacture of the simple tools above-mentioned. Even certain food plants and grasses that could be profitably utilized are beyond their ken. Chief of their tradition power is the accumulation of considerable hunting skill, especially among the Onas. At most, here are merely the beginnings of a margin over the demands of bare animal society. In the matter of organization they are of all men the most destitute. Living in hordes of thirty or forty individuals, they have no government, not much social control, and not any division of labor. The loosest family bond of a polygamous type prevails. However, exogamy is enforced, and marriage of young men under twenty is prohibited. This indicates the subordination of youth. Among the Onas there is a ceremonial initiation of boys at puberty, which amounts to a severe training in endurance and hunting skill. Withal, it is fair to say, although on the narrowest margin, even the Fuegians were not altogether surplusless.

The Australian black-fellows may be taken to illustrate further the lowest level of society. In numbers they probably never exceeded 150,000 on the whole continent. A low birth rate and high mortality are responsible for so few. These, in turn, are due to natural and positive causes alike. Birth control is accomplished by performing ovariotomy on women and the operation "mika" or artificial hypospadias on men.[5] When this does not suffice to keep down the population, infanticide helps out, for it is widespread. It is reported, for instance, that in 1860 one-third of all infants were killed. In addition, there is always an

[5] J. Deniker, *The Races of Men*, p. 239.

excessive natural mortality among children. Moreover, the mature are exceedingly vulnerable to disease and senility. With bodily strength the Australian is not well gifted, and yet he has great power of endurance, and is fairly agile. In mental power he is among the most humble of mortals, ranking far beneath the American Indian. Horatio Hale says they impressed him with "great natural obtuseness, downright childishness, and imbecility."[6] Ability to reason, weigh evidence, and to calculate is but little developed among them. From the foregoing it might be inferred that this race has but little vital force, and no surplus at all. But other facts do not quite justify such a conclusion. While various writers, as Keane, for instance, state that the Australians spend all their time in quest of food,[7] plenty of evidence goes to show that they have much leisure and time for non-life-serving pursuits. Indeed, it is fair to say that not many people in the hunting stage of culture spare so much time from the business of getting a living.

Some of their time-consuming activities which indicate surplus may be pointed out. One is body-painting and tattooing, to which some attention is given by nearly all. Decorative and pictorial art does not occupy them, though some tools, instruments, and sacred sticks show much work. Some picture painting is done upon rocks. Time is spent on making bull-roarers, "churinga" sticks and stones, drums, tops, objects of ornamentation and amusement, and articles for the practice of magic. To the performance of magic itself much time is always devoted. Marriages are celebrated with a day or so of dancing and singing. Some funeral and mourning rites are also observed. There is even time and energy enough for petty wars between the tribes now and then. Above all, leisure is utilized in a

[6] Quoted by D. G. Brinton, *The Basis of Social Relations*, p. 105.
[7] A. H. Keane, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

great number and variety of ceremonials. These are carried on for religious, magical, initiating and play purposes. There are occasions of dancing, singing, ritualistic performances, elaborate dramatization, instruction, discipline, high revelry, and magical practices. In any one of these functions several interests are often mingled, but apart from a modicum of the really useful which may inhere in the ceremonies of initiation, and perhaps even in the religious ritual, they are essentially the furbishings of life for the Australian aborigines. Their famous "carrobarrees," serving several purposes, but chiefly for initiating the youth, are prepared with much labor, and performed with great consumption of time and energy. Lumboltz tells of one intertribal carrobarree that occupied six weeks.[8] The "Engwura" of the Arunta tribe, for instance, is a tribal or intertribal carrobarree consisting of a long series of elaborate ceremonies in which pure play, totemic celebration, magical and religious cult combine to form the initiation of the youth. Spencer and Gillin[9] describe one of these which lasted four months, from the middle of September to the middle of January. Each day there was a council of the elders and a ceremonial, and sometimes five or six of them during the twenty-four hours. This particular Engwura began with the "Atnimakita" carrobarree of ten nights' duration, and was immediately followed by the "Illyoupa" of ten more nights, after which came a pause. Then opened the second phase, which ran for five weeks, ending in an eight day celebration of "Quabara Unjiamba" of the "Ooraminna" ceremony. In the final phase, the young men were inducted into a knowledge of the mysteries of the tribal totems and churingas. Many other lesser celebrations take place throughout the

[8] E. Grosse, quoted in W. I. Thomas' *Source Book for Social Origins*, p. 392.
[9] *Native Tribes of Central Australia.*

year. The same observers assisted at fifteen of them between the 27th of July and the 23rd of August. Frequent performances of the "Intichiuma," or totemic ceremonies, take place. These cover a wide range relating to the wichetty grub, emu, hokea flower, kangaroo, grass seed, mana, cockatoo, etc.[10] Most of the labors and ventures of the Australians, such as hunting, fishing, warfare, etc., have connected with them some ceremonial observance. The large place occupied by their various ceremonials, rituals, and cults makes it clear that the Australians have not a little organic surplus.

In economic energy or wealth they are poor. Much of their food is of the most wretched sort, consisting of roots, fruits, vermin, termites, insects, reptiles, grubs, birds' eggs, fish and game. The supply is never abundant, and seldom adequate, and, as a result, in common with the Fuegians, they are an ill-nurtured people. At times, they have been driven to cannibalism. At best half of their life is spent under privation, says Ratzel.[11] They preserve food for future use in a small way by drying grubs and curing fish. Unless foliage screens can be called houses, they have none, and find shelter only in natural caves. Clothing is wanting, even to bodily ornaments. They possess some prepared skins of animals. Weapons and tools are few and made of bone, stone, or wood. They consist of spears, clubs, or waddies used for fishing, boomerangs, stone axes, shields, digging sticks, baskets, and along the coast rude canoes. No pottery is made, cooking being done in holes in the ground. Finally, a few objects of magic upon which labor has been bestowed complete the inventory of Australian wealth.

The store of social tradition is fuller. While hunting skill is rather poorly developed, there is a large body of

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 176*ff*.
[11] F. R. Ratzel, *History of Mankind*, Vol. I, p. 373.

taboos, rules, or laws governing the taking of game and the procuring of food. Considerable knowledge of foods is theirs; the tribes of Northwest Australia at least know how to deprive the sago fruit and orchid bulbs of their poison in order that they may be eaten. In the partial domestication of the Dingo, or kind of dog, may be seen faint beginnings of the art of animal husbandry. No agriculture, however, has been achieved. A knowledge of how to make several useful tools and instruments already mentioned has been acquired. Time reckoning by moon phases and the taking of bearings accurately are also known, but not any system of calculation or counting. Writing has not passed beyond the crude representation of ideas by means of messenger sticks. That part of the tradition pertaining to social relations and group welfare is particularly rich. The magical art in part looks to the preservation of totemic animals and plants; educational and initiatory lore to the instruction and discipline of youth; customs of social control to the regulation of marriage and limitation of births; and religious beliefs to the conservation of group unity and power. All these things make up a body of accumulated experiences of man as related to his fellows and to nature, which, when stripped of a great deal of error, leaves much that is valuable. In these we find a repository of social power, giving to the Australians a meager surplus margin.

Organization has developed somewhat. Although the people live in small hordes of from fifty to one hundred, and have no settled life, there is a governmental system in vogue among them. The Wakelbura tribe, for example, carefully defines its territory, and subdivides it between sections of the tribe. A cross sectional division for marriage purposes also is maintained. The whole tribe is divided into two moieties, each of which is divided again into subclasses, and these in turn into totems. Perhaps no

primitive people have a more completely developed system of marriage and kinship regulations than these. Exogamy is enforced through a complex scheme of totemic groupings. The tribal life is under the guidance of councils of elders, and sometimes chiefs. It is well organized for the subordination of women to male authority, for the training and control of the young, and for the preservation of customs and beliefs. Withal, the Australian blackfellows, when compared with Fuegians, are seen to possess in general a greater store of social energy, even an appreciable surplus, especially in the organic, traditional, and organizational spheres.

From groups on the lowest cultural plane, such as those just described, with the most meager surplus, we mount up through each successive cultural level, which, as we have already suggested, represent relative to the lowest ever greater surplus stages, and find at each plane societies with almost every degree of surplus relative to the others occupying the same stage of development with themselves. Such gradation has existed in nearly every age of human history, in antiquity even as to-day. The economists, to be sure, have held otherwise. They have been responsible for the statement that until the nineteenth century all the world was living under a deficit economy. But let it be said again that this was true only with respect to economic goods, and in no sense in a strictly sociological meaning. The civilizations of Babylonia, Egypt, Crete, Greece, and Rome were all societies that enjoyed relatively large surplusage; how large we can, of course, in no case even guess. Nor can it be told how far the margin controlled by any of them was of their own production and accumulation, for all were robber societies—even far worse than are the great states of to-day—reaping where they had not sown, and gathering where they had not strawed. The Babylonians, Egyptians, Cretans, and Greeks alike exterminated weaker

groups, enslaved the fittest of those subjugated, carried away their goods, appropriated their arts and useful traditions, thus manifesting prowess, and incidentally waxing mightier by so doing. Rome, if somewhat more humanitarian than her predecessors or contemporaries, in that she put fewer to the sword, was, nevertheless, the chief despoiler of them all. She conquered the world of her time, and made all pay tribute to her. She stole her civilization and her wealth, and thus, by impoverishing and destroying other nations, gathered power hitherto unsurpassed. Antiquity, after this manner, produced a few societies of large surplus in the midst of many with dreadfully narrow margins, whatever their cultural level. Correctly understood, then, we might almost agree with the economists that, as a whole, the world of antiquity, speaking economically at least, was a deficit rather than a surplus world. This side of antiquity, and down to the nineteenth century, the situation has been at all times much as it was of old, with a very few fat nations and many lean ones.

### Deficit East and Surplus West

We are wont, moreover, to divide the modern world—the civilized portions of it—into the deficit East and the surplus West. This again is due to the influence of exclusively economic standards of judgment; but there is, nevertheless, an important distinction to be made between these two parts of the world. When a line is drawn along the east shore of the Mediterranean and northward through the Ural Mountains, it separates for practical purposes two types of civilization. The Orient, for the most part, has the traditions and customs of two thousand years ago, with an economy which, in most particulars, is in striking contrast to that of the Occident. Each community of the Orient lives largely within itself. Production and trade

are local matters. There is, in the full sense, no world market. Transportation for any great distance is difficult, slow, and generally limited to the load a beast of burden, a camel, or maybe a man can carry. Commerce is thus curtailed, much of it being conducted at annual or semiannual fairs, like that of the far-famed Nizhni Novgorod in Russia. Between far separated and independent communities no great amount of intercourse goes on. Iron and steel, and the machines made therefrom, are little used or known. Nature's great stores of coal, petroleum and other minerals have not been tapped. The past receives a servile devotion. Social organization and activity, fettered by custom and ritual, are rigid and inflexible. Destitution, famine, and the plague that wasteth at noonday are frequent afflictions, and never entirely absent. Stores of goods are small and wealth is meager, compared with the Occident. But, notwithstanding the inefficient agriculture, the antiquated handicraft, and the local-trade economy, the East has its surplus as well as the industrial West. The larger social groups are generally above the subsistence level for their stage of culture. Though periods of distressing deficit in material things do frequently intervene, Eastern nations are otherwise not surplusless. The great Western societies are, of course, in all respects the real surplus groups of the world. Elsewhere, none even approximates them in their superabundant energy of every sort.

To get before us the contrasts of Oriental and Occidental civilizations as regards surplus let us take account of a few aspects of Chinese society. This hoary nation, embracing nearly one-fourth of the human race, massed on only one-twelfth of the land of the earth, is undoubtedly the East's most typical society.

Of vital energy some margin is to be found. This is not evinced mentally, however, for though possessed of latent

talent the Chinese are today almost barren intellectually. Their vitality is physical, and in this form some surplus appears. There is an unsually high birth rate, probably from 50 to 60 per 1,000, with four generations bred while we are producing three. Howbeit, there is an excessively high death rate to offset this; it ranges anywhere from 30 to 55 per 1,000 as a normal thing. It is estimated that 8 out of 10 babies die in infancy. Nevertheless, the net result is a marked growth of population annually. During the tenure of the Manchu dynasty, which began in 1544, the population increased from 55,000,000 to somewhere between 350,000,000 and 400,000,000—the exact numbers at no time being known. The average annual rate of increase has run higher than anywhere in the civilized world.[12] The average length of life is short fifteen years less than in the Occident, thinks Ross.[13] This fact might suggest that the Chinese are in consequence an uncommonly youthful and vigorous people, but such is not the case. The dreadful overcrowding of population, necessitating incessant exertion and an exhaustive struggle for life, leads to serious impoverishment of vital force among the masses. The individual units under the circumstances are not vigorous. Even so, there remains an unconsumed portion of energy given to leisure and non-life-serving activities.

While the almost unanimous verdict of Western travelers in China is that it is a land destitute of leisure and amusement, closer scrutiny of Chinese life shows this judgment to be ill-founded. It is commonly reported that unremitting toil "to the utmost stretch of body and mind" is the lot alike of childhood and maturity, of rich and poor, but here again more careful inquiry reveals a condition far less severe. The facts show that China does have leisure. Her

[12] W. W. Rockhill, "Inquiry into the Population of China," *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections,* Vol. 47, pp. 303-321.
[13] E. A. Ross, *The Changing Chinese,* p. 104.

New Year is a protracted holiday, lasting a twenty-fourth part of the year. During this time "nothing shall be done which can be left undone."[14] This season affords an occasion for leisure, and recreation; it is a time for ceremonial calling on all kin, gambling and other pastimes. The remainder of the year, toilsome and grinding as it may be, is generally interspersed for most people with a bit of leisure or recreation now and then. Many festivals in honor of deities are observed as holidays, and on the whole go far to give such rest as the Sabbath of the Western world. Of all pleasures, gambling is chief; it fascinates men and women alike, and most of the nation devotes a good deal of time to it. The great public amusement of China is the theater in one form or another. Apart from the towns and cities it is a traveling institution which makes a stand of three to four days in a place. Frequently in the larger towns, but only occasionally in the average village, is a theater held. A goodly portion of the people some time each year avail themselves of this pleasurable indulgence. Besides regular theatricals there are acrobatic performances, Punch and Judy shows, peripatetic story tellers, annual or semiannual fairs, and two or three feast days each year, in the enjoyment of which most Chinese find surcease from their labors.

Vital surplus is expressed in several other ways besides those just mentioned. There is abundant ceremonial activity of various kinds everywhere in the land. Indeed, ceremony is said to be the life of the Chinese nation. An unfailing stream of marriage and funeral celebrations also entertain. The latter are the greatest of all events in Chinese life, and no end of time is consumed in their observance. In rare cases individuals will even spend three years in mourning departed parents, dwelling meanwhile

[14] A. M. Smith, *Village Life in China*, p. 201.

in idleness in a hut beside the grave. Few can afford such extravagance, but all sacrifice more or less time to honor the dead.

A multitude of religious rites and practices claim a portion of every one's time. Ancestor worship, which is the central feature of the nation's religion, is never neglected. Next to this rank numerous cults connected with animals and the forces and objects of nature, which are widely observed in various ways throughout the empire. The earth, the sun, the moon, and the heavens are worshiped. On the first and fifteenth of the month earth and heaven shrines are attended by many. In some sections two days of the month are set apart for animal reverence. At the bottom of Chinese religious observance is Taoism, which stands for all sorts of magic, divination, and spiritism. Its system of incantation against evil spirits is much in vogue among all classes. A vast deal of time is spent withal in religious worship in China.

Other time-consuming occupations or pursuits which indicate vital surplus are the various forms of art and scholarship. In quest of learning a prodigious amount of time is spent by a considerable element of the population. This education consists chiefly in committing to memory the classics, and is of small life-serving value. Much of the energy thus dissipated should be counted surplus. There are, perhaps, still other manifestations of vital surplusage among the Chinese, but enough has been shown to indicate its limits.

Our next inquiry is, "Has China any overplus of economic goods?" It has been customary to think she has none. Poverty does certainly everywhere abound as the most prominent feature of the nation. There are rich men in China, but they form only a microscopic percentage of the population; and their fortunes are relatively small at best. So severe is the struggle for food that the diet of

all is of necessity abstemious. The waste of the West would be luxury indeed to multitudes of this nation. A meager hand to mouth existence is about all that is allowed the many. A single community will serve to illustrate. Changsha with some 270,000 people has 52,744 who are extremely poor and dependent upon government help to eke out existence; 67,687 more are moderately poor, requiring help in years of short crops to escape starvation. This makes forty-four per cent of the population in need of more or less regular aid in a city which is counted among the richest, most powerful and cultured of China.[15] Famine often comes, and as a blessing, to quickly sweep millions out of the misery of lifelong starvation. The demand made upon the land for food production precludes a rood of it being reserved for recreation or pleasure in many parts of the empire. Land that might be spared for such use has to be devoted to the grave mounds of ancestors, which occupy anywhere from five to twenty per cent of the farming area.[16] A portion of the nation's wealth is thus sequestered.

Notwithstanding the apparent economic deficit of China, there is a margin devoted to furbishings, luxuries, and other nonessential ends. Leaving out of account the wealth accumulations inherited from past ages in many forms, among which may be mentioned innumerable temples, pagodas, extensive public works, among which the Great Wall ranks as perhaps the greatest piece of engineering work ever produced by any race, and various other products of labor, all of which to some extent represent surplus, and considering only the annual dividend, it is evident that according to her standards China has enough and to spare. Some of the extras which she affords may be indicated.

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[15] A. C. Reed, "The Present China," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 4, p. 47.

[16] E. A. Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 70, 71.

There are nonproductive elements of the population, including priests, geomancers, actors, story-tellers, scholars, parasitic public officials, and rent-takers, who live off the nation's labor. Half the soil of China, for instance, is supposed to be owned and leased by retired officials and their families, who are rent-takers. It is no small sum that goes for the maintenance of these leisure or semi-leisure classes. Opium has been another expensive luxury. Before the recent abolition of the traffic, tens of millions of dollars were squandered annually upon it. The cost of theaters to towns, villages, individuals who endow them, and the public at large is in the aggregate a fairly large annual bill. In like manner the upkeep of temples is of considerable expense. Then there is the tax budget, which is drained off the public into the pockets of officials, and in so far as this is the case, taxes are so much surplus. A share of what finds its way into the imperial treasury supplemented by other revenues collected from the public, goes to pay foreign indemnities and the interest on the same. The year preceding the Great War this item amounted to 58,000,000 taels or about $43,000,000. Before the days of the Republic another $4,000,000 was appropriated annually for the imperial court. Chinese students and travelers spend still another 3,000,000 taels abroad, while legations and consulates in foreign lands cost some 2,000,000 taels.[17] The greater part of these expenditures belong to China's surplus account. Above all, wealth is lavished on ancestor worship, funerals, and lawsuits. Millions of dollars go for extravagant funerals. Lawsuits, which are of constant occurrence everywhere, consume large sums. Besides these several forms of useless expenditure there is some saving of capital with which new enterprises are being fostered. Some Europeans well acquainted with China believe her savings to be adequate to develop the

[17] C. S. See, *The Foreign Trade of China*, pp. 334, 335.

industrial resources of the empire.[18] While this is doubtful, there is some visible, available capital.

All told, China's meager savings and her outlay for nonessentials indicate a small surplus. Still, her tribute to luxury looks much like a theft from necessity when vast multitudes of her people eke out only the most ineffectual, half-starved, naked, and painful existence. In the face of this fact it is not far wrong to agree with those who say that China has a deficit instead of a surplus economy.

Concerning China's vast store of tradition, without essaying to take stock of her entire volume of achievement, what portion of it is surplus? Her accumulation of practical wisdom, knowledge, skill, technique, science, art, moral and legal codes, and political policies is stupendous. But this lore of so many ages is a stream whose power turns not alone the mills that grind the real grists of life; it also runs much to waste. Quite like the great yellow river it pours down a superfluous flood of useless waters bearing wreck and ruin, and building barriers to its own undoing. Apparently more fraught with débris is this stream than is the tradition of any other nation; certainly far more so than in the case of those of the Western world, where achievement tends to eliminate the purely superfluous, and pile up useful surplus in the form of practical or material culture. "It has often been remarked," says A. M. Smith, "and with every appearance of truth, that there is no other civilized nation in existence which is under such bondage to superstition and credulity as the Chinese."[19] Things spiritual, as unreal as they are, have authority over all. Belief in devils which infest the earth and the air is only less prevalent than among savages of darkest Africa. Geomancers are consulted on all matters of importance, such as burials, weddings, business under-

[18] A. M. Smith, *Chinese Characteristics*, p. 285.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

takings, building projects, journeys, and no end of other things. Pagodas stand over village and town everywhere for no other purpose than to ward off the baneful influence of the dragons of the air and the earth.[20] The great vehicle of this superstition is Taoism, which everywhere permeates the nation, and subverts wise conduct. This entire body of belief, together with most that is called religious faith, whether it be Buddhism, Confucianism, or what not, is superfluous. Ancestor worship, transforming all dead men into gods, chaining the generations of the present to those of the past, and making the begetting of as numerous a progeny as possible the consuming ambition of life, is not only useless tradition, but, what is more significant, highly detrimental tradition in the struggle the nation must wage for existence. Ancestor worship has made the dead a "positive economic incubus upon the living."

Art in its various forms is extensively developed, and the entire body of skill, technique, and knowledge embraced therein is, of course, dispensable and marginal.

China's code of social control is greatly burdened with unnecessary and detrimental elements. Foot-binding, the narrowly circumscribed lot of their women, an inordinate familism, a stultifying filial devotion, and an oppressive and enslaving ceremonialism in all human relationships are some of the elements with which China could advantageously dispense.

The literary achievement of this nation is on a colossal scale, scarcely equaled anywhere in the West. It is the product of millenniums of effort. Her classics and other philosophical creations together with her poetry are full of practical wisdom, and yet on the whole they form an inert mass of redundant energy. The learning which each succeeding generation draws with costly toil from this innocuous store confers only impotency upon the scholar;

[20] A. C. Reed, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

and thus the current education of the nation, in so far as her schools mediate it, remains chiefly impractical surplusage.

All China idealizes and reveres the past with a servile devotion, for so tradition dictates. Innovation is thus rendered almost impossible. Forces that once were active in invention, discovery and origination spent themselves long ago in creating a tradition equilibrium that forbids and generally forestalls further development. In consequence, this society is overloaded with the merely superfluous, and unlike other great modern civilizations it has little or none of that creation of the new which swells achievement into a real surplus by constantly enhancing the means of control over the environment. The result is that China, having exhausted the possibilities of one stage of culture, is apparently of herself unable to rise to one higher and more amply fitted to sustain so populous a nation.

Surplus organization does not abound in China. Still, she is not destitute of it. There are religious orders among the Buddhists and Taoists with their monastic and priestly societies. Some organization for amusement purposes is also found. The patriarchial joint family system with its subordination of youth and womanhood to an extreme degree is a form savoring of the nonessential in part. The imperial state with its official class has been for centuries a highly redundant organization in Chinese society. Its function was to subsist on, not to rule or serve the nation; for the people govern themselves locally, and find all superauthority a useless and costly burden for the benefit of officialdom. How far the present republic differs, if at all, from the Manchu absolutism in this respect, it is difficult to determine. Of the old empire it is fair to say that, while posing as an autocracy, it was, as states go about the world, a weak and negligible organization. "Nowhere

in the world," said Emile Bard of it, "is such a vast agglomeration of men kept in order and obedience, without police or military force, with such a minimum of public functionaries."[21] While providing itself with an army, the meagerness of the Chinese state stands out above all else in its lack of aggressiveness toward other nations.

When all is considered, it is clear that China has but little social surplus to-day. Only a narrow margin above the requirements for existence is shown. In bygone days it seems to have been otherwise with her, for the past is redolent with power, wealth, and achievement. In this naturally well endowed land, comfort, luxury, puissance and progress dwelt where now penury, mean economy, impotency and stagnation hold sway. Having pressed to the limit, and long since overreached the sustaining power of a handicraft-agricultural economy, China must tap the unutilized energy stores of her environment by the scientific industrial method, or else continue to find inadequate resources for the perpetuation of so numerous a nation and remain subject to the ravages of death and decay.

### Cultural Stages and American Surplus

In order to reach anything like an adequate understanding of social surplus, a detailed study of specific groups at various cultural levels ought to be made. A thorough study ought to be made of primitive hunters such as the Bushmen, in order to get an estimate of social surplus at the bottom of the scale. A similar study ought to be made of primitive pastors, like the Zulus, or Kaffirs to see how far they accumulate any surplus. Then, there ought to be a study of primitive horticulturists of the type of the Hausas or other Sudanese to discover the extent of surplus to be found among ethnic peoples of the most advanced

[21] *Chinese Life in Town and Country*, p. 109.

sort. Finally, civilized societies at their various levels, particularly the agricultural, domestic-economy and industrial stages ought to be studied to find out the extent of surplus in each instance.

Studies of this sort, if the facts could be got at and comparable data compiled, would be exceedingly valuable; but it is quite out of the question to make satisfactory studies of this nature owing to the lack of available material. The energies of society are not generally in shape to be inventoried nor are there proper instruments for taking their measure even when they are within reach. This is especially true with respect to primitive nations, but even with the most civilized the task cannot be satisfactorily accomplished.

In spite of this handicap and the utter impossibility of making exact measurements, I propose briefly to canvass the surplus resources of American society, meanwhile bearing in mind the fact that this society is as fairly representative of the West as China is of the East. The attempted inventory will at least be suggestive even if it amounts to nothing more than an assembly of opinions and crude estimates about our national puissance.

The vital energy of this nation runs into wide margins. The opinion of Graham Wallas to the effect that the white stock of America starts with a higher average gift of body and brain power than any other people of historic times, with the possible exception of a few thousand Athenian freemen in the fifth century, B. C., or the Icelanders of the tenth century, A. D.,[22] is a judgment in which well informed Europeans would probably concur. And the unexcelled push and hustle, enterprise, ambition, and performance of the nation along many and varied lines fairly justifies, in fact, Wallas' opinion.

[22] G. Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*, pp. 49, 50.

Numerically, this nation with 105,710,620 people counted by the 1920 census is by far the strongest of all industrial societies. It is, in truth, the largest unified single nation the world has seen. Applying the usual measures of vital surplus, the annual per cent of increase is first to be noted. Taken by ten-year periods, the average per cent appears as follows:

| *Year* | *Per Cent of Increase* |
|---|---|
| 1790 | ... |
| 1800 | 3.51 |
| 1810 | 3.64 |
| 1820 | 3.31 |
| 1830 | 3.35 |
| 1840 | 3.27 |
| 1850 | 3.59 |
| 1860 | 3.56 |
| 1870 | 2.26 |
| 1880 | 3.01 |
| 1890 | 2.25 |
| 1900 | 2.07 |
| 1910 | 2.10 |
| 1920 | 1.49 |

Comparing these figures with similar ones from other nations the United States shows a rate of increase quite unequaled. This may be verified by glancing at the rates for the last decade of a number of European countries:

| *Country* | *Per Cent of Increase* |
|---|---|
| Austria-Hungary | 0.91 |
| France | 0.17 |
| Germany | 1.40 |
| Gt. Britain and Ireland | 0.91 |
| Italy | 0.65 |
| Russia (in Europe) | 2.01 |
| Spain | 0.52 |

This unparalleled rate of growth, however, is not due alone to natural reproduction as is substantially the case

elsewhere. Foreign immigration into the United States accounts for a considerable portion of the growth. The following table gives the several factors involved, and shows approximately the percentage of increase from genetic sources. In all cases, however, the actual genetic increase is somewhat higher than this table indicates, since it takes no account of returning immigrants, or of their death before the census year:

INCREASE FROM GENETIC SOURCES

| Year | Total Average Annual Per Cent of Increase | Average Annual Per Cent of Increase by Immigration | Average Annual Per Cent of Genetic Increase |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1840 | 3.27 | 0.46 | 2.81 |
| 1850 | 3.59 | 1.00 | 2.59 |
| 1860 | 3.56 | 1.11 | 2.44 |
| 1870 | 2.26 | 0.72 | 1.54 |
| 1880 | 3.01 | 0.73 | 2.28 |
| 1890 | 2.55 | 1.04 | 1.51 |
| 1900 | 2.07 | 0.60 | 1.47 |
| 1910 | 2.10 | 1.15 | .95 |
| 1920 | 1.49 | 0.34 | 1.05 |

Nevertheless, in the light of these data the genetic increase of America appears as great as that of any European country with the exception of Russia. If the figures of column four were corrected by a proper allowance for the immigration factor previously referred to, they would probably show an excess of births over deaths beyond any of the other countries mentioned.

Certain statisticians contend that net population increase does not adequately measure the grade of civilization of a nation, or, as I prefer to interpret it, does not measure the physical vitality. Marcus Rubin of Denmark shows how mere increase used as a gauge is largely meaningless when

several countries are under comparison.[23] For instance, one country may have a birth rate of 25 and a death rate of 15, and another have a birth rate of 30 and a death rate of 20; both show the same net increase, but for all that, manifest real differences in the state of vitality. Hence, Rubin proposes as a better measure the square of the death rate divided by the birth rate. The reasons for using this formula need not be gone into here. Suffice it to say that it gives a more significant index of vital surplus, especially for comparative purposes. The following table will show the high standing of the United States among the leading nations. The lower the figures in the column giving the results of this formula, the more favorable is the rating.

Comparative State of Vitality of Leading Nations

| Country | Birth Rate b | Death Rate d | $\frac{d^2}{b}$ |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States 1900-1910..... | 28.6 | 14.7 | 7.5 |
| England and Wales 1900-1909. | 27.6 | 15.8 | 9.0 |
| Germany 1900-1909 ..... | 34. | 19.5 | 11.1 |
| France 1900-1909 ..... | 20.8 | 19.8 | 18.8 |

Vital surplus is further indicated by the increasing tenure of life, which Americans are experiencing in common with Europeans. In so far as the limited data for the United States can be relied upon, they show about the same rate of increase as for England and Wales, but some three years less than for the whole of Europe. However, it is not unlikely that more complete data would show a rate of increase for the United States comparable to anything in Europe.

As an offset to the favorable showing made by the vital

[23] "A Measure of Civilization," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 60, pp. 148-162.

index there is always the fact of morbidity. Among the 42,000,000 gainfully employed there is believed to be an annual loss of not less than 350,000,000 days due to illness and non-industrial accidents. Non-fatal accidents of an industrial nature add perhaps close to 300,000,000 more days.[24] On top of this must be placed the fact, revealed by physical examinations, "that more than 50% of any group of industrial workers show either diseased conditions or substandard physical states that require medical attention." [25] By these items, directly and indirectly, the vital strength of the nation is regularly impaired.

Another revelator of surplus is superior capacity for work. This is generally attributed to the American people. It is a thing impossible of proof save as comparative productivity may throw some light upon it. If we take for a sample occupation the agriculturists, Americans are about two and a half times more productive than the English farmer, some three times more than the German, and six times more than the Italian. Indices of productivity per person engaged in this occupation have been worked out on the basis of one hundred. They appear in the following table: [26]

| | |
|---|---|
| For each American engaged in agriculture | 292 |
| For each Britisher engaged in agriculture | 126 |
| For each German engaged in agriculture | 119 |
| For each Frenchman engaged in agriculture | 90 |
| For each Italian engaged in agriculture | 45 |

Whether or not similar ratios or anything approaching them hold good with respect to other occupations is a question that has not been determined. Howbeit, several factors besides vital energy are obviously involved, and an

[24] *Waste in Industry*, pp. 20-22.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 367.
[26] Kenyon L. Butterfield, *The Farmer and the New Day*, pp. 9, 10.

index of general productivity, even if we had it, while of some weight, would at best be inconclusive.

A more accurate gauge of surplus is the amount of leisure enjoyed, and of this there is abundance in the United States. It can be crudely checked in a number of ways. About one-fourth of the population of working age, according to estimates, do not labor for a living; they are supported for the most part from the earnings of capital.[27] This class is not by any means altogether idle, and yet its energies represent a large part of the marginal vitality of the nation. In a sense it is a reserve force which may be called upon in case of need. The period of the Great War did call upon it, and drew much of it forth. This seems to be disclosed in the fact that production was raised twenty per cent above the normal during the war years.

The 1920 census reports 50.3 per cent. of all persons over ten years of age, or about 39.4 per cent. of the total population, as engaged in gainful occupations. These figures are not, of course, to be taken as including absolutely all of the working population. The other 60 per cent embraces great numbers always busily engaged, and whose labor is indispensable to the ongoing of society, as well as many dependent children and others, along with the drones, parasites, and idle rich. Turning again to the agricultural occupation for illustration, we have an index of productivity for each person dependent upon the industry. This includes all persons gainfully employed as well as those dependent upon them. With 1,000 used as the basis for each American dependent upon agriculture, the German index will be 685, or 60 per cent as much; the Briton 425, or 42 per cent; the French 406, or 40 per cent; and the Italian 230 or 23 per cent.[28] This simply shows

[27] Irving Fisher, "National Vitality," *Report of the Conservation Commission*, p. 740.

[28] K. L. Butterfield, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

that for each person employed in farming in America there are many more dependent and unemployed than there are in other countries. What is true of this occupation also holds good more or less of other lines of work.

In America, in common with all industrial nations, there is a great deal of enforced idleness for shorter or longer periods every year. During 1900, for instance, there were 5,227,472 males unemployed part of the working time in all occupations. Averaged up, it amounted to three million unemployed one-fourth of the working time.[29] Normally, there are probably on the average not less than 2,000,000 unemployed at all times. Even in our best year, 1919, there were over 1,000,000 unemployed. Despite this, the people were able to subsist, and their leisure, though enforced, should be reckoned as so much vital surplus.

What the total leisure of the nation amounts to when all we have mentioned is included, together with time devoted to pleasure, religion, rest days, and trivial, futile and nonproductive activities no one knows. Some one has estimated that there are 3,000,000,000 leisure hours per week. This would mean on the average four and two-thirds hours for every week day or four hours for seven days per week for every man, woman, and child in the land. It is a liberal estimate, and probably not far wrong.

Any critical inspection of our competitive business system reveals no end of useless duplication of working force. This waste of energy appears especially in the conduct of business in our towns and cities. Veblen thinks it reaches seven-ninths of the working force engaged in the retail trade of our small towns.[30] Moreover, there is waste of energy in time-wasting and unnecessary work due to faulty organization and management in industry everywhere.

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[29] Scott Nearing, *Social Adjustment*, p. 267.

[30] T. Veblen, "Farm Labor for the Period of the War," *The Public*, July 20, 1918.

The committee on elimination of waste in industry of the Federated American Engineering Societies found this waste would run to twelve or thirteen hours per week per man in the industries studies.[31] Such needless use of energy is one of the luxuries in which America, more, perhaps, than any other nation, fondly indulges. If the waste were all computed, it would amount to a vast deal of surplus of which we commonly take no account. But surplus it is when measured by the necessities of existence.

A word is in order concerning the psychic aspects of vitality. If it be true that the American people have more mental energy than any other contemporary nation, that also settles the question as regards surplus. This, however, has not been conclusively proved. But there are some facts that may be submitted in proof. If we take inventiveness for a test, the American people show it to an unusual degree. The number of patents issued by the Government from 1871 to 1918 was 1,179,410. During the same period France issued 464,628, the United Kingdom 496,430, and Germany 318,028. This gives on the average one for about 62 persons in the United States as compared with one for a little less than 80 persons in France, and one to 129 persons in Germany. In other words, if we let the number for America equal 100, the index is 78 for England, 77 for France, and 48 for Germany. From this it appears that there is really ground for the claim to superior mental endowment. Of course, patents do not represent equally all phases of origination. They may reveal America on her strong side alone, since mechanical genius, in which we revel, is apt to be largely recorded in patents. Other sides of our mental life, especially the literary and artistic, may be weaker, while rival nations may excel along these lines. Howbeit, the index of inventiveness is not unfair,

[31] *Waste in Industry*, pp. 12, 13.

and America's lead in it only confirms a general impression regarding her ability.

Tradition surplus can be given only in qualitative terms, and to specify what should be so counted in America would be a tedious task. Moreover, to make a list of the general classes into which it falls would involve a repetition of much that was said in the opening paragraphs of this chapter. Suffice it, then, that we call attention only to a few things of cardinal importance. In a general way, of course, our heritage is one with that of civilized Europe, though wanting some things it has and boasting others it does not have. An industrial economy we share as a common type of culture which stands to most of the world besides as surplus. Whether, all considered, in comparison with leading European nations America can show any superiority in tradition, is difficult if not impossible to determine absolutely. In certain fields, however, it seems clear enough, and, significantly, that of industry especially. Here we find unusual achievement in mechanical inventions and the skill with which they are applied to all sorts of work. Labor saving appliances are more readily produced and freely used than elsewhere. Early in our history this became evident with respect to agricultural machinery. Our supremacy in this particular remains undisputed. What is true of agriculture holds good for a great deal of manufacturing as well.

Apart from things mechanical, other phases of our industrial tradition are extraordinary. There is a unique development of technical and business leadership, for one. Another is an especially effective application of labor, a third is our large-scale methods, and a fourth is our habit of readily discarding old processes and mechanisms for newer and improved ones.[32]

Withal, our industrial art and science has reached a

[32] F. W. Taussig, *Some Aspects of the Tariff Question*, pp. 40*ff*.

state of perfection rather above that of England or Germany, if effectiveness is any index. At least, where we meet them in international trade we are favored by what the economists call "the principle of comparative advantage," which principle, Taussig says, "applies more fully and unequivocally to the United States than to any other country." [33]

When we seek that which is surplus to ourselves measured by ourselves we encounter much unapplied knowledge. Modern technology and management engineering possesses in every way a vast amount that is not used. Moreover, the discovery of surplus is often a question of distinguishing things essential from nonessential. Of the latter there is almost endless variety and quantity. They are exemplified in the great body of speculative thought, religious cult and the like with which all modern civilization is heavily burdened; likewise, in a vast deal of classical lore and cultural heritage which we drag along as impedimenta; similarly, in not a little fine art technique, which we possess equally with European peoples. The same type of tradition is prevalent also in much that we call social custom and convention, in our large stock of ideals and great layout of reform policies and movements. Of the latter we have superabundance in every way. Indeed, no other land so abounds in newly created tradition of this sort as does America. In this we more than make up what we lack of antiquated heritage. Foreign observers have often remarked upon this. Ferrero, for instance, has said: "The American often addresses himself with fervor, energy and great intellectual and pecuniary effort to the eradication of ills which the European regards as incurable and irresponsive to treatment. And this American faith in the power to rectify, revive and purify nature often struck me, no less than many other Europeans, as verging

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

on the chimerical. In short, even in what are called social works, the American often seemed to me more idealistic, more of a dreamer, and less practical than the European; more ready, that is to say, to venture on a struggle against the innumerable ills of life without being quite sure of possessing adequate means for conquering them, at the summons of a mystical faith in the progress of the world." [34]

The things we have mentioned are sufficient to indicate that there is a wide range of tradition in America that is in the nature of adornment, that is largely nonessential.

Surplus tradition always appears in the output of invention, knowledge, and discovery. Of this there is a constant flow in America. Since 1871 the reports of the patent office show that an average of 25,639 new patents have been issued annually. These represent only part of our achievement, but give some idea of the growth of tradition of the more practical sort.

In every way America has a vast quantity of tradition surplus, both relatively and absolutely. Overflowing with the achievements of the past, the currents of her life sweep on, ever swelling with added volumes of new skill and knowledge.

Economic surplus can be more nearly approximated in amount than can tradition, or, for that matter, any other form of the surplus. For 1912, our total wealth was calculated to be from $190,000,000,000 to $200,000,000,000. Since that date to the present not less than $100,000,000,000 and maybe $150,000,000,000 have been added, making anywhere from $290,000,000,000 to $300,000,000,000 of durable wealth. In contrast to these conservative figures the estimated wealth of our nearest rivals in the world is much less. In a paper read before the Bankers' Institute of London, the following figures for 1920 were given: The

[34] G. Ferrero, *Ancient Rome and Modern America*, pp. 144, 145.

United Kingdom, $120,000,000,000; France, $83,000,000,000; Germany, $92,500,000,000; Italy, $35,500,000,000; Belgium, $12,000,000,000; and Japan, $23,500,000,000.

Surplus appears in the additions that are made from time to time to the durable wealth of a country. With us, for many years antedating 1914, there had been an annual increment to our wealth of from $2,000,000,000 to $4,000,000,000, and since then it has become many times that. Friday is authority for the following estimates of our net savings during recent years. By net savings is meant the excess of production over consumption, which is added to durable wealth. These estimates eliminate such increments as were due to inflated values.[35]

| *Year* | *Amount* |
|---|---|
| 1913..... | $6,500,000,000 |
| 1915..... | 9,000,000,000 |
| 1916..... | 14,500,000,000 |
| 1917..... | 18,000,000,000 |
| 1918..... | 22,000,000,000 |
| 1919..... | 15,000,000,000 |
| 1921..... | 8,800,000,000 |

As a result of such enormous national dividends our surplus of durable wealth has become very great; just how great it is not possible to show. There are certain forms of it, however, that can be estimated. One is foreign investments amounting to $8,000,000,000 or $10,000,000,000, while another is a loan of $10,000,000,000 to foreign countries. At home we have constantly added to the capital used in production, and made large investments in numerous nonproductive institutions and enterprises of one sort and another, serving every conceivable human interest. For instance, we have naval equipment that cost not less than $500,000,000, which, taken together with other instru-

[35] D. Friday, *Profits, Wages and Prices*, p. 91, and "The Accumulation of Capital," *The New Republic*, Dec. 14, 1921, pp. 64-67.

ments of warfare, mounts up to fully $1,000,000,000. There are also 4,000,000 to 6,000,000 among 15,500,000 and more motor vehicles devoted chiefly to pleasure into which have gone from $3,000,000,000 to $4,000,000,000. Some 203,432 church edifices representing $1,677,000,000 investment in 1910 gives still another form. All church property taken together is estimated at present values at about $3,000,000,000.[36] These are samples of the many types of wealth that would have to be included in any complete inventory of the luxuries and extravagances of America which go to make up much of her accumulated surplusage of relatively durable wealth. It has gone into objects of beauty and adornment, of comfort and pleasure, of conspicuous display and foolish vanity in lavish measure.

The most cursory examination of current income expenditure reveals an astonishing waste and futile consumption of marginal wealth. Just a few items will indicate this. It is estimated that we spend annually $50,000,000 for chewing gum, $350,000,000 for soft drinks, $750,000,000 for cosmetics and face lotions, an equal amount on "movies," dances, regular theaters, circuses, etc., and $3,000,000,000 on pleasure resorts and "joy rides." Billions are likewise spent for sporting goods, tobacco, candy, personal finery, and numerous other luxuries. On the basis of the federal tax returns for the year ending July 1, 1921, it is calculated that approximately $13,000,000,000 of that year's income was expended for such items as have been mentioned. Many other things not included in this estimate take a considerable toll, as, for example, Christmas toys, the bill for which reaches $100,000,000 each year, and travel abroad, which normally calls for an outlay of from $150,000,000 to $400,000,000 annually. The Federal Bureau of Education estimated that for 1920 our total bill

[36] Roger W. Babson, *Religion and Business*, p. 217.

for luxuries was $22,700,000,000, or over one-third of the annual income of the people.[37]

Another class of expenditures reflecting surplus have to do with such things as institutional religion, reform movements, missionary activities, political campaigns, and other organized interests of an unproductive nature. Religion costs the American people from $240,000,000 to $350,000,000 yearly. For 1920 the home missions budget was over $23,000,000 and that for foreign missions nearly $38,000,000. During the last five years we have given $60,000,000 for relief in Asia Minor. Our annual bill for social work, if that may be counted as surplus, amounts to not less than three-quarters of a billion dollars. How much the total outlay for the class of things under consideration amounts to no one knows, and it would be very difficult to assemble the data.

Perhaps in no other way have the surplus resources of the United States been so well shown as by the expenditure for the Great War. For military purposes together with the added cost of government $28,500,000,000 were spent, and for war relief through the various agencies engaged therein an additional $2,225,000,000. Meanwhile the standard of living of the American people was in no wise lowered. If anything it was higher during the war years than ever before; and, what is more significant still, savings grew by leaps and bounds.

All in all, our wealth far exceeds that of any other nation of to-day, or for that matter that of any other nation of any day of the world's history. And we are adding to it annual dividends far larger than those of any two or three of them combined. At the same time our standard of living is higher, and our tribute to luxury and benevolence unequaled anywhere. Probably $50,000,000,000 and maybe more of our durable wealth could be sequestered without

[37] *School Life*, April 1, 1921.

seriously injuring the nation. This much, at least, I would allocate to surplusage.

If we think of organization surplus in terms of superior effectiveness, the United States as a social unit is far and away the most potent nation of the world; for, as H. G. Wells has pointed out, there has appeared no other organized state of its kind on so large a scale.[38] There have been and are great empires more extensive and populous, but of divergent peoples held together by force, and in consequence relatively weak as effective organizations. But the American nation, though a mixture of many racial elements, is a freely associated integral group, capable of unified action as though it were a single ethnic people like France or Germany. It is this fact that makes it the supreme social organization.

The subordinate structures of the nation are likewise of unusual scale and effectiveness. This is notably the case with industry. In it we have perfected systems which for magnitude and efficiency are almost unknown elsewhere.

Viewed from the standpoint of its prevalence, organization in America is more general than in other countries. We have developed more kinds of it and applied it more generously to our affairs than have other peoples. In many fields it runs to excess. The business world on the one hand manifests unexcelled power in its organization, and on the other uncurbed extravagance in duplication of its systems. It is estimated that for every forty families there is one retail store in the United States. Perhaps fully one-third of the retail establishments of the country are needless—just superfluous creations.[39] What is true of this is equally true of many other fields. Take the social interest as expressed in lodges and fraternal orders, and one finds

[38] *The Salvaging of Civilization*, pp. 53*ff*.

[39] T. Veblen, "Farm Labor for the Period of the War," *The Public*, July 20, 1918.

a riot of organization under some 560 different names. The religious interest is quite as manifold in its structural expression. The Census reports indicate 227,487 separate church organizations in America. Interests of less universal appeal are likewise extensively organized. We have five hundred or more publicly recognized art, science, reform, anti-reform, and literary associations of more or less general importance. Philanthropic agencies abound everywhere. Philadelphia, for instance, has 2,376 separate and distinct societies of this nature. Over four hundred pages of the directory of New York City is filled with the names of such organizations.[40]

Enough has been said to convey some idea of the surplusfulness of American organization. In lieu of any measure of its amount, the disclosure of the fact that it exists in liberal degree will have to satisfy.

Summing it all up, the United States appears in every way to have much social surplus. In fact, her rank is easily first among the nations in this regard, and being first to-day makes her first and foremost of all history.

Some reference has been made to waste in America, partially as an indication of surplus. But it indicates far more than that. It really signifies the consumption, elimination and possible ending of surplus altogether for the nation.

This aspect of the situation needs to be contemplated quite as much as the more pleasing side. Perhaps it should be emphasized even more, for, if what engineers, economists and various other observers of our ways of life tell us is true, namely, that we are the most wasteful as well as the most surplusful society on the earth, may it not be that we are only squandering our heritage in riotous living as against a day of want and degradation? This is quite

[40] R. Binder, *Major Social Problems*, p. 155.

possible. It therefore behooves us to cease glorying in our power and take thought for its conservation, as many have warned us to do.

Let us take account of some of this waste! Putting first things first we may note something of the biologic waste. American industry flourishes at a far greater cost of life, limb and health than industry abroad. In our coal mines for 1907, taken as a typical year, there were 4.8 men killed to every thousand employed. In Germany the rate was 2.5, in the United Kingdom 1.3, and in France 1.1. Since then, our rate has been reduced, but still remains far higher than in other lands.[41] The rate of lead poisoning in the smelting industry is more than one out of five of the workers or ten times that in either Great Britain or Germany.[42] Our railways kill one in every 550 employees and injure one out of nine. For 1919, it was estimated that our industries killed 23,000 and seriously injured 575,000 persons. There were, all told, some 3,000,000 accidents.[43]

The death rate among those employed between the ages 15 and 65 years in industry for 1920 was 11.46 per 1000. This would give about 500,000 deaths annually. For such age groups this is excessive.[44] The excess becomes apparent when the datum is compared with that for England and Wales as the table on page 100 will show.

Notwithstanding the general increase of the life tenure for the nation taken as a whole, there is some evidence to indicate that mortality in the middle age groups is increasing.[45] The prevailing excess in these groups and the probable increasing mortality among them is largely due to death from organic diseases with which they are af-

[41] Webb-Mulhall, *Dictionary of Statistics*, p. 2.
[42] *Report on Lead Poisoning*, Department of Labor, pp. 54-40.
[43] *Waste in Industry*, p. 331.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 358.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 350. From Irving Fisher and Eugene Lyman Fisk, *How to Live*, pp. 370-380.

DEATH RATE PER 1,000 POPULATION BY AGE IN THE REGISTRATION AREA FOR 1910, ENGLAND, WALES, FOR 1911[46]

| Age | United States | England and Wales | Per Cent Excess of United States over England and Wales |
|---|---|---|---|
| All ages ..... | 15.96 | 15.58 | 2.38 |
| 2- 4 ..... | 9.34 | 9.96 | –6.63 |
| 5-14 ..... | 3.12 | 2.77 | 11.25 |
| 15-24 ..... | 5.09 | 3.42 | 32.80 |
| 25-44 ..... | 8.79 | 6.39 | 27.30 |
| 45-64 ..... | 21.42 | 20.54 | 4.10 |
| 64 and over.... | 85.13 | 85.65 | –.06 |

flicted to a greater degree than similar groups in England and Wales.[47]

It is apparent that American industry is succeeding at a tremendous cost to the nation's vital resources. This excessive sacrifice is due to carelessness, greed, a cheap estimation of life, improper methods of work, etc. Authorities are agreed that 75 per cent of the loss attributable to accidents is unnecessary and can be avoided.[48] It is also estimated that 42 per cent of the serious illness can be prevented.[49] In cases of tuberculosis, typhoid, hookworm, and malaria "at least 75 per cent is practically preventable."[50] Reckoned in mere money there would be a direct saving by the prevention of accidents alone of over three-quarters of a billion of dollars annually.[51] Assuming that four lives per 1,000 can be saved from death by disease, there would be another saving of a billion dollars on the

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 350. From U. S. Census "Mortality Statistics," 1918, p. 17.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 348, and Irving Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 389.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 332.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 351. From Fisher's *Report on National Vitality*, p. 12.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 370.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 332.

basis of $8,000 per life. This would be just so much conservation of the nation's wealth producing power.[52]

Nor does the biologic waste end with preventable deaths and disease due to accidents, industrial fatigue, careless living, etc. There is another serious loss in the extinction of capable stock from economic and social pressure. It is said that 1,000 Harvard graduates will dwindle in six generations to 150 descendants, so low is their rate of increase.[53] What is true of this group is apparently true of the professional classes of the whole country. They are not perpetuating themselves. As the capable strive to rise in the social scale they are consumed. Thus, there is a constant drain on the biologic stores of the nation.

False standards of life and keen rivalry for place and questionable prizes are mainly responsible. Nevertheless, it is willful waste of the nation's greatest asset.

More subtle and imperceptible than vital waste is the waste of tradition that is taking place in American society. Our habits are running to extravagance and pleasure, our ideals to elegance and ease, and our attitudes to ca' canny and malingering. Work is being viewed as a curse, frugality as a disgrace, and self-discipline as almost a vice. The virtues of a pain economy have largely ceased to function in this surplus and creative society.

What is happening to the tradition of home and family illustrates the process. This heritage of race experience is being sacrificed for personal freedom, self-expression, a standard of living dictated by the rich, and a wholly distorted notion of permanent values. The industrial system that has removed from the home the domestic arts and with them the training of youth under parental discipline

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 369.

[53] C. B. Davenport, quoted by Wm. McDougall in a footnote in *Is America Safe for Democracy?* p. 165.

furnishes the background for this development, but it does not lessen the significance of the loss.

Another illustration pertaining to tradition is found in the sphere of work. Here honesty, industriousness and skill are being cast aside. The inefficient, untrained and indolent have taken the position that they are to be rewarded equally with men of merit. Thus, the chief cultural assets of the masses are being dissipated. There is an explanation for this in the fact that it has come about as a defensive measure against exploiting capitalism, but that in no wise minimized the fact of waste.

Toil—honest, persistent and efficient—is the basis of all achievement and wealth. The habits of such toil, acquired by the race in its long climb upward from savagery, cannot be neglected and spurned if civilization is to carry on. This is a heritage men dare not waste, though waste it they do. But if they continue the result will be demoralization, decreasing economic surplus and eventual bankruptcy for our civilization.

It is reported that the leaders of the new régime in Russia have had to grapple with this evil, for the proletariat there have been disposed to discard the toil tradition. To counteract it the leaders have put themselves under a discipline, as exacting as that of Cromwell and his Roundheads. There is, indeed, no other road to power, and the class that thinks there is an easier way will never attain power or if they do attain it, hold it. Our surplusful society does not need to exact such rigid and unremitting effort as the deficit economy under which our habits and ideals were formed, but neither does it permit us to give them up for soft and easy ones.

Similarly, with respect to our domestic and other traditions which are being discarded, it has not been demonstrated that we can do without them. They are the materials of which our palace has been built, and, if we waste

them, whence shall it be repaired? The middle class virtues are especially at stake. Those which Leckey described when he said: "The middle class is distinguished above all others for its political independence, its caution, its solid practical intelligence, its steady industry, its high moral average." [54] But, when this class apes the luxury-loving and self-indulgent rich, courts conspicuous leisure, pursues amusements instead of things intellectual and departs from its cautious and careful manner of living, the loss of tradition involved is sufficient to endanger the nation. For it was upon the culture of this class that the present social order with whatever merit it has and whatever surplus it can boast was reared.

Finally, there is conspicuous waste of material resources. The facts have been frequently published but cannot be too often repeated.

Our economic surplus is due largely to the exploitation of such resources. We have appropriated them as though they were unlimited and in a manner that could scarcely be more wasteful.

One-half the value of the wonderful forests, which covered 45 per cent of the area of the United States, has been consumed.[55] Apart from the ruthless destruction that took place in many sections to clear the land for tillage, there has been carelessness everywhere in the utilization of timber. Careless cutting is said to cause a 25 per cent loss in the woods, while the process of milling destroys 49 per cent of the log.[56] Still other destructive methods add materially to the waste.

It is estimated that with due care the waste in the woods and the mill could be reduced one-third. The proper treatment of timber would reduce loss from decay by one-fifth,

[54] William Edward Hartpole Leckey, *Democracy and Liberty*, Vol. I, p. 20.

[55] Chas. R. Van Hise, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 223-244.

and stopping forest fires would prevent other enormous destruction.[57]

We are consuming the forests three times as fast as they produce themselves.[58] But it is significant that they do produce themselves even though slowly. Not so with the mineral resources, which we are squandering with equal carelessness. Once exhausted, these are gone forever.

The end of anthracite coal is already in sight, and yet for every ton mined from one to one and a half tons are wasted or lost beyond recovery in the process. There is bituminous enough to last for perhaps 150 to 200 years, but a half ton is wasted in mining for every one taken from the ground. This waste could be reduced to but 15 to 10 per cent of what it now is by careful methods. The way we consume coal is likewise exceedingly wasteful.[59]

Oil is more limited even than coal. Geologists believe it will be exhausted in from twenty to thirty years.[60] The demand already exceeds the supply. It is a wonderful boon to our civilization and vast fortune has been lavished upon mechanisms for using it. But when the cruse fails, as fail it soon will, what a junk heap these mechanisms will make and how foolish we will think ourselves to have consumed our oil so quickly. Meantime, great quantities are wasted in mining and handling and refining. In the latter process alone there is said to be a loss of not less than 4½ per cent.

Iron is another mineral upon which the wealth of our age greatly depends. However, we are consuming the supply so rapidly that if the increase keeps up all the high

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 262.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 222.
[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 17-24.
[60] F. K. Lane, United States Geological Survey Bulletins, pp. 697-708.

grade ore is likely to be used up in three decades.[61] Better mining could save much. The same is true of lead and zinc, 50 per cent of which is lost through faultful mining and smelting.[62]

The nation's greatest material resource is land. And that more than forests and minerals has been exploited in a wasteful manner. "Soil mining" has exhausted the initial fertility of much of our best agricultural area. Erosion has destroyed other millions of acres. Fertility may be restored to depleted soils, but it costs to do it. The fact remains that the virgin richness on which we have fattened with quick and easy gains is forever gone. Henceforth, in a sense that has not been, we shall eat our bread in the sweat of our brow.

Much more could be said about economic waste, for the story does not end with the use of natural resources. It continues throughout almost every phase of economic life. But it has been made plain enough that this careless and destructive policy is fraught with grave consequences. They are the rapid exhaustion of the great sources of wealth and the elimination of surplus unless we learn to conserve.

The end of the surplus era is of course not yet. The resources are by no means exhausted, but exhaustion is so close at hand that its approach should be stayed by every possible effort. It can easily come upon us with almost cataclysmic suddenness, and bring degradation in place of puissance. At any event, we must face the fact that America is reveling in wealth which can never again be got so easily or so abundantly, or be replaced, if consumed; and if we continue to be surplusful our policy must be to husband and not to waste this wealth.

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[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 62-74.
[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 74-96.

### Social Power

In concluding this chapter it remains only to state wherein lies the great importance of social surplus. That may be done in a few words, for it consists in the power which it confers upon the group possessing it. In the last analysis, social power rests not so much upon the total energy that can be mustered as upon the surplus energy. The margin unconsumed in the struggle for existence and survival is what counts. Command of some margin has been found to exist in practically every stage of human development, but not always in sufficient quantities to render society particularly puissant. The amount of the margin is the crucial thing. Social aggregates inventorying on the whole a great deal of energy may be less powerful and effective units than aggregates commanding far less energy, simply because the latter have a larger marginal reserve than the former. So it comes about that degree of social power does not necessarily coincide either with total energy or with the stages of evolution that we commonly recognized. Thus, it happens that groups of low culture have sometimes outmatched more advanced ones, that nomads have worsted semi-civilized nations, and that barbarians have overwhelmed civilized peoples. In other cases the small have confounded the mighty, because the real disparity lay in a difference of surplus. When China and Japan, for instance, are compared as to their respective stores of energy, China is undoubtedly superior, but Japan is unquestionably a more powerful society, on account of having more surplus. So we have the paradoxical phenomenon of the apparently great being the weak, and the seemingly weak proving the strong.

It is social surplus that makes a society dynamic, whatever its position, stage of culture, location, or degree of accumulated wealth, vitality, tradition, or organization

This fact has not been recognized except in a blind way. No one, in so far as I am aware, has come as near it as has Professor J. B. Clark. He sets forth what he calls the "marks of a dynamic society." They are as follows: (1) An increase in population; (2) an increase in capital; (3) changes in methods of production; (4) changes in economic organization; and (5) changes in consumers' wants. These are, indeed, some of the marks of power or evidences of surplus, but not all of them, as our study has made clear. In lieu of this partial statement, mostly in economic terms, let us, then, submit a more complete and adequate description of the marks of a dynamic society, or of what gives power to a group. This description will, of course, be only the summary of what has been dwelt upon throughout the chapter. *First* of all is vital surplus, manifested, indeed, by increase of population, *i.e.*, by a high vital index, but also by increase of the span of life and rationality, by multiplication of wants and leisure, and by the heightening of the level of endurance and energizing. The *second* is increase of capital or wealth over and above the demands of necessity. The *third* mark is growth of tradition, including changes in methods of production, along with all other achievements in the realm of art, science, philosophy, and so on throughout the whole range of knowledge. The *fourth* and last is the accumulation of organization or structure of whatever kind, the economic systems together with all other forms. These are the elements of social power, the things that make groups dynamic.

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## CHAPTER III

### SURPLUS ACCUMULATION

Since social power depends primarily upon surplus energy it is pertinent to inquire how surplus accumulates. In the first chapter social energy was described; in the second, social surplus was defined, and now the conditions that favor and lead to the rise of surplus are to be taken into account. It is well to dwell upon this, both for the sake of emphasis and to bring under consideration such factors as seem to be particularly effective in generating power. At the risk of some repetition material already used in the first two chapters will have to be recanvassed in this one. But if the fact is kept in mind that the material is employed for a different purpose, the repetition need not become wearisome.

Certain it is that no single factor or set of factors alone can explain the accumulation of surplus. Many things conspire together to that end, and they may not be the same under all conditions. Luck, accident, fortunate circumstances, happy combinations of events, along with the wise choice of policies, and numerous other things, enter in to determine the results. It would be difficult to make a complete analysis in any case, even if we were provided with all the details of social history. But wanting many of the details, we cannot be exhaustive, and shall, therefore, attempt only to deal with some of the more important factors.

### Vital Surplus

When the subject of vital energy accumulations is broached, it immediately raises the question whether any such acquisitions have been made or can be made. For it is claimed by certain anthropologists that man has in no wise changed his natural characteristics since he began to make history some ten thousand years ago. If that be the case, it may not then be at all consonant with the facts to claim that societies acquire increments of vital force of which they were not possessed from the beginning. But, as a matter of fact, both claims may, at the same time, be valid, for there are means of acquiring vital surplus which involve no alteration of man's nature biologically. Leisure, for instance, is one form secured generally by the release and conservation of energy through labor and time-saving devices. Increase of life's tenure is another that is secured by the control of disease and improved conditions of living. Still a third form is a higher level of energizing which is acquired likewise by a changed mode of living. Possibly, though, man's nature has really undergone more alteration in the ascent from earliest savagery to civilization, or even during the historic period than the anthropologists believe. If so, it may be that part of the modern man's vital superiority over his savage brother's is due to certain modifications in his biologic nature.

In this connection we are confronted with a problem concerning racial characteristics. Put as a question, it is: are not some races naturally gifted with superior endowments of vitality? If so, that fact goes a long way towards explaining why some societies have vital surplus and others do not, or why some have much and others but little. Moreover, this fact, if fact it be, may also do away with any need for the assumption that human nature undergoes change. But just how much can be attributed to racial

differences with respect to the vital endowments of societies is a mooted issue; perhaps, in a careful analysis, nothing at all, for it appears that all the great races produce societies that generate vital surplus. They have been produced by the broad heads and the long heads as well as by the medium skulls; by the yellow and the black as well as by the white race.

The vital fortunes, moreover, of all races seem to be subject to like fluctuations. Once China appears to have had vitality she does not now enjoy, and so Greece. If societies of the white race today can boast of incomparable vitality, it should not be forgotten that among them are some which, though once vigorous, are now impotent, and that others now displaying marvelous vital surplusfulness were, a few thousand years ago, but feeble savage folk. Thus vital surplus appears not to be peculiar to any race, nor of necessity an abiding quality of any society, whatever the race. Other factors aside from racial qualities must then be the determining ones. Environmental influences of one sort and another must furnish the chief explanation of differences between societies of the same racial elements. That such influences are the chief ones is indeed suggested when we make use of the term accumulation.

Multiplication of numbers taken as an index of increase of vitality finds its chief cause in the food supply. An environment flowing with milk and honey is the first requisite for anything beyond mere vegetation and reproduction sufficient for group survival. Where food is abundant and readily procured society generally tends to increase rapidly, and overflow with numbers. Polynesia, for example, affords a bountiful supply of excellent plant foods which are easily obtained. Its groups have always been populous. Similarly those sections of Asia and Africa abounding in edible plant and animal life have teemed with men. The influence of this factor has been equally manifest with

respect to civilized peoples, where societies have been planted in richly endowed lands like the United States. It has also become evident in cases where some new and cheap food has been discovered or introduced into an old country. The introduction of the potato into Ireland, for instance, caused the population to increase by millions in a relatively short time. More recently new and improved agricultural methods applied throughout Egypt have given greater supplies of food, following which the population, without immigration, in the space of fifteen years, leaped from seven millions to nine and three-fourths millions. A similar cause led the population of Java, under the Dutch, to increase in less than a century by nearly six times.

Multiplication of population is contingent not only upon abundant food but quite as much upon a stable supply. Where life is now feast, now famine, much increase is not probable. Periods of starvation induce sterility. Brinton is authority for the statement that in the famine ravished sections of the East widespread and lasting infertility results.[1] This probably explains in part why most primitive societies never became large. However, other causes also were at work to prevent the growth of population at that stage.

Among many ethnic peoples it is evident that population was kept stationary by the practice of infanticide. How this custom came to be established seems to be wholly a matter of conjecture; but its rise has been attributed to the difficulty a mother has in caring for more than one child at a time under primitive conditions. Regardless of how the practice originated, it appears that tribesmen very early sensed some connection between the food supply, group welfare and numbers of people, wherefore they took steps to keep down numbers by practising abortion or resorting to a more or less systematic killing of a portion

[1] D. G. Brinton, *The Basis of Social Relations*, p. 97.

of the newborn infants. Where such tradition prevailed, I suppose, about the only thing that could break it and lead to a substantial increase of population was an obvious increase of the means of subsistence; and this might result either from some fortuitous concurrence of circumstances, discovery of new foods or migration into a more bountiful habitat.

Although a plentiful and regular supply of food leads to surplus accumulation through multiplication, means that improve food utilization give surplus by inducing higher energizing. The arts of food preparation by which the digestive system is enabled to get the maximum calories with the least effort from what is consumed have proved a great boon to the heightening of vitality. Along with this the effects of a varied and well balanced diet have to be considered. Those who have managed to procure such a diet regularly and to prepare it for consumption in the most approved way are the best nourished peoples, and the ones energizing at the highest level. Some of the western nations have such a diet, but others fall short of it. The peoples of northwest Europe and North America are particularly fortunate in this. The results appear in the greater number of kilogrammeters of work they customarily perform in comparison with the less well nourished nations of Southern Europe. There is a marked difference, for instance, between the German, Englishman, Scandinavian, or American, and the Greeks and Italians in this respect. Where American and Italian laborers work side by side great difference in efficiency and endurance is seen. Their customary diet is different, but let the same rations be provided for both and the disparity largely disappears. Actual experiments have apparently demonstrated the fact that the Italian on the American's rations approximates the latter's output in work.[2]

[2] E. H. Starling, *The Feeding of Nations*, p. 68.

A more striking difference is seen when the highly civilized nations are compared with primitive groups. By the use of well cooked foods of a varied and properly balanced sort, civilized man has greatly surpassed the savage in vital energy. Some one has calculated that his working ability has been augmented in this manner by at least one hour per day. This means the addition in the course of a normal lifetime of two to three years of working time. This signifies in other words gain of endurance or capacity for exertion, which simply means removal of the fatigue limit, giving "a freer and more buoyant life, and a visible increase in the quantity and quality of work per hour."[3]

Increased longevity generally means gain of vital surplus. Possibly primitive groups sometimes made acquisitions in this direction. Binder suggests that they did so by discovering and moving into more salubrious habitats than the ones customarily occupied by nature peoples.[4] If from the miasmic lowlands, where early man probably dwelt, some chanced to wander into high plateaus, and, tasting the more exhilarating air and finding freedom from insect pests, remained, and induced their clansmen to join them, a new society made up of a stock having a longer life span and superior vitality in general, because of a more healthful habitat, would naturally arise. Miss Semple has pointed out the fact that the highlands of tropical climes have vigorous stocks, while the lowlands are occupied by a devitalized people. She shows how in Mexico, Central and South America the early seats of civilization were above the 2,000 meter line, and how to-day three-fourths or more of the population of Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia live in the plateau basins.[5] This seems to verify the con-

[3] Irving Fisher, "Report of National Vitality," National Conservation Commission, Bulletin No. 30, 1909, p. 666.
[4] R. Binder, *Health and Social Progress*, p. 202.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

tention that some groups did come into vital surplus by migrating from less to more salubrious habitats.

Other factors have probably played a larger part in lengthening the span of life. One has been the proper preparation of foods, another the use of a greater variety of them, and a third the discovery of disease-controlling agencies, and hygienic methods of living. Civilized man has profited chiefly from these. It is possible, of course, that in some cases lengthening the average tenure of existence has tended to lower the social vitality by increasing senescence, but normally such has not been the result. On the contrary, it has probably been quite otherwise, for as Metchnikoff suggested, the working period of life tends to shift forward as life lengthens. During the last two or three centuries both the absolute and relative length of the working period has been increased.[6]

Among savages early maturity and early decay is the rule. "The Australian," says Brinton, "is a Nestor who reaches fifty years."[7] In contrast the average duration of life among the most highly civilized Europeans and Americans is not far from forty-five to fifty years. Here are the averages for various countries as reported by Fisher: Sweden, 50.9 years for males and 53.6 for females; Denmark, 50.2 and 53.2; in France, 45.7 and 49.1; in England and Wales 44.1 and 47.7; in Massachusetts 44.1 and 46.4; in Italy, 42.8 and 43.1; in Prussia, 41.0 and 44.5; in India, 23.0 and 24.0, respectively.[8] Since the sixteenth century average longevity in Europe has been raised from twenty years or less to the present level, showing fully one hundred per cent gain.[9] Greater gains than ever before are now being made by the most advanced nations, if the calculations of Fisher and Newsholme are right. The

[6] E. Metchnikoff, *Prolongation of Life.*
[7] D. G. Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
[8] Irving Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 638.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 724.

former shows that in Massachusetts and England life is increasing at the rate of 14 to 16 years per century, while in Prussia the increase is as high as 27 years. The following table gives the summary of the lengthening of life per century:[10]

RATE OF INCREASE OF LIFE TENURE

| | *Years* |
|---|---|
| During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries | 4 |
| During the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century | 9 |
| Present rate in Massachusetts | 14 |
| Present rate in Europe | 17 |
| Present rate in Prussia | 27 |
| Present rate in India | 0 |

The latter thinks that ten to eleven years have been added to the average duration of the Englishman's life during the last three or four decades. He estimates that the present generation will live in the aggregate "nearly ten million additional years of life, of which the greater part will be lived during the working period of life."[11] More significant still, Finkelnburg shows that not only is the average duration of human life increasing, but the rate of increase is also increasing.[12]

A further element of vital surplus is leisure. The first important acquisitions of it came through slavery. Societies that first made much use of this means had reached the agricultural stage, since before that it was not possible to profitably employ the labor of others. Where this was done, however, free time accrued to the master class. A small leisure class in some form, or at least one released from ordinary toil, is not uncommon among races at the upper levels of ethnic culture. A more extensive class with almost unlimited leisure marked the advance of ancient

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 724, 725.

[11] Sir Arthur Newsholme, "The Increasing Socialization of Medicine," *The Survey*, Jan. 3, 1919, pp. 357-362.

[12] Irving Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 724.

civilizations over primitive groups. In Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome the slave class outnumbered the masters. It was often perhaps many times more numerous, if Athens may be considered at all typical. The leisure of those early civilizations was thus primarily due to slavery.

In addition to leisure accumulation by appropriating the energies of slaves, the invention of machines and the tapping of nature's forces to amplify man's strength also have been important sources. Societies resourceful in the employment of such agencies have magnified human strength ten, fifty, a hundred, perhaps a thousand or even ten thousandfold. However, it has been only the western nations that in the last two centuries have drawn strength from these sources. The greatest disparity has thus arisen between eastern and western civilization in the matter of vital surplus. It takes, for instance, four or five Malays or Chinese to do the work of one European. Alongside the savage with a few simple tools the man of industrial society stands indeed a veritable giant by virtue of his machines. And when we consider the forces of nature which he has grasped, and wields like an Olympian god, the extent of surplus he may command begins to be very impressive. He has amplified his strength by the power of the winds and the waves and the lightning; he has appropriated the stores of ages of sunlight in coal and oil and gas; in short, he has learned how to touch the latent energies of the globe until they become as vital energies, and how to beckon the current forces of the physical world about him until they rise with the strength of Titans to be his servants. All this means in the last analysis increase of leisure. And since the beginning of the eighteenth century that increase has been unparalleled. It has come to western societies not to be equally distributed among all classes, but to be enjoyed by all in greater measure than ever before since the dawn of civilization. Slaves have been set free, and, generally

speaking, all men have gained release from complete bondage to toil. On the whole, society in industrial lands is rich in surplus time, either actual or potential.

It is possible that the rise of machines and modern industrial methods has to some extent given vital accumulation by selecting a type of man particularly fitted for just such exploits. In other words, a larger portion of the population may be becoming keener and more versatile mentally as a result of this experience. Such is the opinion of Graham Wallas who has said that "a much greater proportion of the human species than was the case two centuries ago now belongs to those European breeding-stocks whose mental elasticity and power of forming habits of sustained industry have so far enabled them to acquire most easily, and exploit most fully, the industrial methods which depend on mechanical energy." [13]

The accumulation of stores of vital energy of a psychical nature is to be seen also in increased rationality and foresight. To this end certain environmental conditions are probably conducive, as has been shown in Chapter I. Buckle thought them to inhere in a natural world whose aspects were moderate. Where the surroundings are tame and friendly rather than terrifying and overawing he thought reason had the best chance to develop. Otherwise, emotion and superstition, he believed, would be induced. On this ground he endeavored to explain the difference in rationality between India and Greece. In his opinion the overpowering aspects of nature or distracting physical stimuli made the former emotional, and the friendly world of the latter bestowed larger gifts of reason. Perhaps, among primitive men, reason was nourished by this sort of environment, but I am disposed to think its development was favored far more by the acquisition of knowledge about and an increasing triumph over nature. Such ex-

[13] *Our Social Heritage*, p. 19.

periences give both release from fear and free range to whatever thought power society already has. If, at the same time, the situation gives security from human foes and an abiding confidence in the possibilities of life, the chances are favorable to the growth of rationality. However, where such conditions tend to monotony, they, no doubt, prove fruitless. Life must be sufficiently vicissitudinous to stimulate as well as sufficiently successful and secure to give confidence.

People who succeeded in domesticating animals gained thereby greater security of life and influences promoting foresight. Brinton lays much stress upon this. He says, "The mental growth of many peoples has been inseparably linked to a single animal. Thus, the Tartars of the steppes have their horses, the Todas their cows, the Tuaregs their camels, without which their social organizations would be wholly lost." [14]

Rationality has been promoted, no doubt, more often by favorable stock sifting than by any direct influence of environment. Where the most virile, daring, fearless, and resourceful types of men have been sifted out of old societies and reassembled into new ones, superior mental ability, in so far as it can be distinguished from other factors, has usually appeared in the new group. The contact that takes place in such cases between more or less divergent types having different customs and beliefs is highly stimulating in its effects. The mental potential is apparently greatly heightened. It is believed that societies thus formed have in all ages attained to greatest rationality, Greece, England, and Japan being notable examples.

Certain adherents of the biologic cult [15] are quite sure that nations after reaching the civilized stage have not

[14] D. G. Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 192.
[15] See L. Stoddard, *The Revolt Against Civilization.*

accumulated mental surplus except by the infiltration of savage or barbarian blood. For it is argued that the state of civilization which replaces natural selection by social selection and preserves inferior mental types which outbreed all others brings race decay. It is argued further that in the ancient world, full of nature peoples who were devoid of all inferiority, civilized societies stood every chance of being renewed by the incursion of such peoples, and that they were, indeed, so renewed very frequently. Thus, so long as any civilized nation dwelt next to the sources of good barbarian stocks, it was likely to grow in ability. Without agreeing to most of this theorizing, we may, nevertheless, concede it to be true that ancient civilizations did draw mental power from the infusion of new and vigorous stocks. But it is very doubtful whether ancient civilizations had any unique advantage over modern ones that are being built up by the immigrant stocks of other civilized nations. For these nations also have apparently grown in average mental ability by the mixing process.

Social life or intercommunication has always played a large, if not the major part, in developing man's mental power. It has afforded the most effective sort of stimulation to mental activity, for the brain is the chief organ of intercommunication. Whatever, therefore, has increased and facilitated intercommunication as any means of recording language or agency for transmitting thought through time and space, and whatever has multiplied, widened or diversified the communicating group itself has contributed directly to the expansion of the mind of man.

In the several ways enumerated, and perhaps in others wholly unperceived, vital surplus is accumulated.

One more condition of general bearing remains to be noticed. How the surplus is utilized always qualifies accumulation. If, for instance, it is expended chiefly in mul-

tiplication of numbers, there is gain until the food resources are overreached, and then an unfavorable reaction follows. Famine, undernourishment, morbidity, infertility, and vital diminution result. This has happened in China. Great numbers of superfluous men toil at numerous semi-useless forms of labor for rice and millet that barely keep soul and body together. Practically all other forms of vitality surplus have been sacrificed for reproduction, with deterioration of physical energy and especially stagnation of mental activity apparently resulting. The intense struggle for mere vegetative existence has crowded out the very instinct for mental life on a higher plane.[16]

Futile expenditure of vital energy is quite as unproductive and harmful as when accumulation runs in one direction alone. Primitive societies are unquestionably much given to dissipating energy stores in useless activities of one sort or another. They know not how to use them, save in endless repetition of fruitless ceremonials and enslaving customs. Thus, ordinarily they do not get ahead, but remain relatively static. Whenever people have learned how to use their leisure wisely they have come into more of it. Such knowledge has often turned out to be the very genius of surplus accumulation.

Far more detrimental than futile utilization is the dissipation of vital surplus in wanton indulgence. Both savage and civilized peoples have thwarted advancement and courted decay in this way. It would be difficult to cite a case of any whole nation where this has taken place, but there have been classes in every civilized society following the way of ease, vacuity, pleasure, and vice. We have them especially to-day in the "idle rich," the leisure class, and the high society circles, among whom extravagance, conspicuous display, a breakneck race for excitement, and a

[16] A. C. Reed, "The Present China," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 4, pp. 58, 59.

continuous round of amusement bordering on Saturnalian orgies, spell destruction.

It seems to be a law of the organic world that misdirected energies not only cut short energy acquisition, but bring deterioration. One illustration drawn far, indeed, from human affairs, and yet applicable because following much the same law, is the case of the Trilobitic denizens of early paleozoic seas. These creatures, quick of wit and agile, living in the midst of plentiful food and beset with few enemies, found life easy. They were endowed with surplus, but used it to develop spines, excrescences, and ornamental embellishments of all sorts. They wasted their substance in riotous living, as it were, and from that moment began to decline, so say the paleontologists.[17] Much the same is it with classes of men who squander their vital surplus in luxurious ease and wanton living.

As far as the utilization of vital surplus can promote further accumulation, effort must be directed to the mastery of men and nature, in order to get leisure, to promote the development of tradition, giving release from fear, so that reason may flourish; and to the building of organization that will enable the largest possible number of people to live and energize to a maximum level.

### Traditional Surplus

It is hard to picture man at traditional zero; it is perhaps impossible to discover just how he began to achieve, and quite out of the question to follow step by step his cultural acquisitions. Some six thousand years ago well-advanced societies appeared, and antedating these by another five or perhaps six thousand years still others engaged in herding animals and tilling the soil are glimpsed. But

[17] K. F. Mather, "Parables from Paleontology," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 122, pp. 36, 37.

we cannot penetrate to the beginning, nor yet successfully scan much of the interval between the dawn and mid-day of cultural history. The social world as known to present day science must furnish most of the clues to what happened in prehistoric ages. Unfortunately, we cannot be certain that the past lies open in the present, especially as regards the conditions favorable to achievement. Therefore, in tracing the accumulation of tradition surplus, it will only be feasible to call attention to such factors as are known to be effective, and to leave the rest to imagination.

Numerous theories of cultural evolution have been advanced. One holds the physical environment to be the chief factor either as a creative agency itself or the material upon which man works. In the one case it is viewed as stimulating, and in the other as a limiting determinant. A second theory attributes all to accidental discovery and imitation. A third has been called the "habit environment" theory. It sees culture growing in response to established ways of doing things which were formed originally by responses to the physical environment. A fourth considers instincts, such as curiosity, workmanship, imitation, etc., in addition to environment and habit as being the tradition-building factors. And a fifth calls itself the "socio-psychic theory of culture." "It emphasizes," to quote its author, "on the one hand, that culture is a social matter, that is, a product of group life; and on the other, that it is a matter of ideas and of the intercommunication of ideas."[18]

The notion of the last mentioned author is that the dominant factor is man's rationalizing and inventive power plus his ability to communicate ideas and the power of the group to appropriate them. In other words, it is man's

[18] This is Professor C. A. Ellwood's theory. In fact, the summary just set forth follows this author's article, "Theories of Cultural Evolution" in the *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 23, pp. 779, 800.

inherent ability to originate and to learn. This is certainly a factor of the highest importance, and taken together with the others stressed in the several theories mentioned, gives a pretty comprehensive view of what builds social tradition. And Professor Ellwood takes this synthetic view, giving due credit to crises in the physical environment, psychic accidents, borrowing, instincts, habituation, along with the rationalizing and socializing process.

In the following discussion we shall try to indicate how the several factors have contributed to the rise of traditional surplus, but we shall not adhere to any systematic treatment of the various theories.

It is certain that vital surplus has always been requisite for achievement. If it takes the form of imagination and reason, people become curious, bold, and venturesome. New experiences and beliefs are then welcomed, when otherwise only routine and habit would prevail. This has been duly recognized by numerous writers on social subjects. "Low vitality," says one, "produces aversion to activity and begets veneration for the past. Abundance of energy is needed if new ventures are to be entered upon." [19] More emphatically has another spoken to the same effect. He says, "Prosperous times and the great rewards of enterprise are the strongest incentives to new beliefs, because they intensify happiness, afford freer play to the imagination, and give new material for inductive reasoning. Shift the conditions from prosperity to adversity, introduce disease and famine, let war bear its harvest of suffering or let dangers and uncertainties of an occupation multiply, and a swarm of superstitions will appear to fasten men more firmly to the sources of their ills and to perpetuate their miseries long after the inciting causes have disappeared.[20]

[19] R. Binder, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
[20] S. N. Patten, *The New Basis of Civilization*, p. 176.

Necessity in any form is rarely the mother of invention, notwithstanding the general belief to the contrary. A margin of vitality over and above the demands of necessity gives the spur to progress. This applies particularly to primitive men, for the exigencies of necessity are not so pressing as to civilized men. Weakness does not arouse them, but rather stupefies. Discovery, knowledge, magic, skill, whatever acquisitions of traditions useful or otherwise were made in early ages must have sprung from the strivings of men overflowing with strength and vigor. Ratzel calls attention to this among the present day natives of South Africa, concerning whom he has the following to say: "It establishes with all the force of an experiment that it is not the schoolmaster need that has most power to compel a progress toward culture, but that it is only in a tranquil development, guaranteed by peace and plenty, that the higher stages, even in the matter of huts and house building can be reached." [21]

Civilized men enjoying abundant surplus are not infrequently stimulated by curtailment or abatement of energy, provided it does not go too far. Undoubtedly not a little tradition is generated under such circumstances, and consequently we have the notion that necessity is the mother of invention. But the truth of the matter is that some form of surplus remains the great source of tradition invention, and in highly developed civilizations, especially, this source becomes surplus tradition itself. Hence, instead of its being necessity, "it is nearer the truth to say," with Ogburn, "that the existing culture is the mother of inventions." [22]

It is natural to think that the elements of his physical environment to which early man reacted were the primary and chief sources of his tradition in both its spiritual and

[21] *History of Mankind*, Vol. I, p. 107.
[22] W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, p. 83.

material forms. Furthermore, the character of these elements must have been the primary factors determining the particular kind of tradition that arose and the rate of its growth. If the elements were stimulating they would normally foster cultural development, but if unstimulating or overstimulating they would hinder its rise. We shall, then, look in the first place to the physical environment as the source of cultural surplus.

A varied, fertile and richly endowed environment naturally fosters or attracts to itself many people. Society becomes populous. Mass and density in turn eventually tend to bring about change in structure. Division of labor arises and the kinship bond yields to functional organizations. The appearance of the latter type of structure is particularly favorable to the development, storing and transmission of every sort of art and skill or in other words to the accumulation of tradition. Under the simpler social order when each man was self-supporting and a jack of all works skill necessarily remained largely undeveloped. But when differentiation was forced by increase of numbers and groups began to focus on special functions then it became possible for skill to grow without limit.[23] So the nature of the environment operates in this indirect manner to build social tradition. However, its more direct influences, as they must have played upon primitive groups before the important structural change to which we have alluded took place, deserve immediate attention.

The first considerable body of knowledge gained by any society must have pertained to food and the art of procuring it. The determining factor in this acquisition inheres in the resources of the environment. The natural food supply may act as a challenge or a sedative, according as it is easily appropriated or secured only by the exercise of wits. Where an extensive and varied fauna, especially

[23] A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem*, p. 433.

of large mammals, abounds, the food quest proves much more stimulating than otherwise. Under such conditions, rather than under more easy and less inciting ones, man's wits come more fully into play, and tradition readily develops. Primitive societies so favored generally have the richest folklore, the greatest skill and the most invention. They are the ones, moreover, that seem to make headway most quickly in devising arts of food control and preservation whereby existence ceases to be a mere hand to mouth affair. All in all, probably no other factor meant more to primitive man for the acquisition of tradition than an environment rich in animal life.

Closely connected with the tradition rising from the food quest is that of magic and religion. Societies inhabiting dynamic environments, that is, areas full of formidable animals and natural phenomena, terrifying, unusual, and awe-inspiring, were probably those first to develop along this line, since reactions to manifest power, to the ununderstood, to the awful, to the unusual, or to what is "apprehended but not comprehended" in the world constitute the essence of magic and religion.[23a] Moreover, much of the subsequent elaboration and growth of religious tradition received its chief impetus from the phenomena of the physical universe, and societies favorably situated developed great systems of theology and worship which others could not achieve.

The magical and religious tradition in many cases attained foremost importance, and, singularly enough, in its efforts to foil the evils of the world often created a snare that caught and held fast man himself, and hindered him in all other lines of achievement. Enmeshed in the toils of taboo, artificial fear, erroneous belief, and the dead routine of religious custom, the further advancement of

[23a] J. T. Shotwell, *The Religious Revolution of To-day;* E. Durkheim, *The Elemental Forms of the Religious Life.*

primitive man became a problem of breaking these fetters and escaping the doldrums of the situation. Many never succeeded in doing it, but some did, and to them really pertain the annals of history.

Escape generally came, I suppose, as the result of contacts with other societies culturally different. Sometimes it may have been merely through migration into a new environment, regardless of social contacts. But in one way or the other new achievements were provoked. Folk migrations of primitive people have been common occurrences. Such migrations have generally led to social contacts of a warlike character, involving conquest and subjugation, but the important thing always has been the collision of customs, beliefs, and idea-systems. Under such circumstances the old body of tradition fails to work with complete success; its thraldom is broken; a critical state of mind is induced by the opposition of different customs, and out of the new experiences a wider, freer, richer, more practical body of knowledge, belief and custom emerges.[24] It is not merely the old, larger grown; but through fusion and modification it is an entirely new culture, or at least one with entirely new elements in it.[25] In emphasizing how very important such commingling is Professor Teggert says, "Had there ever been but one system of ideas common to all men, advancement would have been impossible, for progress in ideas springs from comparison, and a sense of difference would not arise from contemplation of different instances of the same thing. Conversely, the critical spirit is easily enough aroused by the juxtaposition of different means for attaining the same end; so that different ob-

[24] F. J. Teggert, *The Processes of History*; see especially pp. 110, 112, 148, 151. On the hypothesis of prolonged struggles between opposing groups which gives mental release from the authority of established idea-systems, this author attempts to explain all history.

[25] W. H. R. Rivers also emphasizes this in his studies. See *The History of Melanesian Society.*

servances for effecting the same result, different mythological explanations of the same phenomena, when brought into contact, may be expected to lead to questionings and comparisons."[26] Societies undergoing such changes are obviously the gainers of tradition surplus.

The peoples who wandered most or formed the greatest number of social contacts, and yet maintained continuity of cultural life, may have been in earlier ages the most rapid builders of tradition, if not always of material tradition, then of idea-systems. Maybe Israel's superior ethical culture is thus to be accounted for. Her early wanderings together with many collisions with Egypt, Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome, along with other results less good, gave enrichment and refinement again and again to her moral and legal codes. If the wanderings of the Aryans were to be followed in detail and their gleanings from other peoples sifted out, the secret of their marvelous cultural advancement would doubtless be found to lie chiefly in their extensive wanderings and many contacts. And it would be discovered also that some branches of that stock made much more rapid progress than others, since they formed early contacts with stimulating cultures. When the general dispersion took place at the close of the last Ice Age they scattered to various parts of Europe. The Teutons and Slavs went far north to the Baltic regions and the Celts to France and England. For many centuries these groups remained isolated and without contacts with stimulating cultures. Consequently they made slow progress. In contrast those branches that went southward into the Grecian and Roman peninsulas soon came into contact with the older civilizations of Egypt, Crete and Mesopotamia, and so developed rapidly. The Greeks were the first to make such contacts. Hence they became the first civilized people of Europe. The Romans next formed

[26] F. J. Teggert, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

them and were the second to attain a high culture. Then followed the Celts of France and England. After that the Teutons, who were moving south, and finally the Slavs, acquired civilization.[27]

McCabe has advanced the very plausible theory that it was the forced concentration and contact of many primitive groups that gave rise to the first historic civilizations of the world.[28] The last Ice Age with its 500,000 years of winter forced the paleolithic races of Europe to take refuge in the eastern Mediterranean regions or those lands subsequently flooded by the melting ice and known to Greek and Egyptian legend as the "lost Atlantis."[29] Here the different cultures were thrown together and acting upon one another produced civilization. Out of this came the New Stone Age in Europe, the rapid developments in Crete and in the Nile Valley and Mesopotamia, whither pioneers had migrated.

The following excellent summary of facts from the history of several civilizations will serve to illuminate further the point I am arguing: "In confirmation of the hypothesis that the changes which have contributed to human advancement have ensued from the collision of groups from widely different habitats, and hence of different idea-systems, we may point to the initial stages of those great outbursts of intellectual activity which have distinguished every people which has risen above the level of primitive man. So, the historian of China is forced to repeat, from chapter to chapter, the formula: 'first the successful invasion, the destruction of the old power, and then the formation of new nations, governments, and types of men,' and the summary of results in each case is typified in the statement that 'not the least of the Mongols' gifts to China was the

[27] J. McCabe, *The Evolution of Civilization*, pp. 88, 89.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

stimulus and fertilization of the native intellect in the domain of the imagination.' Similarly, Vincent Smith, the latest historian of India, remarks that 'the rule of the able and long-lived monarchs of the Gupta dynasty coincided with an extraordinary outburst of intellectual activity of all kinds. The personal patronage of the kings, no doubt, has some effect, but deeper causes must have been at work to produce such results. Experience proves that the contact or collision of diverse modes of civilization is the most potent stimulus to intellectual and artistic progress, and, in my opinion, the eminent achievements of the Gupta period are mainly due to such contact with foreign civilizations, both on the east and on the west.' Again, the entire history of Babylonia and Assyria is an epitome of such situations, and this leads a recent historian to observe: 'It may be put down as an axiom that nowhere does a high form of culture arise without the commingling of diverse elements.' 'The Euphrates valley from the time it looms upon the historical horizon,' he continues, 'is the seat of a mixed population. Egyptian culture is the outcome of the mixture of Semitic with Hamitic elements. Civilization begins in Greece with the movements of Asiatic peoples, partly, at least, non-Aryan, across the Ægean sea. In Rome we find the old Aryan stock mixed with a strange element known as Etruscan. In modern times France, Germany and England furnish illustrations of the process of the commingling of diverse ethnic elements leading to advanced forms of civilization.' Ultimately, attention may be called to Petrie's conclusion in his memorable study of the revolutions of civilization that 'every civilization of a settled population tends to incessant decay from its maximum condition; and this decay continues until it is too weak to initiate anything, when a fresh stock comes in, and utilizes the old stock to graft on, both in blood and culture. As soon as the mixture is well started, it rapidly grows on

the old soil, and produces a new wave of civilization. There is no new generation without a mixture of blood; parthenogenesis is unknown in the birth of nations.' '' [30]

An equally informing story of culture gathering is that of peaceful borrowing and assimilation or grafting on by contact through trade, etc., where neither forced relations, violent collisions nor folk wanderings were involved. As Maitland remarks, ''The rapidly progressive groups have been just those which have not been independent, which have not worked out their own salvation, but have appropriated alien ideas, and have thus been enabled, for anything we can tell, to leap from stage A to stage X without passing through any intermediate stages. Our Anglo-Saxon ancestors did not arrive at the alphabet or at the Nicene Creed by traversing a long series of 'stages'; they leapt to the one and to the other.'' [31] Progress by leaping from one culture to another through borrowing is illustrated in the case of the northern European countries appropriating the newly discovered classical tradition. The Renaissance simply marked the outburst of their surplusfulness. Oriental nations afford other instances of similar borrowing. A notable case was that of Japan, which, in a generation, took over occidental culture wholesale. In so doing it quickly leaped from humble and impotent obscurity to a nation of first rank. All the industrial and commercial mores, the inventions, discoveries, and processes by which the West had mastered nature, Japan made its own. The cultural accumulations of millenniums were transferred in a few decades, and a pygmy people became a giant by the magic of a vast tradition surplus.

One has said it is obvious ''that the scientific and political achievements of the French, German and English peo-

[30] Herbert E. Cory, *The Intellectuals and the Wage Workers,* pp. 83-85.

[31] F. W. Maitland, *Doomsday Book and Beyond.*

ples, the art, literature, and philosophy of Greek and Roman, of Hebrew, Hindoo, and Mongolian, and the cultural inventions of the American, are practically immortal human possessions, a common social heritage open to the usage of all mankind, and having essentially the same constructive value for one race or nation as for the other."[32] But this is not altogether true. The culture of a people does not have the same value or in some cases any value to other nations. The feat of borrowing and utilizing the culture of other societies is apparently one that not all groups are able to perform. If they were, modern conditions of communication and easy contact ought to lead to a common culture throughout the world. But such results are not to any perceptible degree apparent. There are often great barriers that cannot be overcome. One is the too great difference in cultural stage. For this cause savages do not readily become civilized. They do not perceive the advantage or feel the need of the superior tradition. They cannot utilize much of it; it is not grist to their mill. They may even be afraid of the new and take steps to protect themselves against it. Still most primitive people are able to take over certain phases of a higher culture. They usually adopt without great difficulty the use of new foods, drinks, narcotics, customs of dress, methods of shelter and simple tools and weapons from superior peoples with whom they come in contact. The American Indians, for example, received the gun and horse from the white man.[33] The borrowing of primitive from higher culture seems to be confined largely to the more superficial material things. The idea-system of the superior culture is quite beyond the primitive man's experience and so not received by him. Likewise, the fundamental material culture, answering to no need, is not ac-

[32] William Patten, *The Grand Strategy of Evolution*, p. 261.
[33] Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 116.

cepted. The facts are that each cultural level is a coördinated whole highly resistant to change. It will readily take in some foreign elements, but resists wholesale adoption. A higher culture may, indeed, impose itself upon a lower one, and after a long period of persistent pressure cause the lower to assimilate enough of the higher to revolutionize it. This happened in Mexico and Peru under Spanish influences. Apart from this method, however, primitive people do not take over except in a fragmentary fashion, cultures widely different from their own.

However, where societies have enough in common to understand the merits of each others' achievements, they readily borrow. Ethnic peoples freely exchange tradition, and so do those of similar political and industrial organizations. In fact, all who have attained to a fairly high degree of civilization are, as a rule, able to receive with profit achievements from one another. Even so, they do not borrow indiscriminately, but generally selectively. What is taken depends much upon what will fit into the particular type of culture. Every distinct geographical area has a culture adapted to its peculiarities,[34] and that culture acts as the selective agent.

Societies not infrequently borrow to their own hurt as well as to their profit. Tradition may be imported that diverts interest from useful to harmful pursuits, that proves to be evil custom, or that stultifies the kind of effort that yields wholesome internal growth of culture. Spiritual more often than material tradition is apt to be of a subversive nature. I will cite a single instance from the history of Græco-Roman civilization. Let this instance be couched in the language of Professor Robinson: "After the Hellenes were absorbed into the vast Roman Empire, critical thought and creative intelligence—rare and precarious things at best—began to decline, at first slowly and then

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 55, 56.

with fatal rapidity and completeness. Moreover, new and highly uncritical beliefs and modes of thought became popular. They came from the Near East—Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor—and largely supplanted the critical traditions of the great schools of Greek philosophy. The Stoic and Epicurean dogmas had lost their freshness. The Greek thinkers had all agreed in looking for salvation through intelligence and knowledge. But eloquent leaders arose to reveal a new salvation, and over the portal of truth they erased the word 'Reason' and wrote 'Faith' in its stead; and the people listened gladly to the new prophets, for it was necessary only to *believe* to be saved, and believing is far easier than thinking.'' [35]

No known society living in isolation or in relative seclusion has ever evolved a high culture. Sufficient contacts to facilitate borrowing have been necessary to advancement; and the greatest borrowers have pushed ahead most rapidly. They have become surplusful and have reached out to lay hold of whatever other tradition they could get, and thus have continued to accumulate. Such is the manner of the western nations to-day; they persistently and with set purpose seek the new everywhere.

We must not overlook a third important source of cultural surplus, for in addition to that which is derived from direct response to the physical environment and to that which is acquired by contacts with other groups, societies accumulate surplus tradition by reacting to their own body of culture. There is, in other words, independent origination or sheer creation based on and spun out of the existing cultural elements. It is, so to speak, an ''inner growth'' of the culture. Wherever any considerable body of greatly diversified tradition has been piled up, as in all highly developed civilizations, this, indeed, becomes the chief source whence surplus continually springs. It is

[35] J. H. Robinson, *The Mind in the Making*, pp. 118, 119.

notably the case with the growth of material culture in the industrial nations of the present time. They have ceased to gather very much from the physical world directly, and no longer profit from contacts to the extent they once did, but from their own stocks of inventions draw an endless train of other inventions. It is a process of invention adding to itself and of invention becoming piled on invention in a cumulative manner.

Whenever the stage is reached where the body of tradition is so extensive and diversified that it begins to be the chief means of further cultural development, then it is that society begins to accumulate cultural surplus, especially in its material forms, most rapidly. At this stage it passes the threshold of true creativeness endowed with power to accumulate not only rapidly but with considerable assurance and ease. All nations included in the Great Society of the west have reached this stage.

The rate of accumulation by origination is dependent upon a number of things besides the existing culture. There must be widespread diffusion of the culture if invention is to flourish, for presumably the more minds there are knowing the tradition and dealing with it the more chances there will be for creativeness. Again, the vital surplus or mental ability of the group plays a prominent part. Then there is the factor of harmony between the material and spiritual phases, for one may oppose and hinder or encourage and assist the other. In fact, both influences are usually to be seen at work. The nonmaterial in a measure hinders the development of material culture, and material culture curtails the growth of spiritual tradition.[36]

When we consider further the building of tradition among the men of early ages it is clear that no extensive

[36] See W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, Part II, for a fuller discussion of this problem.

accumulations of non-material culture were possible before the arts of writing and making and preserving records were developed. With material culture it was somewhat different. Embodied in forms more or less durable, it was more readily and securely transmitted from generation to generation, and so less dependent upon the making of records. But in the absence of aids in handling things spiritual, if valuable achievements were not often actually lost, their full use and further growth were very much hindered. It is quite as Gibbon said, that "without some species of writing no people has ever made any considerable progress in the abstract sciences, or ever possessed, in any tolerable degree of perfection, the useful and agreeable arts of life." [37] Writing once discovered and put into practice, man's memory was greatly extended and expanded. Not only this, but with the writing of tradition the conservative power of the old men, who are the repositories of knowledge in primitive society, was broken. Henceforth knowledge became more the concern of the plastic and innovating age groups, and a wholly new departure favorable to tradition building was thus brought about. So society not only found itself able to add indefinitely to knowledge, but also found itself encouraging a more likely class of seekers after it.[38]

From the time men first made records to the present day the accumulation of surplus tradition has been dependent in no small way upon the perfection of the arts of setting down and transmitting thought, experiences, discoveries and knowledge of every sort. From crude hieroglyphics painted on messenger sticks, to records impressed on clay tablets or laboriously cut in stone and then to the printed

[37] Quoted by C. H. Cooley in *Social Organization*, p. 73, from Gibbon's *The History of Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Millman's Ed., Vol. I, p. 354.

[38] Spencer and Gillin, *The Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 10-15, 421.

page freely circulated, millenniums intervene, marking by numerous steps the growing ability of society to gather tradition. Finally the printing press provided the means of disseminating widely the social heritage among the masses, and of quickening human minds that before were dormant. More creative ability was thus brought into action, and the stream of tradition began to be fed from more numerous sources. Presently there was a marked stirring of European society in the sixteenth century as evidence of the rising tides of achievement. Meanwhile, with the passing of time, the liberating and cheapening of the press has been the means of directly and indirectly of adding larger and larger volumes of tradition to the great stream, the swelling of whose floods goes on unabated throughout the western world.

Not a few students of society are accustomed to assign to slavery an important rôle in the building of tradition. Slaves permit a leisure class, and so, it is alleged, thought, invention, and origination along all lines were fostered. Certainly we cannot deny that opportunity for meditation was thus given to some, but whether it can safely be assumed that they actually devoted their leisure to the promotion of knowledge is another question. The rise of a class commanding leisure was at any event relatively late, and whatever its merit, profited peoples at the ethnic level but little. There is no clear evidence that slavery has played any special part in the cultural advancement of tribesmen. Ethnic nobilities are generally reported to be indolent and wanton; they are not seekers after new things, but stubborn followers of customary ways.

Among peoples that have attained a high state of civilization, the advantage of slavery is more to be considered. There is at that level a sufficient fund of tradition capital to give profitable employment to talent. The sacrifice of

the many to give leisure to the few under such conditions may turn out to the gain of culture; for the few, or some of them, will devote their leisure to thought, art, and the search for knowledge. Thus it is said of Greece that slavery was not merely an accompaniment, but the essential condition of her remarkable accomplishments, for take slavery away and you take away her long line of thinkers from Thales on; you take away Pericles, Phidias, Sophocles, Plato, and Aristotle. Perhaps, indeed, without slavery these men would not have arisen, and such richness of achievement would not have come to Greece, since in that age no important means of leisure save exploited human energy was available. But slavery may not have been so beneficial as often claimed. Robinson thinks that it was decidedly detrimental in this very case, since it hindered the Greeks from going on from mere philosophy as modern scientists have gone on with "vistas of the unachieved still ahead of them." He says: "Greek civilization was founded on slavery and a fixed condition of the industrial arts. The philosopher and scholar was estopped from fumbling with those everyday processes that were associated with the mean life of the slave and servant. Consequently there was no one to devise the practical apparatus by which alone profound and ever increasing knowledge of natural operations is possible. The mechanical inventiveness of the Greeks was slight, and hence they never came upon the lens; they had no microscope to reveal the minute, no telescope to attract the remote; they never devised a mechanical timepiece, a thermometer, nor a barometer, to say nothing of compass and spectroscope. Archimedes, it is reported, disdained to make any record of his ingenious devices, for they were unworthy the noble profession of a philosopher. Such inventions as were made were usually either toys or of a heavy practical character. So the next great stage forward in the exten-

sion of the human mind awaited the disappearance of slavery and the slowly dawning suspicion and final repudiation of the older metaphysics, which first became marked some three hundred years ago." [39]

If slavery really did prevent the Greeks from developing any considerable science or material tradition, its merits as a means of cultural advancement are greatly to be discounted. It is difficult, however, to get any true valuation of the institution either in Grecian society or anywhere else, for a lot of other factors are always operative at the same time. The several factors cannot be separated. There has been no time in the history of civilization until the last century or so when slavery was not prevalent among all civilized peoples, and in view of that fact it is impossible to isolate it and to adequately measure its influence or to judge just what society would have accomplished without it.

In certain more direct ways, however, slavery clearly augmented the body of tradition. One was by giving rise to the technique of human exploitation, discipline, and social control, all of which have stood the master class in good stead. Another was by inculcating habits of obedience, subserviency, and persistency in labor in great masses of men, thereby fostering industrial organization. New ethical codes were also molded. For the masses the slave morality so prominent in Stoicism and historic Christianity, and for the ruling class the morality of freedom and domination so obtrusive in the state and all success policies, took shape.

Wealth in forms other than human chattels has been far more influential in building tradition. We have already alluded to it in connection with food and vital surplus, but a further word is merited. A margin of wealth has

[39] J. H. Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 113.

always permitted and promoted freedom of thought and action; hence, the possibility of innovating ideas and inventions.

The rôle of wealth is unimportant, almost negligible, among societies of the lower ranks, since only rarely do any of them possess economic surplus. But civilized nations reap spiritual harvest through the use of riches. They are doing so especially to-day. Contrary to an opinion sometimes heard, lands that are plethoric with riches are just the ones that gather the greatest stores of social heritage. For they are the ones that endow tradition-making. Indeed, they are the ones that have set up inventing and discovering as an organized and subsidized business. So extensively has this been done that experimentation, research, and investigation have become regular pursuits. In scores of fields to which vast sums are annually applied numerous men delve in behalf of achievement. The results of their labors appear in a steadily increasing mass of cultural output.

Not the least significant outcome consists in an established belief in continuous and indefinite progress. In consequence thereof society tends in various quarters, if not as a whole, to become purposive or telic. Until perhaps the seventeenth century its labors in behalf of a richer culture were largely unconscious and without design. But of late, to further its ends, the accumulation of tradition has become a fine art. It is no longer left to chance or accident alone, but in numerous fields is a studied and carefully planned undertaking. By looking upon it and pursuing it in this light, western societies have achieved in a short space more than did all the world put together during millenniums of haphazard and blind groping. Beginning an intelligently directed quest, let us say, with Lord Bacon leading the sciences out of the house of bondage in his *Advancement of Learning,* and getting really

under way about a century ago, western society has bent its effort to piling knowledge on knowledge till each succeeding generation can look with pity upon the ignorance and paucity of heritage of the last while luxuriating in its own unexcelled power and glory.

While on the one hand wealth thus becomes a means to tradition building, on the other it hinders its rise. To the development of technical science and agencies for the control of nature money is freely devoted, but not so generously to the furtherance of social science. Human relations as expressed in privileges, rights, duties, obligations, laws, ethical codes, and political policies are realms, not to be sure wholly without change, but with scarcely any alteration assisted by the wealthy class unless such alteration is thought to be for its own advantage. Our capitalistic interests, generally speaking, block as far as practical the development of all schemes and devices looking toward the righting of basic human wrongs or the making of fundamental readjustments in society.[40]

Although we have arrived at an age that is consciously striving to make progress in the accumulation of tradition, no law can be said to govern the process of its building. So many factors are involved, so many unforeseen and uncontrollable elements enter in, so many circumstances qualify, and so many chance agencies play a part that cultural progress has always been lawless and lawless will remain. And yet a naïve belief in the perfectibility of mankind or in the ability of the race to shape its social ends leads individuals to try to formulate laws of cultural accumulation. One curious attempt in the field of tradition has recently been made by a belated discoverer of well seasoned sociological knowledge. The author in question says the accumulation of tradition will follow a law

[40] J. H. Robinson, *An Outline of the History of the Western European Mind.*

of logarithmic increase. Here is his formula: Total gain in T generations $= \frac{R}{R-1}(PR^T - P)$. $R$ equals the ratio of improvement or the number by which the progress, $P$, of one generation is to be multiplied to get the achievement of the next. Where—to use his illustration—$T$ equals 10 generations, the total gain works out 2,046 times the tradition of the generation whose body of tradition was taken as the starting point. This law, says the author, "operates in all fields of human interest," however not at the present time and never in the past, but will operate "when we once acquire sense enough to let it do so." [41]

To be sure, if man had sense enough, a great many laws might be operative that are not, but what boots it to formulate laws of social behavior whose validity is contingent upon nonexistent qualities or habits of the race? Nothing, of course, save the pleasure the dreamer gets from indulging his own fancy. But, regardless of the fictitious quality of the so-called law, is its basic principle that tradition among western peoples will henceforth accumulate with "accelerating acceleration" sound? It is extremely doubtful. Although it is true that knowledge builds on knowledge and tradition grows on tradition and that it has become so extensive that greater growth than ever before ought to follow, there can be no assurance that it will follow. Even continuous accumulation, to say nothing of accumulation at an increasing rate, is problematical. As a matter of fact, tradition has advanced by spurts.[42] The discovery of some great truth, the invention of a primary process or of a basic mechanical device, such as the doctrine of evolution, the application of steam power and the internal combustion engine, have always

[41] A. Korzybski, *Manhood of Humanity*, pp. 90-92.
[42] See W. F. Ogburn, *op. cit.*, pp. 105*ff*.

caused tradition to increase by leaps and bounds. But an impetus so given runs its course, then a slump comes unless and until something intervenes to spur things on again. It happens that during the last couple of centuries a remarkable series of basic discoveries in the western world has continually spurred tradition growth and the age has turned out to be one of unprecedented cultural achievement. But the feverish present must not delude us into thinking that its rate of achievement will go on forever. A halt in the onward march may come at any time, an impasse may be reached, and despite all hopes and plans and efforts an age of relative stagnation may settle down upon the most advanced nations, even as it did upon Egypt, Assyria, Phœnicia, Greece, Rome, Arabia, and Persia. Many things can bring this to pass as exhaustion of natural resources, stock depletion through war, overcrowding of population till stagnation comes as upon China, etc. It may well be as Edward Carpenter suggested in an essay on "Civilization; Its Cause and Cure," published a generation ago, that exhaustion comes by feverish progress, till peoples arrive at the perihelion of power so weakened that they can't go on, and, slumping, are never able to "come back." The continuous and indefinite, not even to mention an ever accelerating accumulation of traditional surplus, is not in any wise assured.

## Wealth Surplus

Societies that live by hunting and fishing subsist simply by appropriating nature's bounty. Except in the rarest cases they are unable to acquire wealth, and then it is chiefly in the form of superabundant food which prodigal nature has thrown in their way. Ordinarily for nature's peoples food supplies are meager, and allow no accumulation ahead of consumption. But without some accumula-

tion, or conditions that ordinarily afford a readily furnished larder, there is little chance that any people will acquire goods of a more permanent kind.

As a rule, it was not until artificial were substituted for natural means of subsistence that wealth accumulation became possible. This generally happened with the domestication of animals. Not all societies, however, were permitted to take this step, for not every quarter of the globe had highly useful species that could be tamed. For instance, neither North America nor Australia had any. But where men were fortunate enough to find in their habitats such species and were clever enough to subdue and breed them, the way to wealth was opened. Not only do flocks and herds give a plentiful and fairly stable food supply, but by natural multiplication they aggrandize their owners. So it is among pastors that we see the first significant signs of wealth, and in some cases the beginning of surplus.

A pastoral economy by no means, however, guarantees a margin of wealth. It is beset by too many hindrances. Pasture ranges are always limiting factors, and sometimes they fail to yield forage; then herds perish. There are, besides this, many fateful circumstances with which nomadic life is fraught; so that all in all only the more favorably situated and the lucky few ever waxed rich by animal herding alone.

More important in the long run than herding was the domestication of plants and the rise of the agricultural arts, especially when animals came to be used in connection with the latter. The origin and degree of development of agriculture among primitive people were almost entirely dependent upon the available plant life within their environment and the facility with which it could be increased in quantity by cultivation. Thus certain regions and not others led to the art and promoted settled societies

of soil-grubbers devoted to sowing and reaping, land-clearing and tool-making, that slowly added to their stores of permanent goods. Polynesia, for instance, was well-endowed with edible plants, though wanting in any large animal species. Here the native population developed a no mean agriculture. In ancient Hawaii a wide range of crop plants was easily produced, and the natives became good farmers.[43] So long, however, as society remained purely horticultural—that is, engaged in growing plants without at the same time breeding animals and using them for beasts of burden and motor power—though the aggregate wealth might become greater than that of any pastoral group, it was seldom able to attain an economic surplus such as pastors commonly achieve.

The regular and persistent exploitation of plants and animals together with a gradual improvement in the arts of husbandry has been a chief source of wealth ever since the beginning of primitive horticulture. The economic bases of early civilizations were thus laid, but wealth did not become considerable without extensive resort to another form of exploitation. I refer to the use of slaves as soil-grubbers, beasts of burden, and motor powers. Richly endowed regions under a fully developed slave system yielded abundant wealth. Egypt in early times became the synonym of riches. An exceptionally well-favored valley, mechanically and regularly fertilized by the Nile floods, gave every opportunity for the use of an army of slaves in the exploitation of nature. In consequence Egypt became the granary of antiquity, and the land of abundant wealth. Evidence of her affluence appeared in the great buildings she erected and the lavish consumption indulged in by her ruling class. Incidentally, it should be noted that the civilization of the Nile was enabled to amass a

[43] V. MacCaughey, "The Food Plants of the Ancient Hawaiians," *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 4, p. 80.

surplus, not alone because of superior production, but also because fairly well protected from constant despoliation from without. Since Egypt was peculiarly isolated and defended by natural barriers, conquerors did not lay waste nor robbers plunder her goods so often and so thoroughly as in the empire seats of Asia. Thus, continuity of development and wealth conservation were permitted, like to which scarcely another instance appeared anywhere on the globe during antiquity. Needless to say, all the civilized societies that were contemporaries of old Egypt derived much of the wealth they accumulated from a similar exploitation of nature through slave labor. So it was with Babylon, Persia, Crete, Greece, and Rome, all of which enjoyed at times no little economic surplus.

Later civilizations like the ancient ones found in agriculture a chief and sometimes the main source of gain. Growing traditions rendered this art increasingly profitable throughout many ages, but not until modern times when scientific knowledge gave great impetus to it did it ever yield such vast wealth to any nation. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries a whole new body of tradition regarding the various aspects of husbandry sprang up in England. This outburst of innovating knowledge may be said to mark the beginning of the age of scientific agriculture. Under its tuition the western nations have freely made use of whatever discoveries any of them have made, and have studiously sought to discover new things, to the end that immensely greater gifts from flocks and fields than were ever before dreamed of have been poured into the coffers of many nations.

Marvelous as is the whole range of agricultural tradition as a wealth-giving agency, there are countervailing elements lurking within. It is a highly artificial development over which man must stand guard lest it fall into ruin and fail him altogether. Built up by the selection of plants and

animals throughout long ages, by gathering them together from the most diverse parts of the earth, and by husbanding them generation after generation, modern agriculture has come to represent a most extreme disturbance of nature's balance. This is particularly true in the world of plants, certain species of which have been made unnaturally dominant, and thus rendered peculiarly vulnerable to the attacks of numerous insects. For such transformations have also meant cataclysms in the insect world, changing their habits, rate of multiplication and equilibrium of relations.[44]

So the result is a wealth-producing tradition on the one hand, and a menacing condition on the other, which makes it imperatively necessary for society to develop traditions of insect control that will give an artificial balance in place of a natural one, if agriculture is to yield much wealth. In fact, it has become a question whether the outlay for insect control will not become so great that it will prevent the gathering of any surplus at all from this pursuit.

The economic entomologists estimate that more than ten per cent of the agricultural production of western nations is annually destroyed by insects. In the United States this equals not less than a billion dollars' worth each year.[45] Moreover, the ravages of insects are rapidly increasing in spite of man's feeble effort to reduce them.[46] Possibly, they will so far triumph as to wipe out most of the gains that flow from modern agriculture, and render its further developments subject to the law of rapidly diminishing profits.

Throughout history the source of surplus wealth has been more often the exploitation of other societies than the exploitation of nature by the arts of agriculture. Robbery

[44] C. S. Brues, *Insects and Human Welfare*, Chapter II.
[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 40.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

has played a prominent part ever since the rise of a herding economy. Pastors generally have been notorious followers of this method. Among ethnic peoples they are usually the only ones to accumulate surplus, and they do it not so much because of the natural increase of their herds as by cattle stealing. By resorting to raiding and plundering neighboring pastors and horticulturists, the stronger societies of herdsmen greatly augment their holdings. This has been the practice in the pastoral regions of Asia and Africa in recent days, and so in Europe during ages long past. Any society acquiring wealth in this manner does so not, of course, by producing anything, but by impoverishing other societies.

Eventually this method of wealth getting led to conquest, the subjection of soil tillers, and the imposition of a regular system of tribute paying upon them. In this way a form of social organization arose which has been the means of surplus wealth to the few since early times. The form is closely identified with civilization as distinguished from barbarism, and we call it the state; but historically it has been little else than a predatory instrument. Among ancient civilizations Babylonia was notoriously an exploiter of other societies rather than of nature. Agricultural peoples round about her were systematically robbed, and the fruits of their labors became the source of much of her riches. In this respect, Babylon was considerably different from Egypt. However, the contrast with other states of that age was not very startling; it was one of degree, not of kind. For all gathered wealth they did not produce; and some, as Rome, for example, carried the exploiters' method to the utmost limits, living, as Seneca said, "on the spoils of all nations." And to-day, even as of old, the great states gather surplus in no small measure in the same way. The weak and helpless peoples about the earth are ruthlessly plundered by the powerful

industrial nations. The natural heritages of their environments are bought for a mess of pottage, or filched away without even an offer of that, by the agents of imperialistic economic interests. It amounts simply to a kid-glove robbery substituted for the mailed fist of yore where it is not still actually done by the mailed fist itself. Thus, partly by the impoverishment of the natural and social resources of backward societies in Africa, Asia, the isles of the sea, Central and South America, such nations as England, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the United States have been able to boast economic surplus.

Organization has been alluded to, and merits further notice as an agency in wealth getting. The significance of tribal feudalism evolved by pastoral nations, and its successor the state, as conditions fostering wealth production, cannot be ignored. For under these forms peoples who were industrially undisciplined were put to work and kept at it by their task masters. The result was more creative effort and more accumulation of goods by groups under such organization than by others. Again, without organization such as came by the state there would not have been security of property over large areas, and consequently but little accumulation. I do not mean to say that security was any too good under early states, but it was better than without them. The state class robbed its subjects, but it also kept off worse robbers from without. In the process of evolution the state has developed an organization by which security of possession is guaranteed with much certainty, especially in western lands. This condition has done much to foster wealth.

Political organization has usually permitted a dominant class to establish and maintain wealth monopoly. Perhaps at times this has conduced to surplus accumulation, since the dissipation of gains could thus be forestalled. One has expressed this rather common opinion of econo-

mists as follows: "In earlier ages when population pressed sharply upon the means of subsistence, inequalities of wealth were often the truest national economy. Wealth more evenly divided would simply have meant more babies. The opulent class served the valuable function of depositors and protectors of the social surplus. They were the useful fat cells of the social body."[47] This influence, however, can easily be exaggerated out of all relation to facts. At best its basis is largely suppositional. It is constantly argued that wealth monopoly is the guarantee of increasing opulence under the capitalistic economy, but there is no positive proof that it is. On the contrary, its influence may be largely the other way. So in the pre-capitalistic ages it may have hindered the creation of wealth, notwithstanding the supposed effects of abundance upon the birth rate, for no one knows what prudential checks might have prevailed under a more democratic economy.

In the course of social development, organization perhaps more than anything else has promoted division of labor, and the increased skill thus obtained has meant increased productivity. At the same time organization has proved the means of assembling and combining the forces of production in such a fashion as to make every sort of creative undertaking possible, and also to enable very profitable utilization of materials and effort, to foster improvement of technique, to allow conservation of waste and gains, and withal to enable capital to breed capital in almost unlimited measure. So it has come about that the western nations making large use of organization have created vast wealth, and come into much surplus. However, with all its wonderful success, modern industrial organization comes far short of results that might be possible were it better adapted to modern conditions. As it is,

[47] Walter Weyle, *The New Democracy*, p. 146, footnote.

the system is highly autocratic, following methods handed down from feudal times rather than those that would probably prove more effective under modern conditions. It is arbitrary, repressive of human nature, wasteful of energy, and grossly inefficient in operation. If individual initiative were encouraged by a system based on coöperative management and participation in the profits of industry in proportion to services rendered, there can be little doubt that production would be much greater than it is, and our surplus more abundant. The socialization of industry under the state might accomplish this, provided there could be substituted for the state a type of organization lacking its vicious policies and traditions. But, unless this can be done, I fear such socialization is a fatuous hope. Syndicalized industry instead would, perhaps, give a more efficient order, and yield results that are entirely beyond the reach of the present industrial régime.

Backward peoples were spoken of above. Mention of them suggests another means of wealth getting which has sometimes come into play. Where the intercourse between the more advanced and the backward has not led to exploitation, occasionally the luxuries and comforts of the higher have inspired the lower to adopt the wealth-gaining methods of the higher. Exotic wants, if once acquired, act as powerful incentives to learn the technique of production by which to supply the goods that satisfy the wants. Where this has been done, rapid wealth accumulation has ensued; an outstanding case in our day is Japan.

There should be mentioned in passing another means by which societies have occasionally obtained economic surplus. I refer to the effects of calamity of such sort as operates to deplete the population of a nation till it leaves the survivors in possession of riches beyond all expectation. Whether this has often happened is doubtful, but at least

one historic instance is known: that of the Black Death during the fourteenth century. By means of its ravages a large part of the population of the nations of Europe was swept away. It is estimated that anywhere from thirty-five to fifty per cent in the German states and England fell victims. When the scourge had passed, the survivors were left fairly rich in goods; richer, indeed, by far in property of every kind than they had ever before been. There was a real surplus. Evidence of its existence appeared at once in the wildest extravagances and display of luxury. A veritable orgy of indulgence took place everywhere. Production practically ceased for a year or more, until the economic margin had been wasted. Thus, the destruction of many gave surplus to the group that survived.[48]

In many instances an important source of wealth has been trade and commerce. Under certain circumstances societies have been able to take advantage of this means. Where they have been so located as to control natural routes and command trading emporiums and markets, where they have developed special facilities and ability for carrying goods by land or sea, where they have acquired unusual skill in manufacturing wares much sought by other societies, or where they have enjoyed a natural monopoly or great abundance of some prized materials, they have generally been able to amass wealth through commerce. Economic history readily furnishes illustrations of societies that became commercial nations and profited by virtue of one or more of the several advantages named. The gold of Ophir, the cedars of Lebanon, and the ships of Tarshish have had their counterparts in every age, but always, I suppose, possession of materials like

[48] See J. W. Thompson, "The Aftermath of the Black Death and the Aftermath of the Great War," *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1921.

gold and cedars have been the more important factors. In present day Europe, for instance, the supremacy of England as a commercial nation rests in no small degree upon her coal supply. For the want of coal Latin Europe has not been able to participate so extensively in trade, and has come into no such surplus wealth. The object of supreme importance to-day is oil, and the nation that can command abundance of this will control the most trade and normally gather most gold into her coffers.

Finally, one other means to wealth accumulation remains to be noticed; it is the exploitation of just such things as coal, oil, iron, or, in other words, of nature's forces as agents of production. The discovery of these forces and the invention of machines to utilize them ushered in an era of unparalleled wealth creation. The vast stores of energy in coal, oil, gas, and water-power, and the still greater supply of electricity that may be distributed wherever wanted, have multiplied man's productive power many thousands of times over what it ever was before. So the industrialized nations of the west have piled up wealth with astonishing rapidity. The national dividends counted in money values have run into hundreds of millions of dollars annually, and then leaped to billions. Before 1914 that of the United States had not been less than two billions of dollars for many years, and since then it has doubled, trebled, quadrupled, and more. England's and Germany's were not so great, and since 1914 have been reduced almost to the vanishing point, but for many decades these were chief among the great surplus nations of the world. So great, indeed, has the economic surplus of the industrial West become that economists are inclined to look upon all societies in all the ages that have gone before as surplus-less in comparison. And their estimation is not so far wrong when we consider the fact that Europe probably created three or four times more heritable wealth during the

nineteenth century than had been brought into existence during all the eighteen preceding centuries of the Christian era. Such sway does the lust for material gain hold over our Western nations that an English economist has appropriately called them "acquisitive societies, because their whole tendency and interest and preoccupation is to promote the acquisition of wealth." The entire modern world has fallen under this spell since England first revealed the possibilities of capitalism and industrialism.[49] And now we get history interpreted economically, just as it was once interpreted politically, and again religiously. The apotheosis of wealth and the greed-for-gold motive, all other things assumed, are, no doubt, great factors in the prodigious wealth acquisition and surplus accumulation that characterize western societies.

### Organization Surplus

The rise of social organization is always promoted by the growth of social capital; that is, by tradition and wealth created by man. The fuller the world is of viable and conveyable things, either in the shape of ideas, arts, or material objects, the more structure will arise. For the existence of objective things transfers the ties that bind men together from instinctive *liaisons* to interests in like external things. The greater the number of such things, the more interests and the greater possibility of more organization. There is also increased possibility of disunity and conflict, since interests are unlike as well as like, and since, moreover, not all like interests are pursued in common. Still, the fact remains that the growth of goods and knowledge directly fosters the growth of the number of possible common interests which cause organizations to multiply. About ideas, beliefs and arts, structural forms

[49] R. H. Tawney, *The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society*, p. 18.

spring up very early, and when surplus goods are brought into existence men begin to exchange them and to effect organization for carrying on trade and commerce. They also begin to organize to plunder and to steal the possessions of others. Moreover, in the course of development organization itself breeds more organization until eventually endless duplication and superfluous complexity ensues. Thus, surplus arises. Looked at in another way, there is also comparative surplus to the extent that synthesis is accomplished and competition eliminated in the largest possible forms of coöperation, for these mean relatively greater efficiency and saving of energy that otherwise would be wasted.

Among ethnic peoples even far down toward the bottom of the scale, surplus organization often appears. Its rise is promoted by the presence of surplus tradition, especially that which has to do with the mysterious. Medicine men seeking to monopolize and control the magical art effect associations. Similarly, other interests in a very limited way foster constituent organizations.

Not, however, until a pastoral economy develops does organization amount to much in the tribal world. But this economy is fairly conducive to organization growth. There are numerous instances of peoples in that cultural stage who have become feudalized. The possession of herds affords a wealth surplus and leads to certain occupational relations and arrangements which readily crystallize into such an order. Feudalism, in turn, prepares the way for and becomes a highly active agency in the creation of another distinctively surplus system. I refer to the state, or that scheme of regulation imposed by a victorious group upon vanquished peoples.

When society had once taken on the institution of state, the acquisition of further organization went on apace. For the business of dominating and exploiting others on

any considerable scale requires division of functions and multiplication of structure. And, inasmuch as domination was the business of the state, it unavoidably became militarized either for conquest or defense, and so expanded structurally. It has always been true, just as Spencer contended, that societies given to conflict have undergone rapid and extensive structural development.[50]

Mass has also been favorable to the growth of organization. In any populous community differentiation of function becomes necessary, and wherever it takes place structure is promoted. Any marked lessening of numbers, on the other hand, curtails division of labor, and brings elimination of organization. Durkheim has laid great stress upon the importance of mass in relation to organization. He points out how, with the growth of volume in society, there usually results what he calls "moral density" or moral coalescence. This, however, is not an inevitable result, for even among very dense populations there may be other factors at work to hinder the growth of moral coalescence. China and India for instance have a great population density but relatively little moral density, due to the fact that religious sanction, glorifying class and caste has effectively thwarted the normal development.[51] But ordinarily the effect of mass is to give moral coalescence. By this Durkheim simply means the development of organization on a functional basis through the division of labor.

The basis of organization antecedent to the functional is what Durkheim calls the "segmentary." It means coherence through kinship or through territorial bonds and is dependent upon similarity of elements. The other type is based on differentiation of functions, giving an organic system where there is coördination and subordination with

[50] See *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. II, Chapter XVII.
[51] A. M. Carr-Saunders, *op. cit.*, pp. 429, 430.

all parts dependent upon the whole and the whole upon the parts.

The real significance of the transition from the segmentary to the "organic" basis lies in the fact that it gives greater scope and effectiveness to social structure. Forms are not only rendered more numerous and ample, but far more powerful. Hence, structural surplus begins to manifest itself on a wide scale. Thus, growth of mass and density in the last analysis are primary causes of organizational surplus.

Such surplus structure is not so much to be found under arrangements of great convenience or necessity; it is rather to be looked for where compulsion does not reign and especially where secondary or tertiary motives have free play. These motives become active where there is an abundance of vital, traditional, and economic energy. Interests of all kinds then seek embodiment in associational forms. Extensive tradition, for example, leads to specialization, and that straightway to structure. Thus, organization comes to flourish as one expression of surplusfulness.

Western industrial nations having an immense and ever increasing body of heritage have tended to excessive organization. There are numerous social service and reform institutions; art, health, protective, and cultural associations; recreational, benevolent, and fraternal orders; political, religious, and ethical societies; and clubs, institutes, and bodies for this, that, and the other purpose, almost without end. The types mentioned are the luxuriant growth of a fertile environment. They represent a great deal of structural surplusage.

One element of tradition is particularly responsible for the acquisition of so much of this kind of organization. It is the widespread if not quite universal belief in some kind of social progress or improvement. Where no such relief obtains or where it is only a flickering ray, or more

especially where fatalistic doctrines possess the minds of men, sufficient incentive for such development is wanting. But given the mores of progress, the telic minded or "pro-environing" elements will express themselves in organized efforts to lead society to various goals which they esteem desirable, provided there is any surplus of other sorts to give them power. While purposive associations are not unheard of even among tribesmen, and are by no means absent from political societies, it is in the modern industrial nations that they flourish most abundantly.

In these societies even the more primary and fundamental economic interests have embodied themselves in a veritable mountain of structure. Endless systems of interlocking and independent forms have been piled up everywhere. There is almost unlimited duplication and redundancy at every turn, all bearing witness to structural surplusfulness. The explanation of it is not altogether complete without taking into account the fact that along with other traditions we have acquired an organization habit that constantly tends to produce more and more structure.

Modern agencies of communication and locomotion have greatly promoted organization. They have done so by widening the scale of human activity to perhaps ten times what it was before the nineteenth century. This has meant not only organization on a larger scale, but also the multiplication of organizations. Thus, without the railway, steamship, and telegraph many that now prevail could not exist, and would never have arisen. This holds true both nationally and internationally. In the latter field numerous associations embracing peoples of many nations have come into being; and a rising spirit of international cooperation is constantly bringing forth new ones. Such developments are clearly extra or superstructural forms from the standpoint of individual nations.

Organization may, of course, be borrowed; and thus so-

cieties have sometimes gained structural surplus. A mutual interchange of this nature is now taking place among the Occidental nations. The Orient is also beginning to borrow from the Occident, and, to some extent, successfully import and transplant our organization institutions. Peoples very far apart in cultural levels do not generally adopt one another's structural acquisitions any more than they do other traditions. There is, of course, little or nothing for the higher to take from the lower, and the lower are seldom able to make any use of the higher forms. Occasionally, however, ethnic societies have been able to take over some bit of structure from civilized nations, and to greatly magnify their powers by so doing. The Zulus, for example, two or three generations ago, borrowed heavily from the English in the matter of military organization, and so, by the aid of what was to them surplus, became for a time a relatively formidable nation.

On the whole, organization is somewhat different from other forms of social energy, in that it is both more stable and evanescent. The stable part is usually slow of accumulation, but abiding, while the evanescent springs up quickly and often abundantly, but does not remain as permanent structure. Much structure is, therefore, always breaking down and passing out of use and existence.

## Conclusion

The career of societies in so far as the acquisition of surplus goes, is a checkered one. They wax and wane at every stage, and are subject to all sorts of vicissitudes of fortune and misfortune. Some pass along a fairly even course for centuries and millenniums, gradually accumulating power, and meanwhile rising from savagery to the highest civilization. Others spring from near the bottom, and by short cuts arrive quickly at the top. Still others,

quite as old as the most advanced, show no marked progress at all, or bear evidence of having once made a fair beginning, and then having sunk back into degradation. Some we know have virtually died, and to others as heirs and administrators has gone their culture. Thus, the Germanic savages became in large measure the legatees of Greece and Rome, and continuing to add to that splendid estate throughout the passing centuries, have come at last to be the chief civilized nations and surplus societies of the world.

The kind of surplus most accumulated has varied with stages of social advancement. Lower ethnic groups are generally flush with vital energy, if with any at all; those somewhat higher up the scale are rich in a certain type of tradition; then come political nations where organization is dominant, and at last the industrial stage arrives, where wealth possession is the all absorbing and most conspicuous thing.

The normal process of surplus accumulation in so far as it can be formulated may be stated as follows: under favorable environmental conditions vital surplus appears. This, in turn, produces tradition surplus, which, increasing in scope and power over nature, gives rise to the means of wealth and to the acquisition of economic surplus. Surplus wealth then becomes the chief means to surplus organization. Throughout the whole process each kind of surplus also tends to multiply itself. Thus from abundant vitality springs a numerous people; from extensive tradition invention and discovery; from wealth, greater riches; and from organization more organization and structure. Moreover, surplus always tends to become enhanced by the reciprocal influence of each type upon the other.

A workable prescription whereby the accumulation and conservation of surplus energy could be guided in a way

to make the process dependable and accumulation indefinitely continuous would be of inestimable value to humanity. But no such thing is really in sight. Indeed, it seems altogether an idle dream to expect that it ever will be. Nevertheless, the question presses, always presses in one form and another, for solution. The Great Society to-day is growing anxious about its destiny; it wants to shape its ends as never before; it is even seriously asking whether it does not already possess the means and lacks only the secret of rightly combining them in order to be completely master of its fate. Half believing that the secret lies close at hand, the Great Society pushes boldly out with the utmost confidence in itself. But the quest is almost surely doomed to futility, for there are so many chance and uncontrollable factors that probably no certain law of procedure can be devised or discovered, and no sure control of destiny be secured.

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# PART II

# SOCIAL PROCESS

*A little prosperity and some ideas, as Aristotle saw, are the ferment which sets the masses in ebullition. This offers an opportunity. A beginning is made. The further development is unavoidable.*

LUDWIG GUMPLOWICZ

*Each Age is a dream that is dying*
*And one that is coming to birth.*

ANON.

## CHAPTER IV

### SURPLUS AND THE GENERAL SOCIAL PROCESS

We have attributed social power primarily to surplus. The major social process as well depends largely upon it. It is the fundamental factor in all change that societies experience. Because of these facts it would seem that social interpretation, especially in its evolutionary phases, should be squarely based upon it, and grow directly out of it. To attempt an interpretation of this sort is the undertaking we have set before us. We may not find in the surplus the open sesame with which to unlock all history and resolve every problem of human association, for no doubt it is too elemental and too general in its nature always to give just that complete and detailed explanation which is often most illuminating. But even though other keys might be indispensable, if the whole social establishment to its innermost recesses were to be flung wide open, surplus still remains the master key. The great doors, methinks, will best yield to it, and give most ready entrance to the wide halls of humanity's communal house.

### The Why of Evolution

By social evolution, to which this part of our treatise is limited, we mean any change. At most, the continuity of change as growth or the unfolding of the complex from the simple is all that the term signifies. No implication of progressive development in the sense of gradual approach toward some predetermined end is intended.

Ordinarily, I suppose, we are accustomed to think of social evolution in a rather partial and incomplete manner. In our study of it we are probably satisfied to take account of the stages in the rise of institutional and structural forms, to trace the growth of folkways and customs, and to observe the course that personality has followed in its unfolding and differentiation, or, in other words, to observe such alterations, transitions, and developments as are apparent. If we go any farther, it is, perhaps, to discover how the change from one type of institution, stage of organization, kind of socius, to some other has been effected. *What* has transpired, and *how*—in the sense of the method and order of procedure—it has taken place, are the two phases of the social process that usually absorb attention.

Important as these two phases are, they do not constitute the whole of the process. The question *why* the change has taken place still remains unnoticed. But this too needs to be dealt with if the evolutionary phenomenon is to be grasped in its entirety. When the question *why* is raised, it involves, in my thought, the ultimate factor; it confronts us with the problem of the causal agency at work, or, in other words, with the subject of social dynamics. What the primary social force is and what its mode of working may be, always, in my judgment, deserves attention in any thoroughgoing inquiry into social change. The *why* of evolution, or its explanation in terms of the effectuating agency, is even antecedent to the *what* and the *how,* and should, at least, receive consideration in conjunction with them.

Herbert Spencer, of course, grappled with this fundamental question. The formula which he propounded in explanation of cosmic evolution, and which Huxley facetiously called a "diabolical dialectic," was a truly notable attempt to describe the operation of the primary factor

in the process. Here it is, first, in its most general form as the law of the cosmic process or the "continuous redistribution of matter motion;"[1] secondly, the simple law of evolution or "the integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion;"[2] and finally, the formula of compound evolution, which is as follows: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."[3]

This formula was all right in so far as it represented a sincere effort to resolve the ultimate problem in cosmic and biologic evolution. If it proved to be more or less inapplicable, inaccurate and inadequate, particularly when applied to things social, it does not follow that the endeavor to find an answer to the question *why* was ill-advised, and should, in consequence, henceforth and forever be avoided. However, since Spencer's attempt there has been but little interest shown in the question as to what constitutes the dynamic of social change.

Much, of course, has been thought and written about the play of the physical environment upon human beings and social aggregates. In the influence of this factor and the interaction of human kind with it many have found solution of the causal question. Out of this notion have risen the doctrines of natural selection, of climatic determinism, the hypothesis that history is the environment in action and various other theories. As causal explanations they are significant in so far as external forces are concerned. For such forces must be reckoned with, since social change is often traceable directly to them. But not so the social process *sui generis*. That goes on within the social series itself. Its cause lies within that series, not outside. It is

[1] *First Principles*, 4th Ed., Chapter XI.
[2] *Ibid.*, Chapter XII.
[3] *Ibid.*, Chapter XIII.

this internal factor that concerns us as the chief causal agency in social change.

Sociologists generally have been neglectful of the problem, and inclined to fight shy of the fundamental issue. Such is the case to-day, unless the efforts of the social psychologists to ground the driving force of society in emotions, instincts and innate capacities can be considered a quest in that direction. Proponents of this approach to sociology, of course, hold that they are dealing with fundamental things. From Ward on such has been their contention. Ward said that "the desires and wants of men constitute the forces of society."[4] "And where there is no desire, no will, there is no force, no social energy."[5] And to-day we have a school of psychologists proclaiming anew the importance of desires, instincts, etc. "The human mind," says McDougall, "has certain innate or inherited tendencies which are the essential things or motive powers of all thought and action, whether individual or collective, and are the bases from which the character and will of individuals and of nations are gradually developed."[6] And again, "directly or indirectly the instincts are the prime movers of all human activity."[7] In the opinion of this school of thinkers it is an altogether sufficient performance in accounting for social causation to analyze these "powerful impulses" or "instincts," and their expression in collective behavior. But whatever the merits of the psychological explanation, and they are confessedly many, indeed, one thing is certain: it does not fathom the depths of social behavior. If we grant that there is an original outfit of separate instincts furnishing the immediate "drives" of conduct, it is still to be asked whether they may not themselves be derivative instead of primary. Of

[4] *Pure Sociology*, p. 569.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[6] *Social Psychology*, 8th Ed., p. 19.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

this there is, at least, a suggestion in the fact that they vary in strength from the latent, negative, very weak and undeveloped to the positive and powerful. That they are, indeed derivative and secondary rather than basic, the thoroughgoing pragmatic psychologists are inclined to hold.[8] According to the view of the latter, there is a vital impulse to activity, largely undifferentiated, from which the variously colored modes of activity that are known as instincts, faculties, or habits, are derived. These factors, which to the first mentioned group of psychologists are the prime movers of activity, thus appear to be effects and products of a fundamental energy impulse. In other words, they rise out of the social surplus, and are dependent upon both its personal and impersonal forms for their power and qualities. Any explanation, therefore, in their terms falls short of completeness, and fails to consider the ultimate agency, or at least the ultimate agency in its elemental form.

If, then, any fundamental explanation is to be reached, we must go back of and outside of ourselves; for the "drives" from within taken by themselves are not enough. We need to return again to Spencer's and Comte's starting point, and from thence take our departure in quest of the motive-power and the laws governing social evolution, for possibly a more valid account than has been rendered can be given.

Quite certain it is that social change like change in other realms of the universe must have its driving force in energy. It is commonplace enough that every transformation is to be accounted for in terms of energy redistribution—its concentration and dissipation. The only question, then, is what constitutes effective social energy and how does it act. Our contention, already stated, is that distinctively social change derives its impulse from the pres-

[8] See John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part II.

ence of surplus. It is not so much the sum total energy that a group may inventory that is the determining factor as the amount of surplus possessed. The marginal power is the essential thing. All turns on the presence or absence of such power as to whether there will be alteration or not. The whole causal explanation is, therefore, concerned with this factor.

In order that our meaning may be made clear, an illustration will be useful. The case of the rise of the Sinn Fein Republic will serve our purpose. Here we have an instance of social change, the *what* and the *how* of which are matters of ready observation. But the *why* of the development, which is not so plain, and which is not commonly inquired into, is, after all the crucial question. The causal explanation according to our theory is found in the fact of social accumulation. For the first time in centuries it happened that the last decade or so brought to the Irish people conditions favoring the growth of considerable social energy. The land acts of Parliament, together with other measures, gave rural Ireland a chance to prosper economically. Other conditions also contributed simultaneously to the furtherance of her welfare and organization, and thus to the genesis of a margin of energy which hitherto had been denied her. In this manner a force was developed that necessarily had to expend itself along some line of action. Taking the line marked out by long generations of resentment and aspiration there resulted an almost unparalleled assertion of strength toward the transformation of the social order.

It will at once occur to some that social change has been given quite another interpretation from the one here offered. Often, indeed, has it been accounted for on the basis of deficit rather than surplus. Ever since Thomas Malthus predicated social improvement on the existence of misery arising from the tendency of the population to

press ahead of the means of subsistence, the deficit or pressure theory in one form and another has been much in vogue. In general it has held that poverty, wretchedness, plague, calamity or whatever induces a social lack has been the spur to evolution. Somehow or other there is supposed to be something lurking in untoward conditions that gives a social rebound, and sets the evolutionary process agoing.

This view has been so much championed by the economists that it will be well to look at it particularly from their viewpoint. W. I. King, in *The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States,* emphasizes one important phase in the following: "When each nation has learned how to regulate its population in accordance with the resources available for its support, one of the prime reasons for encroaching upon the territories of other powers will have disappeared." But we need to examine the underlying premise of this assertion and ask: has encroachment really resulted from lack of resources? It would be hard to find any authentic case to prove it in the history of modern nations. It would be easy enough, however, to show how the greed for larger resources has often led to national expansion, but not easy to point out instances where expansion has come as the result of need. Even if we take the stock illustration of the deficit-economy proponents, namely, the case of Germany before the war, the theory does not hold good. The per capita wealth of the Germans, as it happened, compared favorably with that of other people, the figures being about $1,300 as against $1,100 for the Belgians, $1,400 for the French, $1,500 for the English, and $1,900 for the Americans. And the annual income while, perhaps, less than half that of our country, was fully equal to that of any of the other countries mentioned. Her foreign trade from 1887 to 1912 increased 214.7 per cent, and her population

but 35 per cent. At the same time the figures for the United Kingdom showed but 113.1 per cent increase in trade and 25 per cent in population; and for the United States 173.3 per cent and 50 per cent respectively.[9] There was obviously no economic deficit in Germany, but, on the contrary, a rapidly rising standard of living and a rapidly growing social surplus.

True, there were many in Germany living at the mere subsistence level, but no greater per cent of the population was at that level than in lands with ampler territory and larger resources. No more does the population situation adequately account for a policy of encroachment in the case of Germany than in such cases as England, France or China for whom no such claim is made. If it really be true, as is so often contended, that a crowded, poorly rationed and needy population leads a nation to conquest, why then have we not seen teeming China along with supposedly overcrowded Germany seeking a place in the sun? And since it is a poor rule that will not work both ways, why is it that France and England have grabbed territory right and left when overpopulation has not seriously menaced either of them? As a matter of fact, it does not appear that pressure of population on the means of subsistence has really brought about conquest at all in the case of a single modern nation. Colonies have not been acquired in response to the need for more room on the part of the citizens of any of these lands, else would they have served as overflow basins for the redundant masses. But such purposes they have not served for Germany, nor yet to any important degree for other nations. Germany had a million square miles of colonial empire before the Great War. However, into that territory only the merest fraction of her 26,000 emigrating sons and daughters for 1913,

[9] Karl Helfferich, *Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888-1913*, pp. 73, 74.

taken as a typical year, migrated. Her emigration for many years had been small, and constantly declining. In fact, a counter current had risen to offset it. A tide of immigration had set in as far back as 1890, which had reached the level of 13,000 by 1910. Indeed, according to Helfferich there had been "an excess of immigration since the middle of the nineties."[10] It does not, therefore, appear that the quest for empire on the part of Germany sprang from any deficit or pressure of need. And what was true of her is equally true of her rivals, of nations in general.[11]

Rightly understood, there is some validity in the deficit theory. A hungry, impoverished, and suffering social aggregate is, of course, not absolutely powerless. For so long as there is life, some degree of action is possible; but activity without surplus is erratic and negligible. Under such conditions the normal state is essentially a static one, while surplus alone confers dynamic qualities. No doubt from situations in which a sharp curtailment of surplus threatening exhaustion has taken place a quick rebound sometimes occurs that makes the source of change appear to lie in untoward conditions. But these conditions only act as a stimulus to the remaining surplus, while it is the presence of the latter that makes possible the response. The normal conditions of social change are always those where surplus abounds.

Having indicated the causal agency in social evolution we must further observe its general character and conduct before attempting to delineate its specific rôle in history. We come then to the topic:

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[11] Free use has been made here of material from an article entitled "Economic Surplus and National Policy" which appeared over the writer's name in *The Public* for Dec. 21, 1917. In this article and in one appearing in the American Journal of Sociology, November, 1916, the theory of surplus was first advanced.

### The General Nature and Behavior of Social Surplus

Recalling what is meant by social surplus as it was described in an earlier chapter, we may inquire a little further as to its nature and behavior. In the cosmic order energy is either static or kinetic, and the term surplus has no application or meaning, except as it signifies a state of disequilibrium. Things are described as being of a different potential, and thus in relation might, by a stretch of the imagination, be called surplus or nonsurplus; but no inanimate object can in any meaningful sense be so called. Only in the animate realm has the term surplus any real meaning. All living things, when possessed of more energy than the struggle for existence requires, may be said to have a surplus. Living things include, of course, aggregates of human beings or societies. In the animal and social worlds surplus becomes highly kinetic, that is, it is manifested as power in motion. In human society such is its distinguishing characteristic. All that this means is that abundant energy will expend itself in activities. If vital surplus, activity will appear in such phenomena as multiplication of numbers, creative endeavors, a general strenuosity and push, enterprise and aggressiveness. If fullness of tradition, activity will be seen in such things as expansion of knowledge, invention, elaboration of thought systems, broadcasting of culture, propagation of faiths, and proselytizing.[12] If an overplus of wealth, activity will take such form as quest for markets, widening

[12] So true is this that Wissler in his *Man and Culture*, p. 339, states a law of tradition behavior as follows: "When a group comes into a new solution to one of its important culture problems, it becomes zealous to spread that idea abroad and is moved to embark upon an era of conquest to force recognition of its merits." He cites for illustrations the efforts of the United States and France to confer the blessing of political democracy upon other nations both by persuasion and force, and the endeavors of Soviet Russia to do the same with its political doctrines.

of trade, concession hunting, investment placing, philanthropic adventure, conquest.[13] If accumulation of organization, activity will show itself in rivalry, competitive struggle, movements for union and disunion, agglomeration of forms.

As we have already seen, surplus is of two general kinds or modes—the personal and the impersonal. It is easy enough to see how the personal or vital surplus of society is kinetic, but can we assert that wealth, achievement and organization possess the same qualities? Perhaps not, for they do not of themselves perform any works taken alone. They are only static forms; yet in human society the several phases of energy are, as a totality, rendered kinetic by virtue of the kinetic character of vital surplus. The vital or personal is first, then follows traditional, economic and organizational, created and mobilized by it. The impersonal, in turn, augments the potency of the personal, which again enhances the impersonal, and so on in a constant reciprocity. The impersonal forms are impotent without the personal, and so the personal are relatively powerless without the others. The interactions of the two make them a totality, and we may, therefore, think of the whole of the social surplus as active energy.

It is to be observed further that surplus is always limited, and at the same time highly variable. Groups enjoying it rarely have but narrow margins. Even the greatest and most puissant nations find their mead rather strictly confining. Because of these facts social evolution has been an intermittent and capricious procedure, a very hit or miss affair withal. A glance at the social order from one end of it to the other reveals a picture not unlike a vast combined laboratory-museum, full of experiments in every

[13] Here too is a law of behavior to which Nearing in *The American Empire*, p. 223, has given the following expression: "Struggle to dispose of your surplus capital, otherwise you cannot survive."

stage of realization and preservation. There are tentative efforts that have been checked and structures that have resulted from long and persistent strivings in a continuous course. There are culminated ventures and those in process of realization side by side. In the light of the exhibit as it appears, and in view of the great uncertainty of the energy margin, it is, perhaps, futile to expect that any detailed prevision of social development will ever be possible.

From the analysis so far made it follows that any aggregate of people, be it horde, tribe, race, nation, class or minor group, to the limit and degree of its social accumulation, will tend to be a positive, propulsive, expansive, projective, evolving entity. In other words, it will be a dynamic society, outreaching and growing, undergoing integration and various other transformations. As such it will be a center and vehicle of change in the social world, and, in consequence, the maker of history. In fact, only surplus societies have made history. With their rise began the historic process, and with their persistence its continuance has been secured. History began and has continued, not merely because certain groups had social abundance nor yet because extra-necessitous energy is kinetic, but for the added reason that social abundance has never been equitably distributed. Some individuals and some groups develop it, while others develop none at all, or but very little, thus producing a disequilibrium among them. The prevalence of this condition has been antecedent to all social development and historic movement.[14]

If a surplus society is kinetic it is pertinent to ask how it will expend its energy. A variety of ways are obviously

[14] Professor F. H. Giddings has advanced a somewhat similar interpretation in an article entitled "A Theory of History." See *The Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 35, p. 495. He holds the process to be a "psychological or behavioristic equilibration"; but it seems to me to be somewhat broader.

open. There are, however, three primary and major modes of expenditure; they are *internal consumption, external utilization against the physical environment,* and *external utilization against other societies.* When the first mode is followed there may be indulgence, perversion and wasteful use, until stagnation and even decomposition and disruption ensue, inviting domination at the hands of the more powerful. On the other hand, there may be group improvement through increase of numbers, tradition building, discipline, structural differentiation and capitalization of material resources. Societies tend to follow dissipative ways, especially in the earlier stages of surplus possession. Like individuals they are inclined to have their fling. They become extravagant in every way possible, and indulge in all sorts of luxury. If they abound in material things, riotous living will ensue. If they are rich in new tradition, they will be given to experimentation and extreme speculation in thought. A reign of tolerance, unrest, laxness, ease, and pleasure in general, will hold sway. This, of course, may not happen at all, or at least not on an extensive scale. There may be a wiser employment of the surplus instead. Imitative effort may take the place of dissipative in a way to conserve energy. This not infrequently appears in cases of classes and nations becoming imitative of one another. By so doing they tend to increase rather than lessen their energies.

The natural way of expending surplus at the outstart is by internal consumption and this will normally continue just as long as it remains the easiest way known to the group. And it will remain the easiest way just as long as opportunities for expending it otherwise are effectively balked, as they well may be. Where there is external resistance or pressure the group has no outlet but to act upon itself until conditions arise under which it becomes easier to act on other things or other groups.

Where the second mode prevails with energy focused upon the physical environment, there are some possibilities of expenditure without compensating gain. Exhaustion, degradation and decay may be reaped. Generally it proves otherwise, however, and surplus earns more surplus through exploration, discovery, colonization, subjugation of wilderness and desert, invention, mastery of natural resources and creative works of many kinds. Those societies in particular that take to pioneering and pouring colonists into new and unoccupied regions greatly strengthen and enrich themselves in the end. This specific manner of surplus usage rises where inviting opportunities offer and where there are no good alternatives other than further outlay on themselves. Once initiated, such usage may long prevail and be carried very far, even to the point of diminishing returns or beyond, if some more attractive way does not open. But generally under the influence of increasing energy there is generated surplus to such an extent that other ways are opened. In other words, a will to power sooner or later manifests itself, which is satisfied neither with internal expenditure nor utilization against the physical world. The group is then impelled to expend its force upon other groups.

The third mode, or that involving outlay upon the social environment, falls into three minor phases, which may be designated as *exchange, spoliation,* and *assistance,* with many combinations of the same. Exchange may be described as any free and mutually beneficial give and take between groups. It is surplus expenditure through cooperation—a method making for the conservation and enhancement of social energy. It is exemplified in most forms of trade, commerce, interchange of tradition and movements of peoples to and fro between the nations.[15]

[15] This subject has been exhaustively treated by J. Novicow. See *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 23, pp. 289-349.

Spoliation is energy expended in an endeavor to control, dominate, plunder or make use of other people in a way harmful to them. There are two forms of it to be distinguished, though they often merge into but a single one. The first is the direct and forcible, or what has been called the "bears' method"; the second is the indirect, more peaceable and cunning, or the "beekeepers' method." The direct method involves predacious aggression, ruthless coercion, conquest, oppression and enslavement in greater or less degree of the weaker by stronger societies. It implies conflict and waste, with many chances for acquiring additional surplus on the part of the aggressors, but with not a few possibilities of their losing all and becoming themselves the victims and spoils—subjects marked for vanquishment. Indirect spoliation, or more properly, exploitation, covers a multitude of practices by which one group regularly appropriates a portion of the energy of others without giving any equivalent return. It aims to leave the exploited intact and with a certain degree of independence rather than to destroy them. Tribute taking, perhaps, the capitalistic wage system, monopolistic extraction of royalties and dividends, economic imperialism with its policies of concession grabbing, placing loans, making foreign investments, seizing spheres of influence, and establishing protectorates are some of the familiar practices of an exploitative nature. The third form of expenditure upon other societies, the one we have called assistance, is sharing resources and surplus with groups that are weak, backward, or needy. Such efforts may turn out to the harm of all concerned. Usually, though, they further the general welfare. Gifts, philanthropic enterprises, missionary activities, disinterested services to lighten the burdens, or to improve the lot of others are cases illustrating this type of expenditure.

In all three primary modes of outlay two constant ten-

dencies are to be seen. They are the agglomerative and the dissipative, or the constructive and the destructive, or the organizing and the disorganizing. It is always the positive aspect, however, that counts most, giving, as it does, character to the general social process. In other words, it is the integrative or agglomerative tendency that is the determining one. Normally, the dynamic group manifests itself in this positive way. It obeys a great social law which holds that to them that have surplus shall be given more surplus, and from them that have little or none shall be taken away even that which they have. This law seems to be in force throughout the whole realm of life. Everywhere the regnant impulse seems to be to grow, to construct, to outreach, to expand and to accumulate. From its throne in the world of living nature its scepter reaches over the social order to enforce obedience equally there.[16]

Where surplus is expended chiefly upon the physical world the integrative tendency manifests itself essentially in securing abundance and in wealth accumulation. It gives economic and industrial development. Where surplus is expended chiefly upon the group itself the integrative tendency takes the form of cultural, educative, and disciplinary gains. It furthers social adjustment. Where surplus is expended chiefly against other groups the integrative tendency appears in the shape of governmental and legal structures. It gives political domination. All three phases very naturally go on side by side, become entangled one with the other, and in the outworkings yield many secondary reactions, until the process becomes highly complex. The main lines, however, remain fairly clear. Of these the most significant from the standpoint of strictly social or group evolution is the last mentioned; that is, surplus expenditure toward other societies.

[16] See William Patten, *The Grand Strategy of Evolution.*

Much that we have been saying above may be quite commonplace and obvious, and yet its full significance as sociological fact be overlooked, and its meaning little understood. Unless we grasp the point that there is a positive law of integration which drives society along certain courses, group behavior will not be clearly comprehended. The real significance of this law, however, is revealed in the fact that it operates in obedience to a still more fundamental principle of the physical world, according to which movement takes place in the line of least resistance or greatest attraction. This is only another way of saying that the dynamic group will exert itself most toward objects which promise to yield the quickest and largest returns for effort expended. Such objects, as a rule, turn out to be not so much the group itself, nor yet the physical environment, but other societies. For almost every advantage favors them rather than the other options, since this field offers chances for the immediate acquisition of what every society is after, and what it cannot so readily get from other sources; that is, increase of surplus. So it comes to pass that any dynamic group given equal opportunity will more often expend its energy in some manner against other groups than against its physical surroundings or against itself. In so doing, moreover, the principle of least effort and greatest attraction still continues in force, leading to a further focalization of activity. Consequently, the preferred mode of intergroup relationship becomes established. And it turns out more frequently to be the spoliative-exploiter mode rather than the exchange-coöperative or the service-assistance mode. The spoliative-exploiter mode has unquestionably prevailed as the habitual one throughout human history, and it still holds foremost place in social affairs. No doubt, in the course of the centuries with the widening of association, exchange has grown and likewise the practice of assistance, but not in

such wise as to supersede spoliation. Some think, however, that assistance is a waning practice in the present age. Such, for instance, is H. G. Wells's opinion. He says: "The impulse to devotion, to universal service, and to a complete escape from self, which has been the common underlying force in all the great religions of the last twenty-five centuries, an impulse which ebbed so precipitately during the prosperity, laxity, disillusionment and scepticism of the past seventy or eighty years—that impulse to loving devotion will reappear stripped and bare as the recognized fundamental, structural impulse in human society." [17]

But, however it may be about assistance waning, one thing is sure: it never has been, is not now, and I doubt if it ever will be the "fundamental structural impulse in human society." That impulse is just the opposite and the one that has grown with the growth of surplus. It has grown, taking new forms to suit the changing circumstances, and extending its range to meet the broadening world.

The spoliative-exploitive method of surplus manifestation thus constitutes the most distinctive and determinative phase of what is the essential social process. It has been responsible for the main course of social evolution. The great aggregates and organizations of society have sprung from it. Many of the most important institutions and functions have likewise the same source. Classes and class conflicts, states and governmental developments, empires and international wars, national and race antagonisms, social unrest and rebellion and an endless cycle of strife and change all trace back to this mode of energy expenditure. In short, most that has to do with the transformations of human association is involved. This mode

[17] *Outline of History*, Vol. II, p. 552.

of behavior should, therefore, be counted dominant and looked upon as the key to social evolution.

Two questions emerge at this point. One pertains to what may be called the moral quality of surplus manifestation and the other to the problem of mechanism. Taking up the moral question first, we find two diametrically opposed views held by sociologists. One view is in general accord with that set forth above, except that intergroup relations are considered altogether exploitive-spoliative in nature. This means that when measured by commonly accepted personal standards they are wanting in any moral goodness. Such, for instance, was Gumplowicz's interpretation of intergroup behavior. He showed that while individuals may have consciences, and are moved by considerations of fidelity, justice and kindness, groups are different. Only that is good which gives them success. Might is the only consideration impelling or deterring action. Societies of every sort, large and small alike, seek at every opportunity only their own aggrandizement. Neither right, law, treaty, league, gratitude nor any humanitarian motives play any part. On the contrary, lying, deceit, breach of confidence, betrayal, the ruthless power of the strong overfalling the weak, prevails among savages and civilized alike. "The lack of moral principles," he declared, "is nowhere more conspicuous than in the leagues into which societies unite for the sake of assuring success. The overmatched horde makes terms with its recent enemy in order to fall with superior force upon the present foe; civilized states consider only their own advantage in making alliances. No consideration of principles, intimacy of relations or community of ideas avails; republican France and America ally themselves with Russia without scruple; constitutional and liberty-loving England upholds Turkish rule and aids American slaveholders; and social units behave in the same way. The extreme conservatives fight

side by side with the social democrats to-day for the sake of defeating the middle classes, and to-morrow, perhaps, will join their defeated foe to overcome their quondam ally."[18]

Essentially, Gumplowicz was right; only, his characterizations are too sweeping. Not quite all intergroup activity is as he conceived it. He did not make allowance for a great deal of fair give and take by exchange nor for a certain amount of assistance involved in intergroup conduct. Although normally in the highest degree selfish, it swings now and then to the altruistic side. There is intergroup benevolence as well as exploitation. Civilized nations exhibit it rather extensively. Numerous groups are organized for that purpose, and devote great energy to the service of other groups without apparent thought of gain; and occasionally, states themselves will give succor to the needy. Thus do societies behave quite as "morally" as ordinary individuals. The surplusful, while bound to overfall the surplusless in obedience to energy's urge, may do it either altruistically or selfishly, in a benevolent or spoliative manner. Only, the fact remains that the surplusful do not habitually behave altruistically. And Gumplowicz was right in emphasizing the exploitive factor, for it is the overwhelming one.

All this is quite at variance with the view that social surplus of itself confers an unselfish character upon groups. Champions of this notion think they find ground for their judgment in the moral reactions of individuals who are healthful and endowed with high vitality in contrast to those who are morbid and of low vitality. The former, it is argued, have a sociable, altruistic, unselfish, generous and self-sacrificing disposition by virtue of their overabundant energy; while the latter are self-centered, egoistic, uncharitable, malevolent, ruthless, predatory and

[18] *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 147.

generally unsocial in nature just because they lack redundant energy. From this premise it is further argued that all social exploitation, inhumanity, oppression and injustice, and whatever is morally called unsocial or antisocial activity in the world, springs from low vitality persons, classes and groups; and conversely that whatsoever is ameliorative, charitable, humanistic and for the good of all is due to the high vitality element just because of their abundant energy.[19] But only the most crude and superficial observations with respect to the social qualities of individuals can lead to such conclusions. Any close inspection and analysis proves them to be fundamentally erroneous. Barring types that are clearly pathological, and considering only those that are normal, there is no ground for the theory in question. In fact, the moral qualities attributed to low vitality individuals are, if anything, much more likely to attach to those of high vitality; and those assigned to high vitality people more frequently characterize those of low vitality than the other way about. And when it comes to intergroup relations, we have already shown that they are quite different from what this theory holds.

The error in the theory is due to the assumption that moral qualities and vital energy are necessarily correlated. But such is not the case. And to claim that vital surplus connotates moral goodness is, therefore, false, and a purely gratuitous imputation. All that can justly be accorded it is an outreaching, self-assertive tendency that may prove to be either benevolent or malevolent, socially serviceful or exploitive. Vital or organic energy is, of itself, morally colorless. It implies only power in action. It is a matter of volition, and should be associated with strenuous and not with moral acts. Surplus simply makes

[19] See R. M. Binder, *Health and Social Progress*, pp. 60, 70-73. L. Stoddard, in *The Revolt Against Civilization*, maintains the same thesis.

will more pronounced, conduct more strenuous, but that is all. To be sure, human acts always take on moral color in relation to other persons. They are, consequently, adjudged black or white, or of mixed hue, as the case may be; but neither low vitality nor high vitality, surplusfulness nor surpluslessness can be held primarily responsible for blackness or whiteness or any other moral quality. These qualities have largely an independent origin. What that is will be discussed later on in this work. All that is important here in recognizing their existence is to guard against the notion that the individual's store of energy alone determines his moral behavior. However, in so far as moral nature is something acquired, we should not overlook the fact that the individual's energy is a factor in acquiring it, and so to be reckoned with in the end. Nor should we forget that vital energy is one element—always the basic one—in social energy, and consequently tied up with all group conduct. In just what manner it is so involved will be made clear in a subsequent chapter. It is enough for the present to emphasize that group behavior does not take its moral tone alone, immediately or directly, from the vital status of the individuals composing it; and, in addition, to register a denial of that myth of the imagination that low vitality groups are evil and high vitality groups good in their intersocial relations, while at the same time reaffirming that the behavior of socially surplusful groups is preponderately spoliative and exploitive.

From the subject of morals we turn to the second question that confronts us in dealing with group-behavior; that is, to the problem of mechanism. How far social conduct is a mechanical and how far it is a volitional process are important inquiries.

In discussing mechanism we wish to confine the subject, if we can, to what is strictly of the group itself. This will exclude such things as great folk movements, population

aggregation, etc., caused by environmental pressure. Changes go on all the while in the physical universe that make humankind dance to their pipings like mechanical toys; but these, important as they are, lie outside the social machine proper. Neither ice ages, droughts, floods, climatic shiftings, the throbbings of the "Pulse of Asia," nor any other similar happenings of the natural world are, then, to be thought of here. It is only the mechanistic aspects of the group looked at from within that concern us. Shall we say that, if given surplus, a certain general course of behavior will inevitably ensue and dominate the group, and that almost, if not altogether, mechanically? And shall we, therefore, say further that surplus is the destiny that shapes our social ends? To these questions an affirmative answer, if properly qualified, is the only reasonable one. To say this, however, is not to assert that surplus determines in every detail the fate of the individual and the course of his group. What it does do is to fix the general direction and cut the broad channels in which social activity takes place. But what of the mechanical aspects? Are we to think of the process as merely that, and to identify it wholly with the greater cosmic order which is certainly altogether mechanical. Scarcely so, for such explanation of social behavior does not prove to be complete and adequate. At least in our present state of knowledge the mechanistic hypothesis has to be supplemented by other factors to provide a full account of social behavior. Otherwise, a fairly wide range of facts has to be left out. In the light of present understanding there are successive orders of facts in relation to which mechanism is of decreasing value for purposes of explanation "There is," to quote a statement by J. A. Thompson, "the domain of the inorganic, the physico-chemical order, where mechanism, perhaps, has it all its own way. There is the realm of organisms, the biological order, where

mechanism is checkmated by organism. There is the kingdom of man, the social order, where the mechanism is transcended and personality reigns.'' [20]

But are the social order and personality so completely emancipated from mechanism as this suggests? Is mechanism really transcended in human affairs? By no means! The automatic may be shown to dominate very large ranges of human behavior; enough of it, indeed, so that it remains open to doubt whether society is preponderately mechanical or spiritual, automatic or autonomous, like an engine or an entelechy. Still, were the evidence for both views to be weighed, no conclusive results could be reached, for so much remains in the realm of the uncertain that the case does not now permit of any final settlement. Assuming, nevertheless, that the mechanistic explanation of social phenomena is scientifically desirable, we shall proceed to urge this view, believing that it is somewhat strengthened by the considerations already advanced in this discussion. The thesis that we would maintain being that the dominating features of the social process are mechanically determined.

Given a surplus, it may well be within the range of possibility for any group to wholly control the social process. I see little either in the nature of surplus itself or in human nature that would preclude it. But, as a matter of fact, society has not consciously, in the past, greatly shaped its ends; nor does it do so to-day, or give great promise of doing it on the morrow. In saying this I am quite aware of going against the main current of sociological thought and teaching. There is not much faith any more in ''effortless evolution,'' for champions of the vitalistic view predominate. Hence, there is much striving to control the course of events. Many are afraid of drifting and of being borne whithersoever unguided destiny may lead.

[20] *The System of Animate Nature*, p. 133.

And this is a wholesome fear that is inspiring every sort of purposive effort. Therefore, reform, regulation, legislation, scheming, planning, and organizing in order that along ways of our heart's desire, we may follow to the goals that seem best, are going on everywhere; and yet I doubt if men are really shaping their course in many important ways. The blind forces still master the nations in all larger matters; in most respects they still regulate the conduct of groups and classes. There are social crises, the products of chance; there are revolutions and wars, largely resulting from the drift of circumstances; there are migrations of peoples, little influenced by conscious guidance; there are mutations of customs and institutions, devoid of design or planning. The accumulation of stresses, often unperceived and beyond control, goes on working and producing effects of great moment. Resources become exhausted, and men are driven into the severest competition all unawares, as in China. Intergroup animosities grow, and the mass of people responsible for them fail to perceive whither they are drifting or what consequences are involved. Customs tyrannize and helpless conformity drives us along well-worn grooves. Habits and instincts impel men and nations to follow established ways. Interests take possession and carry them to unintended goals. All are victims of forces that press on every side, from which there is no escape, forces that defy reason and baffle efforts to control. In the main, things happen as a result of the blind strivings of social energy, and consequently in a mechanistic manner. They work themselves out by the same method that operates in the physical universe; that is, by the "method of nature." There is modification, retardation, and acceleration due to acts of conscious purpose, but there is no such regency of will as can change the main trends. Willed acts, conscious efforts, and purposive endeavors are invariably accompanied by unin-

tended, accidental, fortuitous and incidental results. A very considerable part of all social change, development, and movement is apparently of this sort. It is, moreover, not just the by-product of designed undertaking, but the natural process going on in spite of social will. As such, it generally constitutes in the end the main line or product of the social process. It is essentially that process itself. In so far, therefore, as there has been any order or scheme of development in human affairs, it has sprung not so much from design as from mere accident, due to the nature of the social situation itself, which permits energy to follow some lines more easily than others.

The objection will, of course, be raised that while primitive societies may have been largely subject to the "method of nature," civilized peoples have so far advanced that they are coming to be masters of the social destiny. It will be urged further that the whole trend is now toward telic conduct, that the social process approaches more and more the mode of conscious self-determination. Without for a moment denying whatever truth there may be in this contention, I do not see that the facts justify the claim that there is any particular achievement in the line of emancipation from mechanical determinism. For when one looks about him to find evidence of it on the part of the great nations, what does he find everywhere but the sway of the undirected and mechanical? How true to the facts are the words of a German philosopher commenting on the period since 1914! They are so universally valid as a description of this phase of the social process that I shall quote them here. "We are free agents," says he, "only in rare and inspired moments, although we might constantly enjoy that gift of choice. No sooner have we made a decision, started out upon a path, than we passively surrender ourselves to it, so that human conduct becomes almost as mechanical as the courses pursued by

the heavenly bodies. No period has illustrated this truth with such clearness—with a clearness that verges on the point of caricature—as the last six years. Thoughtlessness and lack of initiative are mainly responsible for the war itself. That tragedy might well have been avoided. The national leaders of the day did not understand how to draw off the high tension currents into another channel but instead let them follow the blind will of nature. Since then the absence of prevision and rational control in human affairs has been more glaringly conspicuous than ever before in history. In no single instance have we gone beyond recognizing the purely mechanical consequences of a momentary, accidental counterpoise of forces. As a necessary result, the course of history has followed to a unique degree the course of nature; that is, it has moved in a circle." [21]

Apropos of the notion that society grows increasingly self-determining, certain facts of a contrary bearing should be considered. The solidarity and simplicity of ethnic groups is much more favorable to self-determination than is the diversity and complexity of industrial society. Unity of action is more readily secured by the former. Although every advantage in powers of prevision, in agencies of mastery over circumstances and in facilities for achieving ends rests with the industrial nations, the very surplusfulness and the resulting degree of individuation with its dissipation of energies among many functions renders such nations incoherent and unwieldly, and does much to nullify what would otherwise be a superior power of self-determination. So it is doubtful whether societies entangled in the maze of modern existence are relatively any more self-determining than were tribal groups. There can be no doubt that the whole trend of social evolution

[21] Herman Keyserling, "1914 and 1920," *The Living Age*, Nov. 20, 1920.

has been in the direction of greater *personal* self-determination, but the reverse has been true in many respects with *social* self-determination. Personal freedom increases the burden of the integrating process. The tax upon reason is multiplied while every influence tends to lower its intensity. Hence, free men flounder and are overwhelmed in the midst of a complexity they are unable to grasp or handle.

On this point Graham Wallas has made some pertinent observations.[22] He calls attention to the fact that mankind coöperates and functions collectively very well in small "groups" where the numbers run from three or four up to as many as thirty or forty. In such groups there operate instinctive factors of leadership and obedience which make it possible for this "loosely and intermittently gregarious animal," man, like the wolf pack, to carry on together. But even then the coöperation of a contact group involves only such acts as stimulate a cooperative instinct. When, however, "the coöperative act is one that does not naturally stimulate a coöperative instinct or precision, and complexity is needed, artificial and therefore socially inherited forms of group coöperation must be used."[23] Such artificial forms man has to some degree developed; they are products of his conscious efforts to adjust himself to large numbers of his fellows, and constitute a part of the ready-made heritage at his command. Upon them he must wholly depend for all collective undertakings extending beyond the immediate range of the contact group; that is, in all affairs of national and international scope.

But the traditions of large scale coöperation have not yet been wrought out in any adequate manner, and the conscious planning and purposive endeavors of nations

[22] See Graham Wallas, *op. cit.*, Chapters I, IV, V, and VIII.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 58.

are, therefore, very lame and halt and blind affairs. For one thing, it is very difficult, if not impossible on any large scale, for the citizen to form any true picture of his fellow nationals so that the coöperative instinct may be aroused. This is due, says Wallas, to the inadequacy of the social artifices that are available for bringing true images of the feelings, thoughts and wills of the many to each of the millions of men who must participate. We, therefore, go blunderingly and blindly along, only to fail at the crucial points in our collective projects.

All this is more or less patent even with reference to the very homogeneous nations, to say nothing of the very heterogeneous ones, and it becomes a glaring fact whenever anything on an international scale is attempted. The anti-coöperative instincts of fear, suspicion and hatred always flare up between peoples of different racial and cultural characteristics the moment those who would carry on together begin to get anything like a fair image of each other. Hence, out of experiences involving attempts at international coöperation there has generally come a new desire for national isolation.[24]

The prodigious activity of modern surplus societies in contrast either to primitive groups or to the older oriental nations, together with the relatively large degree of individual freedom enjoyed, is, no doubt, responsible for much of the delusion of social self-determination. But no less to-day than in ages past are the main drifts, the ground swells, the fundamental movements, the dominant social process, notwithstanding a growing sense of social participation and an increasing amount of purposive endeavor, largely manifestations of surplus energy acting in obedience to nature's method. This basic social force carries along classes, groups, and nations, much as gravity the waters of a river. And just as gravity is not something

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 203, 204.

apart from the water molecules, but inherent in them, in their position and surroundings, so surplus inheres in the group itself, its relationships and its environment. We may be conscious of this master force of energy, we may strive to stay it or to circumvent its carrying us whither we would not, but still it bears us on and on, and ever on, and the prospects that it shall ever be otherwise are not bright.

## Formal Statements of the Evolutionary Process

Before setting forth in broad outline the main features of the social process, it will be well to state what we mean by society. Without resorting to formal definition, the term as generally used in this work means any sort of human aggregate, component or constituent, great or small, organized or unorganized, which acts or is capable of acting as a unified whole. Thus, races, nations, tribes and states are societies, and likewise hordes, clans, associations, interest-groups, factions, parties, classes and subclasses are societies. There are major and minor bodies, aggregates within aggregates, and societies of all degrees and grades. Every one of the large national or political communities has numerous classes and interest or struggle groups "dividing the whole into factions or crowds."[25] These subordinate associations revolve about all sorts of interests—economic, ethnic, religious, political, ethical, etc. —and between them even as between the larger communities of races, nations, states and empires there goes on an incessant give and take of energy, as the shuttle of fortune flies to and fro across the fabric of human events.

Expressed in formulæ, the theory of history or of social evolution here suggested may be stated as follows:

*First*, the group process: Whenever any group of indi-

[25] See E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds.*

viduals, population aggregate, component or constituent association or class, tribe, nation, state, party, or society of any kind develops a surplus, it becomes, in proportion to the amount of surplus possessed, dynamic and active; and in the resulting redistribution of its energy, undergoes integration and differentiation. Going on alike within and between major and minor groups, the strain of the process is now toward and now away from an equilibrium. But no stable equilibrium ever being reached, the process amounts to nothing more than a constant and unending redistribution of social energy. Thus, history is a drama of the rise and fall of dynamic groups, classes, etc., which, striving, expanding, outreaching, overflowing in their preponderant mode of expression, dominate the less dynamic, static, or non-surplus ones; usually by conquering, subordinating, enslaving, suppressing, despoiling, destroying or otherwise controlling and exploiting them; occasionally by aiding, defending, serving, developing, effecting alliances with, or in some manner benefiting them; and sometimes by following both policies alternately or even simultaneously. The integrating phase of the process takes its rise in the generation of vital surplus. This, in turn, originates and adds to itself the traditional by which further power is accumulated to acquire more of the traditional, and so on, with each new increment of energy, gaining increased ability to lay hold of still more and other forms of energy, till eventually the organizational and economic are achieved, mastered, and controlled by the integrating group or class. All along there is a reciprocal action of the vital on the one hand, and of the traditional, organizational, and economic on the other hand. The vital achieves tradition, which being utilized, further augments and colors vital power, which again produces more tradition, organization, and material surplus to be once more transformed into the vital, and from the vital

back again to the other forms, in a perpetual give and take. The differentiating phase of the process is in a large measure the resultant from and the by-product of the growing or integrating movement. Every change in the course of social evolution derives its initial impulse from some new accumulation or concentration. Classes, subclasses, parties, occupational groups and organizational forms thus arise. Their appearance in any society precipitates a struggle between them for possession of surplus and social dominance.

*Second,* the personal process: Concurrently with the accumulation and concentration of social energy and the concomitant differentiation and integration of institutions, organizations, and structural forms, the evolution of personality takes place. Due largely to the inequitable distribution which comes about with respect to the accumulation, the three factors of personality, sociality, and individuality, fail to develop uniformly in all the socii. Hence, as it happens, with the accumulation of much surplus individuation tends to outrun and overbalance socialization to such an extent that what are commonly called unsocial and anti-social types appear fostering antagonistic ethical codes and causing inharmonious and unstable relations to prevail.

Simultaneously, however, with this development, and due in part directly to it and in other part springing from common causes with it, redemocratization and universalization take place. Thus, while national group solidarity tends to disintegrate, at the same time a compensating socialization through universalization operates to further a wider unity, embracing all humanity, and to bring about a growing sense of equality among men. Throughout the whole process it appears with respect to personality just as with regard to structure that periods of approaching equilibrium alternate with periods of growing disequilib-

rium, until, viewed in the long run, the process shows little more than an incessant surplus generation, agglomeration, and redistribution.

*Third*, the control process: With the accumulation of power there is concentration till some group possessing the major portion of it dominates the larger social body of which the group is a part. Thus appears the phenomenon of regularly established social control or the regulation of individual and group conduct. Control is accomplished not altogether by purposive effort such as the term suggests, but also by virtue of the position and preponderate influence enjoyed by the surplusful class. The surplus possessors dominate more or less mechanically.

As surplus is generated, the regulative function, which in very primitive and relatively surplusless societies is accomplished by the natural reactions of individuals to one another, comes to be performed first by a few surplusful personalities and then in the further course of integration by classes originating and appropriating energy of one form or another.

Throughout, the process involves a succession of surplus forms and classes dominating the social order. The ruling class is always that group which, possessing the form of surplus that chances to be most mobile, abundant and useful, is able to bring all other forms of energy into abeyance, and thus the whole of the society to which the ruling group belongs under its control.

The control process is to some extent carried on through the activity of leaders. They appear as highly vitalized and individualized personalities, who, as functionaries of various types, are possessed of or are the agents of some objective form of surplus. While leaders are evolved regularly, disturbed times, which render social energy fluid, bring them forth in unusual numbers. In fact, in proportion to the degree of social fluidity there is opportunity

for the exercise of the directive and originative function, and consequently the probability of many great men appearing in conjunction.

*Fourth,* the cataclysmic process: The distribution of energy as between the component classes and groups of any large complex and dynamic society of the political or industrial orders being unequal makes areas of different pressure. Whenever the stress between such areas becomes too great, a sudden redistribution of energy is liable to take place. The occurrence is somewhat like a storm in the physical atmosphere, and gives what is called social revolution as distinguished from social evolution.

The social process in relation to surplus groups having been outlined, and its outstanding principles indicated, this chapter may be considered finished, and the way sufficiently opened for us to pass to a more detailed and elaborate survey of the process as revealed in actual social history. To such a survey succeeding chapters will be devoted.

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## CHAPTER V

### SURPLUS AND STRUCTURE

In the last chapter a general theory of social evolution was stated. It is next in order to consider this in relation to the data of social life, and to trace and interpret the social process in its actual and historic manifestations. In doing this, we shall endeavor to follow only the main and broader lines of social evolution, and to show how social surplus has been the determining factor in the process. Were we able and inclined to retrace the entire course of human events in both the historic and prehistoric eras and to loiter sufficiently long on the journey, all the intricate and devious pathways followed by the evolution of society might be fully revealed, but such a long and arduous pilgrimage is quite out of the question. In lieu thereof we shall essay only a bird's-eye view, such as will show, if possible, the operation of the surplus factor in the more important steps of social change.

The present chapter will seek in the main to observe the process relative to institutions and organizations; that is, as it applies to the structural side of society. The treatment will, of necessity, have to be more or less schematic, but it need not, for that reason, do violence to facts, turn events into fictitious tales, or cast upon the course of things such a light as never was on sea or land. It will seek to follow out certain lines of structural formation, not, however, always claiming them to be universal, for the development has not been exactly the same everywhere.

The larger structural phases signify most. There are

three of these which we shall designate—ethnic society, political society, and industrial society. The rise of each phase, its main features, developments and the manner of transition to the succeeding phase, will concern us. We shall begin our study with the simplest forms of human association, as they appear in ethnic association.

## Ethnic Society

Ethnic society is the general term which best describes the first great stage of collective life. It means association on a kinship basis, and includes everything from the most primitive hordes of savages to settled nations of barbarians. To trace the main features of the evolutionary process through this range of life from the early beginnings to the second great stage of association is the purpose of this section.

The social process began with the appearance of vital surplus in the most primitive ethnic group. Individuals who chanced to be favored with unusual endowments of mental or physical energy were, in consequence, the alert and active, and at the same time, the audacious, forceful, and self-assertive elements. Impelled to self-expression, they manifested their superiority over the mass of fellow-tribesmen either by display of wits or by show of physical prowess, or by both means. Perhaps it was by a certain general cleverness and skill in procuring food that the exceptionally gifted first impressed themselves upon their group. At any rate, this would seem to be the form of expression naturally to be looked for under primitive conditions, and ethnic societies are actually found according first place to the most capable and daring hunters. Such was the case, for instance, among the Maritime Chukchi, the Yukaghis, and American Indians, as the Chippewan and the Plateau Shoshoneans.[1]

[1] R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, pp. 344, 345.

However natural it may have been that the high vitality individuals should on the one hand evince superior mentality in devising new ways for catching game or fish, or, on the other hand, give proof of extraordinary power by hardihood in the chase, or through martial valor, it does not appear that these were always just the ways of self-expression. A more indirect reaction to the business of getting a living on the part of the most energetic often took the form of making magic, controlling the *mana* or manipulating luck agencies as a means to satisfying wants. Strange as it seems to the civilized man, such things as these generally hold first place in the world of primitive man. How this came about we can only guess. I have suggested elsewhere that magic originated from a certain natural reaction of the psycho-physical organism to the environment.[2] When sentient man first began feebly to think and speculate in any way about his world, he anthropomorphized it; even felt it to be alive, a part of himself, read his inner experiences into it.[3] To his naïve mind personal feelings, attitudes, and actions, being the most immediate, were the most potent and efficient causative agencies.[4] All things animate and inanimate, being as himself, and not even clearly distinguished from himself, can, of course, as he feels and believes, be influenced or controlled by his own will, purpose, and conduct toward them. In his most important field of experience, namely, that in relation to his fellows, this concept generally holds good in practice. Carried over to the personified world in general, personal action is applied universally and indiscriminately as the causative and con-

[2] *A Hoosier Village*, pp. 135*ff*.

[3] See also Ivy G. Campbell, "Manaism" in *American Journal of Psychology*, January, 1918, and F. Boas, *Handbook of American Indians*.

[4] C. A. Mercier in *Causation and Belief*, pp. 143, 144, stresses the same point,

trolling force. Thus, the anthropomorphizing savage attempts to regulate and manipulate everything near and far, great and small, by his own attitudes and inconsequential practices. He cajoles the game, or multiplies the fruit supply by his incantations, frowns down the tempest, or casts a spell upon the waters to make them obey. And so it was that the magical art got its start, for some of the acts appeared effective, even in relation to nature; and so magicians came into being among primitive men. Often the children of civilized people, recapitulating the history of their evolution, pass through this anthropomorphizing period, and are, for a time, little magicians. They are always to be seen in our midst. Some of the more sensitive and imaginative will be found originating devices all their own, with which to persuade things to do their will.[5] Thus, for a time, they seek to manipulate the universe, and then pass on to another stage of development; and, in passing on, reach the uncongenial atmosphere of mature civilization, where the magical plant, though perennially sprouted and watered by childhood, withers away and dies. But where all is favorable, as it is in the savage's world, it flourishes everywhere abundantly.

Who were the magicians of primitive society? Men of "a distinct psychic caste" often, sometimes of a neurotic type, and at other times only normal, but very shrewd individuals like the leaders in industrial pursuits.[6] They were always the men of vital surplus, who, with more than ordinary sensitiveness, imagination, inquisitiveness, shrewdness, power of inference, and origination, first perceived, however erroneously, that certain acts and happenings, inconsequential as they might be, were somehow associated with other successful and resultful acts in connection with food getting and other affairs; and who,

[5] *A Hoosier Village,* pp. 82, 83, 135, 136.
[6] A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization,* pp. 215-224.

fastening upon these incidental acts as the causative and controlling elements, proceeded to repeat them as necessary and advantageous performances to successful enterprises. If, perchance, the supposed causative act, when repeated, seemed to work, it then became a ceremony or a medicine necessary for securing the luck; and the magic-finding genius by his discovery and its use made a deep impression upon his fellows. He would then be looked to to originate other magic, and would thus become a recognized medicine man. Almost everywhere in primitive societies we find the magician taking first place. In Australia, throughout West Africa, among many of the Polynesian Islanders, and in numerous tribes of American Indians, the medicine man unquestionably ranks first.

I have shown how, among primitive men, some who were endowed with surplus vital energy expressed themselves by physical exploits, or by discovering and devising agencies of supposed efficacy in environmental control, and I have also suggested that by so doing they impressed their fellows with their superior ability. In turn, the tribesmen gave them recognition, and accorded them honor and prestige. Through the personal ascendancy thus achieved much influence and power came to be enjoyed. Thus, vital surplus in asserting itself initiated the differentiating process, the further steps of which remain to be traced.

In view of their great importance in all primitive societies, it may be inferred that magicians were the first distinct social class to appear. The fact should be noted that their rise to eminence came by their adding to a vital surplus another form of energy, namely, tradition surplus. All magic is, of course, surplus tradition. From the crudest bits of ceremonial practice, luck lore, and causal inference, by increments of newly discovered and invented incantations, additional medicines, wisdom gained from

growing familiarity with the *mana,*[7] and deeper penetration into the mysterious, the body of magic gradually grew in scope and value, and *pari passu* with its growth the witch doctor's power was also constantly enhanced. It would be quite natural, moreover, for them, producing and controlling the most important traditions of the tribe, and exercising the power and greatness thrust upon them by social recognition, to make the most of their position and to take all the advantage possible. And this they apparently did very generally by making themselves the exclusive manufacturers of the magic, manipulators of the *mana,* and the keepers of the tribal mysteries. Thus, through a natural monopoly of the great bulk of the nonmaterial tradition surplus or tribal wisdom, they became a distinct professional class. As such they exist almost everywhere in primitive society, under the various names of witch doctors, medicine men, magicians, seers, Shaman and priests, but wherever found, performing much the same functions and playing an important rôle in tribal life.

Having become a separate class with numerous functions relative to the tribal traditions, the magicians eventually formed associations of a secret nature, which they governed for the purpose of conserving their power and further controlling affairs to their own advantage.[8] These societies in their original form embraced the tribal elders, and functioned as organizations for general social control through preservation of the mysteries and initiation of youth at

[7] This word is from the Melanesian Islanders, and means just power or mysterious energy. See R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians,* pp. 118*ff.* The Algonkin Indians used the word "manitou" in a similar way to describe the "Great Big" or power everywhere and in everything. See Wm. Jones, "The Algonkin Manitou" in Thomas' *Source Book for Social Origins,* pp. 683-692. Goldenweiser in *Early Civilization,* pp. 197-201, also treats of the main idea.

[8] W. H. R. Rivers advances the theory that primitive secret societies may have developed from a "totemic group of immigrants who settled in relatively small numbers among an aboriginal population." See *The History of Melanesian Society,* Vol. II, Chapter XXIV.

puberty into the tribal order. This type of society prevailed generally among the Australian tribes. A further development led to a secret order, where the membership was more or less exclusive, and graded in such a fashion that the members of the higher degrees form an inner circle of magicians who dominate the entire organization for their own benefit. Finally, in some cases, the medicine men have so narrowed the numbers eligible to the secret corporation that it becomes exclusively a priestly order. Such was the case among the Maoris of New Zealand, whose Whare Kura society was strictly a priestly order, exercising great power over the tribe. The Ogboni societies of the Yorubas of Africa are of much the same type.[9]

Whatever form the secret society takes the medicine men are generally found in control. Where they do not dominate other developments have checked their influence and robbed them of power. Where wholly uncurbed they form close corporations and virtually dominate tribal life. Their activities are manifold. Lowie describes them in the following manner: "Deriving support from their supposedly mystic powers these organizations sometimes degenerate into gangs, terrorizing and robbing the uninitiated. But they are also likely to assume at least the forms of a body dispensing justice. They will punish the membership for breach of confidence or like transgressions, and inflict penalties on outsiders for antagonizing their interests; they may develop into the one body wielding political power, and as such they have even been utilized by British colonial administrators." [10]

The rise of secret fraternities through the efforts of the magician class marks an important stage in the differentiation of society, for in them significant constituent or functional organization first appears. Up to their ap-

[9] Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*, pp. 170-176.
[10] *Primitive Society*, pp. 300, 301.

pearance the ethnic aggregate had been only the component groups united by blood ties; the clan and the household being such, even though a constituent factor chanced at times to be included in them. Goldenweiser calls attention to the prevalence of various types of what he thinks are functional groupings among primitive people.[11] There are, he says, groups based on industrial lines, as, for instance, among the Haida and Tlingit, where all men pass as wood workers, or among the Zuñi and Hopi, where all women qualify as pot makers, or among the Polynesians, where boat makers are a distinct class. A second type of grouping rests on principles of birth and privilege or birth and occupation as among Polynesians, where chieftainship belongs to the nobles, or in Indian castes, where occupations are hereditary. Still another type is the association based on magical or religious or military interests. This last type, however, does not appear to me to have much, save the fact of a functional element, in common with the groupings which Goldenweiser distinguishes. The others are, in the main, cases of broad distinctions between people having various functions or privileges rather than designations of definite constituent organizations. But the last type is made up of true associations constituted for functional purposes. The conspicuous thing about them is their definite form, a secret fraternity exercising governmental control over the tribe. The secret orders are interest organizations pure and simple, cutting across immediate kinship bonds. Howbeit, confined within tribal blood bonds, they must be looked upon as products of traditional surplus, for they revolve about and center in tradition and its control. The motive responsible for their genesis at bottom is an acquisitive and selfish one on the part of the mystery keeping class. Originally the high vitality individuals whose energy went into magic making and tradition build-

[11] A. A. Goldenweiser, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-270.

ing found sufficient motive in having their desire for recognition and personal ascendancy satisfied, but in due course competition for honor and social control arose, and an instinctively grasping and conniving faction crept into the magician class, and asserted itself. Other motives then became dominant, and the desire for power and gain came to the fore. The secret society formed to exploit and control society for the particular benefit of the magic fraternity was the result.

The predominate influence of medicine men and magic in most primitive societies would seem to justify the assumption upon which we have been proceeding: namely, that the primary social process has followed along the lines just marked out. Differentiation, however, has not been unilateral. In addition to that already indicated, and more or less parallel thereto, another line of development has gone on. To trace this is next in order.

It will be remembered that in the analysis of the surplus vitality element previously made some men were shown to have manifested their energy more through physical exploits than otherwise. They were the unusually strong and aggressive, fearless, and enduring, forceful and valorous individuals. In heroic deeds, enterprises and adventures they expressed themselves, in contradistinction to the mentally superior, who followed the more subtle pursuit of magical invention and wisdom. Excelling in the hunt, in encounters incident to the chase, in deeds of prowess and valor, in conflicts with hostile tribes, and in other hazardous situations, the highly endowed physically, by virtue of these things, came to be looked up to and admired by their fellows. They were esteemed as mighty hunters and martial heroes. Thus recognized and exalted by their tribe, they found themselves enjoying the ascendancy of natural superiority, and, in addition, the power of leadership and authority conferred by social election.

Exercising the prerogatives of leaders in food-getting expeditions and in campaigns against enemies, these practical men gradually became an independent functional class—the enterprisers, let us call them. Primitive society very commonly has such a class, known as braves or warriors. Among the Crow Indians, for instance, and likewise among the African Zulus, they are well distinguished.

In the course of their rise the enterprisers developed a body of practical knowledge pertaining to getting a living, to group affairs and to warfare. They devised instruments of the chase and conflict, acquired skill, profited by experiences, and established various mores; in short, they accumulated a body of tradition of a more or less material nature. I do not mean to suggest that it grew up entirely apart from the body of magical tradition, for it did not; it was strangely interwoven with it. Nevertheless, the practical had its own source and its own followers. Unlike the magical, however, the latter could not be readily monopolized, and that being so, it tended to become common property. Still, the enterprisers managed to augment their power greatly, even through this form of surplus. In other words, they failed not to add to their virtue knowledge.

The outstanding personage, or personages in some instances, among the enterprisers became chieftains. The Cheyenne Indians, for example, had a board of forty-four chiefs, four of whom ranked as superior, and elected a supreme chief from their number.[12] Usually the lot of chief fell to the greatest warrior, or, if more than one, to the two or more most distinguished. The tribal exploits and adventures were planned and directed by them. This leadership was originally a temporary thing. Indeed, temporary chieftainships have been the rule in most primitive societies of which there is record. Where permanent

[12] R. H. Lowie. *op. cit.*. p. 386.

tenure of office arose, it was at the outstart only for the lifetime of the incumbent, and not a hereditary position. The Omahas afford an example of a tribe that established a permanent chieftainship of seven men, with two of them having preëminent rank.[13] The factor bringing about permanent tenure was probably exceptionally masterful and commanding personality, which, by sheer ability and resourcefulness in organizing raids or conducting warfare, prolonged a temporary incumbency into one of lifelong duration, and thus established the custom of permanency.

Very often, though not by any means always, before this came to pass another important change in tribal domestic life had been taking place through the activities of the surplus class in question. It was the transformation of a matrilineal, if not a matriarchal such as was approximated among the Iroquois, into a patriarchal society. This development was largely a by-product of intergroup conflicts, in the course of which women were taken captive by the warriors, and appropriated for wives. By means of this practice the old system of tribal life was undermined. The captive women in the midst of an alien people were sibless or clanless. There were no kinship groups of their own to defend them, and to which their husbands were responsible. Being the exclusive property of their captors they were dependent upon and obedient to them or their captor's clan alone.[14] The children, moreover, of such wives were under the father's rule, instead of the mother's or the mother's kinship group, as in the matrilineal or matriarchal system. To his sons by such marriages the leader, be he chieftain or priest, could pass on his prerogatives unhindered by the matrilineal law of succession which gave preference to the sisters' sons. Thus, wherever this new kind of family appeared, it afforded more free-

[13] R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 386.
[14] J. F. McLennan, *The Patriarchal Theory*, pp. 235, 236.

dom and other advantages to those establishing it.[15] By enhancing their power it gave to the surplus class a powerful motive for carrying on raids against weaker tribes. So it came about that getting wives by capture came to be the preferred method of the warriors. Naturally, to the chiefs leading successful expeditions, the lion's share of such choice booty would fall. In this way chiefs came to have numerous wives and women slaves, who, together with their progeny, gave them a considerable following of dependents, and greatly augmented their power and authority. In this manner came the patriarch, and the way was opened for the development of kingship.

Wife capture, instituted by the warriors, could not, of course, remain their exclusive right. It tended to become the common practice, in so far as opportunity permitted, of all the tribesmen. At any event, once introduced, the old order was doomed, and in time gave place to the patrilinear and patriarchal system.

So far the products of differentiation on the line we are now following have been an enterpriser class, chiefly of warriors, a chieftainship more or less permanent for the outstanding brave or braves of the warriors, and, through the activities of this class in warfare, the introduction of a patriarchal system supplanting the matrilineal order, and finally making possible the powerful patriarchal chieftain, who, perchance, will become a king.

Usually, before the full-fledged king appears in primitive society, an opportunity must be afforded for the tribe or its surplusful warrior class to further augment its power by the control of another form of social surplus. In other words, movable wealth must become available.

This happened first, I suppose, when tribesmen began to cultivate the soil, grow food or domesticate animals. Under

[15] See Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Outlines of Sociology*, F. W. Moore, Tr., pp. 112, 113.

a crude hoe culture, where such grains as buckwheat, millet, and barley, and a few tubers and gourds were produced, the amount of goods was small, but enough to entice neighboring tribes to plunder them where possible. Where cattle had been domesticated, and a pastoral culture entered upon, the property was greater, more mobile, and consequently more tempting to aggressive hunting and herding neighbors. At the same time the mere food interest had expanded into a property interest, and the desire to control wealth had become a fairly strong motive. Thus it came about where movable property had been acquired, particularly where it took the form of herds, that the warrior class got a new impulse to aggressive action. Cattle-stealing became their chief concern. They instigated the business of lifting herds over the borders in raiding expeditions. For this there was plenty of opportunity, and it was the easy way of getting wealth. Wherever pastors or nomads have been found, tribal history has always been the story of cattle-stealing and conflicts incident thereto. So it was among the ancient Semitic peoples, the Homeric Greeks, the Germans of Tacitus,[16] the Irish tribes of the Brehons, and so is it to-day among certain Mongolian tribes, and the Zulus, Hottentots and other cattle raisers of Africa, to cite but a few examples. By cattle-lifting, the warrior class acquired wealth, became masters of a new and more potent form of surplus than any hitherto available, and thereby magnified their position, and further increased their power in society. But this was not all. Even more important was the resulting transformation in the social order, which, under the influence of economic surplus, passed from a kinship organization to a feudalistic system.[17] An excellent account of such development has been left us in the case of the Irish tribes in the Brehon

[16] Tacitus, *Germania*, Chapter XV.
[17] F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 294-296.

laws.[18] There the cattle-lifting chieftains, who led their marauding braves across the borders, came back to be rewarded with a large share of the stolen herd. This stock was let on shares to impecunious tribesmen, to border squatters or "kinreckt" men; that is, tribal outlaws without clan attachment who always dwelt on the outskirts of the tribal domain. The cattle-lifters, or "Bo-airs," as they were called, offered all such men protection, on the conditions that they would take stock on shares as herdsmen and in turn render such other service as the Bo-airs might need. Thus, a following of "fuidhuirs," or cattle tenants, came to be attached to the warriors who had grown rich by cattle robbery. A new relationship, by this means, came into vogue—one based on personal allegiance instead of blood kinship.[19] The feudal bond, similar to the *commendatio* and *beneficium* of European society of the Medieval Age, came into force. Under these new conditions and arrangements, the Bo-airs waxed rich from the increase of stock, and mighty through their numerous retainers, slaves, and followers, and in time they grew powerful enough to exact a share of the herds of every tribesman by virtue of the fact that they, the nobles, together with their followers, were actually in the majority in the tribe. Thus, a feudal cattle-aristocracy, or noble wealth-controlling class, came to dominate in old Ireland, and in recent days in somewhat the same fashion among the Zulus.

In such an aristocracy the most powerful chief became king. To martial prowess and other meritorious qualities that had elevated him to a permanent chieftainship, wealth in herds was added, and a numerous body of personal retainers. By means of these a far larger range of inde-

[18] H. S. Maine, *Early History of Institutions*, 1888, pp. 134, 143, 144; L. Ginnell, *The Brehon Laws*.

[19] F. S. Chapin, *Introduction to the Study of Social Evolution*, p. 288.

pendent power than hitherto exercised became his, and kingly prerogatives came to be assumed. Thus the Zulu king controlled a great treasury of cattle, and through the support of a coterie of cattle nobles tyrannized over the nation. In other cases the kings of tribal people have become even more absolute autocrats. A notable instance was that of the Dahomi despot.

Where an aristocracy of wealth arose and a full-fledged king emerged, the enterprisers, and especially the warrior class, became subordinated to the political element, and the mere agents of their authority. This happened among the Zulus, and also in Dahomi. Thus it came about that a distinct political class was differentiated. It was no longer the enterprisers or warriors as such that ruled, but a separate wealth-controlling element. This was common among Polynesian and African societies.[20] The differentiation of the political class was made possible only through the rise and control of movable wealth, and the accumulation of an economic surplus within a given tribe by plundering other tribes.

The political aristocracy or autocracy, if it, perchance, attained to that level, had arisen by robbing other tribes, and, when once established, carried out the same policy of exploitation within its own tribe and towards its own people. This, indeed, is the true "political means," that is, getting goods by robbing others, which is the governing method everywhere of the ruling class, whose power rests on the control of economic surplus.

We have shown how, under certain conditions, the political class was differentiated in primitive society. This does not imply its rise everywhere nor preclude its rise otherwise, under other conditions. For it is very clear that social development does not traverse the same road in all parts of the world. There is great variety rather than

[20] R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 349, 350.

uniformity. But, in spite of that, if our theory that surplus is the motor promoting and driving forth social differentiation is correct, we should find, whatever the conditions, that it was economic surplus that gave rise to the political method, and in the end to a political class in society. We should find also that the main lines of social evolution have been strikingly similar wherever the several forms of surplus have appeared.

When tribal feudalism, built on a pastoral economy, had developed, primitive democracy in its most essential phase, that is, the economic, came to an end. Substantial equality in goods had prevailed hitherto. Wealth, indeed, had not been much of an item except in rare cases before the herding stage anyhow, and never before that had it been so movable or so desirable. Chattels had consisted of tools, instruments of the chase and conflict, meager products, if any, of horticulture, and a few other personal and family effects. Sense of ownership in land was not yet individualized. Even chattels were not infrequently joint and communal goods. Without accumulated wealth to speak of, there was almost no economic surplus. Under such conditions, there were, and could be, no rich and poor. Every man or family was about equal to every other. Such rank as there was depended not at all on property, but on superior ability, experience, and the control of surplus tradition, as we have already seen. But cattle-breeding gave to tribesmen considerable wealth, movable wealth, highly useful and valuable wealth. It greatly increased the property interest, and gave tremendous accentuation to the sense of personal ownership. There was a natural tendency in a cattle-economy for inequality to arise. Luck played an important part in growth and size of herds. But differentiation in the distribution of wealth was never marked or significant [21] until equality was effec-

[21] Franz Oppenheimer, *The State*, pp. 34-37.

tively destroyed by political means. The already existing surplus-controlling class—warriors, chiefs, etc., by virtue of their naturally dynamic character, tended to gather to themselves control of the new energy, that is, the economic goods. But it was chiefly through intertribal cattle-raiding that this came about, and the surplus faction really succeeded in laying the foundation for relatively large fortunes in herds. And then for the first time in history rich men appeared, and primeval democracy simultaneously disappeared. Those grown rich in cattle were the men who already ruled over tribal affairs, but riches put their regency on a new basis, and elevated them to a new plane of power, just as the control of any new form of surplus had always done before. Thus a political class as such was differentiated. So it happened that tribal feudalism opened the way for the further unfolding of the social process and virtually initiated momentous changes yet to be traced.

So far, in describing the social process, we have traced two lines of development. Beginning with the high vitality individuals who fall naturally into the mentally and the physically superior, we indicated the lines of differentiation struck out by each. On the one hand, we followed the intellectual element, and saw how it evolved into a magician class, proceeded to devise constituent organizations of a secret nature, and by means of them elevated itself often into the controlling and dominating faction in ethnic groups. On the other hand, we followed the enterprisers and observed how they became the warrior class led by chieftains, and how then, through intertribal conflict and wife-capture they transformed the domestic organization from the matrilineal to the patriarchal; and how again, when movable property had come into existence, their braves by the practice of cattle-lifting established what has been called tribal feudalism; how chiefly by means of this

system the wealthy men became an aristocracy, forming a distinct political class, often under the leadership of a king, to whom the warriors and enterprisers were subordinate, and how finally the whole tribe was exploited for the benefit of the ruling class.

These two lines of social integration and differentiation —the one spiritual and the other material, let us say—did not proceed in such a distinct and unrelated fashion as our schematic method of presentation would seem to imply. Throughout the whole process of development there was more or less competition for dominance. Sometimes one became ascendant and so remained, and sometimes the other assumed all authority, and often, before ethnic society ran its course, there was a union of both under one or the other.

In as much as the magicians were the first to emerge, to develop, and to monopolize traditional surplus, and the first to originate surplus organization as a means of consolidating and conserving the power of tradition, their dominance was primary, and in a great majority of cases so remained. Where such was the case, integration about this class was the outstanding fact, and the enterprisers—warriors and chieftains—came under their regency. By way of illustration, among the Northern Maidu the Shaman heading the secret society of magicians made and unmade the chief, and held over all others the place of greatest eminence in tribal matters. "He regulated the ceremonial life of his people, adjusted disputes, insured a good corn crop, warded off disease, and by his magical powers inflicted condign punishment on the enemy; indeed, he himself often led war parties in person. Over and above all these things, he was the authority on tribal mythology and lore, and it was his duty to instruct the people on these lofty topics." [22]

[22] R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 342, 343.

The enterprisers as warriors, likewise, not infrequently became the center of integration, and put all beneath their authority. This seems to have occurred chiefly where there was occasion and necessity for martial activities. The Polynesian and North American societies of primitive men showed this development. The supremacy of the warriors was established in a majority of these tribes.[23] Where this was the case, the martial tradition and organization had become more important than the magical, and the latter had taken secondary place.

When movable wealth and an economic surplus was achieved, then the enterprisers who had formed a wealthy class held sway. These, of course, rose out of the warriors' class, as already shown. This, I suppose, did not commonly happen unless a nomadic or pastoral stage had been reached, though tendencies in that direction appeared among nonpastors in a few cases, notably maritime peoples. The Hupas, Shastas, and Banks Islanders, among the nonpastors, may be cited as examples.[24] The Altaians and reindeer herding Chukchi [25] and the numerous pastors of Africa all gave primary place to the rich men of the tribe.

When the rich arose and became a separate and independent political class through the advent of tribal feudalism or otherwise, then all became effectively subordinated to their power and rule, as among the Zulus and other African tribes. A complete union of the spiritual and material interests after this fashion, under the enterprisers' leadership, did not, apparently, take place until an economic surplus had appeared. But with its genesis and the emergence of rich men an alliance between the two lines of interests began to be formed. The enterprisers—the powerful war lords and rich nobles—ruled by might,

[23] Hutton Webster, *op. cit.*, pp. 74, 75.
[24] R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 343.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 343.

that is, by robbery or political means, but they were not thereby delivered from the thraldom of superstition and magic, nor were they able to cope with the subtle magicians or to circumvent their influence. The blessing and support of the magicians, moreover, were always needed to give success to their enterprises, and to sustain their authority. On the other hand, the magicians could not live by *mana* alone; they needed material things, and the prestige of more tangible power. Under such conditions the two naturally drew together—the one receiving *mana* and the favor of the gods, the other wealth and protection—and thus was formed the ruling class. The chief or king became the foremost magician or high priest of the magical cult, uniting in himself the function of patriarch, judge, king, and priest. He began to find sanction for his rulership, not in the might of power or wealth, but in the right of mystical prerogative and appointment. Among the Maoris of New Zealand, for instance, the development was practically such as has been indicated. The chief was at once leading magician, richest man, and most powerful soldier.[26] The full development of this union, however, did not take place under tribal conditions, but passed on to run its course in civilization.

## Political Society

When, under pastoral conditions, primitive society acquired economic surplus, developed tribal feudalism, and evolved a distinct political class which, as exclusive followers of the exploitive means of getting a living, held sway over social destiny, the stage was set for another act more momentous than any that had yet transpired in the drama of history. This act gave that phase of social

[26] Hutton Webster, *op. cit.*, pp. 83, 84; R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.*, pp. 345, 346.

integration under which arose the state and political society.

Before the nomadic or pastoral stage the state was hardly possible. Neither huntsmen nor horticulturists are state builders. If, in any case, they evolved the state, it was exceptional. To be sure, the Aztecs and Incas, who were only in the horticultural stage, approached a state organization, according to the reports of Spanish conquerors. But when due allowance is made for the highly colored descriptions which are the sources of our information, it is not certain that these nations had become anything more than tribal federations of a feudalistic type. If their organizations were created by hunters conquering and establishing rule over soil-tillers, as some have conjectured, then their method of origin was indeed political, and for that reason they should be considered essentially states. Even so they remain highly exceptional instances; for, as Oppenheimer has shown, nomads, either as pastors or "Vikings," that is, sea nomads, are the real state-makers.[27]

Pastors became the original state-makers, not merely because they were pastors, but chiefly because as such they were the first societies endowed with enough social surplus to achieve so great a work. Herdsmen, because better and more regularly nourished, had more vital energy. They multiplied faster than hunters for this very reason. By the exploitation of the labor of others, there grew up a larger warrior class, and a more complete discipline of all elements by means of more effective organization under the patriarchs.[28] This superabundant vitality expressed itself normally in aggression and warfare. Hence "Herdsmen and warriors became identical concepts."[29] The eco-

[27] Franz Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*
[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 42-46.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

nomic surplus, moreover, especially where tribal feudalism had arisen, was concentrated in the hands of the rich Bo-airs, of whom the political class was composed. The lines of greatest traction for the energy of this class were the relatively impotent soil-tillers and smaller pastoral groups round about. The soil-tillers were especially easy prey, since, unlike pastors, they could not readily flee with their wealth from invaders. Their immobility, as well as their comparative weakness, made them attractive victims. Primitive horticulturists, while possessing normally more wealth in the aggregate than pastoral groups occupying an equal amount of territory, had ordinarily but little economic surplus since they tended to breed up to the limit of their resources. Under the circumstances pastors were quite capable of mastering horticultural groups. Already, through cattle-raiding and marauding expeditions, the predacious or political means of getting wealth in preference to the economic had fully developed, and become the customary method of the ruling class of the pastors. The further employment of it in relation to agriculturists led directly to the founding of political society.

Under tribal feudalism, weaker pastors had been robbed of cattle, women for wives, and a few men for slaves. At the worst, they had been despoiled of all goods and put to the sword. The latter has been the method, at times, of the wealth-hunting Zulus, Kafirs, and others of Africa, who, by fire and sword, have devastated large areas and exterminated the population. But this bears' method of destroying the beehive to get the honey eventually gave place to the beekeepers' attitude toward the bees.[30] For it dawned upon the despoilers that it would be more profitable to subjugate and permanently exploit the labor of the vanquished than to rob and utterly destroy them. Thus, it came about that pastoral tribes conquered and

[30] *Ibid.*, on Franz Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

subdued weaker pastors and horticulturists, and established control over them for the purpose of exploiting them as serfs and slaves. The organization of control or relationship between the conquerors and the conquered so formed was the institution called the state. Defined, according to Franz Oppenheimer, from whom has come the fullest statement and most able substantiation of this distinctively sociological theory: "The state, completely in its genesis, essentially and almost completely during its first stages of existence, is a social institution, forced by a victorious group of men on a defeated group, with the sole purpose of regulating the dominion of the victorious group over the vanquished, and securing itself against revolt from within and attacks from abroad. Teleologically, this dominion had no other purpose than the economic exploitation of the vanquished by the victors." [31]

Evidence that the state originated in this wise everywhere abounds. It is clear with reference to Egypt, Canaan, India, China, Asia Minor, Greece, Italy, Europe, and parts of present day Africa. Surplus nomads conquering sedentary soil-tillers only to be vanquished in turn by some other more powerful pastors or Vikings in a continuous series, runs the chronicle of history age after age in many lands. "In Mesopotamia, wave follows wave, state follows state—Babylonians, Amoritans, Assyrians, Arabs, Medes, Persians, Macedonians, Parthians, Mongols, Seldshuks, Tartars, Turks; on the Nile, Hyksos, Nubians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Turks; in Greece, the Doric States are typical examples; in Italy, Romans, Ostrogoths,

[31] Franz Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 15. Herbert Spencer was, perhaps, the first to make the discovery that the state arose through the forceful subjugation of one tribe by another. (See *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. I, Sections 257, 260, 456.) This explanation has been accepted by other social scientists, and by them given grounding in a wealth of data. However, Gumplowicz and his school have been the chief investigators in this field. See *Der Rassenkampf;* Ratzenhofer, *Die Sociologische Erkenntniss;* and Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*

Lombards, Franks, Germans; in Spain, Carthaginians, Visigoths, Arabs; in Gaul, Romans, Franks, Burgundians, Normans; in Britain, Saxons, Normans.'' [32]

From the outstart the victors had to occupy the land of their conquered host to secure the spoils. In the form of cattle and produce, all the economic accumulations were regularly appropriated. In order to secure these and to defend the vanquished from other nomads, the invaders had to place garrisons of warriors to watch over the peasants and to guard the frontiers. In time, the peasants acquiesced in this subjection, and even accepted the arbitration of their masters in the settlement of clan quarrels. Thus the conquerors gradually assumed judicial functions, defined rights and duties between their subjects, and so made law. By more and more interference, the conquerors eventually took over the entire governmental function of the conquered. In this manner, control of much of the tradition and more of the essential organizational achievement of the subjugated group passed into the hands of the state-makers. Accompanying this development local gods were brought under subjection to those of the invaders, and the latter's religion made the only true one. Meanwhile, in time, through the growth of a common language, more or less crossing of stock, development of common interest in repelling enemies, a common consciousness of unity of all dwellers on that same territory, and a sense of difference between their own and other groups, arose, and the foundations of the state were thus made fairly secure. The new bond was no longer the blood tie of ethnic society, but the tie of a common lot and a common land—the bond of political society.

Into this new order the king of the state-makers came to exercise and enjoy more power than ever before by means of the greater wealth at his command and the pa-

[32] Franz Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 16, 17.

tronage under his control. He sometimes claimed the conquered territory as his own lands, and disposed of them as he saw fit to vassal princes. We see this happening among Africans, in Uganda and Dahomi, for example. Under the conditions prevailing in the more stable political order, the kingship often became hereditary and tended to become a dynasty.

Not only did the kingship thus become magnified, but the tribal nobility was likewise strengthened. The integration of surplus wealth which made them cattle-lords under the tribal order, continued to augment their power in the primitive state. In taking possession of the conquered territory it was but natural that a larger share of the land with its peasant occupants should fall to them, together with greater rights to unsettled territory for the use of their herds and herdsmen, than was assigned to the ordinary freeman, common warrior, or tribesman of the nomadic group. So the economic ranks of the nomadic tribe were carried over into the state order, and incidentally placed on a far more secure foundation than cattle ownership—even on that of serf-tilled land itself. Not only was the basis of society thus changed, but the power of the nobles was by the same means much engrossed through the large fiefs falling to them. For all of this meant the addition of so much permanent wealth to their already large possessions of herds, and at the same time an increase in the retinue of followers. In this way the basis for a landed feudalism such as came to prevail throughout western Europe, Japan, and other parts of the world, was laid. And just as the king in his office, so the rich nobles, becoming permanently established in their fiefs, soon made their order hereditary, and thus founded the aristocracy so familiar to the student.

The feudal nobility from the very beginning of the state formed the nucleus for the continual agglomeration of

wealth and power. It remains for us to sketch the process of this further integration and in doing it we shall have recourse in the main to Oppenheimer's analysis.[33] The quest of the lords of the feudal state was for serfs and slaves with which to settle unappropriated lands, in order to enhance their revenues and power. Warlike expeditions were, therefore, led by the nobles no longer for cattle-lifting, as in tribal feudalism, but for slave-hunting. Serfs were thus acquired to produce wealth, to swell the lord's following and to augment his fighting force. By this means the lords continued to wax ever richer and more powerful; and the state continued to expand in territory until limited by other states likewise expanding.

As the state expanded, the nobles were made officials of the provinces, since under the conditions that everywhere prevailed in the world until within recent generations it was not possible for any central government to rule over a far flung territory. The lord accepted responsibility for keeping his province secure. This demanded an army, and to provide it the king relinquished the tribute of the province to his vassal. The lord, in turn, rendered a portion of the tribute collected to the king, provided him with soldiers, and kept order in his province. This arrangement operated to the advantage of the local lords, for every opportunity was thus given them to extend their own authority at the king's expense. And this they did everywhere, it seems—in Egypt, China, Japan, Persia, and Europe—during the ages of feudalism. So it came about that the wealthy nobles as the king's officials developed into mighty princes ruling over principalities more or less independent.

Within their provinces the rise of the nobles to great power was at the expense of the freemen, even as it was at the expense of the king's authority in the state. This

[33] Franz Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, Chapter V.

was due to the control of all unoccupied lands of the province by the lord. These lands were his in pay for services to the king. He thus had the power to settle them with his own followers, to the exclusion of the freemen. The latter, moreover, generally being supporters of the king, were hated by the lord, because standing in his way. They, however, were unable to get the king's help against the lord, since the latter was too strong to be opposed. In the end the freemen, discriminated against, robbed of lands and crushed, were reduced almost to the level of serfs, and made mere vassals of the great lords. For protection they were absolutely compelled to accept such a status. Freemen and serfs finally tended to merge into one class—the plebeian. So it happened in Rome and Germany, and western Europe generally. Such was the full-grown feudal state. It was a hierarchy. "The pyramid rested on the laboring population, of whom the major part were as yet peasants; the surplus of their labor, the ground rental, the entire 'surplus value' of the economic means, was used to support the upper strata of society." The uppermost stratum was the political class—made up of lords, princes, king and their entourage—the controllers and monopolizers of the social surplus.

The process did not, of course, terminate with the rise of the feudal state; it went incessantly on through endless rounds of integration and disintegration, through the rise and fall of surplus-controlling states and classes within them. States clashed with states, the strong overcame the weak, and empires emerged. A stately array of them has passed through the world,—Babylonian, Assyrian, Persian, Egyptian, Macedonian, Roman—to cite only the vanguard of the procession, for we need not pause to review them all, or stop to recount their stories. In all ages it has ever been the same: states that developed surplus have reached out to dominate, the great ones to gobble up the

smaller ones, and to give rise to empires. Then empires have disintegrated. Their disintegration was always inevitable, for the princes and satraps grew mighty in their respective provinces, and even made of their principalities centers for a new integration. They easily achieved independence of the king, and thus disrupted his empire. So the empires of old fell apart, and the process of integration began anew about new surplus states. In every land and age since states began they have expanded into empires, empires have broken asunder and other states have builded other empires, and thus the ceaseless redistribution of power has gone on and on. In Mesopotamia, Persia, Egypt, India, China of old, in Europe of the Middle Ages, in France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and Japan of more recent centuries, the story has been an identical one. In this sense history has repeated itself. The surplus state, ever since its beginning has behaved in essentially the same manner under all conditions.

Resulting from the integration which led to the political order were certain internal differentiations. Stratification was at once manifested; the initial cleavage following political lines was between victors and vanquished. If the latter chanced to be of a very different race, and were not readily assimilable to the victors, a fixed caste system such as India shows was the outcome. If there were no great racial differences, the division became neither so marked nor so abiding. However in any case there was a clear separation of the two, due to more or less pronounced ethnic differences. Conquerors have always esteemed themselves superior to those subdued, and the relationship of rulers and subjects has changed this attitude into a fixed form. No such relationship had arisen antecedent to the state; there had been rich tribesmen, to be sure, and even a cattle-nobility under tribal feudalism; but society

was otherwise homogeneous. There had been only superiority among brethren and equals but no ethnic differences, and consequently no stratification such as the state gave. It was, let it be emphasized, the control of economic surplus which led to the development of the new organizational surplus represented by political society that produced this social stratification.

Further class division on economic grounds between nobles, freemen, and serfs also appeared. The distinction between the first two had, of course, been carried over from ethnic society, but the status of serfdom was new. The freemen were the common tribesmen of the conquerors who had but little property, and, because lacking in surplus of any sort, had but little chance or ability to exploit. The serfs were the conquered, who, being deprived of the fruits of their labors and exploited by their masters, had neither property nor liberty.

A third cleavage arose over the mode of getting a living. By virtue of the state a considerable leisure class was separated from the toiling masses. The state-makers, especially the warriors, the medicine-men or priests, the rich robbers, and the chieftains or political class of the conquerors, became in the new order practically emancipated from the necessity of supplying their wants by their own efforts. Instead, they commanded the labor of others, despised work, and looked upon it as degrading. The subjected remained toilers, eating their bread in the sweat of their brows, and were forced to yield all their surplus gains to the leisure class. So appeared the fundamental occupational division of society into exploiters and enslaved toilers. Slavery was thus a distinct product of state-making. Primitive hunters held no industrial or true slaves, for there were no important means of utilizing them. Women were stolen for wives, captives were taken in war and enemies sometimes hunted to be sold to slave-

keepers, but there was no permanent slavery worthy of note. Pastors held a few slaves, especially after feudalism developed and many herdsmen were needed. But slavery remained almost negligible until the state institution was imposed upon agriculturists. For, though slaves were useful to primitive soil-tillers such agriculturists had not the surplus with which to subdue other people and to acquire many slaves. But when pastors subdued them, and exploited their labor, then slavery began in earnest, and all toilers became either slaves or serfs.

The differentiation of toilers themselves into various occupational groups was a relatively late thing, notwithstanding the fact that artisans of a rudimentary kind sometimes appeared in ethnic societies. The full development of crafts and artisan classes probably did not even take place until the rise of a money economy and wage payment. For not till then did any part of the servile population acquire sufficient surplus to alter its status and advance itself beyond serfdom. But the wage system gave some spare time and more freedom, and thus more or less opportunity to follow self-chosen lines of activity.[34] It is not improbable, however, that such differentiation was fostered from early days by the conquerors, who needed tool and weapon makers, and other manufacturers of special goods to satisfy their wants. And it may even be, as Ghent has suggested,[35] that exploiters, in order to command certain coveted products, sometimes conquered and enslaved tribes, which, as tribes, had developed special crafts. The status of smiths and other artisans among certain peoples would seem to give confirmation to this theory. Thus, either by surplus rising among the toilers themselves, or by the activities of the surplus-controllers of the state, occupational division of labor was brought about.

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[34] Carl Bucher, *Industrial Evolution*, p. 330.
[35] W. J. Ghent, *Mass and Class*, pp. 41-43.

While the warriors had become a fairly distinct class under tribal feudalism, under the state they became entirely so, took on added importance, and eventually a new status altogether. They no longer participated in the loot as formerly. Instead, they became dependents—mere instruments by which the king and nobles sustained the state and carried on exploitation without much obligation to share the spoils with their fighting men. In time, with the coming of a money economy, the army became chiefly a hirelings class, and once reduced to that level, has ever remained there—the mere catspaw of the surplus-gatherers.

Another significant differentiation attending the rise of the state had to do with the distribution of the population. Thus, it came about that cities first made their appearance in conjunction with political society. Before the state they scarcely existed, but "it is doubtful whether there was a state without a city as the seat and center of its political power." [36] They arose for the most part as the abodes of the conquerors, being the strongholds of the invaders. Many of the earliest English towns, for instance, arose in just this manner. They were garrisons of Romans, Danes, and Northmen.[37] The chief city was the king's seat and center of government. In the ancient empires the city of the great king became the center of the religious cult of the invaders, and the guardian deity of that city the god of the state and head of the deistic hierarchy.[38] Temples were built, religion and politics usually became fused into one, and generally the chief priest and the king were identical persons. Law and authority and the state itself thus got divine sanction and the right to rule. Such things as these brought together a relatively numerous people in one

[36] Wm. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, Schaub, Tr., p. 326.
[37] A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 171.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 325.

compact dwelling place. Other strategic locations, where the nobles and their followers abode for the gathering of tribute, likewise became centers of political and economic activity. In time, the conquered gathered more and more into such localities for thither they fled for protection within the walls when danger from other invaders threatened. The foreign traders or merchants also came and went at will, making the city a trading post. Their articles of exchange stimulated local production of many wares, and thus handicraft industries naturally developed in the urban places. The city, therefore, evolved an economic means of growth which tended to draw the peasants in increasing numbers and to increase the number of permanent citizens of foreign origin.[39] Thus, scattered over the empire, many populous centers arose. Sometimes they were arbitrarily established in conquered provinces by the planting of colonies for political purposes. Alexander did this in his empire, and so did the Romans in theirs.[40]

In the late industrial age causes of an entirely different nature have led to the rise of many cities, but the primary and original one goes back to the source indicated—the efforts of the state-founders to hold fast their dominions. Indeed, the state and city in maritime regions were often identical, for the robbers of sea and trade routes needed no land and serfs for exploitation.[41] They needed only to occupy harbors, islands, fording places, and turn them into strongholds in order to plunder and take toll of all who passed their way. Thus, the ancient city-states of the Mediterranean civilization were in their genesis simply bands of pirates or Vikings or colonies of traders who robbed the seafarer, caravans of traders and the coastal dwellers of their goods. Rome, Carthage, Venice, London,

[39] Ludwig Gumplowicz, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-150.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 326, 237.
[41] Wm. Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 323; Franz Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 155*ff*.

Paris, Constantinople and many another city apparently began in this way. City-states were to the maritime regions what garrisons of nobles and warriors were to the inland territorial states—both seats of political organizations and power engaged in exploiting others.

The city representing the surplus-controlling group became the nucleus for a new integration entailing profound changes in the social order. Thither was brought the loot and tribute taken from the peasants. Thus, wealth accumulated in urban places. To the shrines of the great gods, located at these seats, came worshipers, and the religious establishment with its priestly class, into which tribal magicians had evolved, flourished. Great aggregations with extensive trade developed as a natural consequence, just as we see them doing to-day in the cities of the Fellah conquerors of the Hausas of the Sudan. Here, too, arts and crafts fostered by foreign traders, the political class and by the very exigencies of the situation became more extensively pursued than elsewhere. As time passed, all occupations of this nature gravitated more and more to these centers, while the peasants' villages were left to follow agriculture and herding almost exclusively. Along with this a money economy came into vogue, and in the cities barter was soon supplanted by money exchange. So the political centers had added to them industrial and commercial activities, which, in time, grew to be paramount. Thus, the cities came to be dominated by the economic instead of by the political means of getting wealth.

Just how this transformation came about has been shown by Oppenheimer, to whose analysis we shall again resort.[42] The expansion of the state's territory at length made it unprofitable for the nobles to exact tribute in kind from the peasants. The expense in overseers and agents ate up the levy. So payment in kind was relinquished in favor

[42] Franz Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, Chapter VI.

of a tax and rental. The substitution of this system, coupled with the ambition of the lords to achieve independence, made things easier for the plebs. Indeed, the lords could magnify their position only as they favored the plebs, and won their personal allegiance. In this way a veritable revolution in the feudal state was effected. For, as the great landlords acquired a large degree of independence in the control of territories, they did not reward their knights and retainers with gifts of land and serfs as the king had once done. If they should do so, they knew full well that every knight was liable to become a rival for control of the principality by the same method as that to which the princes themselves had resorted to undermine the king. In lieu of land and serfs, therefore, they bestowed upon their subordinates only certain very limited rights to tax, thus confining their incomes to definite payments of labor and produce.[43] The princes, at the same time, found it necessary to restrict tribute due themselves to specific and limited amounts of work or other payment. In this fashion, the manorial system arose, and the serfs ceased to be mulcted for all they could give of toil and the fruits thereof by their masters. A limit was set to exploitation, and a small surplus remained to the peasantry. They had some time to call their own, and rights that were more or less respected, and so they got started on the road that eventually led out of serfdom. The economic margin remaining with the serfs made them in some measure the consumers of goods other than products of the field and herd. This encouraged production on the part of craftsmen, and thus gave spur to the growth of industries in the cities.[44]

Meanwhile, in the struggle that was always going on between the king and provincial lords, the cities, as a rule,

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 233, 234.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

rallied to the king, and similarly within the provinces they championed the prince's cause as against the knight's. By so doing the industrial group gave check to the predatory methods of the state-making class.[45] The cities, moreover, grew in population at the expense of the manors, for in their contest with the lords and knights they enticed many peasants by offers of personal liberty. The king, to hold the loyalty of the cities, confirmed such grants. For instance, in Germany of the fifteenth century there were nearly three-score imperial cities; that is, those holding charters directly from the crown. There were some, to be sure, which were loyal to the lords, but most of them, because of gifts of many liberties, attached themselves to the crown and its cause. In France, under Louis XI (1461-1483), the freedom of cities was similarly achieved, and under Henry Tudor (1485) at the end of the War of the Roses a like change was effected.[46] This made the cities the emancipators of the serfs fleeing to them, and so free labor, in contrast to serf toil, was originated. Aided by the cities, the king finally triumphed over the nobility, effectively subordinated it, and so put an end to the striving for supremacy within the political class in such a manner as to establish absolutism.[47] And a new phase of social organization was thus initiated which was to unfold into what we shall call:

### Industrial Society

It was urban development that brought about the transition to this new social order and to the third great evolutionary stage. Industrial society superseded political, just as the latter displaced ethnic, when, through human achievement, new forms of wealth, characterized by still

[45] Franz Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-240.
[46] A. F. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
[47] Franz Oppenheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 245,

greater mobility, came into existence and when at the same time a dynamic group devised methods of appropriating the surplus thus arising, and by so doing made itself the dominant one, or, if already that, rendered its supremacy more complete and secure. Thus, in ethnic society, when a cattle-herding economy was attained, and considerable movable property became available, tribal warriors found they could readily obtain this wealth by the robbery of other tribes. Some tribes, consequently, soon acquired economic surplus and tribal feudalism arose. Wealth and power, accumulating in the ranks of the predacious Bo-airs, at length reached forth to conquer neighboring soil-tillers, and thus the political state was established. Likewise, when under the political state various crafts and trades, operating through a money exchange with banks and credit began to flourish within populous centers, and when concurrently the master class of these centers discovered that the utilization of wage labor in manufacturing was the easy way to appropriate the surplus produced by industry, capitalism sprang up, and the initial stage of industrial society was ushered in.

Professor Sombart assigns the beginnings of the modern capitalistic period or what we have called industrial society to the mid-thirteenth century.[48] At this time the whole economic system involved in what is known as the domestic economy was developed.

Explaining the rise of capitalistic society he says: "State, technique and production of the precious metals are the basis of capitalistic development. The state, by its army, creates a great market for capitalism and fills economic life with the spirit of discipline and order. . . . Technique makes production and transport on a large scale, first possible, then necessary. . . . The precious

[48] Werner Sombart, "Der Moderne Kapitalismus," *Zweite Neugearbeitete Auflage,* 2 Bände.

metals influence economic life in many ways; they transform the market in a direction essential to the development of capitalism; they heighten the capitalistic spirit by strengthening the desire for gain and perfecting the means of expressing values."[49] Then follow in sequence: the development of a wealthy bourgeoisie; changes in consumption; the creation of new productive powers; the capitalistic undertaking.[50]

A capitalistic basis, then, distinguishes industrial society from political society, which rests on military power and the exploitation of lands and serfs and sets it off from ethnic society also, the foundation of which is kinship. Industrial society, moreover, is characterized by occupations peculiar to it, the dominant ones being manufacturing, mining, trade, and transportation; whereas in political society agriculture is dominant, and in ethnic society hunting, fishing, herding, and horticulture hold sway. The object and the method as well of this new order, which differentiates it from political society, is the exploitation of natural resources and the surplus products of human effort and ingenuity, rather than the more direct and forcible exploitation of human beings together with the entire fruit of their labors. To be sure, the predatory methods of political society continue in force under industrial conditions. Political means are yet persistent; the state with ample power still prevails; but, nevertheless, the old has been considerably modified and abated everywhere, and the ways of the new have become the chief means. For that reason it is fitting to speak of the great Western states as industrial rather than political societies. They may also be described in Professor Tawney's words as "acquisitive societies, because their whole tendency and inter-

[49] W. Sombart, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 332.

[50] A. P. Usher, Tr. *See* "The Genesis of Modern Capitalism," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1922, pp. 529, 530.

est and preoccupation is to promote the acquisition of wealth."

Certain contrasts between the old and the new need further emphasis. Political society involved expansion by militaristic or direct power imperialism, whereas industrial society resorts to economic penetration and commercial conquest, and thus comes to imperialism indirectly. The former was essentially destructive; the latter is fairly creative; the old was thoroughly autocratic, coercive, and oppressive, built on the utilization of slaves, serfs, and soldiers; the new inclines a little more toward the democratic and liberative with the forces of nature and machines much utilized in place of men, with large gains for human freedom and voluntaristic effort resulting. Howbeit, class conflict and the exploitation of the weak by the strong flourishes much as they did under political society. The difference is only a matter of degree and order of procedure. The everlasting struggle to get social surplus and to dominate still continues. The essential social process remains the same to-day as yesterday, and as it will continue to-morrow.

It was by virtue of a growing social surplus—some economic, more traditional, much organizational, and most of all vital—of which they became possessed, that the cities of the feudal state grew into formidable antagonists of the political interests. Taking sides, as we have seen, in the fight between two factions of the latter, the cities obtained many advantages and much power. And when at last the worsted nobles joined forces with the king in a common cause, it was to counter these cities as dangerous rivals for the social mastery. The main struggle therefore resolved itself into a contest for supremacy between the political class and the urban industrial class. The outcome of this contest was, first of all, the development of the constitutional state. This modified form of the state re-

sulted simply from a compromise between the two rival classes in the course of a prolonged struggle for control of the social surplus. Constitutions themselves represent merely definitions of fundamental rights and duties agreed upon and accepted as rules of the game by two surplus-controlling groups, neither of which finds itself able completely to subordinate the other. Instruments of this sort were first devised and employed by the political class itself to settle conflicts between rival factions within its own ranks. Such, for instance, may have been the early Grecian and Roman constitutions, under maritime conditions, where city and state were identical; though more likely in these seafaring city-states constitutionalism sprang in large measure directly out of the clash of the piratical aristocratic-plutocratic element, who were in control, and the trader-plebeian class, who were subservient to them. In Athens at any rate the plebs grew in numbers, knowledge and goods, until, in the aggregate, they mustered sufficient surplus to withstand the patricians aggressively. Magna Charta in Britain, where the city was but the stronghold of the landed state, more truly represents constitutionalism in its genesis. Subsequently, however, when the conflict within the ranks of the political class had been settled, and the factions had become reunited, the conflict between this class and the industrial cities was joined in dead earnest. Then it was that the method of constitutionalism was extended into the field of interclass adjustment, and the true constitutional state slowly emerged. In fact, it was chiefly the commercial city versus the state that gave vogue to constitutionalism as a general principle of government. Once in force, constitutionalism eventually culminated in the republican state.

Money exchange, an achievement of the cities, profoundly affected all economic conditions; it made wealth

more mobile than it had ever been before, shifted its center of gravity to the urban places, where the monetary surplus became concentrated, and thus brought into existence the capitalistic system.[51] This system, when full grown, gave the cities complete mastery within the social order. Capitalism as we have already said signifies domination by the class controlling the wealth surplus under a monetary system and wage-labor. In harmony with the law of the social process it was inevitable that those who were already masters of other forms of surplus in the urban centers should appropriate this new one and become a distinct class. The monetary system enabled them to buy labor for wages, dispose of the product thereof for more than the wages, and to keep the difference or the excess value of the product over its labor cost. This excess in the form of rents, interest on loans, salaries, merchants' profits, taxes, dividends, and manufacturers' profits constitutes the chief source of surplus accumulation. So began the exploitation of wage-earners, and within the civic order a new cleavage—one between producers and manipulators of producers, together with their products. This cleavage, starting with a distinction between craftsmen and merchants, was followed by a separation of wage-earners and capitalists, and at length gave rise to what it is customary to call the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. However, from the standpoint of the relation to capital, this twofold classification does not adequately describe the social cleavage. There are small property owners who do not employ labor together with professional people that constitute a group intermediary between the rich and the wage earners. These are a middle class. But viewed from the standpoint of psychology and general attitude, the middle class wants to be counted with the capitalists and not with the wage earners. Hence, it is

[51] A. P. Usher, Tr., *op. cit.*, pp. 243*ff*.

not wrong to speak of the capitalistic and the middle class groups as the bourgeoisie.

While the cities carried on the conflict with the political class this cleavage remained relatively unimportant, but when at last the former triumphed in the struggle the civil classes fell apart, and the capitalists entered upon a régime of labor exploitation, different in no essential principle from that followed by the feudal lords towards the serfs on the land. In political society the exploiters owned both land and labor, while under industrial society the capitalist owns only the tools and materials, labor being free. The only noteworthy difference is that existing between a slave or serf and a contract or wage relation. Thus, the cities proved to be the medium through which society exchanged landed feudalism for industrial feudalism.

This change did not fully come, however, until the cities had achieved complete social supremacy, and this they did not generally attain in the great landed states until after the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century. The invention of machinery and steam power, by which the new economy was fully ushered in, enthroned them, crowned capitalism, and gradually delivered the state and society bodily into the latter's hands almost everywhere throughout the western world.

Since the advent of the industrial order the social process has continued with the bourgeois class forming the nucleus of social integration. This class, in every way identified with the city typifying its social life and attitude and giving it distinctive character, is thoroughly pugnacious and domineering. It has drawn to itself the most mobile and energetic elements from the rural regions as well as from its own immediate habitat. It stands a body self-assertive and audacious, giving to the modern industrial metropolis prestige, influence and power in supreme

measure. Urban autocracy within the social order is the outcome. To such a degree has this urbanocracy developed and so profound has its influence become that the anthropologists think they see as a result two distinct types of people differentiated in the European populations. One type is identified with the city and the other with the country. The rural type, in contrast to the urban dwellers that we have just described, is shown to be patient, peace-loving, immobile and submissive.[52] A sifting similar to that in Europe has been gradually taking place in America, particularly in those geographical sections most under the shadow of urbanocracy. And were it not that there has been a constant migration and crossing of people together with considerable infiltration of new blood from other lands to tone up the rural stock of America, the general inferiority of the latter probably would be more pronounced than it is.

Created by and endowed with the economic surplus accruing from the exploitation of wage earners, the bourgeoisie have constantly reached out and grasped the vast and intricate achievement consisting of devices, processes, discoveries, technology, and mechanisms whereby mastery over nature has been won with such astonishing rapidity and to such a remarkable degree in the last century or two. Possessing this body of tradition, the class in question brought social organization under their sway. The earth's treasures, likewise, have flowed with increasing volume into their coffers until undreamed-of wealth is commanded by them. Political power, in consequence of all this, has become theirs, until the state virtually lies in the hollow of their hands. The one time political class through this process has been absorbed and swallowed up by the plutocracy which now sits in the seat of authority. Thus, a new ruling class—the industrial barons, the money

[52] W. Z. Ripley, *Races of Europe*, pp. 537-559.

kings, the financial magnates, or Titans of big business, as they are variously designated to-day—have subordinated all other classes. In truth, they have practically brought all principalities and powers into subjection unto themselves. The outcome in reality is the reduction of society to two social classes in the fully industrialized parts of the world; namely, the pecuniary and the industrial, as Veblen has termed them; the one living by profits from "functionless proprietary rights," the other on such fruits of their labor as remain after the pecuniary class has taken its toll.

From the accumulation and concentration of social surplus within national areas has sprung a vigorous nationalism, and a new era of empire building inevitably has followed. The energy-giving capacity of the new economy has been almost immeasurable, and the nations which were first to develop it soon found themselves endowed with a social surplus so great that all nonindustrial societies appeared in comparison negligible and impotent. Such energizing of a few groups and such upsetting of the world's existing equilibrium as resulted was never before witnessed or dreamed of. Under the impulsion of its immense power the plutocracy in every estate reached out and in all directions sought to dominate as much of the world as it found profitable. Capitalistic imperialism was the outcome, and particularly "since England first revealed the possibilities of industrialism, it has gone from strength to strength, and as industrial civilization invades countries hitherto remote from it, as Russia and Japan and India and China are drawn into its orbit, each decade sees a fresh extension of its influence." [53] The little nations, primitive peoples, backward and undeveloped races, in short the nonindustrialized lands of the earth, have all fallen prey to the big powers. A half dozen or so nations

[53] Scott Nearing, *The American Empire*, p. 18.

comprising the heart and brain of the "Great Society" have literally in one way or another divided up the earth and parcelled it out among the several empires. There are component states, colonies, protectorates, conquered territories, spheres of influence, preferred nation prerogatives, mandatories, and other forms of dominion whereby commerce, spoliation and exploitation are facilitated. Everywhere the nonindustrial nations have in some fashion been made to pass under the yoke of the capitalistic empires. One after another, independent states have been absorbed by the British, German, French, American, Italian, Austrian, Russian, Belgian, Dutch or Japanese powers—until by the second decade of the twentieth century only fifty to sixty remained where there had been from three to four hundred antedating the industrial revolution.

This industrial imperialism is an economic necessity, the natural outreach of accumulated energy, the propulsive power of unexpended surplus, the "manifest destiny," indeed, of wealthy industrial societies. There is an immutable law of energy which they must obey. It demands the utilization of surplus. For capitalism it says, "Struggle to dispose of your surplus capital. Otherwise, you cannot survive."[54] This law absolutely necessitates empire building. It compels the seeking of foreign investments, and the making of loans to weaker peoples; it causes the forcing of concessions, franchises, special privileges, and spheres of influence in undeveloped areas rich in natural resources from minor and helpless nations; and in the end it leads to the extension of dominion over such nations and over as much of the earth as is needed, is profitable, or can be secured. Unlike the old political, the modern economic empires are unlimited in their reach. The method of their building is a new one. Here is the process: capital accu-

[54] Scott Nearing, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

mulation takes place; it flows out into new fields; plutocratic interest controls and militarizes the home government; public opinion is made subservient to these ambitions; unrest is incited in the foreign lands, disturbance and revolution that seem to jeopardize investments blaze forth; then comes the stirring of the public bagpipes to a wail of "righteous indignation" over the "indignities suffered by our citizens" engaged in "lawful pursuits abroad," against insults to the flag and the "humiliation of our country"; when presto! the tune is changed to "intervention" and empire proceeds merrily on its way. Thus; has it been with all the industrial states—England, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, and America. The United States, for example, has acquired three million square miles of continental territory, has seized the Philippine Islands and Panama, made Cuba, Porto Rico, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua its colonies, and brought Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Peru, and Liberia and other countries under its yoke in fulfillment of the law of capital surplus.[55]

The remarkable integration of states under industrialism has been attended at every stage by the clash of empires. In a continuous struggle to control as much of the actual and potential surplus as possible it could not be avoided. Territory, raw materials, natural resources, trade, trade routes, and markets have been the chief bones of contention. Over these, international conflicts rage, and about them turns the integration or disintegration of present day empires, just as around other sources of surplus the social struggle of past ages revolved in a similar fashion and with like results.

These conflicts and the chief instruments by which they are waged—great standing armies and enormous navies—

[55] See Scott Nearing, *op. cit.*, for an able account of the whole process.

have been commercialized to an unprecedented degree. The bourgeoisie have turned war and war preparation into big business enterprises. As such they are agencies of profit and exploitation and the means for perpetuating the rule of the class making use of them. Within each industrial state the military establishment and the armament business, together with their subsidiary and collateral interests, are tools whereby the ruling class picks the pockets of the public and grasps a large share of the economic surplus. To the same end, and for a like purpose, international wars are fostered, for these, as a rule, prove highly profitable to the bourgeoisie, even though costly to the belligerent nation as a whole.[56] No instance better illustrates this fact than the case of the United States in the World War. It was a harvest time for her plutocracy, creating not less than 18,000 new millionaires, adding perhaps 75 to 80 billions of dollars to their holdings, and shifting the financial center from the old world to this country. To be sure, such wars may turn out disastrously, utterly ruinous to all classes, and even bring the end of empire to the vanquished, while threatening with ruin the victors, as we have seen in Europe; but otherwise they add wealth and prowess to those who dominate.

Differentiation has kept pace with the integrating movement under industrial society. A rapidly accumulating tradition has given rise to multiple structure. Constituent groups of every sort have appeared and become the most significant factors of modern life. Notable among these, because there is a tendency for the whole productive activity of society to polarize about them, are the corporation and the labor union.

In the struggle with the political state, the ancient and

[56] A particularly illuminating discussion of "The Capitalist System as a Cause of War" will be found in Chapter VI of Sidney and Beatrice Webb's *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization.*

medieval cities evolved the guild system. Organizations of merchants and craftsmen became the first distinctively industrial associations. These long persisted, and gave way only as the city achieved ascendancy, and a full-fledged capitalistic society took possession of the field. With this event craftsmen and capitalists separated into distinct and potentially antagonistic groups. The corporation has been created by the capitalists, and the labor organization by the wage-earning class.

The corporation originally grew out of the struggle of industrial cities with the state; it was first a special charter of rights and privileges granted by the latter. Subsequent history has to do with its appropriation by capitalistic interests as a convenient form of organization affording the easiest means of control over the economic surplus. In its business form it is a highly privileged agency having the unique status of a person, sometimes in partnership with the state though generally independent of it, but always representing the concentration of economic power. It is this agency which at length has become the most characteristic organization of industrial society. It is to the latter what the secret fraternity was to ethnic, and the state to political society. Its rise to such eminence directly succeeded the industrial revolution as one of the results of that development. When, in 1776, Adam Smith wrote *The Wealth of Nations,* chartering of corporations was unusual. Only fifty-five had been chartered in one hundred years of English history, and all had failed. Banks, insurance companies, canals, and municipal water companies were the only important incorporated enterprises.[57] Meanwhile the use of this agency has become so widely extended that scarcely any industrial enterprise of importance remains unincorporated to-day. Not less than one-half and maybe fully three-fourths of the total wealth of the United

[57] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations,* Book V, Chapter 1, Part III.

States, for instance, is thus controlled. More than three-fourths of the net annual economic surplus seems to be credited to their account.[58] What is true in America is substantially the case elsewhere throughout all industrial society. Corporate interests, moreover, have undergone integration. Trusts, cartels, and monopolies have been effected through mergers and combinations. Paralleling economic imperialism, they too have assumed international proportions. Such combinations, both on a state and worldwide scale, continue to grow apace. They are fostered by co-operative agreements, trade and credit arrangements, mutual understandings, interlocking directorates, even more than by formal organizations, as the capitalists become seriously class-conscious and perceive the advantage of unity and solidarity. Thus the capitalistic class consolidates its position, and aspires to complete control and dominance over modern society, in so far as it does not already possess the same. Corporate capital strives for such absolute power and irresponsible sovereignty as the secret society and the political state once enjoyed.

Its ascendancy, meanwhile, has been challenged by the organized wage-earning group. Labor organization has arisen to counter the master class. While trade unionism is not the direct descendant of the craft guild, and did not spring out of the same general conditions and from quite the same source, it has more or less continuity of aim with the guild. It represents the first organized opposition of the exploited ever encountered by the dominant group within the state. That the wage-earners could rise at all is due essentially to the great difficulty, if not impossibility, of any class achieving complete monopoly and control of

[58] David Friday in "The Accumulation of Capital," *The New Republic*, Dec. 14, 1921, pp. 64-67, has pointed out that over six of the eight billions of dollars which this country accumulated in 1921 were gains of corporations. The other billion and over went to the unincorporated businesses.

the social surplus under a well-developed industrial economy. Although the immediate effect of the industrial revolution was to reduce craftsmen to a state of sheer impotency, and to render their condition worse than for many centuries, at the same time it conferred upon them greater mobility, and massed them in urban centers, and thereby made possible large scale organization which, because of their dispersion and immobility, had never before been within their reach.

So modern labor organization was really generated by the industrial revolution, though brought forth slowly and with great difficulty. Virtually held down to little more than a mere subsistence by the iron law of the wage system, and systematically mulcted of the fruits of achievement, the laborers had left at first only their vital energy. But of this there remained some surplus as a legacy from earlier civic emancipation, since it was neither practical nor wise for the master class to exploit to the uttermost limit. Such vital surplus as remained expressed itself in the acquisition of tradition, especially the knowledge of organization and the methods of effecting, perpetuating, and employing it for practical ends. The movement for organization was therefore set going. By sheer force of numbers in union at first, laborers exacted better wages and working conditions; subsequently, by pooling what economic margin they could pinch from that they had won, they amassed power sufficient to enable them to wrest concession after concession from their masters, and gradually to gain control over more and more surplus.

Beginning on narrow craft lines, the organization of labor has widened into trade and industrial proportion, and now proceeds to federate its forces into unified wholes. Its line of advance parallels that of capitalistic organization in the trust development. Its combinations are efforts to form vast monopolies of the labor force of society.

Simultaneously with this integration, class consciousness and class philosophy have developed. The masses of industrial laborers have become disillusioned, and generally aware of their relatively fixed status. Above all, a knowledge of the social process has dawned upon them, and the way to social dominion has become revealed. Thus, within a century, capitalism has come face to face with a power formidable, autocratic, and equally sordid, lawless and selfish with itself, which disputes its right to rule, and often demands bluntly its abdication. Between the two what peace there is is an armed peace in preparation for the next conflict.

Industrial society has, therefore, become involved in a tremendous class struggle. The issue is whether the dictatorship of capitalist shall continue or give way to a dictatorship of the proletariat. The employing class dominates and [59] the laboring class submits or resists and between the two a ceaseless contest for power is waged. By parliamentary and violent means alike the proletariat, becoming constantly more aggressive, launches its forces against the position of the bourgeois régime. The latter has the ability to crush its opponents and generally does so, but yields ground where expedient. So far the proletariat has gained but minor advantages, and come into possession of but meager doles of the profits of industry and but small voice in its management. In one instance only has it really deposed the bourgeoisie, and become the ruling class. I refer to the Russian Revolution. Though this case is wholly unique, it may not remain so long, for by every means available the proletariat of other lands is striving for the mastery of the social surplus, and for domination of the entire social order. That it will succeed in other countries is not improbable, that it will sooner or

[59] See Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-226, for an excellent discussion of class war.

later triumph everywhere is not impossible; for in it is really the strength of irresistible numbers. As this is being written it has come into political power in England though not in such a manner that it can wholly dominate. If, forsooth, the proletariat become possessed of adequate power, as it bids fair to do, by laying hold of ever larger and larger increments of traditional, organizational, and even vital and economic energy, at the expense of or in spite of the ruling class, the time will come in every industrial land when the balance will swing the other way, and all the wealth and all the might of the bourgeoisie will not be able to withstand it. At any event, no stable equilibrium is in force; no *status quo* has arrived or will arrive. For "the old order changeth, yielding place to new." Just as it has ever done, so will it do again; since the major process remains always the same.

The rise of constituent groups as conspicuously exemplified in the corporation and the labor union bids fair to shift society to a new basis of unity. The kinship basis of ethnic association gave way to the territorial basis of political society and now the territorial basis, which has so far persisted under industrialism, promises to yield place to a basis of unity in functional grouping. A rapid trend to that end is manifest. Territorial areas once meant industrial, political, social, and ethnic unity. They stood for homogeneity, fraternity, neighborhood, and community locally and for the state nationally. But that was when an agricultural economy prevailed. Now that life is industrialized and urbanized the organic units are rarely territorial any more; they have little or nothing to do with districts and places; they have become occupation, professional, interest unities of one sort and another.[60]

I do not mean to say that functional groups were never important before this, for they have been. The medieval

[60] J. Corbin, *The Return of the Middle Class*, pp. 159, 160.

guilds were powerful agencies in the heyday of political society. They probably embraced as large a portion of the industrial population as do functional groups to-day. But the guild unit did not supersede the territorial in neighborhood, community, city, or nation. The life of a place remained essentially one and indivisible. The fundamental bond was the place itself.

One can scarcely overestimate the importance of this change, particularly since it seems to indicate that a new kind of political order is in the making. The territorial basis on which the state and political action has so long rested fails to meet the needs of peoples whose lives in other respects are dominated by functional group interests. An integration of industrial and professional groups is therefore likely to take place in order to accomplish what the territorial state cannot do. Such an integration will mean either a radically new type of state or the complete abolition of the institution. If a new state, it will be one resting primarily on representation from functional organizations instead of from territorial districts. If the state is swept aside, some sort of government incidental to industrial organization will probably ensue.

In the foregoing we have traced the course of social evolution chiefly in its structural aspects. Throughout, we have tried to reveal the process, and to show how, with the rise of surplus, social units become active; integration and differentiation take place; classes form; groups clash; domination and exploitation ensue; and how, in a state either of mastery or servitude, and 'mid an incessant struggle for surplus control, humanity pursues its strenuous way. Withal, we have tried to make it clear that social change is due to the rise of new forms as well as to the accumulation and concentration of surplus in classes, groups, etc.; and we have endeavored to show that redistribution and the gathering about new nuclei cause the

shifting of social power and the realignment of social forces. Thus ever ends an old, and thus ever begins a new round in the constantly repeated process of society.

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## CHAPTER VI

### SURPLUS AND PERSONALITY

The preceding chapter was devoted to the rôle of social surplus in structural evolution. Our present task is to observe what part this factor plays in the differentiation of personality.

### Analysis of Personality

A brief analysis of personality at the outstart will simplify our undertaking. The two phases to be considered are sociality and individuality. The former may be defined as the state of participating in, union with, and adjustment to the common life. By the latter is meant the quality of being autonomous, self-directive, self-determining, of consciously choosing or rejecting relationships, and of experiencing distinct self-valuations. Other closely related terms occurring in this connection also need definition. Socialization is one; it signifies the process whereby through the multiplication of relationships personality finds expression and realizes and maintains unity with the group. Individuation is another, and means the procedure by which individuality as above defined is attained.

The two factors of personality indicated are not essentially antithetical; they are complementary, forming the reverse sides of one and the same reality. There may be and often is great disparity in their development, giving as a result what may be called asymmetrical personality or maladjusted types. These, however, do not much appear save in highly advanced societies. On all except the lowest

cultural levels the social process fails to maintain anything like a personality equilibrium. It brings forth symmetrical and asymmetrical, normal and abnormal, well-balanced and aberrant types, at the same time. All, however, are equally and naturally its products, whatever their kind and whatever their effects upon the social situation.

The social process effects change in personality. What is that change and how is it produced? In order that any development be understood, the original or undeveloped state needs to be known. Our first question is, then, really concerned with personality under primitive society. There have been two diametrically opposed theories and a compromise one regarding this.

The first has considered the primitive state as an ideal one of unity and solidarity. In harmony with this view the differentiation of individuality has been looked upon as a departure from the normal, perhaps as even a mark of decadence. The second has pictured man's original state as one of isolated individuality, with sociality an acquisition in the struggle for existence. Though they have not always idealized this supposed primordial condition, certain adherents of this view have sometimes deplored the subsequent sociality. However, other advocates of the same position have regarded the process of socialization as highly desirable, and an approach toward the ideal.

The vogue that this second view has had will justify our dwelling on it a bit. It is well stated in the opening sentence of Max Nordau's chapter on "Society and the Individual" in his *Interpretation of History*. Thus he speaks: "It would be of the deepest interest to know how the individuals composing the human species, who certainly must have been completely free and independent originally, came to sacrifice their freedom, and to form tribes, peoples, and states on a basis of mutual dependence."[1] Upon such

[1] *The Interpretation of History*, M. A. Hamilton, Tr., p. 159.

a presupposed individualism, Spencerian thinking, neo-Darwinian biology, biological sociology, eighteenth century political science, and bourgeois ethical philosophy all built their systems of speculative thought. There is little doubt that all took their cue from the conditions of modern life. This they magnified a thousandfold and pushed it back into primitive times, over into the prehistoric and finally clear into the prehuman world. They clothed man and his precursors with that rampant individuality which they saw all about them, and which some were disposed to glorify. Collectivity or sociality was then conceived to be a mere incident rising in a ruthless individualistic struggle for existence that had been going on from earliest biologic ages. The term socialization then came into use to designate the process of eliminating the jungle disposition in man and of adjusting him to group life and to harmonious association with his species.

The compromise position holds that man has always been a group-living animal, with both sociality and individuality characterizing personality at all times. However it does not conceive of the primitive state as being ideal in either respect. The two factors of personality are conceived as having evolved together, giving a sociality and an individuality at each stage peculiar to that stage. Neither individualization nor socialization are from this point of view regarded as aberrant developments.

Clearly, in the light of accumulating knowledge of human and animal life under natural conditions, those who postulated isolated being were wrong. In so far as man and his anthropoid precursors are concerned, the individual did not antedate society. Indeed, neither was first; they were only opposite sides of one and the same phenomenon.

Certainly, there was at some time in the development of organic life, a point when biologic individuation took place,

when the separate and distinct organism became differentiated. But even so, why assume that life straightway and always took an individualistic course? There is no good reason in fact or theory that I can discover for such assumption. It is quite as plausible to believe that gregariousness was the original and natural mode of existence. There is, indeed, more ground for holding this to be the primal and normal mode, and nongregariousness to be the variate therefrom, than the other way about. Where there are multiple births and prolonged infancy, group life seems to be altogether the natural thing. On this basis, the prevalence of gregariousness among most of the higher species of mammals apparently rests. Maybe this affords insufficient ground for asserting the universal priority of collective existence. But there are yet stronger reasons to be urged. It is a fact that the most natural and easiest of all organic reactions are with reference to similar organisms. It is a further observation that the greater the degree of likeness, the more certain and pronounced their mutual interstimulations and reactions become. Giddings has pointed this out, showing how organisms of like kind stimulate each other nonrepellently and tend mechanically to form and continue group states. He says:

"In distinctive stimulations of kind by kind, then, and in characteristically facile reactions to kind, we discover relatively simple mechanistic factors of innate gregariousness or herd instinct; the chief manifestations of which are a matter-of-course toleration of one another by individual units of a kin group, an automatic tendency to go with kind or at least to avoid separation from kind, an automatic imitation of kind, and an unhesitating reaction to herd stimulation."[2]

In the light of this analysis it would seem that group life

[2] F. H. Giddings, "Pluralistic Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 25, p. 395.

has a fair claim to priority over individual existence, that not only is man a political being, but that most other animals are naturally social animals, and in so far as they are found outside of groups or societies, are variates from the modal way of living. But coming back specifically to personality at this point, we can, perhaps, then declare with some justice that, if priority needs be at all, sociality may claim it. However, let us affirm only that individuality is social relationship, and that likewise sociality is social relationship; that the two are but complementary phases of personality, which is a social entity.

While change wrought in personality by the process has been twofold, the outstanding feature of it according to our view has been on the side of individuation rather than of socialization. The results of the process to be pointed out later came far short of rendering man's state ideal. In certain respects, though not by any means in all, the development has been away from a primitive ideal. The differentiation of personality has fostered individuality at the expense of sociality. How this development has taken place along with the nature of the change itself will now be considered.

The first affirmation of our thesis is that personality develops with the growth of social surplus, and varies with its distribution. In order to substantiate this, it will be necessary to study the history of personality. We cannot unroll the entire scroll of history, but by looking in upon the long annals here and there, we may, perhaps, catch the drift of events. But before we consult the historic record, let us state how the surplus causes the development of personality.

The mechanics of the process of the evolution of personality is very simple. It begins and continues with the creation of things, of thought systems, of knowledge, and of organization, which, in turn, react upon personalities to

reconstruct them. The surplus creates a world in which men live and that world acts to create them. The procedure is just one of objective creativeness, whence rise self-construction and emancipation. For instance, when men began to make clubs to strengthen their arms, to shape stones and sticks with which to dig or strike, to use pelts for clothes and shelters, or when they in anywise began to construct out of nature's materials and to accumulate property, their personalities began to find escape from their primitive and initial limitations and to be enlarged. And as they went on constructing things, winning knowledge, forming special habits and beliefs, and building institutions and organizations the sense of personality also went on enlarging, till, through the ages, little by little, an ever fuller, more complex, and wider milieu has surrounded man and permitted a corresponding evolution of the self. Social surplus gives men mastery over nature, over the energies of their fellows, and over the conditions of existence. To the degree these are attained by any people, possibilities of freedom accrue to the socii, optional lines of conduct become increasingly available, the door of choice is opened, and the necessity for making choices presses and becomes imperative. The socii are thus made autonomous; and they develop self-consciousness and group self-consciousness to the extent that participation in or control of the surplus is permitted. In assigning an emancipating effect to the surplus it is not forgotten that some forms of surplus may at times be enthralling. Not all play a liberating part. Certain ethical and religious doctrines, world views, and philosophies of life may be circumscribing and enslaving to the spirits of men. Every age has had more or less of just such tradition, which men have devised to their own hurt. Social structure and institutions have also many times proved to be millstones about the necks of men. A system has opposed and crushed very often.

But after full allowance is made for all that fetters, hinders, and oppresses in the surplus, the great bulk of it in all generations has had precisely the enfranchising influence we have attributed to it.

It may be objected that it is not the surplus at all that brings about the evolution of personality; that we have put the cart before the horse, that it is rather personality that causes the development of social surplus. Well and good, for that is true also, since the two things are always in reciprocal relation. But, I contend that it was first of all the accumulation of social capital, largely in respect to things, customs, and idea-systems which objectively environ men, that enabled personality to become autonomous. When, however, this happened, the more or less individualized man then became a more or less conscious and purposeful creator of surplus. He then ventured, dared, challenged, destroyed, discovered, originated, and functioned as a true social creator. Thus were the ways of life further widened and its vistas lengthened. And so, by a continual give and take between man and the surplus, has the process gone on throughout the ages.

All this is obviously quite at variance with the common notion that the degree of individuation is somehow connected with the number of people in association. Boris Sidis expressing this notion says, "Greatness of individuality is inversely proportional to the mass of the social aggregate."[3]

It is then contended that mass suppresses and its absence allows individuality to develop. There is, indeed, a kind of individuality that does appear in isolation, but normally we cannot think of it apart from association. I do not, in fact, see that it has any very particular relation to mass. Perhaps, historically, increase of mass has tended more to develop than to hinder individuality. But the real deter-

[3] Boris Sidis, *The Source and Aim of Human Progress*, p. 37.

minants are overlooked by those who talk about mass. They are the things the aggregate commands—its culture, customs, chattels, organization, and ideas. In proportion as it is rich and full of these, out of it will rise individuality, regardless of the aggregate's mass.

### Personality under Ethnic Society

To the subject of primitive society we must again revert. We shall view it from the standpoint of surplus in relation to personality. At the lowest levels of tribal life society is comprehended in small, pretty much isolated, homogeneous kinship hordes. Tools, arts, tradition, accumulated goods, and organization are meager. There is no surplus except, perhaps, a margin of vital energy. Substantial equality in possession of whatever energy there is is a mark of such groups. This is true not only as between members of the same tribe, but also between tribes occupying a general cultural area. The native peoples of the Australian continent, for example, show this. What of the state of personality under conditions of this sort? Apparently, there is no very distinct consciousness, either of the group or of self on the part of the socii. Individuality is generally negligible, but sociality is pronounced. Groupal authority is dominant; all are embraced in an inflexible solidarity.

This solidarity holds, not because of much or any perceived or conscious sociality, but largely on the basis of instinctive association, as already explained. In other part, it rests on the very force of the circumstances of existence, in which there is no alternative or suggestion of any but submission to group authority. The unity that obtains is, therefore, one of least effort on the part of all. It is a harmony essentially mechanical because unconscious.

The indistinct state of consciousness prevailing under

such conditions is revealed in various ways. It is illustrated, for instance, in the solidarity reflected in crime and punishment. The group is the offender and not the individual who may have done the deed. Therefore, any one of its number may answer for the crime just as well as the offender himself. The psychology of primitive society may be made clear by an incident related of an American Indian by Montaigne. The savage visiting France observed that among the French, says Montaigne, there were "men full and crammed with all manner of commodities, while, in the meantime, their halves were begging at their doors, lean, and half starved with hunger and poverty; and he thought it strange that these necessitous halves were able to suffer so great an inequality and injustice, and that they did not take the others by the throat, or set fire to their houses." Montaigne explains that these savages "have a way of speaking in their language to call men the half of one another."[4]

In this incident the failure of the primitive man clearly to distinguish self from others is apparent. This comes out still more patently in the psychology of the Australian Blackfellows. They are typical of many who include in their social groups totemic plants and animals, along with fellow men, and who do not customarily distinguish self from fellows or totemic confrères. The dim past for the Australian, for instance, is known as "Alcheringa," whence come the spirits which are incarnate in men. Of this past and the native concept of self, Spencer and Gillin speak as follows:

"In the Alcheringa lived ancestors, who in the native mind are so intimately associated with the animals and plants, the name of which they bear, that an Alcheringa of, say, the kangaroo totem may sometimes be spoken of either as a man-kangaroo or a kangaroo-man. The identity

[4] Quoted by A. J. Todd in *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 48, 49.

of the individual is often sunk in that of the animal or plant from which he is supposed to have originated."[5] What is true of the Australians is also true of most hunting tribes. No real distinction is made between persons, animals, and natural objects. Human and animal consciousness are confused; self is not thought of as being separate from others.

From this lowest cultural stage where a mystical state of personality is found, mankind has risen to higher and higher levels. Personality has been differentiated; individuality has emerged in increasing degree as surplus has arisen. Although at no time under ethnic association is much individuation to be discovered, it nevertheless gets a start. Ethnic groups have their leaders, division of functions begins, classes are formed, and a few individuals attain some degree of autonomy. As elsewhere shown, it was vital surplus that gave the first leaders to ethnic groups; they were magicians, skillful hunters, braves and chieftains. Yet, superabundance of vital energy did not of itself apparently suffice to give much self-consciousness and self-determination. Something more potent and enfranchising had to be added. Tradition was necessary. Thus, when the vitally superior discovered or devised some agency, real or unreal, that gave or seemed to give power, and so multiplied his natural ability in some way or other, the individuating process really began. That this was the real beginning of personality differentiation seems to be verified by the conditions pictured in the märchen myths of many people. In them the lore of tribal men reflecting their mental reactions richly abounds. These myths tell of the coming of heroes who control magical forces. These heroes were certainly the first more or less distinct personalities to make their appearance upon the stage of social life. Such distinctiveness as the märchens attribute to

[5] *The Native Tribes of Australia*, p. 119.

them derives largely from the possession and control of magical tradition. Therefore, we would seem to be justified in claiming that it was the rise of tradition surplus that led to the individuation which accompanied it.

In the märchens the hero always meets in some fashion with magical experiences which confer benefits upon him and his tribe through him. Wundt, in calling attention to the märchen tales in his "Elements of Folk Psychology" cites one current among the Pawnee Indians, which runs as follows:

"A young man did not join his companions in their sports, but went alone into the forest. One day he returned with a buffalo cow, which had become his wife and had borne him a buffalo calf. But the very moment that the wife and calf entered the hut of the man, they were transformed into human beings. Nevertheless, a cloud of magic hung over the man. If the child were to fall to the floor, it would be changed back into a buffalo calf. Now, this misfortune actually came to pass, and the mother was also again changed into a buffalo cow. Sadly the young man then went into the forest, where he himself became a buffalo, and for a time lived quietly with the buffalo herd. Suddenly, he again returned home, transformed into a man. But he had learned from the buffaloes how one must set about to lure them forth in order to hunt them. This secret he imparted to his fellow-tribesmen, and since that time the tribe has enjoyed plenty of buffalo meat."[6] While it is true that this typical märchen clearly reflects that mystical state of consciousness which characterizes ethnic groups, it also shows the dawn of individuality in the person of the hero. This type of myth so widely prevalent further indicates that it was the achievement of traditional surplus that gave the first distinct personalities. The magician, indeed, as we have elsewhere shown, generally

[6] *Elements of Folk Psychology*, pp. 273-283.

holds first place among tribesmen. He, more often than any other, is the outstanding and most distinct personality. He, if any, exercises some self-direction; he is always somewhat individualized.

Where there are chieftains, as among African hunters and American Indians, their rise appears to be due often to prowess in the hunt or in conflict with other tribesmen. Successful strategems for foiling the enemy or capturing game prove the means of power and tribal recognition. Chiefs seem to be almost self-chosen in some instances, and thus bear witness to a considerable degree of individuality. In a great number of cases, however, it is clear that the chiefs' preferment and authority has sprung from his possession of some magic. The Masai of Africa,[7] the Maoris of Polynesia,[8] and some of our Indians of the plains afford typical examples where this was the case. Other instances indicate the foundation to be some taking ceremony or other tradition which the chief originated or could reproduce more effectively than any other tribesman.

Economic surplus in a few tribes has sometimes been an individuating factor of considerable importance. Myths of fortune are not uncommon. In them the märchen hero often has a fairly well-defined personal character.[9]

Ascendancy rests upon wealth, particularly among two groups of Indians, those of Lower California and those of the northwest coast of North America. In both groups a plentiful food supply of fish or horticultural products affords opportunity for personal property accumulation. Those who acquire surplus stores become the authoritative and dominant personages of the tribe. Of the Southern group the Northern Californian, Maidic and Hupa tribes show the influence of wealth in this way. "The Hupa

[7] R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 382.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 345.
[9] Wm. Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

headman," says Lowie,[10] "was the man of greatest affluence; the villagers looked to him for the necessaries of life in time of scarcity, or for assistance with money in case of disputes. His power descended to his son, provided his property also descended; but if some unusually able or industrious rival acquired greater wealth, he won with it the dignity of office." The Tlinkits of the northwest coast have some wealth in canoes, slaves, blankets, implements, food stores, etc. Whoever comes into possession of a surplus of these goods rises to power and honor, and an extraordinary degree of freedom compared with his fellows. The chieftainship goes with such fortune, and the power enjoyed varies with the amount of wealth and the energy of the incumbent of the position.[11] Such individuality as obtains goes along with possession of wealth.

It is evident that here and there among primitive hunters in Australia, Africa, Polynesia, and America, from time to time, notable personalities have appeared. They are always masters of such surplus as their tribes can boast, of magic, economic goods, or some form of tradition, and they are invariably the most individualized men of their group. Mbatian of the Masais of Africa was such a one.[12] Jalina of the Dieri of Australia was another greatly individualized man. He is described as having been one of the greatest of medicine men, a respected, reverenced headman of his people. His authority was far-reaching, and his genius widely recognized. He was an originator and a modifier of tribal customs, and as such, a man of initiative and a fair amount of self-determination.[13]

At the upper levels of ethnic society, that is, among pastors and horticulturists, conditions are somewhat more

[10] R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 343.
[11] G. A. Krause, *Die Tlinkit Indianer*, p. 122.
[12] R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 382.
[13] See A. W. Howitt, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 20, pp. 65, 66.

favorable for the differentiation of personality, and we actually see more distinct individuality. While the general situation remains about the same as among hunters, there is the advantage of a much richer body of tradition, which gives more certain control over the environment through a more abundant and stable food supply, and a more extensive as well as more flexible organization of group life. The African cattle herders and agriculturists are cases in point. When compared with hunters, their leaders generally exhibit more originality, greater freedom, and more distinct qualities of individuality in every way. The Zulu witch-doctors, for instance, are described as self-made men. No hunting tribes have ever produced such personalities as the Kings of Dahomi or the Zulu nation. No chieftains elsewhere ever enjoyed more privileges, were more resourceful and independent than these.

Viewed as a whole, ethnic society does not appear to be so altogether devoid of individuality as some have thought. Certainly it is not so barren as those who have been wont to date the beginning of individuation this side of the Middle Ages would lead us to believe. Nothing could be more apparent than the fact that magicians, chieftains, the leaders among tribesmen, who controlled surplus of some form, are more or less individualized. However, individuation pertains only to a very few, and to these seldom in any very marked degree. The surplus is always most meager under tribal conditions even at their best. Opportunity for autonomous activity and self-expression in any large measure is altogether wanting, even to the exceptional few who control whatever surplusage there chances to be. The few may deviate somewhat from the fixed orbits of the ethnic world, but there can be no far wanderings, because the options are so limited. The tradition is insignificant, the wealth is small, the organization is narrow and static, and in consequence the soul simply lacks leeway.

The socius, at the utmost, remains automatically and unconsciously fixed in community and under the dominance of sociality.

### Personality under Political Society

The development of personality under political society is next to be noticed. Only fragments of its long history can be studied, or indeed are available for study.

To begin with, the surplus situation under the state needs to be called to mind. The original state and the fully developed state of later days are, of course, about as widely separated in the matter of surplus as in point of time. For with the lapse of ages tradition piles up, and since little or none is ever really lost, in latter times there is available such stores of knowledge and achievement as earlier citizens never dreamed could be. Substantially the same thing is true with respect to the accumulation of wealth, though this is more uncertain than tradition. It happens, then, that political society, at whatever level we take it, is endowed with social surplus incomparably greater than existed under tribal association. Political society, in fact, it will be recalled, originated in the rise of an economic surplus which enabled one group to subjugate another, and thus to carry on systematic robbery of the conquered. In contrast, therefore, to ethnic society, under which tradition affords the chief form of surplus, political society was built up on economic resources. The latter has always been characterized by economic exploitation on the part of a wealth-holding, profit-taking class, exercising dominion over the many. This class, throughout the ages has despoiled, taxed, forced wars, and plundered the masses by wage systems, military régimes, and a state organization. It has decreed misery for the many, while reveling in luxury itself. In other words, the state

has always included a governing class who appropriate and control the surplus, and a body of people, who, as serfs, slaves, or citizens, either do not participate in the social surplus at all, or share it in only the most restricted measure. The political societies of the world are characterized, moreover, by the absence of such isolation as prevailed under ethnic conditions. They are not homogeneous kinship groups, but greatly mixed aggregates united by coercive measures, or, in modern states, by interest bonds for the most part. The full significance of the social situation under the state becomes evident when it is pointed out that the mingling of two or more different cultures is generally involved. It is under such circumstances that old tradition is enlarged and reformed and the new fully created. Traditional surplus is, therefore, brought into existence by the rise of the state. This means a wider and less uniform world of thought and custom than under ethnic association; or, in other words, it means more opportunity and necessity for self-assertion. Hence, individuality emerges more frequently. The entire surplus situation from the beginning to the end of the political order has been such as to afford freedom and opportunity for the exercise of initiative and self-direction in ever-increasing degree; and, moreover, it has been such as would call out and necessitate more or less activity of this nature.

The type of personality found in early political society is reflected in the prevailing thought of that age. Myths, legends, theologies, and other conceptual deposits are the general sources. They give us the heroes of the times, in whom are revealed the living men. We see them in a great variety of sagas, such as the myth of Hercules, the Homeric tales, the Niebelungen legend, the story of the Argonauts, etc., all products of early political society. These heroes are in many cases outstanding, unique, highly individualized men, however much their deeds may transcend human

power. The "legend," says Wundt, "introduces the strong, all-conquering hero, and in contrast with him, the hero who is resourceful and overcomes his enemies through subtle cunning. It tells of the aged man, superior in wisdom and experience, and also of him, who, in the unbroken strength of youth, and with stormy passions, overthrows his opponents. It further portrays the hero who plots evil, but who is nevertheless characterized by a sharply defined personality." [14]

These legendary personalities manifest their individuality through their ambitions and deeds. The destinies of the many are under their direction as they were not in ethnic society, thus showing a decided step forward in the differentiation of the individual.

The warrior occupied first place among the heroes of early political society.[15] Siegfried, Ulysses, and Achilles are good examples. They are all original and striking personalities. How came they to be so much more individualized than the braves of tribal days? Whence came their individuality? Its sources are disclosed when it is observed that most tribal warfare was only petty conflict, largely for wife-capture and revenge, while the warfare in which political society engages was organized for plunder and conquest. The state was originated by marauding and conquering groups in order systematically to expropriate the wealth of those subjugated. To these robber groups belonged the warrior-heroes, glorified in ancient song and story. The warriors were the gatherers of the economic surplus, or rather, they came to possess such surplus by plundering the subjugated. Such were the men who conquered Troy, typified in the champions Ulysses and Achilles. No tribal braves ever enjoyed so much wealth as these, unless they became state-makers, and passed over

[14] Wm. Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 371.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 320.

from the ethnic to the political world, and none, in consequence, became so highly individualized. The political warrior-heroes, by virtue of their unprecedented surplus, had power, liberty, range of opportunity, and release from constraining circumstances, and thus could be and did become the individuals they were. They merely represented the conquering class and the dominating element under the state.

Another hero of importance was the lawgiver.[16] He is found in both legend and actual life. Clisthenes, Servius Tullus, Moses, Draco, and Hammurabi are the names of a few who promulgated legal codes. Their attributes disclosed by the work they performed in defining the rights and obligations of citizens show them to have been greatly individualized. The cause of their distinctive and autonomous characteristics lay in the possession of a large share of the social accumulation, for be it remembered, the lawgivers were representatives of the dominant class. They, in reality, were the state. The laws themselves reveal their mastery of the social organization and of the entire store of energy. Hence, their prerogatives of lawgivers, and hence, also, all the advantages of being true selves vouchsafed them by their age.

Early political types are again deposited in the gods. At this time anthropomorphized nature became personified to the extent that personal deities appeared presiding over the world of nature and social affairs. The gods are thoroughly individualized beings; they are capricious, lawless, arbitrary persons, enjoying leisure and luxury, having power and dispensing fate. Such were Odin, Zeus, Osiris, Mithra, Jahve, and numerous others of the early political world. All gods are clearly nothing other than apotheosized heroes. In them dwell the characters of earthly men in all fullness, for gods are but humans exalted, pure

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 321.

creations of the fancy and fears after the image of their creators. The deities are a mirror in which we see clearly what manner of men dominated society. It is, therefore, obvious that only those who themselves experienced such freedom from restraint, such loosening of societal bonds and obligations, such enfranchisement of the spirit as only the control of a good deal of social abundance would give could evolve from their imaginations deities as individualized as many of the ancient gods were.

In general, it may be said that from the very advent of political society, individuality began to be an outstanding fact. It was manifested in the character of warriors, rulers, lawgivers, the gods, and the founders of states and cities. Wundt goes so far as to say that the general characteristic of this age was "the predominance of the individual personality. Externally this expresses itself primarily in the fact that the age regards even all past events as the deeds of individual persons."[17] Whether we can say also that there was a progressive individualization running on to the end of political society proper, may be open to question, for the historic record does not sufficiently inform us in this matter. However, it is fair to assume that some development accompanied the growth of surplus, though neither could have been constant. It was more than likely an intermittent development. The most significant change probably consisted not so much in the heightening of the individuation of the already individualized few, as in a tendency for the scope of individuation to become broader. At the most, no early political society individualized more than the dominant few. The ranks of men remained surplusless and undeveloped in personality until later periods of history.

Early political society eventually matured into fully developed states and empires under which flourished the

[17] Wm. Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

great civilizations of antiquity. What of personality, then? Had it undergone any appreciable changes since the beginnings of the state? Was the manner of man living under the civilization of Babylon, Assyria, Israel, the Hittites, Egypt, Greek or Roman empires the same or different? Our knowledge of him is none too certain, and the conditions under which he lived are not any too well portrayed. But the data in some cases are sufficient to convey a fairly adequate notion of the people and their world. Hence we may take account of the state of personality in a few instances.

A fact at once confronted when the ancient civilizations are studied is that those of the East differ greatly from those of the West. The empires of the Nile, the Tigris and Euphrates, and Western Asia never advanced to such heights of civilization as Greece and Rome. The contrasts are many, not the least important of which is the one pertaining to just that which concerns us: namely, types of personality. Neither in Egypt nor Asia does any such degree or extent of individuation appear as we see in Greece and Rome. In the former the development of personality did not pass much beyond the stage portrayed in early political society. In the latter the differentiation went farther. This can be brought out by taking a look at two specific instances, Israel and Greece, one from the East and the other from the West.

Israel undoubtedly represented by far the best of eastern civilization, and personality there attained its fullest development outside Europe. But in vain does one seek for any widespread individuality among the Hebrews. To be sure, they advanced somewhat beyond the heroic stage as we see it represented by Jahve, the patriarchs, state founders, Moses, and the lawgivers, the kings, David and the warriors, the prophets and priests. There were, in the days of her maturity, people outside the dominant few

who were much individualized. Such men and women of the common ranks not infrequently appeared. Even the doctrine of individual responsibility itself was advanced by Jeremiah the prophet as early as the sixth century, B. C. And yet, neither the belief in nor the practice of personal responsibility, self-determination and independence of group authority, and customary behavior was ever general in Israel. Sociality was the predominant quality of the Jews. Community was regnant; it remained throughout essentially a mystical unity. The nation's thought was of the whole, the common lot, the sins and fortunes of the group, and not of the self apart. Social solidarity expressed or implied was the burden of the prophet's message. We see it glowing in Isaiah's picture of the suffering servant, and we see it flaming forth in the doctrines of Jesus of Nazareth.

In contrast to Israel, Greek civilization, as it flowered in Athenian life, was much more individualized. This is evinced in numerous ways. Her philosophy clearly reveals it. Plato's Republic, with its idea of justice signifying adjustment, really puts the emphasis directly upon the individual. The social ideal it upholds is based upon a recognition of individual differences, and the need of opportunity for their full expression. Each citizen is to be a self, and to occupy the place for which his nature fitted him. Hellenic thought eventually gravitated to an even more extremely individualistic position in Epicureanism. This teaching stressed the notion that the individual creates the state; it held that all the socius needs to do is to look out for himself. This philosophy became widely accepted throughout Greece.

Perhaps nothing in Grecian history so well exemplifies the height to which individuality attained as the splendid freedom of her thinkers. Their critical intellect and fearless scepticism were nowhere matched in antiquity, and have

been rarely excelled in modern times. What boots it that vested interests flanked by the "desirable" citizens slavishly upholding the status quo, banished Anaxagoras and Aristotle, hounded Euripides, and killed Socrates? The fact that these men lived at all speaks volumes.

From the practical viewpoint there was a good deal of freedom in Greece. The sophists went everywhere throughout the cities, teaching personal freedom and the dependence of social institutions upon the individual's will. Men traveled far and near. Especially, under the empire of Alexander, they went into remote regions. "It is the individual who is seized with the longing for travel, his purpose being to find elsewhere more favorable opportunities for the exercise of his vocation; or, perhaps, to see the world, and thus to enlarge his field of experience and his knowledge."[18] Such freedom pertained chiefly to the few, to the scholars and the traders, who frequented the groves and marts of Athens and Alexandria, along with the nobility of Greece.

In Grecian everyday affairs there developed a good deal of self-determination. Here the citizen, in contradistinction to the mere subject, first appeared. Men became free members of the state, voted, held office, and chose their governors. They also made laws in expression of their own wills, as distinct from laws given by decree of a ruling class. There was self-government in Athens and elsewhere among the Ægean states for the nonslave classes.

Such was the development of personality in Grecian civilization, but what of the scope of individuality? It evidently included more than the enfranchisement of the Eupatridæ or nobles. There was also an emancipated citizenry. That this class was numerous is doubtful, for the vast body of people were serfs and slaves. At most the citizens were relatively few, and therefore the

[18] Wm. Wundt, *op. cit.*, pp. 488, 489.

range of individuality was decidedly limited. However it was absolutely unparalleled, both in quality and scope, either in Israel or any other seat of civilization of that age, except only in Rome.

We now ask why the difference in the status of personality, as between Israel and Greece? Is our hypothesis that the difference lies in the distribution of surplus verified here? I hold that it is. Nowhere in the world before Rome became all-powerful was there any society, of which we have knowledge, so richly endowed in general as Grecian civilization. None had such social abundance. I do not, of course, mean wealth alone, though the Grecian people were as rich as any nation of old. I refer especially to their tradition. In cultural achievement they are acknowledged the masters of antiquity. The land itself was the crossroads of the world of that age; it was the frontier of the older civilizations about the Mediterranean, as well as that of the cruder people to the northward. Hence, there met on this soil, as in no other place, all the traditions, all the cultural achievements, all the knowledge, and all the wisdom of the world. In all this, the hardy Greek stock, itself the select of adventurous breeds, overflowing with vital energy, fairly reveled. It found emancipation in this fullness of energy. The leeway of life was thus made broad; the horizon wider; the options more numerous; the possibilities less restricted than elsewhere; with the result that personality expanded and became remarkably free, and in turn contributed further stores to this surplus.

In contrast, Israel, although at times flourishing and making progress, was on the whole repeatedly despoiled and oppressed. Her achievements, while significant, remained few and her accumulation comparatively meager. Little chance had she for the liberation of the souls of her many people. Only the very few became individualized. Nor did Babylon, Assyria, Persia, or Egypt fare better,

even though they suffered no such despoliations as Israel. At times, no doubt, they had some economic overplus, but their tradition and organization remained crude, and life correspondingly hedged about and bound in a mechanical unity for all save the ruling class.

The Ægean lands passed in time under Roman rule and Greek cultural attainments, were absorbed, preserved, and added to until Rome could boast a civilization richer and broader than that of Greece. Roman social surplus surpassed that of any empire of antiquity. It was no better distributed, however, than in Athens. Hence one cannot distinguish any particular difference in the state of personality under the two civilizations, though it may be that the plebeian class was more extensively individualized in Rome than in Greece, since they apparently became generally more self-conscious and self-assertive. They organized revolts and were class-conscious from the fifth century, B. C. Apart from this, Rome, like Greece, evolved no universal individuation of her people. Surplus her ruling classes had; and differentiated personality was theirs; but her masses were in servitude, and their spirits remained unfree.

Everywhere under political society the situation remained much the same as that we have depicted. At a much later time and in a very different part of the world we find the historians calling attention to the very same facts we have been pointing out. Thus Gulick speaks of old Japan:

"While, therefore, it is beyond dispute that the old social order was communal in type, and so did not give freedom to the individual nor tend to develop strong personality among the masses, it is also true that it did develop men of commanding personality among the rulers. Those who from youth were in the hereditary line of rule, sons of Shoguns, Daimios, and Samurai, were forced by the

very communalism of the social order to an exceptional personal development. They shot far ahead of the common man. Feudalism is favorable to the development of personality in the favored few, while it represses that of the masses."[19]

### Personality under Industrial Society

Having observed the evolution of personality through the ethnic and political stages, we come next to the industrial order. There is, of course, no hard and fixed line between these stages. The political drifts over into the industrial, overlaps and merges with it in both time and form. The distinction as elsewhere made rests purely on the fact of the predominant mode of organization. Thus, in the political, a military and coercive state carries on exploitation, while productive and commercial activity hold subordinate place; whereas, in an industrial society productive and economic interests concentrated in manufacturing and trading cities are the foremost factors, while direct political exploitation is secondary.

The city, as the dominating group, is found under both social orders. In political society it is first of all a military garrison, the seat of the tribute gatherers, the abode of the state founders. These distinguishing features are but little modified so long as the political order remains. The cities of Egypt and Asia Minor under the ancient empires were essentially of this type. Thebes, Memphis, Susa, Nineveh, Tyre, and Babylon are examples. Likewise those of Greece and Rome in large measure were political cities. The city of Rome in all its glory was in nowise industrial. It lived on the fruits of commerce, or tribute exacted in the form of grain and other produce from the provinces.[20] The city

[19] Quoted by E. A. Ross in his *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 255.

[20] Adna F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 163.

of industrial society is industrial, given to manufacturing commerce and trade. These are its primary interests, and since it is most powerful in the state, these are consequently the dominant interests of society.

The rise of true industrial society came subsequent to the Middle Ages. There was only an approach to it previously, either in antiquity or during the medieval period.

There are really two epochs to industrial society—the handicraft and the factory periods or, preferably, the commercial and the industrial proper. At the close of the Middle Ages the former rose presently to its zenith. Manufactory and commerce came to be supreme in urban places, and they in turn to be supreme in society, at least throughout much of Europe. During medieval times the castle and political or military interests had dominated in the midst of an agricultural economy, but now it was the city with industrial and trade interests which was supreme. This was the situation even before the fifteenth century. In Italy there were the all-powerful cities of Venice, Genoa, and Florence; in north Europe the Hansa towns and free imperial cities. The Hansa towns, in furthering their commercial interests, really took over the political authority, and became the state. What was true of them was in a more moderate degree generally true of the cities elsewhere. The arrival of this new age was, of course, no sudden thing; back of it had been the slow development of all that is included under commerce, trade, and manufacturing, and the gradual integration of these things in the cities, until their interests became the organizing forces of society.

The significant thing about the advent of an industrial economy was the large surplus it brought. European nations became energized as at no former period. Wealth in relative abundance appeared in the industrial centers. A money economy had fostered capital accumulations.

During the Crusades the cities had garnered most of the treasures of Europe, for the nobles had sold their goods and landed estates in many cases to the burghers, in exchange for gold and silver with which to carry out their expeditions to the Holy Land. Thus, a large part of the wealth of feudalism passed under control of those whose interests were commercial.[21] By means of such capital trade and manufacturing were greatly stimulated. The luxuries of the Orient and the commodities of domestic production were abundantly supplied and increasingly consumed by the mass of the people. Into Italy, for instance, where the great awakening first became manifest, a flood of Oriental wealth poured itself through the channels of commerce. It was displayed in much luxury and art. Thousands of patricians and princes lavished riches in founding and adorning temples and palaces, on building monuments and gardens, and providing pageants and games. Elsewhere as well as in Italy wealth was being accumulated and the cities grew in numbers and power.

The vital energy of industrial society also was measurably increased over what it was under political conditions. A wage system had given the masses of men a margin of time not exacted by the master class. This was vastly different from feudalism, under which the serf had naught to call his own. Division of labor had so far advanced that the economic and vital margins were by this means considerably widened over those of antecedent times. For instance, it is estimated that there were only ten to twenty occupations in Ancient Rome, whereas the German cities by the year 1500 A. D. had from one hundred and forty-eight to three hundred occupations.[22]

The store of tradition had become immense. The legacy of antiquity plus all that the Middle Ages had added, was

[21] A. F. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

now available. To be sure, much of the religious and moral tradition was enslaving. An imperial church had woven a net to enmesh and bind the human spirit. Nevertheless, commerce and trade had broken through these fetters, as they had gathered knowledge and experiences of their own. These interests were now appropriating ancient wisdom—the classical learning—and shaping it to new ends. The lore of the classical world was as new wine. It was so much traditional surplus to those who partook of it. It stimulated, dispelled the mists that enshrouded the mind of the times, unbound moral spirits, and struck off customary restraints to thinking, sentiment, and conduct. Old ways, old beliefs, old practices, had not proved adequate to the demands of the newly risen economy. Thus, innovations were being fostered and prized. The arts and sciences were under pressure to yield something more useful, and were responding with new discoveries and inventions. Under the impetus of trade with the Orient, maritime science for instance had brought forth the compass and the astrolabe, and given a tremendous spur to adventure and exploration. New ways to India had been found, and the western hemisphere discovered. The old trade routes had been altered and the horizons of the peoples of Europe extensively widened. Copernican astronomical discovery had given an entirely new position to the earth, and in so doing had upset all the vast structure of science and philosophy coming from the Middle Ages. Printing had been perfected so that the literature and learning of medieval and classical civilization began to be spread abroad. Gunpowder had been invented, warfare revolutionized thereby, and the entire organization of society subjected to alteration. This growing mastery over the earth and the sea and the heavens meant so much surplus to society. Nor did it stop at this, for social organization itself—the structure development—had been tremendously emancipat-

ing. The rigid caste system of feudalism had been much broken by the rise of the free cities, and within the cities themselves the confining bonds of the guild had been loosened. As a consequence organization was more mobile and more effective. All these things, and more besides, give evidence of much social accumulation, an amount greater, indeed, than had ever before blessed any age.

It is, therefore, no wonder that this first epoch of industrialism has been looked upon as the flowering period of personality. It is not at all strange that the historian first discovered the individualized citizen here, for, in comparison, other ages appear almost devoid of such development. One who studies this period cannot escape encounter with individuality for it is ubiquitous. There was literally an outburst of it on every side. How otherwise could it have been with such a plenitude of social power enlarging every man's world, lengthening his cable tow, and compelling him to make choice? Everything conduced to the efflorescence of the spirit, and everywhere it bursts forth. The age is, therefore, called the Renaissance, the great awakening, the era of enlightenment, and the Reformation.

Let us note specifically some of the evidences of the unbinding of the ego, of individuality. Jacob Burckhardt a half century ago promulgated the theory that medieval "man was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, class, family, or corporation," that in the Renaissance of Italy for the first time the subjective side of consciousness asserted itself and "man became a spiritual individual, and recognized himself as such." [23] This is, of course, true, not in the sense in which Burckhardt meant it, but only in the sense that in the Renaissance, for the

[23] Jacob Burckhardt, *Kultur der Renaissance,* p. 104, paraphrased by Kuno Francke *Personality in German Literature before Luther,* p. 5.

first time, any considerable number of people became individualized. The ruling feudal class had a fine degree of individuality during the Middle Ages, as we are coming to see through a more penetrating gaze into medieval life. Kuno Francke has thrown new light upon this in his study of *Personality in German Literature before Luther.* He mildly states the facts as follows: "Alongside with this spirit of submission to a corporate whole, there are found in chivalry the germs at least of a tendency which ultimately was to set free the individual and raise it above the level of merely corporate existence."[24] But our interest lies in showing how much wider was the scope of individuality at the close of the Middle Ages when industrial society had arisen. The knights and the great folks of the manors and towns we would expect to find with personalities more highly developed than under chivalry. But how about burgherdom in general, with its craftsmen and bourgeoisie, and how about the peasantry, either freeman or serf? Have they, any of them, become much individualized? Certainly in the towns where the culture and wealth of the age were gathered, we ought to find all classes pretty well developed. Let us see how this was. In so far as life is pictured in the literature, art, and thinking of the period, Francke has shown how much more general was the development of personality than at any preceding time. The summary of his study is well worth quoting: "But this much may be said. The individual person and the individual fact obtain a deeper significance, exercise a broader influence, and stand out in stronger relief in the epoch of citizen and peasant ascendancy than had been the case in the epoch of chivalric culture. The quicker pulsation of life in the cities, the greater variety of social types and conditions, the more intense friction between man and man—all this leads to spiritual stirrings

[24] Kuno Francke, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

of the masses which cannot help unfettering the individual. It is, therefore, not surprising that the literature of this epoch shows an intensity, a freedom, and a power of individual emotion and observation which is hardly paralleled in the literature of chivalry. With deeper fervor and more rapt intuitions than their scholastic predecessors do the German mystics of the fourteenth century set out to solve the riddles of the universe. More fully and more truly than in chivalric lyrics does life ring out in German folk song of the end of the Middle Ages. More trenchantly and baldly than even Walther von der Vogelweide does the bourgeois satire castigate the follies and vices of human society. And with greater minuteness of actual detail as well as with wider scope of emotion than ever before is the Christian legend visualized in religious drama of the fifteenth century." [25]

With a wealth of detailed evidence gathered from every sort of art and literature produced in Germany during this epoch, the author has substantiated these statements. The facts are thoroughly convincing as to the widespread development of personality, especially in the cities of the age. The middle classes, at least, are proved to be fairly self-conscious.

What was true of Germany was true of Italy, France, and England also, according to the evidence from various sources. Italian literature, for instance, from Boccaccio on, reflects the same extensive individuation of personality as in Germany. When we consider the deeds of men rather than their thought, a greater freedom and originality of self-expression is found than had been in vogue at any time hitherto. The ambitions of men were unbounded among the upper and the middle classes alike. There seems to have been a mania to make a name for oneself, in Renaissance times. By every sort of means men strove to

[25] Kuno Francke, *op. cit.*, pp. 44, 45.

obtain one. They were eager for uniqueness. They attempted to do everything, from circumnavigating the globe to the most monstrous crimes of history. Nor were these self-expressive efforts confined to the upper class with its Prince Henry, the Navigator, and the Borgias. They were widely manifest among the common people in every land. The butcher, the baker, the shoemaker, and tailor, the innkeeper, and grocer were showing initiative, and asserting themselves to some degree in independent ways.

The climax of the individuating process of this new industrial epoch did not come, however, till the sixteenth century and the religious reformation. Since that time the prevalence of individuality in the middle class is patent to all who are conversant with that period. We need not recanvass the evidence here.

The second epoch of industrial society began with the extensive invention of machines in the middle of the eighteenth century. There was however in no sense a sharp break between the two epochs. There was not even a period of slump, only a gradual integration till certain inventions and discoveries precipitated a veritable revolution in industrial life and swung society to a higher cultural stage.

When we consider this phase of industrialism from the standpoint of social surplus, it becomes obvious at once that the endowment is immeasurably greater than in the handicraft epoch, or in any other stage of evolution or age of civilization. In every industrialized land there is normally an overplus of vital energy among nearly all classes, such as no other age ever witnessed. The physical vigor, mental caliber, tenure of life, and amount of leisure are unparalleled. The body of tradition in all its ranges exhibits such accumulation that all comparison with anything that ever was before is rendered entirely futile. Such range of knowledge as none can compass have be-

come so diffused that many are wiser than the greatest of the Greeks, the wise Stagirite; such control of time and space and matter as lie within command of the common man even the ancient gods might envy. But modern man's mastery of the physical forces is, perhaps, less significant than his mastery of the mysteries that enthralled the generations of yesterday. For, though much of such wisdom ministers not at all directly to the ends of existence, and is, therefore, purely surplusage, it is, nevertheless, wonderfully influential over the spirits of men.

Economic goods so far outmeasure that of all other ages that the economists insist there never was any surplus at all till the nineteenth century. This is, indeed, a wealth-possessing and wealth-producing order of unequaled magnitude. No doubt the masses of people, though denied complete or large participation in the vast riches of modern society, enjoy a standard of living and a degree of comfort that kings of old might covet. There is, at least, an extensive commonwealth of which all are sharers. In place of church, state, community, guild, home and but little else, there is the utmost variety of organization. In place of unity and conformity there is diversity, competition, and conflict in structural forms. The differentiation of occupations, for instance, illustrates in one field what is true in scores of other ways. There are reported to be somewhere between five and six thousand occupations in industrial society to-day, in contrast to its beginning period at the close of the Middle Ages, when there were not to exceed three hundred, as in contrast to present day China, with not over four hundred. All summed up, the social surplus is in every respect incomparably greater than at any other time in the history of western society.

What this means for the socius hardly needs statement. Every increase of the marginal energy in its manifold forms gives variety, multiplies opportunity, lengthens life's

tether, and necessitates more preferential reactions. It is not alone the number of possible options, but their frequency in brief intervals and short spaces that is of significance. The environment of the twentieth century world is a time-annihilating and a space-eliminating as well as a replete and overflowing one. Fifty years of Europe are literally better than a cycle of Cathay, and the personalities of the two environments are correspondingly individualized. We may profitably dwell for a moment upon one phase of the situation—that of organization, with all its multiplicity, diversification, and complexity. In contrast, the Middle Ages, for instance, had but little organization, and that was highly centralized and all-embracing. The church, state, and guild monopolized, cramped, and canalized men's souls. Personality was thoroughly stereotyped by the heavy impress of limited social structure. There was, to be sure, more range than we see among primitive men or in early political society, but compared with the world of to-day the medieval age offered little chance for an expansive life. With the widest range of choice in organization the modern man is not crowded into narrow molds. Organization impinges on more sides, and no one side is so overwrought. There is a freedom and breadth in evidence that comes in part from the abundance of structural forms through which life expresses itself.

What, then, of the exact state of personality in this age? It scarcely needs any argument to prove that individuality holds sway; the fact is commonly recognized. Everything heralds a wonderful degree and range of it. Generally speaking, its development has paralleled the growth of social accumulation from the beginning of industrialism to the present day. Whatever may be said of the height and the scope of personal self-consciousness in the Renaissance, it is clear that few, if any, thought of themselves

as isolated individuals. Certainly, the ordinary citizen and the peasant did not; notwithstanding the extraordinary height of personal sensibility, the sense of community remained strong. Only the present epoch from the eighteenth century on has produced a thoroughgoing individualistic philosophy, setting the socius in opposition to community, and deriving the latter, with all its institutions, from the conscious willing and acting of isolated beings. To be specific, eighteenth century thinking from the first brought forth the theory of natural rights, postulating a race of originally unrelated individuals. As such, men were conceived to be free and equal by nature, and endowed with certain inalienable rights. Out of this doctrine sprang the idea of social contract, in which the state and institutions in general were held to be created by agreement involving the surrender of some natural liberty for certain corporate advantages. The popular acceptance of these notions revealed the state of consciousness that had come to prevail in western society. A further reflection appeared in the economic and political theory of *laissez faire*, which still finds wide favor among the upper classes throughout the English-speaking world. The doctrine of evolution as expressed in the idea of struggle for existence of Spencer and Darwin likewise shows the extreme individuation of modern society. Of similar purport is advanced religious thought, which repudiates all external authority, and puts in its place the individual's inner sense of value as the exclusive sanction. The creed of personal liberty in its various modern expressions is another mode in which individuality is revealed.

If we consider conduct rather than thought, independent action and exclusive self-direction are so universal that it is difficult to picture any other form of behavior. I suppose this is illustrated as fully in religious practice as in anything among large numbers in all the industrial-

ized nations. The belief in individual responsibility has been worked out with freedom of the utmost sort. In domestic relations the reign of romantic love and marriage, divorce and remarriage proclaims the same spirit. In political affairs the growing independence of party allegiance, especially in England and the United States, showing itself in turncoating, in the rise of new movement, in the frequent changing of minorities into majorities, indicates a like freedom. In the moral realm an endless procession of reformers, agitators, innovators, shows a widespread lack of conformity. In commercial activities self-interests have frequently gone to such limits as wholly to disregard the group's existence or welfare. In place of corporate authority, there has been what virtually amounts to anarchy. With astonishing self-reliance, people of all classes move about the world, seeking fortune and pleasure in the ends of the earth. The ties that bind to home or native land, to party or clan are loosened with the greatest celerity, and apparently without wrench of soul. The bonds of groupal life are weak. Men are strongly egoistic and atomic; not, to be sure, equally so everywhere, but relatively and generally. The independent, aggressive, self-determind type is the most approved and ideal man of the age.

While all classes in industrial society give evidence of individuality in a way never before seen, it cannot be said that all have attained to a like development of personality. Every degree of individuality is found. It varies with the extent of participation in the surplus, from aggressive nonconformity, striving after uniqueness, and almost complete isolation to the weakest sort of self-hood, well-nigh negative sense of independence, and a real fear of being distinct, or in any wise at variance with the customary and formal. There is also variation among the various national groups. This depends in part, at least, upon the

degree of industrial development. A marked contrast, for instance, is seen in the case of France and England. The former is far less individualized than the latter; her sociality is more mechanical. Or, if it be not this, it is at least a far less intense degree of self-consciousness and self-assertiveness among the masses. If the fact that France as a nation is far less industrialized and probably possessed of relatively much less surplus than the Anglo-Saxons, is not alone sufficient to account for the difference, it is certainly the chief factor. Again, Russia in contrast to the nations of western Europe shows far less individuality. Her masses are overwhelmed by the sense of community, and are but slightly self-conscious. This difference is accounted for in the same manner as that between France and England.

### Development of Sociality

The evolution of individuality having been indicated, the question of the development of sociality can be compassed in brief space. What of it under ethnic conditions? It obviously exists as a practical fact. Indeed, the communal element is at its maximum. It is not, however, in any marked degree a conscious unity, as we have already shown. Durckheim has called it a "mechanical solidarity." From this stage, as individuality has arisen and constantly increased its range through political to industrial society, sociality has tended to find a new basis. Conscious and willed unity has tended to take the place of the instinctive and mechanical. There is a perception of differences and resemblances, and a recognition of common and opposing interests. Just so far as men choose to pursue their common interests together rather than apart, and to identify their own good with the welfare of the whole, be that whole the small group, class, community, race, nation, or hu-

manity, to that degree is there conscious solidarity, or what Durckheim has called "organic solidarity." Such is the sociality of modern society in large measure, though I do not think we can say that it is exclusively a unity of choice; a mechanical element still remains, or, better said, an instinctive factor operates to make community. In so far as association is an act of choice, however, the possibilities of unity among modern men far surpass those of tribal life; and likewise do the possibilities of disunity.

Let us briefly sketch the development. As the making of tools, clothes, utensils, and weapons, the building of houses and various structures, the taming of plants and animals with their cultivation and herding, and the rise of all the other arts and occupations of man took place, giving goods and knowledge and a slowly accumulating surplus, the first effect was to individualize men. This came, however, at the expense of sociality or by laying upon it demands for new adjustments. There early began to appear movements within the social body that were divisive and disruptive of the uniformity and solidarity. These took the form of purposive or interest unities in contrast to the hitherto unconscious and instinctive bond. This new type of unity, objectified in organization, furthered more individuality and increased the possible disharmony, while at the same time it made possible wider and greater sociality. More and more as the world of things man created has grown in abundance, more and more as the heritage of tradition has fructified, and more and more as social energy in all forms has accumulated has sociality become functional, and therefore uncertain instead of instinctive and secure. That is to say, it has become centered in conveyable objects—in wealth, ideas, arts, occupations, and organizations. And the future sociality of mankind has little outlook save as it pushes forth in this same direction. However, the indi-

viduating process always outruns it, for the multiplication of the surplus makes objective synthesis ever more difficult and general sociality hard to secure. From one viewpoint it would seem that increasing individuation ought to foster free association as men grow more self-determining. They accumulate the capital, as it were, of purposive sociality, and ought to create that sociality in a measure commensurate with their abilities. Although they have created much, they fail to attain enough to keep the two factors in any approximate balance. But we have reserved this for fuller consideration in the next chapter.

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## CHAPTER VII

### SURPLUS AND PERSONALITY (*continued*)

We have seen how personality develops with the growth of social surplus, and varies with its distribution. A further fact to be indicated is that by virtue of the unequal development of personality society is rendered inharmonious and unstable. At the same time there remain to be noticed two compensating tendencies, namely, universalization and redemocratization.

### Personality Classes

In the course of this discussion we have become aware of glaring inequalities in individuation. Let us pause here to dwell upon them for a space. In primitive society there was virtual equality, for the state of personality was well-nigh a uniform one; only a very few ever became individualized, and they in no high degree. But as soon as any considerable surplus appeared its distribution tended to become unequal, and the differentiation of personality began to vary in proportion as the socii had access to and participation in the surplus. Thus the possibilities of uniformity in individuation and socialization were forever destroyed. By the time political society had made its advent the lack of uniformity had become pronounced. During the subsequent evolution, through the latter political stages and the industrial order, personality gradually differentiated, until at the present time it has become almost infinitely varied. Personality classes have appeared

in every modern nation. In a rough way at least three levels may be described by way of illustration.

In the first class we find those who have large surplus at their command. It may be relatively unlimited. These are known as the leisure class and the plutocracy. They are ordinarily the most highly individualized. So were they in the past, and all the more so are they at the present day. They are, as a rule, free and self-determining in the highest sense. Many among them exhibit personalities greatly overwrought with individuality, especially in the world of to-day. They are prone to make choices that set them at variance with the group, that isolate. In them sociality may be so weak that the only appropriate description is unsocial or anti-social. This may take the form of "victorious egotism" of the "*L'état c'est moi*" variety, or exclusive snobbery and aloofness. In the past it sometimes took on an ascetic form, in the shape of sainthood. Not all, however, who enjoy boundless autonomy make choice of apartness, and of the lot that eschews, antagonizes, and subverts community. Some seek harmony instead, and endeavor in the most laudable manner to identify their interests with the group's welfare.

A second class is composed chiefly of the economically independent. They are often called the middle class. Unlike those of the upper stratum, their command of the surplus has limits, especially along economic lines. There are bounds set to their liberty; they are, in consequence, the moderately individualized type. Among them there are few as highly individualized as the rank of the upper class. Extreme choices are not so often made; relatively fewer cut themselves off from the group so completely, and fewer identify themselves quite as fully with communal life. There is plenty of selfhood, but along with it a fair regard for groupal interests.

A much lower level presents a class known as the sub-

merged tenth, coinciding with the poverty stricken. From the standpoint of sharing the social accumulation, these are the dispossessed people. Personality is poorly developed when this class is viewed as a whole. In past ages, say, for instance, the early political period, there was scarcely any individuality seen among the masses. Nor did early industrial society see more than a fringe of the common people become emancipated in soul to any marked degree. Even at the present, only a very moderate individualization is discernible in their ranks. Relatively, they are, perhaps, more antonomous than were any save a very few at the close of the Middle Ages. But when measured on the scale of to-day, their self-directiveness falls short; it is, on the whole, only slightly manifest. There is not so much choice made, nor so much ability to choose as one observes at other levels farther up the social scale. There is much more evidence of sociality in every particular at the bottom. A lot of it is instinctive, to be sure, and what is of pure choice is not extreme.

I do not wish to convey the idea that present day industrial society is fully stratified along personality lines. The classes are not clearly defined or fast closed groups—certainly not in America, nor even in Europe, where conditions are more favorable for stratification than in the New World. While definite segregation and anything like clear demarcation are not in evidence, there is, nevertheless, in a very rough way, variation between economic levels somewhat as I have indicated. There is, of course, for not a few, a constant shifting of class with the varying fortunes of life, but, with numerous variations and exceptions, due to several factors, the general levels persist.

### The Moral Principle

The unequal development of personality involves the moral question. Indeed, such disparity has to do with it

in every way. Since, moreover, the whole question of social harmony is wrapped up with this problem, consideration must be given it.

Let us begin by stating what is meant by morals. They are, in the first instance, customs, established modes of behavior, prevalent types of personal and group conduct, or habitual human interactions. These interactions, however, are always being evaluated, measured by standards of quality which groups set up. Great differences of better or worse are consequently assigned to them, and accordingly to men as judged by them, or by the "moral law," as it is usually called. So individuals are declared to wear various moral hues ranging from black to white. Their deeds are accounted good or evil, and a dichotomous classification is commonly made which divides men into sheep and goats, "spiritual" and "natural," elect and damned, or the good and bad designated by one terminology or another.

In all great societies, instead of there being one standard or moral code, several prevail. There is, however, generally one dominant ideal of conduct upheld and inculcated by the ruling class. This is the code which is known as the "moral law," simply because it represents authority and sovereign power. It is declared to be the one that men ought to obey, and it is the one to which the ruling class tries to make its subjects conform. But the ruling class does not itself generally follow it. Other classes also have their own codes. So in actual practice there is no agreement as to right and wrong, no single code or commonly accepted moral ideal. On the contrary, diverse principles of conduct and modes of behavior hold the field.

What underlies ideals of conduct? What grounds give the approved standards of behavior? Broadly speaking, I think we can say they are considerations of group interests

such as security, unity, and welfare. Acts, therefore, that represent a kind of equilibration between the individual and the social well-being or supposed well-being are approved; while voluntary acts that further the group's well-being, performed by persons regardless of or at the expense of themselves, are particularly praiseworthy. When the conduct of the individual harmonizes with the customs and interests of the group, it is commendable, but when it is disharmonious it is blameworthy. Socially harmonized activity is what every group wants, what it seeks to enforce, and what it writes into moral law. Naturally, the scope of harmony sought by most codes is essentially limited, having in view only the immediate group, class, or nation. There is, of course, an ideal ethic set up in theory that would universalize harmony; but as a practical standard it usually proves to be only a reed shaken in the wind. Immediate group harmony is always in practical conflict with that broader one leading out and out in ever-widening circles to the inclusion of all humanity.

Whence is the moral principle? What determines the quality of human character? The lack of uniformity already observed suggests that the moral element probably has a history; and so it has. Negatively, we can say, then, with Vernon Kellogg, that it "is not something forced into or upon us from the outside at some one supreme moment by some great mysterious molder of Man. It is not something fixed in us in one form forever. It is not something as old as the beginning of time, that shall endure till time's end."[1] But, on the contrary, it is an achievement of nature, and a becoming. In its racial aspects it is a product of the evolution of the species and of society, and likewise, in its individual aspect, a product in whole or in part of the social process. It is a factor also in the social process itself.

[1] *Beyond War*, p. 111.

There are two chief determiners of personal human conduct; they are heredity and environment, or original nature and nurture. Heredity is generally considered to be the more important factor. It is, therefore, customary to inquire first into man's original nature or his ready-made self. The school of psychologists most in vogue just now tells us that this consists of certain rather clear and distinct predispositions, faculties, or instincts. McDougall, for instance, lists what he calls "the principal human instincts" as follows: the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear, the instinct of repulsion and the emotion of disgust, the instinct of curiosity and the emotion of wonder, the instinct of pugnacity and the emotion of anger, the instincts of self-abasement, self-assertion, the parental instinct and the tender emotion, the instinct of reproduction, hunger, the gregarious instinct, the instinct of acquisition, and the constructive instinct, together with some general or non-specific tendencies as imitativeness, suggestibility, the play tendency, and a preference for the familiar rather than the unfamiliar.[2] Others either extend or abbreviate this list, but agree that instincts are the sources whence springs human conduct. They hold them to be the motive forces of adult beings, giving direction and quality to overt acts. These instincts are, of course, balked, hindered, accentuated, integrated, and variously modified and compounded by experience; that is, by reacting to the environment. But whatever the influences of the environment in which they function, and the effects of rational control upon them, innate tendencies remain the primary materials of individual and group conduct.

McDougall traces the development of moral conduct chiefly from the instincts of submission and domination, though the parental instinct and the pugnacity instinct are not ignored. There are four levels of conduct, each of

[2] *Social Psychology*, pp. 45*ff*.

which must be traversed by the individual to reach the next higher.[3] (1) At the beginning is purely instinctive action, modified only by pains and pleasures that are incident to the action. So far behavior has no social character. (2) The next stage is that in which instinctive impulses are modified by rewards and punishments administered by other persons, leading the recipient to shape his conduct to get the one and escape the other. (3) The next stage gives conduct that is controlled by anticipations of social praise or blame. This implies the operation of the submissive instinct, for praise or blame of superiors is what is regarded. Most individuals, though they may in their development pay respect to successive groups of superiors, still remain submissive to the social group. (4) The highest stage is one in which conduct is regulated by the individual's own ideas of right, regardless of any praise or blame of his immediate social environment. Only individuals of strong, self-assertive tendencies who have tasted the codes of conduct of many different groups and shaken off the authority of one after another arrive at this self-regulative plane. While moral conduct is all essentially social conduct, that which is self-governed is most truly moral.[4]

Professor Woodworth does not find the two instincts of submission and domination, so much stressed by McDougall, adequate sources of moral conduct. He emphasizes in addition another or "a definitely social motive," which is the gregarious instinct properly understood.[5] This motive is a direct "drive" to associative activity for its own sake as one of man's objective interests, and it gives the relationship of equality rather than that of inferiority or superiority. Thus, thinks Woodworth, the element of

[3] *Social Psychology*, p. 181.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 174.
[5] R. S. Woodworth, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 195*ff*.

justice enters the code of conduct, which otherwise, in the case of McDougall's superior self-contained man having his own selected code, would be without certain social content.[6]

The radical empiricists led by John Dewey repudiate altogether the theory of definite "native equipment," declaring that "there is no ready-made self behind activities.[7] Dewey, therefore, does not begin at all as does McDougall with an inventory of original tendencies. He begins instead by showing how the environment made up of institutions, customs, patterns, social habits, and existing modes imposes itself upon a plastic, inchoate, indeterminate self in the form of habits. This environment, tradition, social milieu, or collective mind is a rather stereotyped inert thing, largely transmitted from the past, and not greatly dependent upon the qualities of living men. Imposed upon individuals, it becomes in them incorporate habit. Habits are thus acquired, predispositions "to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express" ways of behaving.[8]

It is, of course, not to be understood that acquired tendencies are superscriptions stamped upon a passive object, for the individual is from the first an active agent. He has impulses. These, moreover, are only protean energy, indeterminate, objectless "drives," plastic and adventurous urges; they are not clear and distinct tendencies to anything; they do not exist as specific "instincts." For "any impulse may become organized into almost any disposition according to the way it interacts with surroundings."[9]

Thus impulse without pattern or predilection to any particular sort of expression fares forth in search of a

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 199, 205.
[7] See John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct.*
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 42.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

self, to discover one, to experiment in creating one which is more inclusive than the one that exists.[10] It meets at once an equally active world, rigid with established habits. Interacting with this matured social medium it takes on form, becomes set in patterns, acquires tendencies, is furnished with habits which give types of behavior or moral character. These habits are no more independent and distinct in activity than are impulses; they fuse into a unity, act in ensemble, giving what we call character to the individual. Interaction between impulse and surroundings does not, however, lead to the constant production of a uniform type of character, because there is conflict between habits. Social practices break down under such conflict and release energy. Energy or impulse reacting to the patterns takes on new form or changes individual habits. In this manner human nature is not a fixed thing, not something unalterable like the Ethiopian's skin or the leopard's spots, but a changeable factor, varying throughout the ages with the varying patterns of tradition. As social habits have changed, it too has changed, for social habits determine it.

A third element in conduct according to Dewey is reason, which is merely a function of habit when habits are at variance with one another or with external conditions. It is simply a focalization and readjustment of other habits to terminate the conflict. The termination or decision is a new harmony of habits on the basis of the future consequences of present behavior. The work of reason is "the rectifying of present troubles, the harmonizing of present incompatibilities by projecting a course of action which gathers into itself the meaning of them all."[11] Thus, the good is arrived at. It consists in satisfaction "in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when con-

[10] John Dewey, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 210.

flict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly release of action.''[12] There is no higher and lower, but only successive acts and the process of composing alternatives. This process gives moral quality, so that ''the better is the good; the best is not better than the good, but simply the discovered good. The worse, or evil, is a rejected good.''

The interaction of the individual and the environment may make him into a harmonious or conflicting type, a conformist or a rebel, approved of by the dominant code or rejected and condemned. In all, the revision of conduct, the choice of alternative habits, the reintegration of activities by experience illuminated by knowledge goes on with success or failure throughout the process of development.

Such is Dewey's explanation of behavior. It makes conduct essentially an extract of the environment, the mature social habits reincarnated and interacting again with that environment. It allows heredity to furnish no faculties at all, only energy. Thus, what others call ''native'' activity is simply acquired habit. ''Instincts'' or impulses, though first in time, are not primary in fact, but wholly secondary and dependent.[13]

The two methods of accounting for conduct just sketched are obviously at variance. The first views moral nature as a set of ready-made tendencies locked up in us, and working themselves out in the environment. The second holds it to be resident in the environment and from thence working itself into human conduct. Either theory taken alone is extreme, and errs by neglecting or underestimating certain truths in the other. Those who start with native tendencies see too many of them, and often make them too definite in expression. Some tendencies

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 210.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

that are made out to be drives to specific kinds of behavior may be only general impulses, as the pragmatists say, capable of becoming organized into any sort of activity or habit through interaction with the surroundings. On the other hand, to deny that there are any native tendencies at all, or to hold that such as may exist can be organized into any disposition by the play of the environment, is to ignore what seems to be a very patent fact—that individuals are unlike from the start, and remain so to the end. They are psycho-physically unlike, and react differently to the world, regardless of the social milieu and the effects of nurture. Take away from the individual every element derived from the world about, and there remains the ultimate fact of some personality that cannot be reduced to the same terms in any two cases. We do not come into this world as identical plastic blanks, to be variously shaped by the milieu; nor yet as forces completely furnished unto all good or evil works. Rather do we come partly furnished and ready to be finished by the social world into various types of men.

There are certain outstanding modes of behavior to which we have previously referred in relation to social evolution. It was especially in order to understand these in their personal reference that we were led to dwell upon the moral process in general. Now we shall take them up more specifically. I refer to the exchange-coöperative, the service-assistance, and the spoliative-exploiter modes of behavior. Although established in tradition as social habits, they spring from native tendencies in the individual also.

Long ago Plato recognized two types of men by virtue of their inborn natures. He called them the master class and the slave class. Nietzsche, accepting Plato's observation, described the first as having initiative and bravery, as being successful and dominating, while the second he described as being subservient and peaceable, as loving charity and self-

surrender. Therefore, when McDougall stresses what he calls instincts of *self-assertion* or *domination* and the instinct of *self-abasement* or *subjection,* he is only dealing with certain innate qualities that have long been recognized as such. And when Woodworth gives emphasis to what he terms a *"capacity for learning social behavior"* or for *participating on an equal footing with others in group activity,* he likewise does no more than call attention to another quality long considered native.

These native tendencies to *submission, coöperation,* and *domination,* as I conceive them, are, perhaps, not to be thought of in any case as instincts. Certainly not, if an instinct is to be defined according to McDougall "as having a definite stimulus and a definite reaction, and also a definite emotional state."[14] Rather are they more accurately described as "native capacities" or aptitudes for certain activities, though perhaps unprovided with any ready-made reactions to stimuli such as instincts have.[15] Accompanying these capacities is always found an interest in the activity, which, in other words, means "a drive towards activity of the capacity to which it is attached."[16] These capacities may be further described as faculties for the acquisition of certain types of habit. Given this much readymade in reference to the activities in question, interaction with the environment supplies the rest. And what is supplied is the more specific quality, or what is distinctively called "moral."

The social order is crammed with all the possibilities there are for behavior. Good and evil abide there to entice and captivate the generations as they rise. Every element of conduct is inherent in the sentiments, ethical codes, ideals, customs, policies, doctrines, practices, institutions,

[14] R. S. Woodworth, *op. cit.,* p. 200; Wm. McDougall, *op. cit.,* p. 29.
[15] *Ibid.,* pp. 59*ff.*
[16] *Ibid.,* p. 74.

organizations, and relationships of society. On both its personal and structural side alike the environment confronts the natural individual with influences affording stimuli to and eliciting responses from his native tendencies, and, in the end, shaping him to some type.

The interplay of these two elements, original self and environment, are, then, the determinants of moral types. That interplay, however, is conditioned by certain other factors yet to be considered, namely, rationality, vital energy, and individuality. If we think of original self and environment in their usual all-inclusive sense, what we have just referred to are not factors apart. But, as we have been using the term original self to mean only certain capacities for modes of behavior, and the term environment to refer only to qualitative aspects, we must, therefore, take account of the other factors mentioned. In doing so, we shall, of course, continue to focus upon the three modes of behavior already mentioned.

The power to reason and exercise rational control over conduct pertains in some measure to all normal men. By taking thought they can conform their spirits to ideals. A character with qualities somewhat of one's choosing may be abstracted from the environment. For, within limitations, the individual may pick from a number of possible associations, create this, that, or the other condition, choose between alternatives, and harmonize situations, and in so far as he does these things exercise guidance over the making of the man he turns out habitually to be. The following statement, barring its overemphasis, is not an incorrect estimate of the rational factor:

"In certain living peoples we see human nature in which the inherited instincts dominate; others in which there is a balance between the raw instincts on the one hand and the intelligent modifications of these instincts plus the acquirements through reason on the other; and still others in

which human nature is so wholly the result of reasoned modifications and acquirements that only those necessary basal instincts that have to do chiefly with the physiology of nutrition, reproduction, and the like, exist unchanged." [17]

To recognize the rational factor, however, does not argue that it is generally equal to the purely circumstantial. For in greater measure do men become victims of their own conduct, of choices once made, of the positions they occupy, of the power they yield or lack, and of the circumstances in general into which they are thrust or have created for themselves. Nor does it argue, moreover, that native capacities for certain types of behavior can be so much altered as Kellogg's statement implies. Rational control, as I conceive it, usually takes place in the direction of native tendencies, not crosswise of them.

Vital energy also conditions the process. We have elsewhere included even rationality under this term, but here we are using the two coördinately, meaning by vital energy the force or vigor of any faculty, tendency, or impulse. It is thus distinguished both from native tendency and from reasoning power. The distinction, like some others which we are making, may be, of course, an abstraction pure and simple, but nevertheless useful for the purpose of analysis.

Vital energy, the second conditioning factor, let us again remind ourselves, has no moral coloring, but, conditioning the expression of native tendencies and the exercise of rational control, turns out in the end to have a great deal to do with character. Surplus individuals, by virtue of their abundant energy, are aggressive and pushing. They more readily and more completely respond to situations, thrust themselves into places and relationships of opportunity and influence, which, of course, play upon them to

[17] Vernon Kellogg, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

form or reform their characters. But do all of high vitality select substantially the same kind of environment? They do not necessarily do so. What is selected depends first upon what is within, upon the natural inclination. In harmony with it, each type takes to a different outer sphere. "It is not commonly recognized," says Glueck, "to what extent and in what a variety of work man's instinctive disposition determines the kind of experiences he is likely to expose himself to and this, indirectly at least, determines the nature of his acquired equipment."[18] Where surplus is meager and vitality low, it is apparent that the individual is handicapped. Strictly limited energy conditions his reactions. It hedges about the outreaching of innate tendencies for a world in which to develop. The result is he is molded more by the environment which chance allots him than is the high vitality individual, whose preferred world is more readily obtained. However this does not imply that the native character type is any less strong. It does suggest, though, that the *instinctively coöperative* and *submissive types,* when vitality is low, stand a better show of succeeding or surviving than the *instinctively dominating type* under like conditions.

Let us now observe with what results the three native disposition types, conditioned by the rational factor and vital energy, react to their surroundings.

The *dominating type* of individual selects a world, or more specifically an occupation or a series of situations congenial to his nature.[19] If what is habitually chosen really turns out to be congenial, then all is well, the disposition flourishes and the fully developed masterman or superman finally appears. If the choices are mistaken and opportunity and energy lacks, the disposition is thwarted,

[18] Bernard Glueck, "The Psychiatric Attitude," *The Survey,* Oct. 15, 1922, p. 106.

[19] J. M. Williams, *Principles of Social Psychology,* pp. 58-60, 214, 215.

and the product will probably be a lion at bay, but never a lamb. When thoroughly successful this type makes use of fellow men as means, usually in a domineering, ruthless, unsympathetic, predatory manner; occasionally, however, quite otherwise, and the spoliative-exploiter mode gives place to the assistance-service method; for domination may be had in either way. It may be got quite as much by faring forth to redress human wrongs as by exploiting humankind. Sometimes the same persons turn from one to the other; they are morally ambivalent. Thus, we have the paternalistic, the predatory-benevolent, the exploitive-philanthropic, the imperious-humanitarian.

The *submissively constituted* individual likewise seeks and chooses situations that suit his inclinations. If he falls into them without hindrance or difficulty and the chances of his so doing are always good, the submissive disposition will come to normal maturity. If, perchance, the chosen worlds fail of promise, nullification and perversion of the disposition may result. Where developing normally, this type, which regards others as ends rather than means, becomes the true servant of mankind, going about doing all sorts of good. It is sympathetic, generous, charitable, self-sacrificing, and kind; it counts others better than self. It furnishes, withal, the great stream of altruism, for the true source of such activity is the submissive attitude. Where this virtue springs, as we have already suggested that it sometimes does from the dominative attitude, it is likely to be pseudo-altruism, a pretending one, not of the legitimate line. The submissive disposition does not, however, always express itself positively. Often it is rather negative—or shall we say positive in another way—since it strives merely to fit in, to become thoroughly identified with the milieu. It is then actively conforming and peace-loving rather than ministering in habit.

The *coöperatively disposed individual* proceeds in the

same manner as the other two to find a world suitable to his nature. He too meets with success or failure; his nature is fostered or balked as the case may be. Where he comes into his own, as it were, this man is of the tolerant, just, fair-minded and even-handed type. He neither exploits nor assists, but gives and takes, bears and forbears in all things, merely preferring equitable relations with his fellows. He is the righteous citizen, rather than the good man or the domineering type.

The third conditioning factor to be noted is individuation. By this is meant the range of freedom and opportunity afforded by the environment and the resulting degree of personal autonomy permitted. It is the quantitative rather than the qualitative aspect of the environment that is involved, for this is of chief importance in the individuating process. The distinction is, of course, another abstraction, but, since we have been thinking of environment qualitatively, it is well to make the distinction and to give separate consideration to the factor. In our previous discussion individuation was viewed as a product of social surplus for the objective side of which environment is but a more inclusive term. Individuation in that connection, however, meant only self-determinism, and should not be confused with moral character, nor should social surplus or environment be confused with the more restricted usage employed in the present connection.

The number of options or alternatives, the range of choices, the accessibility to all that society offers in any given case, the extent of spatial freedom or physical mobility, etc., are important in the interaction of self and surroundings. The status of self-determination results therefrom, and this in turn makes a difference in the choices and consequently in the quality of character integration. Thus, the most autonomous, other things equal, tend to reach the fullest and most extreme moral develop-

ment, while the less and the least self-determining tend likewise to realize character types corresponding to their respective measures of autonomy.

The moral qualities of the personality classes were incidentally touched upon at the opening of this chapter, but even at the risk of some repetition we may return to them again. Comparing the uppermost and the bottom levels of society as measured on the scale of individuation, the former, often called the "natural aristocracy" class, seems to be ruled largely by the code which grows directly out of the self-assertive or the dominative tendency, and the latter, or the masses, by the one springing normally from the submissive disposition. Such, at least, is the opinion of many who have made long and close observations of social life.[20]

Those under a natural impulsion of self-assertion and selfish ambition, when thoroughly individualized, dominate their group. The altruistic and serviceful among the highly individualized have but little show, for their activities are against that assertion which pushes men to the top. "Individuals pronouncedly sympathetic persist in their ideals, and gather like-minded groups around them. But the ideas of these groups are met by the opposition of a state, of an economic order, of ecclesiastical and educational systems that, in spite of features to the contrary, are organized essentially for the satisfaction of egoistic dispositions.[21] The ruling class, therefore, is overridden by the egoistic and self-seeking, and so the whole of society is largely ruled by a self-seeking moral code. Hobson characterizes the rule of the moneyed class as the domination of "immoral superiority" because, says he, "their supposed superiority is not a moral, but ultimately an immoral su-

[20] See, for instance, C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 138, and *Social Process*, pp. 221, 222.

[21] J. M. Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

periority resting upon a monopoly of material, intellectual, and spiritual opportunities.'' [22]

S. N. Patten thinks the aristocratic class in particular, and the whole of those I have called the most individualized, have lost ''many fundamental characteristics common to mankind.'' [23] The individualist is described as follows: ''He pioneers, reorganizes, and ultimately he dominates. He is self-centered, and indifferent to the effects of his plans upon the happiness of others. He reorganizes men for purposes frankly selfish; as scientist, explorer, or entrepreneur, he exults in work, and in lordship over nature. His relation to society is that of the agent who increases its returns and governs its energies. As a captain of industry he patrols the vast wealth of his class, and he is openly proud of his personal accumulations. When men of this class confront the environment with consciously increasing power, unhampered by obligations to their fellows, they become specialized, and as a result of that, more individualistic and unsocial. Their ancient group instincts wane, and others cannot replace them.'' [24]

In contrast to this the moral code of the masses, or, I prefer to say, of the least individualized, is commonly reported to be essentially altruistic. This is the opinion of many careful observers. Jane Addams, for instance, says the proletariat is notable for kindness, pity, and ''an unquenchable desire that charity and simple justice shall regulate men's relations.'' [25] Henderson shows how the poor are ruled by ''primitive elementary feelings of sympathy, of kinship of minds, of race solidarity.'' [26] Cooley believes that kindly, ''homely and friendly ideals of life

[22] J. A. Hobson, *The Crisis of Liberalism*, p. 216.
[23] S. N. Patten, *The New Basis of Civilization*, p. 41.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 84.
[25] *Newer Ideals of Peace*, Chapter I.
[26] C. R. Henderson, *Social Progress in the West*, p. 37.

have always had their stronghold among the common people." [27]

"Similar observations," declares the author of *The Intellectuals and the Wage Workers,* "may be made in all those cases in which, by a complex tradition, a social class is set off from the mass of the people. The chiefs of the Polynesian Islands, the kings in Africa, the medicine men of all countries present examples in which a social group's line of conduct and of thought is strongly modified by their segregation from the mass of the people. On the whole, in societies of this type, the mass of the people consider as their ideal those actions which we should characterize as humane; not by any means that all their actions conform to humane conduct, but their valuation of men shows that the fundamental altruistic principles which we recognize are recognized by them too. Not so with the privileged classes. In place of the general humane interest the class interest predominates; and while it would be wrong to say that their conduct is selfish, it is always so shaped that the interest of the class to which they belong prevails over the interest of society as a whole. If it is necessary to secure rank and to enhance the standing of the family by killing a number of enemies, there is no hesitation felt in taking life. If the interest of the class requires that its members should not perform menial occupations but should devote themselves to art or learning, then all the members of the class will vie with one another in the attainment of these achievements." [28]

I have said that the self-seeking moral code, the "success" code, which dominates the ruling class, is the ascendant code of society. It is the prevailing mode of conduct of those who control the social order; it is the mode of the state, of the aristocracy, of the plutocracy, of much

[27] *Social Process,* p. 258.
[28] H. E. Corey, pp. 187, 188.

of the "protocracy," of the large holders of the objective and material surplus everywhere. All else is largely ruled out and overriden in the realm of daily affairs. Those who are otherwise minded have relatively little chance; they are pushed to the wall or forced to yield to customary ways. Thus, the spirit of the few becomes the spirit of the many, by conscious imitation, in a sort of self-defence, by unconscious suggestion, through force of circumstances, where even no natural disposition favors it. "I notice that many men," says Cooley, "even of much natural sympathy and fellow feeling, have accepted 'every man for himself' as a kind of dogma, making themselves believe that it is the necessary rule of a competitive society, and practising it with a kind of fanaticism which goes against their better natures. Perhaps the sensitive are more apt to do this than others, because they are more upset by the spectacle of 'victorious egoism' around them."[29] Professor C. A. Ellwood speaks in similar vein in his *Reconstruction of Religion*. He says: "During the nineteenth century a large element in the privileged classes refused to recognize or to conform to any standard at all save their own pleasure and their own wishes. . . . The wealthy set an example of extravagance, luxury, and fast living which inevitably demoralized the rest of society. But these were only straws upon the surface. The program of self-interest, material satisfaction, and brute force came to extend through and through the fabric of western civilization. It was not simply the moral standards of the individual which were rebarbarized but, as we now know, the life of whole nations."[30]

There are enough people of instinctively dominative natures in the medium and least individualized classes to make them not only a fertile plasm, but, even more, gen-

[29] *Social Organization*, p. 354.
[30] *Reconstruction of Religion*, p. 102.

erating agencies for a mode of conduct like that emanating from above. At least, in these classes, there are cohorts aplenty to aid and abet in the propagation of the dominant code, until all classes have come more or less completely under the spell of "immoral superiority" or "victorious egoism."

What I have called the dominant code is primarily the mode of intergroup, interclass, interrace, and international relationship and conduct. Within groups, classes, races, and nations rather than between them, more of the altruistic, serviceful, and simply coöperative holds. There are class codes of sympathy, loyalty, and mutual aid; they are found among all groups and subgroups. They include very narrow professional codes, and much wider group loyalties.

The intragroup code holds within certain limits, but beyond intergroup principles come into force. Thus there is one set of rules which the majority follow in their interest groups, and another set applied to outsiders; as, for example, one for the home and another for the market place; one in relation to the native and another for the foreigner.

This is strikingly told in Matthew Arnold's poem, *West London:*

> Crouch'd on the pavement, close to Belgrade Square,
> A tramp I saw, ill, moody, and tongue-tied,
> A babe was in her arms, and at her side
> A girl; their clothes were rags, their feet were bare.
> Some laboring men, whose work lay somewhere there,
> Pass'd opposite; she touched her girl, who hied
> Across and begg'd and came back satisfied;
> The rich she had let pass with frozen stare.
> Thought I: ("Above her state this spirit towers;
> She will not ask of aliens, but of friends,
> Of sharers in a common human fate").

Only the few carry over the altruistic principles of group life into intergroup relations. Theoretically, the most in-

dividualized, necessary qualities granted, ought to do it, and would always do it, were it not that overwhelming influences such as we have indicated are against them. Practically, the least individualized are supposed to be more inclined to do it than the others.

We have seen that moral nature springs from a modicum of innate capacity interacting with established social habits under varying conditions of rationality, vital energy and individuation, that all in all the innate capacity factor is relatively small and the environmental the great determinant. Obviously, therefore, human nature is not to any great extent a fixed thing, but subject to the molding influence of the external world. And yet, despite great environmental alterations, it has apparently remained much the same throughout the ages. But why so? It is not, I take it, so much because of the existence of certain stable natural types as it is because of the persistence of moral codes that no environmental changes have yet sufficed to alter. The physical, that is, spatial, temporal, and material aspects of environment have undergone amazing transformation, but not in such wise as to revolutionize the patterns or standards of behavior inherited from a long social past. Human nature can be changed very much by changing the social milieu, but the difficulty is in doing the latter. It is so little under control of social purpose, and so much a matter of blind chance, that society will have to put up with its present character indefinitely.

## Social Disharmony and Instability

The unequal development of individuality, coupled with all that this involves of surplus control, together with diverse moral types that persist, is productive of social disharmony, unrest, and instability. The parts are widely divided against the whole. Classes with various degrees

of self-consciousness and freedom are incompatible and antagonistic. The very moment that self-determination to any great extent became possible, the interests of social solidarity were jeopardized, for some chose to break away as far as permissible from community and to set up their exclusive interests against the group's welfare. From that time on there have been men who, though dwelling in society and produced by it, have yet been its enemies. So it has come to pass that there is disharmony between the parts and the whole. It exists within personalities and between groups of the same. It has grown apace as the social surplus has accumulated.

This unequal individuation has helped to split society into divergent and antagonistic creeds and thought systems, conflicting economic and occupational groups, warring parties and classes, and clashing organizations. It has rendered nations heterogeneous by folk migration, by making the relations of men more and more impersonal, and by undermining moral unity through the rise of group and intergroup codes. It has fostered exploitation, suppression, domination, and subordination. It has given rise to incompatible types, and created every sort of inequality of status. It has erected subversive organization, and brought about ruthless monopoly and endless waste.

Social evolution has thus reached a difficult and critical stage. It approaches such a situation as that Le Bon describes as the end of social evolution. He says: "What constituted a people, a unity, a whole, becomes in the end an agglomeration of individualities lacking cohesion, and artificially held together for a time by its traditions and institutions. It is at this stage that men, divided by their interests and aspirations, and incapable any longer of self-government, require directing in their pettiest acts, and that the State exerts an absorbing influence.

"With the definite loss of its old ideal the genius of

the race entirely disappears, it is a mere swarm of isolated individuals and returns to its original state—that of crowds. . . . Its civilization is now without stability, and at the mercy of every chance." [31]

Thus it may be said that the golden age of society, which Rousseau and his school, with a great deal of fidelity to elemental facts, pictured in the "state of nature," has been irretrievably lost. Its homogeneity in occupation, uniformity of opinion, undivided moral code, concord, and freedom from dissension and serious strife have vanished beyond recall: while division and disintegrating tendencies reign instead.

If all could be equally individualized, that lamented age might return again. There would be a basis for harmony and unity quite as strong as in ethnic society, if not much stronger, since there would be added to whatever native sociality that persisted, the factor of rational coöperation through the recognition of common interests. But, as it is, the power to choose is unequally present and imperfectly operative among all modern peoples. It affords no common basis. Such stability as there is is due to a combination of elements, including a large measure of compulsion, sheer inertia of habitual behavior, instinctive response, and force of structural pressure, along with a mead of recognition of common interests.

Paradoxical as it may seem, it is nevertheless a fact that the process of individuation as it has worked out has actually decreased social self-direction. Personal self-direction has, of course, increased, for that is what individuation means, but *pari passu* social self-direction varies inversely with the growth of personal freedom. With all the ability to coöperate that the social situation thrusts upon us, as individuals, our energies become so dissipated that the power to concentrate and coöperate for

[31] Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 11th Ed., p. 239.

the good of the whole is diminished. Hence the social order tends to be dissolved and instability to become regnant.

Social instability began to be a serious problem in antiquity, where individuation had made some headway. It appeared in Greece. Here, states were subject to unrest, radical alterations and rebellious moods. In Rome a condition of chronic instability developed. From about 500 B.C., when the plebeian revolts began, on to the end of the empire, Rome was shaken by discontent and strife. There was widespread antagonism between classes and disturbance was constant. Open revolt and threatened upheaval impended for centuries. The whole of her later life was menaced by incessant revolutionary agitation.

The next period of marked unrest occurred at the close of the Middle Ages, with the beginning of industrial society. The Renaissance period was characterized by unsettled life. There was dissension and conflict everywhere throughout Europe. Crime reigned supreme among all classes. It is a common remark of the historians that the age was devoid of morals. The end justified the means in the dominant code of the times. Harmony had never been so little in evidence as then. It is said that "when Luther appeared, the state of the popular mind had come to be a surging mass of conflicting emotions—of class hatred and party passion, of vulgar cynicism and frivolous skepticism, of bold enjoyment of the flesh and blind groping for the spirit, of sturdy trust in human rights and fanatic craving for the destruction of order." [32]

From the close of the Middle Ages to the present time this instability has been like a rising tide, until the entire western world of the present century has become engulfed in turmoil, strife, and rebelliousness, threatening chaos. Everywhere the industrial states and their dependencies are torn by warring factions and conflicting classes, par-

[32] Kuno Francke, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

ties, and races. A spirit of profound and abiding hatred toward institutions and the structural order under which industrialism flourishes has arisen and spread abroad. Gilbert Murray has called this "Satanism." He takes the name from the times of Nero and Domitian, when the persecuted Christian sect identified Roman society with the rule of Satan. Murray describes Satanism as "the spirit of unmixed hatred toward the existing world order." He believes that unless the world order is speedily affected by a change of heart, and seriously sets about the business of promoting human brotherhood, it is doomed. He thinks it "will be shattered by the widespread hatred of those whom it rules." [33]

The instability of society as just described verging on anarchy and dissolution is due, as we have been trying to show, not so much to the prevalence of individuality as to its unequal development. If the development were more uniform or more complete in all, solidarity would be more secure. But no equilibration in this respect can be hoped for or promoted.

The theory has been advanced that social life falls into alternating periods of socialization and individuation. Ratzenhofer adhered to this view,[34] and Ellwood has reaffirmed it.[35] From the historic viewpoint certain cycles of harmony and disharmony have indeed appeared. The accumulation of surplus, as we have seen, gives rise to individuation, and when this affects more than the ruling class disharmony is pretty sure to result. A lessening of community ensues. The disparity of personality classes that prevails means maladjustment, opposition, confusion, more or less disturbance, and possibly anarchy, rebellion, and disorganization. These are the revolutionary times of

[33] Gilbert Murray, "Satanism and the World Order," *Contemporary Review*, April, 1920, pp. 171, 172.
[34] Sociologische Erkenntnis, pp. 201-204.
[35] *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 177-179.

history. On the other hand, there have been cycles where the range of individuality has not reached the great bulk of the nation in any marked degree. The personality status has been one of general uniformity. Under such circumstances community has been pronounced. Conformity, concord, and coördination have given harmony with a minimum of antagonism. These times have received such names as Ages of Conformity, Eras of Good Feeling, Golden Ages, Pax Romana, etc. These cycles of both sorts, as I see it, pertain especially to the past, in which the few surplus holders dominated an otherwise little differentiated body of people. In so far as the modern industrial nations are concerned, they have little meaning.

As to any regular alternation of such cycles, there is little evidence. While the amount of surplus has always fluctuated and nations have suffered periods of curtailment and loss, the general trend has been one of increasing surplus, widening individuation, and growing disharmony. Such, at least, has been the course of evolution in western society ever since the close of the Middle Ages. The stupendous store of surplus of to-day, and the very general, though extremely unequal, participation on the part of the population of any nation in the same does not promise well for any Golden Ages ahead. Harmony and stability are not possible to modern states and empires in the face of a fairly general individuation that is at the same time so glaringly disparate.

There are, of course, several possible outcomes to the present situation. It is conceivable that there may be a check-up on accumulation for a time, that an impasse may be reached, and the ruling class be able to so consolidate its position and entrench itself long enough to effect a kind of Pax Romana. Or again, such a radical curtailment of the surplus may take place, leaving the existing monopolistic control so unshaken that the few will be able to crush and

coerce the masses into conformity not unlike that of the Middle Ages. Another possible outcome is that disharmony will continue to grow until the social order will end in chaos in many states or in all, and effect such a leveling down and redistribution of energy that a new age of harmony and concord will ensue. A more hopeful view might look upon the present as transitional, and the eventual outcome such a gradual equalization of individuation as will give unity and stability. This is by no means impossible of fulfillment, but the social process, judged by its present and past performance, holds no promises that this will be the way. Any one of the three first mentioned alternatives are far more probable; otherwise, there is little chance for a recurrence of a cycle of sociality in any of the component groups of the western world.

### Universalization

While the growth of surplus and its inequitable distribution has developed the individualized type of personality and rendered society inharmonious and unstable, there has been a compensating result in the rise of universalism. The process of universalization means a wider integration or socialization of the world's inhabitants. It signifies a world-embracing sociality. It may be called humanity which, "when predicated of an individual, means that he transcends the limits of all more restricted associations, such as family, tribe or state, and possesses an appreciation of human personality as such; in its application to human society it represents a demand for an ideal condition in which this appreciation of human worth shall have become a universal norm." [36]

Under ethnic conditions, without surplus to speak of, the social world was the tribe or federation of kindred

[36] Wm. Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 472.

tribes. Stranger tribes were known and their existence recognized through petty bartering and occasional conflicts. But society was strictly localized. Myriads of small groups, each complete in itself and altogether independent of and stranger to or hostile toward others, made up the world of mankind.

Political society began when considerable surplus had been accumulated. The state held sway, giving a much larger group, composed of several or many local units. Under its coercive influence these units in time became fused into a community with some degree of consciousness of kind. However, only the state-making class possessing the surplus became much individualized in the early states of the world. In fact, not until the state had amassed sufficient energy to launch out upon empire building did individuality come into prominence. But when this happened the beginnings of universalism also appeared.

The stream of tradition, swollen by the stores of many local basins of culture that political activity caused to flow together, the garnered wealth concentrated in the exploiter's hands, the organization so expanded as to cause the mingling of peoples of various kindreds and tongues, especially in cities, all conduced to the growth of individuality, and at the same time to the rise of universality. The data bearing on the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Persian Empires are not abundant enough to reveal much concerning personality, but when we turn to Greece and the Macedonian Empire, we observe, as already shown, a striking degree of individuality, and the first important development of universalism. Here the political order had come to embrace vast stretches of territory and to hold dominion over many nations. Under imperial rule a more or less common cultural tradition had spread among the various peoples. Cities of considerable size, like Alexandria, had been established; colonies of people had been transplanted from

one part of the empire into another; slaves had been carried hither and thither throughout its confines; and, withal, there had come about such an intermingling of races as had never before been known. These broadening contacts and the widening liberties of the age began to give to at least the few a consciousness of universality, of a society which, if not quite conterminous with the bounds of humanity, included a good portion of it. This consciousness crops out in Stoic philosophy, which, in so far as we know, was the first notion of universalism to arise anywhere in the minds of men. The Stoics held that the mind was shaped to a universal reason or plan. This reason gave natural law, and in consequence human law, alike everywhere. They observed that through reason a universal brotherhood of man existed, expressing itself concretely in the products of reason in institutions. The universal reason was what men were seeking to appropriate when they invented gods as supreme beings. Thus we have in Stoicism the notions of universal being in God and of human brotherhood in man, by virtue of adaptation to the universal being. This thought system was, therefore, the outlook of the most individualized class, whose consciousness was becoming humanized through the influence of surplus.

The Roman Empire flourished under a richer cultural heritage, a body of tradition in general and wealth in particular, far superior to that of the Grecian Age. Among many other things it could boast a universal language. Greek was spoken everywhere about the Mediterranean basin. Howbeit, there was, perhaps, no more general participation in the surplus than in the preceding age. It is to be noted, however, that throughout the period the universalizing process went on alongside the individualizing. This is illustrated, for instance, in the religious thought which came to be widespread in the empire. I refer to

Christianity, which championed a universalism far broader in reality than Stoic philosophy. The Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man on the basis of the Fatherhood of God had none of the abstractness of Stoicism. There is a virile concreteness about it when we hear it proclaiming that "all are made of one blood for to dwell together upon the face of the earth." There is a practical turn for the first time fully realized when we hear the chief apostle of the faith declaring that there is neither Jew nor Gentile, Greek nor Barbarian, bond nor free. It is not at all evident that this essential notion of Christianity was very widely dispersed, except in rare cases, and assuredly it was not the mode of thought among the lower classes. But the great leaders of the movement, like Saul of Tarsus, were never weary of proclaiming it aloud. The Kingdom of God idea standing for a world-embracing social order, expressing, as it did, the very genius of Christian thought, reveals, as nothing else, the consciousness of humanity to which some had attained. This idea was more than doctrine; it was the life itself of not a few, for they went everywhere preaching it and seeking to put it into practice, even to the uttermost limits of the empire.

Passing the Medieval Age, and coming to the industrial period, a growing universality is seen running abreast of the individuality then manifesting itself so extensively. Enough emphasis has been laid upon the surplus conditions which then prevailed. Suffice it, therefore, to point out how far universalization was present. The Middle Ages had witnessed the spread of Christianity and the rise of the Church as a universal institution throughout much of the world. Christendom had come to look upon itself as a single state with two heads, the secular and ecclesiastical. The unity thus afforded was not a vital consciousness of kind for the many, however much it may have been for the few. When tested, it proved only a theoretical bond.

The Crusades demonstrated its unreality; they failed mainly for this cause.[37]

In the Renaissance, on the contrary, a real consciousness of universality made its appearance. Larger areas of society awaked to a sense of the unity of Christendom. True, the Church became divided, and separate states, as the French, English, and Spanish, took shape; but beneath all the divisive tendencies there was a growing awareness of a common humanity. Amid a multiplicity of national languages the rediscovered classical literature, art, and learning, furnished a new interest bond. Humanism was a form of universalism. Commerce and trade reached out as never before, and brought increasing numbers of men into peaceful contact throughout the known world. No other influences were so powerful as these. In all the history of civilization the sweeping away of the barriers of local seclusion has been the work of the trader in a conspicuous fashion. Neither war nor religion have done more for the integration and amalgamation of isolated social groups.[38] World travel for various purposes became common, and exerted a broadening influence over personality in every way. Social life attained a degree of freedom and openness previously unknown. The real Renaissance men were truly cosmopolitan and fully conscious of it. They felt at home in every land and among all nations. Erasmus was a representative more of the age; its spirit was his own. He found himself equally at home in France, Italy, England, and Germany. What was true of him was not, of course, by any means true of every man, and yet it came nearer being true than it had ever been down to Renaissance days. In many, individualism and universalism were equally combined.[39]

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[37] R. Lodge, *The Close of the Middle Ages*, p. 517.
[38] A. F. Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
[39] Wm. Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 492.

Industrial society in its latter day development, endowed with immense surplus, exhibits individuality and universality everywhere. The means of communication, locomotion, and transport foster alike the two aspects of consciousness. Intercommunication in the matter of news, ideas, and sentiments between the major groups of the world is a constant phenomenon of no less significance than the regular interchange of goods. Perhaps of even greater importance is the free and easy passing of citizens to and fro between the civilized nations. When savages moved, it was the whole tribe that traveled to distant places in search of better hunting grounds. When barbarians shifted, masses left their home seats, crowded out by enemies or lured to conquest. They went to slay and plunder. Early political peoples pushed out from their original localities generally in quest of empire, and occasionally on missions of peaceful colonization. In the ancient states a few traveled beyond the confines of empire. At the close of the Middle Age, with the advent of industrialism, travel began to grow, and has continued throughout the latter centuries of history until to-day multitudes of every race journey the world over to seek work, to get knowledge, and to find amusement. Other hosts go peacefully from their fatherlands to take up permanent abodes in strange lands. The peaceful migration of so many has profoundly affected the attitudes of races and nations toward one another. Of the civilized peoples of the Western world it can be said with absolute truth that there are no longer any stranger races. "Civilization," says Ross, "which once was *fluvial*—as on the Nile, the Euphrates, the Ganges, the Hoang Ho; then *maritime*—as on the Persian Gulf, the Ægean, the Mediterranean, the Yellow Sea; then *oceanic*—as was possible after Columbus and Magellan; has lately become *planetary*.[40] Interracial and

[40] E. A. Ross, *Outlines of Sociology*, p. 378.

international acquaintance, a worldwide social intercourse and in larger measure than ever before the elements of a worldwide culture has developed a strong sense of the all-embracing society of mankind.

Those who pursue art, science, and letters recognize no racial or national walls of separation. Neither do the leisure class and the devotees of sports. Among the financial magnates there exists a somewhat similar sense of solidarity. But nowadays neither the aristocracy nor the bourgeois hold a monopoly of the consciousness of universality. The proletariat also shares in it. Perhaps it is even more sincerely present in them than in the ruling classes. The working class International bears witness to this sense of unity. 'Mid many disruptions due to war its spirit has not been destroyed. Thus, by classes of various kinds based on an appreciation of common interests, the consciousness of humanity steadily makes headway.

The outreachings of the component groups of the Great Society to exploit by trade and dominate by force every backward nation and uncivilized portion of mankind have not been in vain for humanity. In other words, the outworking of the social process in intergroup relationships has also worked effectively under industrialism to the furtherance of universality. This process has reduced the number of political units from as many as three hundred in the sixteenth century to less than three score in the twentieth. It has likewise brought about the merging of nationalities into larger and larger groups till a few great languages and religions suffice for the greater part of mankind. Thus is the growth of the all-embracing consciousness facilitated. To the same end, but directly, and far more effectively, has the outpouring of generous and great munificence from the surplus nations unto the enlightenment, healing, and upbuilding of the deficit ones gone on for many generations. If the dominant element of the

Great Society everywhere seeks to plunder and oppress the weak, there is another faction who, with goodness of heart, seeks to heal and help all the suffering millions of the human race. The total effect has been and still is a growing sense on the part of increasing numbers that the lot of mankind is a common one.

Perhaps the most important of all the achievements of the age in the direction of universalism appears in the worldwide revolt which has sprung up among the proletariat and the altruistically minded of the upper classes against the ages old political method, the state's policy of exploitation, and man's inhumanity to man. Its roots lie in the revulsion of feeling which comes to those who have grown conscious of the oneness of mankind whenever they see the strong overriding the weak. The accentuation of individuality which modern days has brought has undoubtedly been responsible for this new force rising to counter the dominant method of surplus groups.

Universalism, let it be noted in conclusion, tends in some measure to counterbalance the unsettling tendencies of the individualizing process. It operates somewhat as a check to the instability of industrial society. It is a wider sociality that seeks to replace the narrower one that individuation has dissolved. This development hardly presages a world society in lieu of national groups. At least it does not promise anything of the kind in the near future, for such a consummation would involve mutual sympathy and understanding on a universal scale and a uniformly individualized citizenship everywhere. And as yet the world's social surplus will hardly allow so great a thing to come to pass. The barriers that still divide men can be broken down, the physical conditions that circumscribe many races can be removed only as the surplus grows and the souls of men attain emancipation and enfranchisement to a degree that only a few now enjoy and on a scale as wide as the

human race itself. No such situation is in sight, and any world-society is, therefore, an idle dream. Such a society is, moreover, dependent not on the will of men so much as on the blind process of energy working through social forms. The larger integration through universalization will undoubtedly continue to take place; it may go to very great lengths, but, though it checkmate intergroup disharmony, it is no certain and dependable stabilizer of the existing world order. The incessant redistribution of energy goes on, and every equilibrium that tends to be established is sooner or later overthrown. Such will probably be the end of present developments.

### Redemocratization

In addition to the other effects of the growth of surplus upon the spirit of men, redemocratization or resocialization has begun to manifest itself. I say redemocratization, because I think of society as originally democratic, of its having lost that condition through the process of development and then of its beginning again to return to a democratic basis. The return forecasted is not, indeed, to the condition whence it departed, for that is impossible, or at least so remote that it is scarcely conceivable. Primitive democracy rested on blood-kinship, undifferentiated personality, uniformity of occupation, custom and behavior, considerable community of possessions, and substantial equality of goods, rights, duties, and privileges. It was pretty much a dead-level state of affairs to which surplusful society such as now prevails over much of the world could not well return. On the contrary, any new democracy must find equality 'mid much diversity, and rise from purposive achievement more or less arbitrarily maintained instead of from a natural status.

Redemocratization as the movement has appeared in

history has many phases. A number of these we have treated at length in another volume.[41] Only certain influences of the evolutionary process that have wrought democratically upon personality will be referred to in the briefest manner here. We shall ignore most of the historic period and confine ourselves to the industrial age, and particularly to the latter part of it, for this era has been the only one in which any profound manifestations of the new spirit have appeared.

During this time surplus has not only piled up till it has reached unparalleled abundance in the western lands, but it has grown along certain lines that have been singularly effective in altering man's outlook toward the universe, his conception of himself, and his attitude toward his fellows and the social order.

In the first place, the fullness and complexity to which society has attained and the fairly general participation in it all to which the many have come has given the individual a sense of power that men of other ages never enjoyed. This sense of power comes from the physical and mental freedom that he exercises; and to the under man especially it comes in a large measure from the assurance that growing class organization gives him. It proceeds, moreover, for the many to translate itself into a feeling of equality with the best, expressed in such sentiments as "I am as good as you are," "The rich are no better than anybody else," etc. Thus appears the actual heightening of self-valuation among the masses of mankind, causing them to throw off the abject and respectful manner and to assume a challenging attitude toward all men and classes of men claiming special privileges or occupying positions of superiority and all laws and institutions upheld by them.

More significant still has been the effect of that part of the tradition included in the scientific method and its

[41] See the author's *Ultimate Democracy and Its Making.*

achievements. By it innumerable mysteries, superstitions, fears, sanctities, divinities, principalities, and powers enthralling men, have been destroyed. The mysteries of the natural world have been largely dissipated, and the sway of gods and devils within it broken; the divinity that hedged about the king and priest has been relegated to the limbo of oblivion; the sanctity clothing customs, laws, and institutions has been torn asunder; the bulwark of holy tradition behind which stood aristocratic classes and established orders has been largely leveled down; and the fear of all principalities and powers has been swept away. In brief, science has shorn every kind of ancient authority of all extrinsic sanction and ordination, and shown it to be full of fraud and deception. By so doing it has turned attention to the real source of authority, which is man himself, and quickened the rank and file to trust in themselves to constitute whatever they wish and will respect. To the extent that this attitude has spread abroad it has been an equalizing influence, because it has magnified man in his own eyes and in the eyes of his fellows.[42]

Neither the growth of surplus in wealth and physical power nor the accomplishments of science in building new tradition have been without harmful as well as good effects. But be the harmful what they may, the good effects upon the souls of men to which we have just alluded probably outweigh the evil. The sense of power and importance, the feeling of self-dependence, the consciousness that he himself is creator, together with the realization of the spirit of equality arising therefrom rank with the greatest spiritual attainments of the race. They are the very essence of democracy. As yet, however, the latter is little more than a subjective attainment waiting to be objectified in the social order. The democratizing of personality is by no means general. And it must become much more so, if

[42] See *ibid.*, especially Chapter VIII.

not wholly universalized, before the nonpersonal order can reach a stage of equality worthy the name democracy. That this can be reached, save as personality changes its surroundings, and they in turn react to widen the range of democratized personality and so on in reciprocal process, is a commonplace of social science.

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## CHAPTER VIII

### SURPLUS AND LEADERSHIP

In tracing the evolution of personality we have at the same time followed the development of leadership in certain fundamental aspects, for the growth of individuality and the rise of leadership are parallel and, in part, identical phenomena. Incidentally, and without calling attention to the leadership function as such, the type of leader found particularly in ethnic and political society has been sketched. If now special attention were to be directed to the emergence and unfolding of this function, a recanvass of the ground already traversed would be necessary, but that would bring to light nothing new concerning the social process. We will, then, forego the effort, and merely add to what has already been presented a summary of the salient facts bearing on leadership evolution. That summary added, we shall then turn to a more deliberate consideration of leadership in relation to surplus and other phenomena, with reference primarily to highly developed civil society.

Ethnic society, as we have seen, being characterized by undeveloped personality, shows but little leadership. What there is is generally sporadic and temporary. Only at the upper levels of savagery, where classes have begun to form, and where certain functions have become somewhat institutionalized, is there anything like permanency in positions of ascendancy. Surplus being meager, and lines of activity consequently few, the possibility for much self-assertion is wanting. The pursuits of food-getting, magic, warfare,

ceremonials attending important events, and, perhaps, in tribal life at its summit, a few other functions, are the only chances that are offered. Tradition dictating unchanging ways rules, and innovation is unwelcomed and rare. Leadership is, therefore, concerned almost wholly with conformity rather than with alteration.[1]

Political society, much more surplusful in every way, stratified and well organized, having many functions, shows a far greater individuality and a corresponding degree of leadership. These characteristics of its beginning become more pronounced as maturity is reached. Contrasted with the ethnic order, leadership is not only more common and stable, but is highly institutionalized. Organization reigns in place of custom, and within the compass of definite forms personality asserts itself. Through numerous occupations and institutions, dominant personalities rise and flourish. Everywhere, from first to last, the story of the state tells of warriors, builders of cities and empire, givers of law, founders of religion, kings, priests, prophets, bards and judges, artificers and discoverers—a long list, withal, of those who dominate in one sphere and another. Among them are not only those who function through organized activities, but men who create new structures. The organizers of new adaptations vie with those who shine through the old. In both its institutionalized and innovating nature is political leadership distinguished from ethnic. However, under the fully developed political order, the first is its most marked feature.

Industrial society with an immense surplus and highly

[1] See Eben Mumford, "The Origins of Leadership," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 12. This is a very able study of the whole question, with special reference to primitive society. My work, which advances a theory and reaches conclusions similar to Mumford's, was wrought out before I discovered his work, and entirely independent of its influence. In revising what I had previously written for this chapter, however, I have made use of some of his terminology.

developed, often extreme, individuality, is exceedingly rich in leadership. A great variety of organizations, institutions, and functions afford the widest opportunity for self-assertion. There results even more abundant institutionalized leadership than under political society. The outstanding feature of industrialism, however, is the prevalence of the organizer type. A social order so maladjusted, problematical, inharmonious, and disturbed as this one constantly demands the coördinator of new adaptations and adjustments, and gives to personalities fitted for that work every chance for expression. In as much as the modal surplus of industrialism is economic, the greater part of its organizing and innovating leadership revolves about economic problems, even as in political society it turned about organization and in ethnic about a form of tradition.

So much for the broader phases of leadership evolution. Now for a more careful study of the process. Heroes, historic epochs, crises, change, and publics concern us; to find, if possible, how they are related among themselves and to the social surplus. Our first interest is the great man himself.

## The Leader

Who is the great man, genius, or hero, as we may choose to call him? Much depends upon who answers the question. We may harken to Carlyle, Emerson, Spencer, and scores of lesser voices, but find little agreement. Lester F. Ward said that the genius is one in whom there "is a sort of focalization of psychic power."[2] N. K. Mikhalovsky says: "Hero we shall call that man who by his example captivates the mass for good or for evil, for noble or degrading, for rational or for irrational deeds."[3] Evidently we must give to the term great man, genius, or hero, the

[2] *Pure Sociology*, p. 36.
[3] J. F. Hecker, *Russian Sociology*, p. 136.

largest sense, meaning any one who in any field achieves conspicuously. We, of course, are here interested primarily in political and social achievement. And in this field I would dub him hero who has a great surplus of energy and is able to suggest and direct social action, manipulate forces, and in one way or another dominate the public.

"What is the great man?" it is next in order to ask. He is a product or resultant of his time. Indeed, all men are that, if nothing more. "Genius is in things, not in men," said Odin. This now widely accepted observation was well expressed by Macaulay. In his essay on Dryden he wrote as follows: "For, in fact, it is the age that forms the man, not the man that forms the age. . . . We extol Bacon, and sneer at Aquinas. But if their situations had been changed, Bacon might have been the Angelical Doctor, the most subtle Aristotelian of the schools; the Dominican might have led forth the sciences from their house of bondage. If Luther had been born in the tenth century he would have effected no reformation. If he had never been born at all it is evident that the sixteenth century could not have elapsed without a great schism in the church."

Again, the great man is an epitome of his time—a shorthand edition of the age, if you like. Professor C. A. Ellwood well says that he is "usually a focusing point of many and sometimes of nearly all of the tendencies of his age. Indeed, greatness largely consists in being able to sum up in one's own personality some of the more striking tendencies of one's times."[4] In similar vein Goethe wrote concerning himself: "My work is an assemblage of essences which have been derived from the course of Nature. This bears the name of Goethe."

It will perhaps be agreed that the great man is at once product and epitome of the age in which he lives, but can

[4] *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, p. 270.

anything more be conceded him? An old claim assigns him the rôle of origination also. So old and respectable is this claim that until recently it was all but rank heresy to dispute its validity. The hero-worshiper, since time beyond record, has considered the great man the creator of his age. Looked upon as a superman or as a heaven-sent visitant, setting at naught the laws of heredity and violating every condition of environment, the hero has been acclaimed the shaper of the social destiny, the real maker of history. As Emerson said, "There is properly no history, only biography." A modified form of this type of the great man doctrine is somewhat less extravagant in its claims. Galton, for instance, found genius in biologic endowment, but for all that made it omnipotent in so far as environment is considered. Others holding that the genius is subject to the laws of heredity and wholly under the influence of the environment as well, still insist that he, directly or indirectly, produces the events of history. In its sanest form Professor Ellwood states it as follows: "the genius being largely a product of biological variation," introduces "variation in the ideas, ideals and concepts which become the instrumentalities of masteries over nature on the one hand and of human nature on the other." [5]

Thus, from product through epitome to originator of his times the doctrine of the great man passes from one extreme to the very opposite. But surely the truth lies at neither pole; it is probably midway between. The genius is at once product and originator of his age.

In all his thought and action the great man is a strange blending of the new with the old. A careful study of the geniuses of the world would, I believe, give evidence of this in every instance. And the new would almost invariably be found very small, often infinitesimal. Only in the rarest cases would the two elements come anywhere

[5] C. A. Ellwood, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

near the proportion fifty to fifty. A Luther or a Lenine, say, might approximate it, but hardly a Napoleon, a Darwin, or a Bismarck, and by no means a Metternich.

Our interest in the great man, however, culminates in his relation to change. The old and the new are, therefore, important quantities in his make-up. To the extent that the old in him lies, he is only or chiefly what may be called a passive social agent. He focalizes the times; he is their proxy, but nothing more. He surpasses his contemporaries, because more quickly or more fully than they he grasps the meaning of the social trend, and gives expression to it. As a Milukov, he may hurl Philippics against autocracy and set going the revolution of an empire, or as a Lincoln he may issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and yet in neither case act otherwise than in a thoroughly representative capacity. Thus the times are often merely epitomized, accentuated, or brought more quickly to conclusion, not essentially altered by the great man. Macaulay, with his accustomed perspicuity, put in thus: "Great minds do indeed react on the society which has made them what they are, but they only pay with interest what they have received." Certainly many of the world's heroes have functioned only in this passive way. However, in so far as the genius embodies the new, he is or may be an active social force. He then generates, creates, and transforms; he is an agent of evolution. If he discovers the western hemisphere or writes *The Origin of Species* it is as an innovator that he acts. He is truly the initiator of fundamental and abiding change in the direction of the new.

Granting that great men are the change-directing factors of society, we should expect in any continuously changing social environment to find them normally appearing with considerable regularity. Their distribution in time should be pretty even. This, however, is not generally the case. While leaders flourish at all times, and sporadic

geniuses appear, the curious fact is that great geniuses tend to occur in groups, and leaders to flourish abundantly at odd intervals of time.

### Epochal Leadership

Human events do not run in smooth curves; they break into mountains and plains. History is periodic. The historian, noting these periods of short or long duration, as the case may be, designates them as ages or epochs. If he wishes to apply specific names, as often he does, use is made most frequently of the names of distinguished personalities who have lived in the particular period. The history of every race and nation bears testimony to this practice. Thus, we read of a Periclean, an Augustinian, an Elizabethan, a Napoleonic, a Victorian, a Lorenzo de Medicean, and many another age. Numerous such periods similarly designated characterize the annals of all political and industrial peoples. We have our own American Revolutionary, Civil War, and World War eras with their galaxies of immortals. Nor have such designations been bestowed merely because there were rulers to be honored or eminent men to afford names for convenient catchwords. Despite the fact to which Cooley calls attention, that history is, no doubt, in general "far more individual, more a matter of a few great names, than is accomplishment;" that it is written so a few names get the credit for the things that mankind does,[6] there is a certain credit due the genius or leader. For notable individuals have shed the light of their influence in marked degree over periods of time. And it is, therefore, altogether appropriate that intervals of history should be named after them. In American history it is fitting that certain epochs should bear the names of Hamilton, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and possibly Wil-

[6] *Social Process*, pp. 122, 123.

son. They mark the great stages of transformation in our national existence. In each instance the period was under the dominance of a great man or a group of great men.

But why this historic periodicity, this irregularity in the course of evolution and in the appearance of great men? Whenever the scientist comes across such phenomena of grouping or modality, either in things of space or of time, it indicates to him the presence of some definite causative force. He may not always be able to isolate and discover that specific agent, especially when the field chances to be the complex one of social life, but with reasonable hope of success he may try. To inquire, then, as to the causative agency behind that phenomenon in question becomes a part of our immediate task.

The periodicity of history and the irregularity of evolution is due, I assume, to the fact that alterations have very often been radical and sudden rather than gradual. Transitions have taken place in a *per saltum* fashion, thus revealing the influence of some distinct force. Back of the stages and epochs, then, we must seek for the force producing them. This force, as a rule, appears to be social crisis.

## Social Crises

Crises are no uncommon events. At times they chase one another across the stage of human affairs in frightful succession. Of late the world has been enthralled by the spectacle of one of globe-embracing proportions, while others of national and local importance have danced across the proscenium with such frequency 'mid chaos added to confusion that the cry has arisen: "What can the whole wild drama mean?" Only the meaning of crises in general, however, concerns us; and we shall seek to interpret them in terms of function. The origin will be noted in subsequent paragraphs.

Crises are social derangements, which run from mild disturbances to chaos, and range in scale from the purely local to those of international scope. The more extreme ones are associated with catastrophes, wars, and revolutions.

In its initial stage a crisis is characterized by a high-wrought state of things. There is great social disturbance and unsettling; how great depends upon circumstances. The deliberations of men being interrupted fall into more or less confusion. Elemental instincts are thus given a chance to assert themselves unduly with the result that calm and carefully balanced judgment is subordinated. Passion of one sort or another holds wide sway. Action takes on a feverish haste, becomes more or less disconcerted, and loses effective coördination. Everywhere there is a tremendous stress of affairs. Institutions grow "groggy" with a sense of instability. And 'mid the incessant "*Sturm und Drang*" the whole moving equilibrium of society becomes unbalanced and upset.

The crisis passes to a second phase, when what may be called a process of social liquefaction sets in. The excessive heat and pressure that accelerated activities generate, operate to reduce old affirmations, longstanding convictions, well established premises, settled policies, and prevalent systems of thought and conduct to a fluid state. Doubt and questioning dissolve dearly cherished dreams, ideals, and illusions. The "cake of custom" cracks open, tends to disintegrate and to assume a flaccid condition. Even organizations lose rigidity and become pliable, if not highly plastic. Withal the crisis acts as a great universal solvent; it brings general fluidity.

The significance of this state of things lies chiefly in the fact that a great release of energy takes place. Dormant forces are rendered dynamic. The social potential, so to speak, becomes high. This liberated energy, moreover, is decidedly kinetic; that is, it is active, shooting here and

there. It is moving along no set lines, is confined to no certain channels, is relatively uncontrolled. However, it is free to take any of several courses or to strike out along a way of its own making. And in the effort to redirect and readjust itself it is destined to find some definite course. Such conditions as those just described make crises fruitful of the greatest possibilities for society. The destinies of nations are consequently largely given over to their keeping. The decisive or turning points in the course of events are reached in them. A Russian sociologist, N. I. Kareyev, has correctly estimated their importance. According to Dr. Hecker he states that: "In the actual history of society progress and regress have been realized principally in crises."[7]

A third phase of a crisis is reached when the kinetic forces begin to show a tendency to flow toward some channel or to manifest a strain in some particular direction. This is only another way of saying that social thought and effort have begun to gather themselves together again, that they are definitely setting toward some goal or policy. Once started, the integration of the social mind about some common purpose or purposes follows with more or less rapidity. This focusing of energy is the all-important and decisive stage of the crisis. Thus, out of the fluidity comes possibilities for permanent change.

How crises and change are related in the economy of society is fairly clear. It does not seem to be exactly or necessarily an instance of cause and effect; it is, perhaps, rather one of occasion and consequence, if the distinction be not without a difference. At any rate, the fact is that crises afford the most favorable conditions possible for far-reaching and enduring change. What these conditions are we have just indicated; they having been shown to consist in an unusual liberation, mobilization, and focusing of

[7] *Russian Sociology*, p. 197.

the social surplus. Such times are, therefore, the optimum occasions for change.

From what has been said it might possibly be inferred that energy, thus released, made mobile, and finally focused, takes direction in a purely capricious manner. Such, however, is not always nor altogether the case, and it was not at all intended to suggest that there is only mechanical operation. On the contrary, this energy is somewhat under human control. There are focusing agents. What these are and what influence they exert in determining the direction this energy is to take is yet to be pointed out, and constitutes an object of further inquiry.

Putting together the several observations so far made, let us see what we have found. If great men frequently appear in groups and the great periods of social change often bear the names of great individuals and coincide with the occurrence of these groups, it would seem that there must be some connection between groups of great men and social change. If, moreover, these periods of change are generally related to crises in a more or less direct way, does it not probably follow that there is also some connection between great men and crises? It would be reasonable so to conclude. Just what the relation between these three factors is, we may now venture to suggest. Crises are the occasions of change, and change is directed by great men. And, further, since the circumstances attending crises and making them the occasions of change are also the most favorable conditions for the exercise of directive ability, it follows that groups of great personalities very naturally arise at such times.

Otherwise stated, a crisis gives genius an opportunity to manifest and to exercise itself which it does not have in normal times. The unusual amount of free and mobile energy then available and seeking channels of some sort, old or new, readily lends itself to the control of the master

mind. Indeed, without this undirected energy in persons and the body politic there is little chance for leadership. But with it everything is propitious for achievement and change. The assertive, directive, compelling, representative, creative individual is in demand; he, indeed, is now of all times the most useful type. For, when structure fails, people are eager to find something by which to steady themselves, to lean on, as it were, and the leader furnishes this. Consequently, he readily comes to the fore, struggles to lead existing tendencies to culmination, to initiate new movements, to introduce radical ideas, to accomplish important undertakings, to alter established policies, to coördinate activities, to effect some invention or discovery, to instigate revolution, or, in short, to do some deed or think some thought worthy of a genius. He may succeed and he may not, for of the many called only those few who excel are chosen. Their names go down in the chronicles of mankind as heroes and immortals. Thus, it happens that crisis calls out genius and selects it in groupwise fashion; and thus it also happens that the course of social evolution is broken into epochal stages.

Sociological literature is not without a partial recognition of this suggested relation between crisis, change, and the great man. There is, for instance, a dim perception of it in the writings of the Russian Nihilist, N. G. Chernishevsky, who, as he is interpreted by Dr. Hecker, said: "Great historical events are not dependent upon any one person's will, nor upon any personality. They are realized through a law as immutable as is the law of gravitation, or of organic growth. The rapidity or slowness of the process depends upon circumstances which can neither be predetermined nor foreseen. The most important of these circumstances is the rise of strong personalities, who, by nature of their activity give to the unchangeable trend of events a certain characteristic, and who hasten or re-

tard the course of the trend, . . . and by their superior strength give definite direction to the chaotic forces that move the masses."[8]

While positively stating that great men influence the trend of events only in the degree of their rapidity, this writer seems to be aware of something more when he asserts that they "give definite direction to the chaotic forces that move the masses." If correctly understood, he has closely approached the truth for which contention is here made.

In much clearer light Professor C. H. Cooley in *Social Organization* has discerned this truth. He says: "The fact that great personalities often appear in disordered times may seem to be a contradiction of the principle that the healthy development of individuals is one with that of institutions. Thus, the Italian Renaissance, which was a time of partial disorder and religious decay, produced the greatest painters and sculptors of modern times, and many great personalities in literature and statesmanship.

"It is no doubt the case, however, that there is a spur in the struggle of a confused time which may excite a few individuals to heroic efforts and accomplishments, just as a fire or a railroad disaster may be the occasion of heroism; and so the disorder of the Renaissance was, perhaps, one cause of the men of genius."[9]

One point of my thesis is here definitely made by Cooley; namely, that a crisis is the cause of the appearance of groups of great men. This he attributes to a "spur in the struggle of a confused time which may excite a few individuals to heroic effort." But just why there is a "spur" to genius in such times or what that spur is, he does not apparently see, or at least omits to mention.

However, according to the theory advanced in this paper,

[8] J. F. Hecker, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
[9] *Social Organization*, p. 348.

let me repeat, there is a spur to genius on account of the extraordinary release and transformation which the social energy is undergoing. Of a truth, this so-called spur is not so much a spur as an opportunity. It is the supreme chance for the exploits of genius. Our common saying that "the times call forth the man" when analyzed simply means that opportunity has been present. A crisis is the great man's heyday.

William James did not altogether agree with this, for in dealing with this subject in his essay on *Great Men and Their Environment,* he insisted that it is not a mystery that geniuses are "exceptionally abundant" in the "high tides of human affairs," since "many geniuses coming together and in rapid succession are required" to usher in these times. He said: "It is true that great public fermentations awaken and adopt many geniuses, who in more torpid times would have had no chance to work. But over and above this there must be an exceptional concourse of genius about a time, to make the fermentation begin at all.[10] The cart, it would seem, is here put before the horse. According to my notion, geniuses are not so much the direct cause of crises as the result of them. Crises certainly have a great variety of causes, rising both from forces within and from without the group, alike. Climatic and environmental fluctuations with their resultant influences upon population and conditions of existence cause them. Accidental discovery and folk-shiftings may bring them about. Again, they are most commonly precipitated by a concatenation of events or by the cumulative effects of some social policies or conditions of maladjustment. They rise from a slow concentration of surplus which no one has engineered. Seldom can they be traced to the work of a great man or to any concurrence of great men. They are most often results of a mechanical drift, without personal

[10] *The Will to Believe,* p. 243.

activity. Crises are thus satisfactorily accounted for, and on the basis of them the coming of groups of great men, but the coming of groups of great men is unaccounted for on the hypothesis that they are the cause of crises. James left the problem hanging in the air, and if it were a riddle like that whether the egg or the chicken comes first, it would be well to leave it just where he did; but it is no riddle, and, as I have tried to show, there is a secure basis on which it may be safely grounded.

At this juncture it may be asked, "Is the opportunity of the great man unlimited?" To answer this question satisfactorily a discussion of the subject of publics is necessary, and to that we now turn.

## Publics

William James in the essay cited above has clearly set before us this problem of the great man and the public. He states it thus: "Social evolution is a resultant of the interaction of two wholly distinct factors—the individual, deriving his peculiar gifts from the play of physiological and infra-social forces, but bearing all the power of initiative and origination in his hands; and second, the social environment, with its power of adopting or rejecting both him and his gifts. Both factors are essential to change. The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community." [11]

In and through and by the public as a medium the great man lives, acts, and is ultimately selected for honor or dishonor. At all times limitations are set by this medium; the possibilities of individual effort are circumscribed on account of it. Whether, therefore, the outcome of a crisis shall be anything more than a blind beating and throbbing

[11] William James, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

and shifting of energy, depends upon the nature of the public as well as upon the presence of genius. Critical times may very well eventuate, as J. Q. Dealey declares when he says: "Warlike leaders, fiery prophets, inspiring poets may . . . disturb the customs and traditions of the multitude, but when the storm of agitation is past, the seemingly irresistible billows sink back into the bosom of the sea, and scarcely a ripple marks the place. The reason is, perhaps, clear. Great changes are not made through genius and enthusiasm unaided." [12]

But not all "billows sink back into the bosom of the sea."

> There is a tide in the affairs of men
> Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune.

This tide is the crowd urge, trend of public passion, instinctive reaction, prejudice, sentiment, belief, and opinion; it is the drift of the total crowd-mindedness.

Publics, like the great man, who, after all, is bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh, are mixtures of old and new elements. Modern publics, especially, are of this character. A great body of traditional instincts, feelings, dogmas, beliefs and ideas, and an equally great body of customs, habits, and practices, called folkways and mores, constitute the old. The new is made up of novel schemes, prophetic visions and ideals, rationalized systems of thought and purpose, radical doctrines, unconventional feelings and sentiments, experimental undertakings, Utopian ventures, and whatsoever deviates in thought or act from the beaten ways of men. How these two elements come into existence does not matter. Between them there is opposition and conflict. Each is always endeavoring to supplant the other, the real combating the ideal, the innovating clashing with the customary. Into the midst of this

[12] *Sociology*, p. 68.

struggle the great man enters. He aligns himself according to his inclination with one side or the other, and becomes its champion, or, perchance, himself one of the "bringers-down of flaming news" and the blazers of a new and living way. At any event his lot is cast with one faction or the other, the unchanging and reactionary or the idealistic and progressive wing of the public. To be sure, the position of the great man is not always well-defined. He may be vacillating, though ultimately he will make choice and throw the weight of his influence to one side or the other.

In the one case, his rôle is only to set the currents of events surging with increased momentum along the old channels till the channels sink to new depths in the social strata; in the other, his mission is to turn these currents from old courses into new, and to set them sweeping permanently forward. Whether, therefore, it shall be the reactionary or the forward-looking type of leader who prevails at any given time depends entirely upon other conditions of the public yet to be indicated. What these conditions are, others have attempted to show. I shall of necessity, for the most part, follow their lead.

Much depends upon whether the public is homogeneous or heterogeneous as to the kind of great man selected. Heterogeneous publics, with their many widely divergent interests, are likely to be innovating and radical in their choices. For the culture is bound to be complex and the habits of men formed in many differing and inharmonious patterns. The resulting range of choice and the friction and conflict it entails tend to release energy for new adventures.[13] Normally, in them, the forward-looking have the better opportunity for success. Homogeneous publics, with few or many interests harmoniously combined, are apt to be very conservative for the reason that energy is not easily

[13] J. M. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 128, 129.

liberated. They more often will choose the reactionary and taboo the innovator.

The extent of the surplus is another important factor. Much of it is necessary for innovating choice. Without it nothing will be ventured. Individuality, moreover, flourishes where surplus abounds, and is widely distributed. If it be useful tradition, the public will probably be intelligent. Thus, leaders will be numerous and radical with much surplus, but otherwise few in number and of the conservative type. The unindividualized, ignorant public is just a mass, moved by instincts, like sheep. Ready-made or customary opinion prevails in it, and the leaders chosen are self-imposed, instinctive, stand-pat bosses. The individualized and thinking public is moved by ideas and principles more than by dramatic personality; it is reached in considerable measure by rational appeal. Its leaders are more often hand-picked instead of self-imposed; they may be rationally progressive.

Again, the success of the great man is conditioned by the presence or absence of public dissatisfactions and felt needs.[14] In other words, the emotional factors of the social heritage play a part. Hopes, loves, hates, prejudices, may outweigh everything else. Neither programs will count nor policies avail in the presence of profound feelings unless they cater to those feelings. Indeed, programs and policies themselves have to become emotional expressions. Then are leaders certain to be men of ardent passions, mere exponents of the prevailing mood, and chosen for their extravagance of feeling rather than for their wisdom. They are, as Vico said of heroes, "in the highest degree rough, wild, of the most limited intellect; but of vast imagination, and the most ardent passions; and as the result of these characteristics they must . . . be barbaric, cruel, harsh, wild, proud, difficult to manage, and obstinate in whatever they

[14] See E. J. Urick, *A Philosophy of Social Progress*, p. 139.

set before themselves.'' [15] Unless they thrill with the popular passion, even the ''holy malcontents'' meet with apathy, and the ''stellar visionaries'' are at best greeted with only amused tolerance. Generally in critical times a yearning for the new stirs the heart of society, the radical emotions rule, and the innovator finds favor, but when the times are static there is a preference for the familiar, the conservative feeling prevails, and the upholder of the good old ways receives a crown. Needless to say, most times are static. Complacent ignorance, apathy, instinctive dislike of change, the attitude of submission to authority, dominant customs, and classes, and fixed habits of conformity to institutions hold sway. Hence few progressive leaders appear in public life.

The question of public emotion opens directly into the larger one of public sanity, as J. M. Baldwin calls it.[16] The success or failure of any particular type of great man is controlled by the degree of sane social judgment prevailing at the time of his advent. And normally the public is supposed to be very sane in spite of its prejudices and passions. It is alleged to have a sense of the fitness of things, of what is of abiding worth, and of what is just and fair to itself. It is said to be fundamentally rational and sound in its reactions to leaders. If its methods of choice do not always seem to be exactly rational, it achieves a rational end by unerring instincts. Thus we have the doctrine of vox populi, vox Dei—of infallible democracy. So it is held that aspirants to public favor who exhibit balance, profound insight, and practical good sense will normally gain recognition over other types. But there is slight ground for the claim of public inerrancy in the choice of leaders. The public is not ordinarily and uniformly sane. It does not, as a matter of fact, regularly elevate fit and

[15] Quoted by Max Nordau, *Interpretation of History*, p. 357.
[16] See *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development.*

rational men. One has only to pass in review the great men of any nation to discover that many of them have been heroes of the type Vico describes. They appear both in peaceful and disturbed times. Almost any hour the extravagant and visionary adventurer may find the public in a receptive mood, and encounter no sane judgment of weight to hinder his triumph. So mere idealists, extreme enthusiasts, wild fanatics, and eccentrics and self-seeking egotists have taken their place among the heroes of history. Perhaps, on the whole, they have been rather less frequently chosen than the fairly well-balanced type, but they have been chosen all too often to give much assurance as to any certain public sanity.

Carlyle believed that in each person there is a craving toward the ideal, toward something transcending the actual, which gives ground for hero-worship. But, in my judgment, it is extremely doubtful if the ordinary public mind has any such craving for the ideal in the abstract. For concrete objects transcending the actual there may well be hungering and thirsting. And if personalities appear who seem to incarnate the things idealized they will become the heroes. Inherited tradition, of course, very largely determines what shall be idealized. It depends upon what has been, or, as James with partial truth suggests, upon the direction in which past geniuses have "warped the community." [17]

There are certain conditions under which felt needs for the new develop and come to prevail, and thus to allow the innovating leader to be chosen. They may be prepared by the persistent preaching of new political, economic, and moral doctrines by the prophet, propagandist, politician, journalist, or any one who "stirreth up the people." An extended period of criticism of authority, exposés of wickedness in high places, agitation in behalf

[17] William James, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

of fundamental change in the existing order, creates dissatisfaction with things as they are, and produces disharmony between the mores and institutions of a people and their ideals. Thus the normally inert mind of the many consciously or unconsciously is given an active inclination toward innovation. Then the fullness of time for the champion of change is at hand. Such were the times, for instance, on the eve of the French Revolution when the writings of Rousseau, Voltaire, and others of Utopian faith had undermined the old political and social dogmas of the nobility and third estate alike. Conditions fostering a felt need for the new, notwithstanding many hindrances, arise fairly often in the more energetic western nations. If, then, a crisis is precipitated it is a safe guess what kind of a leader will succeed.

A felt need of more than ordinary strength for the old and customary may arise in many ways. It is apt, for instance, to appear among a people who, after having enjoyed much surplus, have been compelled to undergo a prolonged period of sacrifice and hardship. Usually, though not always, it is war or revolution that exhausts their energy, following which a surge of weariness sweeps over them and a social slump sets in. The motive of such reaction is always a desire for rest and ease. It expresses itself in cautious, conservative, selfish sentiments, choices, and outlays of effort. Then it is that the times are opportune for the backward-looking and "normal" leader, the restorer of the ancient order.

Notwithstanding the emphasis we have all along laid upon crises as giving the most favorable conditions for change under the direction of leaders, the fact must not be lost to view that, while modifying, crises do not fundamentally alter the intrinsic nature of the public in which genius must function. Crises only make conditions easier by temporarily lessening or hindering their force; they do

not remove those limitations inhering in the nature of the public, especially those of an instinctive or biologic character.

A final and highly important feature of the modern western-world public, playing a part in the selection of the great man, remains to be considered. I refer to the organization of public opinion, or rather to the chief agency of that organization—the modern newspaper.

More and more this agency controls the process of making up the public mind. Once it was an unimportant factor. Indeed, until recent decades it was practically negligible. Public opinion was then organized by personal appeal. But to-day a well-nigh omnipotent press virtually dictates that opinion. Therefore, in the final analysis, it is nearly in accord with the facts to say that the public selects its great men by grace of the newspapers.

Just how does the newspaper function in this regard? By gathering and editing the news and commenting as it likes upon the same, the press exercises an effective censorship over the stuff of which public opinion is made. Depending as it does so largely upon this ubiquitous agent for its information, the general public very naturally thinks the thoughts of the paper after it. Almost unconsciously the average individual does this, and reflects the ready-made judgments, sentiments, and attitudes which he gets from the newspapers. Unless his paper has spoken upon the question he has no opinion; he is all at sea. The mind of society is thus largely made up for it in the editor's office.

The real nature of this mind depends upon the bias of the dominant press. And generally speaking, that bias is strongly impressed by certain special interests. This is because the papers are virtually subsidized by them. The result is that the news is colored, poisoned and purveyed in the way which best serves these interests; and what cannot be so treated is deliberately suppressed. Now, the

particular interests dominating all the great and influential newspapers and journals of every western country to-day and the news-gathering agencies as well happen to be the so-called "big interests." A remarkable unanimity of attitude on all important public issues, always, of course, favorable to the ruling interests, is consequently to be found. Thus public opinion is chiefly organized and disseminated ruling-class opinion.

Again, the newspaper addresses its appeal fundamentally to primitive instincts, basic emotions, and ignorant prejudices. It frankly admits giving the public what it wants. And what is more natural than for the public to want its instincts and passions gratified? And, in lieu of any higher appeal, what is more reasonable than that this gratification should be entirely satisfying to the rank and file? On the economic principles that the lowest standard of business sets the pace, the instinctive appeal of one group of newspapers necessitates a similar appeal on the part of all. Discussing "The Problem of Northcliffe," the late English newspaper magnate, Norman Angell has the following to say on this point: "Just as in commerce debased coin, if there be enough of it, must drive out the sterling, so in the contest of motives, action which responds to the more primitive feelings and impulses, first thoughts, established prejudices, can be stimulated by the modern newspaper far more easily than action which is prompted by rationalized second thought. Any newspaper appealing to the former group of motives must 'get away with it' long before that which appeals to the second can establish its case."[18]

Just what, then, is the nature of public opinion as shaped by the modern newspaper most likely to be? Since the press is subsidized and dominated by interests which

[18] Norman Angell, "The Problem of Northcliffe," *The New Republic*, Vol. 9, No. 117, p. 346.

are fundamentally and generally thoroughly conservative and since, moreover, its appeal is principally to instinctive motives which are also entirely conservative, it follows that public opinion, in so far as it is really of newspaper origin or propagation, will ordinarily approve conformity and condemn non-conformity. This has long been the newspaper's rôle, only it has grown more intense as capitalism has been put on the defensive. Gladstone's indictment of the press of a half century ago is peculiarly appropriate to the press of to-day. Here are his words:

"There is an undoubted and smart rally on behalf of Turkey in the metropolitan press. It is in the main representative of the ideas and opinions of what are called the upper ten thousand. From this body there has never, on any occasion within my memory, proceeded the impulse that has prompted and finally achieved any of the great measures which, in the last half century, have contributed so much to the fame and happiness of England. They did not emancipate the Dissenters, Roman Catholics and Jews. They did not reform the Parliament. They did not liberate the negro slave. They did not abolish the corn laws. They did not take the taxes off the press. They did not abolish the Irish established church. They did not cheer on the work of Italian freedom and reconstruction. Yet, all these things have been done, and done by other agencies than theirs, and despite their opposition. . . . Unhappily the country is understood abroad mainly through the metropolitan press."[19]

Summed up, the facts relative to the newspapers come about to this: There is, within certain limitations, and in all except unusual ones, government by them. They do much toward making and unmaking public men in every field. Prestige, power, and success they give, and success,

[19] John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone,* Volume II, p. 557.

power, and prestige they take away. Thus they largely select the leaders of modern times. By decreeing what ideas and proposals are fit and what are unfit, what shall prevail and what shall fail, they determine what kind of man shall come to the fore and be the chosen hero. And, by virtue of their inclination almost wholly to the side of the old, the type of modern leader that gains recognition is more likely to be the conservator than the innovator; this, of course, holding true especially in the realm of political and social activity. Another word from Norman Angell bearing on this question is pertinent. Says he: "All revision of conception in any field in the past has been the work of small minorities, of individual minds; a few heretics, encyclopedists or pamphleteers able to reach other minds for a sufficient length of time to break down the first prejudice. But that influence of the individual mind maintaining a heresy, the modern press, by virtue of the psychological Gresham law acting in the particular economic and industrial conditions of our time I have indicated, tends to destroy." [20]

Abundant evidence in proof of such newspaper control of the public mind and choice could be drawn from the contemporaneous events of any modern western nation, particularly from England, France, Germany, or the United States.[21]

The selective forces of the public are apparently on the whole and under normal conditions those of a conserving nature. Conservative and even backward-looking personalities will, therefore, most often gain recognition. Innovators must overcome opposition to succeed, and among the triumphant ones of history they are in the minority. At all times, even the most favorable, the public as the medium of the great man limits his opportunity.

[20] Norman Angell, *op. cit.*, p. 347.
[21] See Upton Sinclair's *The Brass Check.*

In what I have said about the agencies of public opinion, it has, of course, been assumed that these continue to function even in the midst of crises. And, as a matter of fact, they do so continue, except in the rarest instances. If, however, they are swept away or so shattered that their influence remains unimportant, or if, perchance, they fall under the control of a radical party, then personality has a better chance. Then the more original and innovating types will tend to come to the fore in unusual numbers.

## Conclusion

Perhaps a brief application of the generalizations of this chapter to present conditions will be the most profitable way to conclude it. Certainly no fact is more obvious than the profound effect the prolonged world crisis has had and is having upon every land swept within its vortex. Almost everywhere this event is acting as a great social solvent setting free, rendering mobile, and causing a redirection of the forces and energies of society. It truly said in the midst of the conflict: "The war has already cleared away more mental and material obstacles to progress than a century of plodding agitation and legislation would have moved."[22] The crisis has made possible and precipitated change; it has opened the social order to well-nigh universal transformation. Customs are being altered, convictions revised, programs reshaped, and institutions remodeled. Lo! Here is reversal of governmental policy. Lo! There is revolution. The courses of empire take new way. The nations are mutating; howbeit, America but little with them. It is not clear in many quarters as to the final outcome; the end is not yet.

Great men have also arisen to direct the change. Many

[22] A. M. Simons, "Pacifism vs. Revolution," *The New Republic*, March 24, 1917.

have already appeared, especially in Russia and Germany. They ought to come in unusual numbers. Just how fruitful in yield the times will be, cannot, of course, be foretold. But there is abundant promise, and very probably, on account of this time, new galaxies will arise to shine in almost every national firmament. Indeed, rare opportunity for the genius is at hand. Here are new worlds to conquer. Statesmen and publicists have the chance to move with majestic mien and power straight toward new goals and to lead their nations with them. They have equal chance with singular perversity to set their faces toward the past, and to turn backward the march of the centuries and the cause of human progress. We actually see them doing both.

In several lands there have been strangely sneaking, limping, skulking, caviling, floundering, halting, and blundering attempts at leadership. Now it has faced forward, and now it has marched backward. The incessant swinging of events, the swaying of ponderous affairs, seems to have given a bad case of vertigo to aspiring leadership. Meanwhile, divided between the old and the new, the public have been peculiarly susceptible to the impressions of both the conservative and the innovating type of personality. They have, apparently, at times been ready to select either type, if only pronounced and consistent adherents to one way or another would present themselves. However, the newspapers have always come to the rescue and with a loud shrieking chorus have shouted, "Great is the god of Mammon! Sacred is private property! Divine is capitalism! Glorious is war! Holy is nationalism!" And in a still shriller key have sung songs of hate and fear about liberty, reform, revolution, and peace; till the uproar has almost silenced every apostle of the essentially new. Driving the innovators to the wall, they are compelling the vacillating leadership of the nations to choose the beaten

and backward ways. They are ushering in the reign of "normalcy" in Europe, such as we have in America.

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# CHAPTER IX

## SURPLUS AND SOCIAL CONTROL

The social process involves social control. Its dynamic in most particulars springs from the surplus. To show how this is, and to indicate the changes social control undergoes in its operations, is the purpose of this chapter. Some of the ground which it will be necessary to cover has been traversed already in dealing with the evolution of institutions. However, we shall survey it here from a different viewpoint, dealing with those phases of ethnic, political and industrial society which pertain alone to the regulatory process.

### Social Control Defined

What is meant by social control needs first of all to be stated. In general we mean by it the disposal and manipulation of vital energy. Otherwise stated, it is the government or regulation of both individual behavior in or under association, and of the behavior of the associations or groups themselves.

Ross, to whom sociology owes the phrase, has distinguished two aspects of the phenomenon. One deals with that type of behavior which rises from design or from the conscious planning of such beings. The first type gives what Ross has called a "natural" or "moral" order. It is concerned chiefly with direct personal relations. The second type he calls "political" or "artificial" order.[1]

[1] E. A. Ross, *Social Control*, pp. 41, 411.

This concerns groups, institutions, classes; that is, it is a matter of the relations of corporate rather than of personal units within corporate wholes.

In addition to instinctive and purposeful control, as pointed out by Ross, a third mode should be recognized, namely, the mechanical, or, more properly speaking, the natural. The term "natural" is used here not with the same meaning Ross gives it, but in the sense of the method or process of nature. This mode of control cuts athwart the other two, modifying, perhaps sometimes even nullifying, and always acting as an undercurrent to influence the course of human effort. This aspect of control cannot be wholly disentangled from the other two and studied as a thing apart, but we shall endeavor to recognize it, since it is one manifestation of surplus energy.

## Extent and Degree of Control

The growth of social control closely parallels the acquisition of social surplus. Incidentally, this fact has been demonstrated by Hobhouse and his co-laborers in so far as primitive societies are concerned. In a study of four hundred and more cases a positive correlation between the amount of government and justice and the cultural level was revealed. Among hunters the absence of government was found to be outstanding. Many pastors and some agriculturists were likewise found to be without it.[2] Generally, however, as the economic status advances above the lowest cultural levels, an almost continuous increase of government appears.[3] Accompanying this there is a tendency to consolidation of government, and to the extension of the area governed. Specifically, about half the societies at the

[2] L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, *Institutions of Simpler Peoples,"* p. 51.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

bottom of the scale are without organized government at all, whereas the highest pastoral and primitive agricultural societies always have some organized government.[4]

The system of justice shows a similar correlation with the economic status. From the lowest groups where "self-redress or no law" prevails, there is a steady advance through socially controlled private retaliation to public justice as the dominant mode among people at the top of the ethnic social scale.[5] The findings regarding justice are summarized as follows:

"Upon the whole matter we conclude that, both in extent and in internal quality, the development of social order is roughly correlated with advance in economic culture. The lowest societies are very small, and even within the smallest groups there is very often no provision for the maintenance of justice. As we advance from the Lower Hunters, we get always larger societies, and by degrees provision for the maintenance of justice within these extended groups. At our highest point we get a large proportion of the cases in which public justice is fully developed over the whole of an extensive group, and this brings us to the threshold of civilized order just as economically we have come to the point at which civilization is usually held to begin."[6]

The cultural stages of ethnic association dealt with by these authors are really so many levels of surplus development. If the study had been extended into the field of civil society, many other levels would have been involved. These, too, would have shown social control increasing in a fairly continuous manner, along with the growing surplus.

It does not follow from this, however, that society becomes more orderly and harmonious as we mount up the scale from ethnic groups to industrial nations, even though

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 52-82.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

the systems of government, justice, and regulative agencies in general steadily grow more extensive and powerful. In fact, peoples at the bottom of the ladder are more orderly and better controlled than are those at the topmost rung.

Students of simpler peoples commonly report their association to be free from much disturbance or disorder.

"Generally speaking," says Lowie, "the unwritten laws of customary usage are obeyed far more willingly than our written codes, or rather they are obeyed spontaneously." He cites the Crow Indians as an example of tribal people who look upon personal brawls with contempt, who consider misdemeanors with great disfavor, and graver offense as cause for social ostracism. Thus they maintain a very orderly association in a very natural way.[7]

Ross admirably summarizes the observations in the following:

"The most astonishing fact brought to light by the ethnologist is that frequently the savage is not, save in his mode of warfare, 'savage' at all, but is, on the contrary, amiable and peaceful. After a long acquaintance, Europeans have described Ostyaks, Samoyeds, Eskimos, Dyaks, Aleuts, Papuans, Tunguses, Sioux, and Zuñis, as the 'gentlest' or the 'kindest' races on earth. We find them living in joint families or house communities with an intimacy and peaceableness we cannot attain to. The Hottentots are reported as 'all kindness and goodwill to one another.' The Papuans are 'sociable and cheerful.' 'They laugh very much.' The Negritos live in harmony among themselves. The Bushmen are 'kind, generous, and hospitable.' The Andaman Islanders are declared to be 'gentle and amiable in their mutual intercourse.' The children of the Siberian savages 'never fight.' 'For a hundred years, one single murder has been committed in the tundra.'

[7] R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, p. 398.

'Scorning, scolding, and the use of rough words are absolutely unknown in Aleut life.' '' [8]

In contrast, the author quoted sets forth the characteristics of the civilized Germanic races as being self-assertive, violent, aggressive, predatory, lacking in amiability and sympathy, and withal a very intractable lot.[9]

In other words, civilized society is, despite all its machinery of control, far less orderly, quiescent, and harmonious than primitive society. Ross attributes this wide departure from the conditions under which the savages live to the extraordinary energy of the Teutonic nations. In this he is quite right, in so far as he goes, though he had in mind only vital energy. Much more is, of course, involved. The accumulated economic, traditional, and organizational energy must be reckoned along with the vital to explain the lawless and intractable quality of modern western civilization. Savages are orderly and peaceably inclined, because they lack social surplus, and civilized men are disorderly in their association because of their surplus endowments.

Thus we seem to have a paradoxical situation confronting us in the growth of government and control on the one hand and in the increase of disorder on the other. This, however, is but the outworking of the social process in its twofold method of integration and differentiation. Through the integration of surplus social control develops its organization and machinery, and at the same time the differentiating movement creates division, disunion, and disorder.

## Ethnic Social Control

Something has been said already about social control under ethnic conditions. It remains for us to trace its developments in more detail.

[8] *Social Control*, p. 15.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 16. 17.

Its earliest manifestations reveal the group as a whole in so far as there is any public government at all concerned in regulating the conduct of the members. There is a distinct recognition that the function is tribal, that it is the means of preserving the community and giving continuity to its life. In the exercise of control the chief interest centers and revolves about the education, training, and initiation of the adolescent youth. For the performance of this work the mature men of the tribe usually constitute a fraternity. This organization is the guardian of the customs, legends, wisdom, mysteries, and all important tribal experience, and holds itself responsible for passing them on to the youths when they have arrived at the proper age for initiation into the men's group. A system of more or less elaborate ceremonies is in vogue everywhere for this purpose. These rites are kept by the grown men with the utmost secrecy, and revealed only to the initiates in the course of their induction into the men's group.

The puberty ritual inculcates unquestioning obedience and thorough subordination of the individual to the common ends. It provides certain indispensable requirements for any social existence. Among these are the sense of solidarity and brotherhood, acquaintance with tribal lore, respect for the elders, and regard for group customs. Such is social control in its most important features among the most primitive races. In addition to instructing and disciplining the young, the tribal elders may sometimes punish important infractions of group customs, violations of magical taboos, etc. Otherwise, offenses and misdemeanors are privately avenged by the families or clans concerned. But, as we are dealing with constituted or organized control rather than with the private form, we shall not dwell upon the latter.

This democratic mode of control is everywhere preva-

lent in ethnic societies of Australia and New Guinea.[10] Generally the only ones concerned with carrying on the regulative function in any of the tribes are the men. From the women and uninitiated boys all the mysteries are kept hidden, and the rites are used as means of terrifying them in behalf of male supremacy. Howbeit, in some cases a secret society of women similar to that of the men is found. Some of the Australian tribes and a number in Africa afford examples.[11] The girls, upon arriving at the age of puberty, are trained and initiated in some such fashion as the boys.

To the type of ethnic control above described Pitt Rivers gave the name of "gerontocracy," or the rule of the elders.[12] This, indeed, is what it virtually amounts to, and very naturally, since in them dwell the wisdom, the lore, and the garnered experiences of tribal life. They are in possession of the surplus, such as it is, that the tribe has accumulated, and by virtue thereof they naturally dominate. In spite of the fact that it is called the rule of the elders, it is essentially tribal, mass, or democratic rule among most of the Australian tribes. Authority radiates from the elders as the repositories of tribal policy in the interest of tribal welfare, and not from them as self-seekers and exploiters of the group.

Under the régime of the elders, however, a perversion of social control appears at a rather early period. From the purpose of group welfare alone it becomes skewed to private ends. Fraud, deceit, chicanery, and intimidation are practiced upon the novices, women, and children in the case of the Australian tribal elders, even though the system of control is most democratic.[13] Although this does not necessarily mean that it is always done for private benefit, in

[10] Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies,* p. 75.
[11] *Ibid.,* p. 45.
[12] *Ibid.,* p. 6.
[13] *Ibid.,* p. 6.

many cases it actually becomes a means thereto. The elders in certain Australian tribes, for instance, impose food taboos upon the youth so as to reserve for themselves the very best. They also require the novices to catch game for them.[14] Women are sometimes monopolized so that the youth may not marry any of the younger and prettier ones. Lumholtz declares that in Queensland it is hard for the young men to get wives before they are thirty.[15] In this manner the most primitive sort of social control begins to take an exploitative turn.

The next step in the development brings us face to face with the full-fledged secret society, made up of a limited group endeavoring to control the whole tribe, largely for the benefit of the dominant class. The secret society is constituted by and composed of the tradition-possessing men. With the increase of magical practices and traditional knowledge in general, such societies evolve out of the ranks of the elders, or rather, out of the leading witch doctors among them. Any new medicine, ceremonial or knowledge of the mysterious is to these men a secret giving power, supposedly efficacious for manipulating the universe, and certainly adequate to control those who know not such things. Realizing this, the surplus possessors try to monopolize the magic by confining it, or the most important parts of it, to a very narrow circle. By so doing they are able to dominate, and by dominating they manage to enhance their own interest at the expense of the whole tribe. Social control thus actually becomes or tends to become class control, or the rule of a more or less powerful aristocracy.[16] In the Melanesian and African societies this is common.[17]

The Egbo fraternity among West African tribes, the

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 67.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 71.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 75.

Ogboni of Yorubaland, the Areoi society of Tahiti and Polynesia generally and the Dukduk prevalent throughout the Bismarck Archipelago, are specific instances.

The Dukduk, being one of the best known and most famous, will serve to illustrate. It is a fraternity having numerous degrees, each succeeding one being more difficult and costly to enter, while the highest is reserved for an aristocracy composed of chiefs, together with a few others. The upper crust completely dominates the organization, and through it the tribal life.[18] Control is maintained by means of magical ceremonies, and all sorts of outrightly fraudulent practices. The inner circle dupes the lower degrees, and the whole society tricks the rest of the tribe.[19]

The Dukduks, who are supposed to be spirits, appear in tangible form six or more times annually. The inner circle announces their coming a month in advance, giving warning to the young men to provide great supplies of food for the Dukduks' use. Failure in this brings their displeasure and direful results. The spirits present themselves as a pair of gigantic cassowary with heads and masks showing hideous human faces. Their high-handed behavior spreads terror among the women, children, and youth of the tribe, and elicits the utmost reverence from all. Those who have displeased them may be killed; women who are caught in the bush are said to disappear forever, and the young men are generally subjected to severe beatings as part of the ordeal of preparation for receiving such mysteries as may be confided to them by the Dukduk rulers. A secret lodge is built for the spirits during the day, to which they repair at night. Here vast stores of food collected from the tribe are borne supposedly for the Dukduks' consumption.[20]

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 109.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 110-114.

The Dukduk fraternity has been called the "law-god" society, and described as "the administrator of law, judge, policeman, and hangman all in one."[21] Webster says of it: "The Dukduk law bears down most unequally upon the weaker members of the community, upon those who for one reason or another have been unable to join the society, or have incurred the enmity of its powerful associates. Its forced contributions impoverish those who are already poor, while those who are rich enough to join share in the profits of the mystery. The fraternity exhibits in the clearest light the culmination of that process of fraud and intimidation which, having its roots in the puberty institution, becomes more and more prominent "when the tribal society stage is reached."[22] This typical instance of tribal regulation through the secret fraternity indicates how a class monopolizing the most significant form of surplus that ethnic groups of the lower orders acquire is able to control the entire society in the most important aspects of its behavior, all to the end that such other accumulations as the class in power may wish can be readily expropriated.

The next great step in the evolution of ethnic control brings the ascendancy of an economic class. The rule of the secret fraternity gives place to the rule of the relatively wealthy. This very clearly does not ordinarily transpire till a pastoral stage is reached, though a few hunters or fishers in exceptional abodes have attained such development. This was true of the Polynesian tribes.

Herds give economic surplus of peculiar mobility, and afford the adventurous tribesmen in every pastoral region unique opportunity for getting fortune. This is possible especially through stealing the cattle of neighboring tribes. The enterprising brave who leads a band of raiders on a

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 110, 116.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 110, 111.

successful cattle-lifting expedition may easily become rich in cattle. In this way a wealthy nobility has frequently arisen among pastors. It is very often a feudal order. Such it was in their tribal days among several of the civilized peoples of history. Recent and contemporary tribesmen of South Africa in a number of cases have evolved a nobility of rich cattlemen, the Zulus and Bechuanas being cases in point.

Very often such a class is headed by a permanent chief or king. It is probable that the evolution of the separate and distinct ruler was furthered more by the rise of economic surplus than by any other factor. In some cases, no doubt, his rise was due to magical powers instead, and when so he emerged directly from the secret society.[23] Howbeit, the strongest kingships among ethnic peoples apparently occur in conjunction with the rule of an economic class. In Africa the king has tended to be a despot with the tribe more or less feudalized. Under economic rule, particularly in the pastoral and higher horticultural stages, government begins to be a special occupation, and to take organized shape. The economic class tends to become a political class, following the methods peculiar to that class, and more fully employing them when it arrives at maturity under the state. In brief, governmental organization begins to be differentiated from other social activities.

Where economic surplus rises and falls under control of a class, this class is almost certain to bring the entire society of which it is a part into subjection to itself, since control of the most important form of surplus gives power to exercise general social control. The ascendancy of a wealthy class involves either the complete domination of the tribal secret fraternity by it or the reduction of that organization to a subordinate place or to a state of impotency. If it is a case of domination, all are excluded from the

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

inner circle directing the fraternity save the wealthy. Thus, for example, it is with the Egbo society of the Kamerun and others like it throughout West Africa.[24] By means of such domination the secret order is converted into a tool of the wealthy ruling class. That class makes effective use of this agency for police and espionage work. If these and other functions once exercised by the all-powerful secret order are taken away from it and entrusted exclusively to retainers of the wealthy class, the secret fraternity may virtually disappear, or it may still survive in some other form, as, for instance, a society of witch doctors or priests. Among the Yorubas of Africa the society remains an organization of the priesthood. But even then it is headed by the tribal chieftain, who is the chief priest.[25] In general, wherever an economic class becomes ascendant, there is a pronounced tendency for all the rites, ceremonies, and magical practices to pass under its supervision and become instruments of its rule.

A further means of regulation and government employed where control is economic is the exacting of tribute on the part of the rulers. This, however, is done in no very systematic way. The practice probably did not arise in any form till economic control developed. The imposition of fines for various breaches of custom is also in vogue. Among both the Zulus and Thongas such practices prevail. It is the custom of the king of the latter to receive food from every kraal at harvest and a share of all game killed. Services of several kinds also are required.[26]

At the upper limits of ethnic society controlled by economic energy is often found a military system by which the young men are organized to serve the ruling class. Such is the case in Abyssinia, and more especially among

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 94.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[26] R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.*, p. 371.

the Masais of East Africa and the Zulus of South Africa. A more effective method of domination than this can hardly be conceived, for it serves to curb and direct much of the vital force of the tribe.

Thus an economically wealthy class in a variety of ways holds sway over the affairs of tribal life. Under its rule government attains a considerable degree of definiteness, and operates as a function more or less apart from the mass reactions of the tribe. The latter, of course, continues in force, regulating behavior in its less important aspects.

A condensed view of ethnic social control, therefore, reveals the fact that possession of that form of surplus which chances to be the most important at the time confers upon the possessing class power to control tribal life.

The appearance of each successive form involves, moreover, some change in the method of control. From mass control where the surplus is mainly vital, it changes to class control when tradition becomes dominant, and continues as such with the class growing more distinct when economic surplus arises. The dynamic of ethnic control apart from the vital factor which is always present is tradition and economic surplus, but especially tradition. Indeed, when viewed in the large, we may say that traditional control is modal to ethnic society.

## Political Social Control

Whenever a society advances beyond ethnic organization the state appears, and political control comes into force. This takes place, as already shown, when the surplus possessing class of a tribal people leads them to subjugate another nation, and to settle in the latter's midst to exploit it. Highly developed ethnic groups frequently become feudalized, and take to plundering their neighbors for a living without ever founding true states. But it is an easy

step, and one usually made, from such practices to the subjugation of those who have been habitually robbed, and to the occupation of their territory in order to utilize or exploit them more readily. In this way political society came into existence. The invaders and state-makers do not comprise the whole of the conquering tribe, but only its surplus class. It is, therefore, always a body far less numerous than the subdued group which founds the state. Moreover, it is a group related to the conquered as an alien caste rather than as an ordinary social class. Political control in its beginning, therefore, differs radically from ethnic, inasmuch as the latter is under native class domination, that is, ruled by those of the same blood and culture, whereas the state is the imposition of authority by an alien people.

Mastery of tribal surplus engenders an expensive tendency and makes possible such conquest. The conquerors impose themselves upon the vanquished tribe at first by sheer might, and are able, though a small minority, to maintain power by virtue of their command over what is to the newly formed order a real and most important kind of surplus. That surplus is a form of organization, specifically the state. This institution is only a scheme of alien group domination for the purpose of exploitation. As the most effective form of surplus at the time, it becomes the dynamic of social control, commanding all other forms of surplus, and at the same time operating as the chief instrument of regulation. From first to last, throughout distinctively political history, control of this device gives control of society as a whole.

The sole and single object of the state-makers is, of course, satisfaction of their own ambitions and wants by means of the services and the fruits of the labors of others. In the early and formative stages of political society the state is an agency of direct utilization. It is little more

than armed bands and garrisons of invaders taking what they desire by main force and intimidation. By superiority of military strength and organization the subjected group is coerced. Obedience is arbitrarily exacted. The vital energy of the vassal people is thus directed and appropriated for the benefit of the master group.[27] At the outstart the subject masses have no status respected of the masters; they, being but slaves or serfs, belong with the soil, and soil and peasant alike are only so much property. Direct, ruthless, capricious appropriation of human energy and its products is the method employed. Rapine and slaughter, destruction and terror, are freely used to awe the subjects into obedience, and to establish and to sustain political supremacy. Once created, however, political society gradually becomes unified and stable by means of the activities in which it regularly engages. These activities, are first of all, defense against attacks and conquest.[28] A social environment full of political societies scarcely allows any alternative for any one of them except frequent warfare. To be either hammer or anvil, as Goethe put it, is normal to a social condition where sovereign classes possessing the surplus are everywhere existent. Societies thus rendered dynamic must of necessity strive and express themselves by reaching out or overflowing. So they clash and become victors or vanquished in the process. Aggressive activities take their rise entirely from the ruling class as the energizing center. The masses join in or are compelled to acquiesce.[29] The outreachings of the state either in conquest or through self-assertion in defense operates to bring the masses completely under its will, since the hazards of foreign conflicts always foster domestic unity and the consolidation of control in the hands of the ruling

[27] Ludwig Gumplowiez, *Outlines of Sociology*, F. W. Moore, Tr., p. 129.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 117.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

class. War is consequently regularly promoted in one way and another by them. The nature of this pursuit and the situation it creates is such that the masses are made but helpless pawns of the state. In the name of defense real or fictitious the citizens are drawn into armies and compelled to do the bidding of the rulers. By offers of reward, appeals to predatory instincts, challenges to avenge insults, to uphold the most holy faith, to expand the frontiers, and other sorts of inducements, armies are mustered and mobilized in campaigns of murder, robbery, and conquest for the benefit of the state class.

If war is successful a few of the subjects may be granted a considerable share in the plunder, and permitted to enter the ranks of those who rule in the newly acquired provinces. But though conquests be successful and the single state like the Latin league grow into an empire, the masses in general remain victims of sovereign class control. This is true whether they be the people of the first formed political society about which empire has arisen, or the last to pass under the yoke in some remote province. For in the one case the citizens are forced to serve in and to sustain the armies of the state, and in the other they are enslaved and plundered by them. In either case the citizens are exploited by the political class, the Grecian helot and the Roman pleb along with the barbarians over whom they triumph.

In the process of empire making the state organization greatly expands. A military institution to begin with, it unfolds a military system under which the man power is readily manipulated by the sovereign class. Egypt, beginning about 600 B.C., clearly exemplifies such a development.[30] This manipulation is accomplished chiefly by means of a standing army into which the vital energy of the em-

[30] J. H. Breasted, *A History of the Ancient Egyptians,* pp. 193*ff*.

pire is drawn, and by which it is consumed. A typical case was that of the Roman Empire, where war, army, taxes, more provinces, more plutocrats, more slaves and serfs, more war, more army, on round the vicious circle, made Roman society little else than a rich class, an army, and a wretched mass of slaves and serfs. Thus fully militarized political society is easily controlled by the state makers.

Dominating state organization, the sovereign class extends its sway over economic surplus even as over the man power, and thereby makes still more secure its sovereignty. This starts with the expropriation of land which the conquerors parcel out among themselves. It was the practice of Rome, for example, to grant portions of conquered territories to colonists, but always the larger part was kept by the state. These state lands readily fell into the hands of the patricians, who held them as private property. Most of the land of Italy and of the subject countries thus came to be massed in vast estates under the ownership of the imperial class. Ownership of the land involves claims upon the services of the peasants dwelling upon it. Human labor and the fruits thereof are then appropriated. Serfs and slaves are much in demand to carry on herding and cultivation. At first there is direct seizure of goods and compulsory work, then the peasant is left in peace provided a stipulated amount of produce and service is rendered. Thus, Rome required a tenth of the grain, a fifth of the fruit, and a share of the sheep and oxen. Finally, instead of a tribute in kind, when money comes into use, a tax is levied and collected. By taking the economic surplus the state class becomes a plutocratic class, holding in its hands most of the wealth of political society.

Such extraction of the economic surplus from the peasants renders them impotent and submissive. Roman provincials and coloni were regularly reduced to poverty and

destitution. Even the Italians who had formed the Latin league and then conquered an empire themselves succumbed to the tax system and plundering of the governing patricians. They lost their small holdings under state confiscation, and became degraded serfs or slaves. The whole wealth appropriating business from direct seizure through tribute paying to taxation operates to keep down the social energy of the citizens; it proves to be a most effective aid in regulating them.

The use to which the surplus sluiced off by taxation is applied in fully developed political societies makes this activity even more significant. The most important use is war. Originally armies were largely supported by booty taken from the enemy, but in time more adequate means had to be supplied by special requisitions made upon the citizens. When a standing army was formed regular taxation for war purposes ensued. Thus, taxation and war become reciprocal activities, and the mainstays of the state.

Incidentally, the state-makers' need of taxes compels them to see that the citizens are able to pay.[31] As a result the roundabout method of fostering economic surplus was introduced. Beneficial institutions and activities were promoted. Roads were laid, canals dug, rivers rendered navigable, harbors built, trade routes protected, husbandry fostered, all in the first instance for the army, but in the second for the sake of trade.[32] Industry was encouraged by fixing monetary standards, erecting tariffs, and negotiating commercial treaties. Greater production was thus secured, and more taxes yielded. Howbeit, all such policies designed to aid and regulate wealth-getting tend to make the citizen more amenable to state control.

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[31] Max Nordau, *The Interpretation of History*, M. A. Hamilton, Tr., p. 192.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 193.

In the course of political development state benefactions increase and the circle of beneficiaries widens. This becomes necessary when the few grow richer and the many poorer as often happens. Tax levies are then represented as for the benefit of the public. Considerable must be spent to alleviate the struggle for existence, or to add some element of material and intellectual well-being to the lives of the majority.[33] The Greek state provided cheap corn from public granaries, financed colonization projects, provided a kind of state pension for the most indigent,[34] made allowances to citizens for attending public gatherings such as theaters, courts, assemblies, etc.,[35] and gave employment in the erection of great and beautiful buildings. These aids mostly tended to pauperize and make the citizens dependent. But the governing class, by resorting to them, maintained its control of society. Rome did all the things mentioned of Greece and more besides. For centuries tens and hundreds of thousands subsisted on public doles of cheap corn. Many received it free. Imperial bounty provided gladiatorial shows, games, and other popular amusements on a liberal scale. Public works were carried on to afford support for the populace. Colonization schemes were initiated. Many kinds of charity flowed from the state and nobility.[36] Thus, the Roman populace was pauperized and rendered subservient to the master class. By means of taxation, then, the state makers control economic surplus, and through it, in large measure, the citizenship.

The state, in addition to dominating economic surplus, brings the most important tradition surplus under its authority.[37] In political society this is the religious. Pos-

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 204.
[34] C. B. Gulick, *Life of the Ancient Greeks*, p. 249.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 206-215.
[36] C. S. Locke, *Charity and Social Life*, pp. 95*ff*.
[37] Wm. Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, Schaub, Tr., pp. 302-321.

session of this greatly facilitates social regulations. If, in the beginning of the state, the cult of the subjects is not very different from that of the political caste, it will be tolerated. Otherwise, it will be outlawed as by the Israelitish conquerors of Canaan, whose Javeh cult brooked no rivals. Whatever be the situation, the state eventually takes charge of this tradition. Religion is then ordered to suit the interests of the ruling class, and must conform to its dictates.

The state does not fail to make good use of this agency. Fear of the gods enthralls the masses, and the rulers so identify themselves with the gods that fear of the one is transferred to the other. The powers that be are then ordained of God. The state becomes an organization sacrosanct; its decrees, commands of deity, and its laws, his will. Such, for example, the Mosaic decalogue and the priestly code of Israel were declared to be. Violation of the laws and disobedience to the divinely constituted authority become, under these circumstances, acts more or less unholy. Always, the gods are to be honored, lest evil befall, and direful calamity be inflicted, but the state prescribes the manner of doing it, and so exacts obedience.

Religious tradition involves organization which the state must also appropriate. State and church become one. The head of the state becomes the religious ruler; he is high priest over all the priestly order. Shrines and temples pass under state ownership. All ministers and attendants become state officials, either recruited from the sovereign class or absorbed into its ranks. The king will then pose as the representative of God, and may even become in some instances a very god himself; as, for example, in ancient Egypt.[38] Where this happens neither the king nor the state can do any wrong. By means of such organization the power of the state-makers over the masses is ren-

[38] J. H. Breasted, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

dered practically absolute. Take, for example, the Russian Church under the Czar, concerning which Raymond Robins says: "The Church has been the spy system of autocracy for 200 years." The church has been controlled by 7 per cent of the population to spy upon the 93 per cent.[39] Almost everywhere political society has followed this development. Egypt, Babylon, Israel, Greece, and Rome of old, and the European societies under the Christian era reveal alike the process of identification of state and church corporation.

If the religious tradition undergoes changes, as sometimes happens, through borrowing of culture and contacts between peoples, the state, when it cannot suppress, will appropriate the new. This Rome did in the fourth century after Christianity had crept in and grown to be the most important body of surplus tradition. The rulers, not being able to destroy the faith, took charge of it, and organized it into the supreme state religion. It then sanctioned "the divine right of kings," hedged with protection "the holy office of bishop," marked with crime any of the populace who "spake evil of dignitaries," however much such men might impose upon, enslave, rob, or even plot death against certain of their subjects. Thus the sovereign class employed the Christian religion to retain mastery.

In the fully developed states of Mediæval Europe ecclesiastical organization attained ascendancy over the political. Lex Dei became the ruling principle. It included everything else—the lex Christi, the lex Mosis, the lex ecclesiæ, the lex civitatis, and the lex naturæ. However the organization remained political in form and method. Religious tradition had in reality only climbed into the

[39] Raymond Robins, "Social Control in Russia To-day," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1919, p. 136.

rulers' seat, while the state form continued to be the great dynamic of control. The church became a state. The state temporal and spiritual was then at the zenith of power. By being denied the benefits of religion the most wayward subjects could be brought to terms. The sovereign class was practically the arbiter of the temporal and eternal destiny of its subjects. Supernaturalism was regnant, and was so mediated through the church-state that everything was brought low in obedience. To fall under the ban of religion was to be an outlaw and outcast. The success of that régime is, to some degree, indicated when it appears that one-third of the land of Europe became church land by the thirteenth century, when we see great numbers of the most talented and energetic men and women turning to the monastic life. And besides, education, art, science, and most of the other lines of tradition also passed under the influence of the church. Thus, through the unity of state and church the sovereign class exercises complete authority over the populace.

Still another form of tradition which the state makes use of remains to be noticed. This is law. It starts to develop very early in the political order, and really marks the transition from control by direct means to indirect, from what is often called the rule of might to that of right. However, law is really only might dressed in a garment that makes it appear less stark. But this does not render the state any the less irresponsible and despotic. Law is not at the outstart wholly an invention of the state-makers; it is rather a growth, which only at a somewhat later stage is taken control of, codified, and promulgated by the state.

The two component elements of the state at its inception, the conquerors and the subjected, have, perhaps, scarcely any folkways and mores alike.[40] They may differ

[40] Ludwig Gumplowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

widely in language, religion, and numerous ways of doing things. In consequence there is no natural harmony. There is antagonism and constant clashing between the two elements. Out of this, however, some *modus vivendi* always emerges. The rulers adapt themselves to their subjects, and the latter accept the situation. New habits gradually take shape and become the bulwarks of order in the composite group, just as in each of the original ethnic groups involved.[41] Compromises between the commands of the master class and the customs of the subjects take place. These are carried out and become rights.[42] Rights harden into established ways, and these, together with whatever rules the state may from time to time continue arbitrarily to lay down, constitute law. For a long time it remains mere oral tradition, and pretty uncertain in meaning. In fact, the master class interprets it to suit its own advantage. Eventually, however, the law is written down and published, and thus the will of the state is more clearly defined and declared. Regulation is then somewhat less capricious and more dependable.

In the Greek state the code of Draco, of 621 B.C. was the first written law. It remains the synonym for severity, but the Babylonian code of Hammurabi or the law of Manu of India was even worse. All early laws promulgated by the state are severe. The nearer they are to the direct method of control, the harsher they are. The law of Manu fully illustrates this. A few instances may be cited. The Sudras, under penalty of torture or death, were forbidden to read or listen to the reading of the sacred books, or to commit them to memory. The laborer's name was to be an expression of contempt, so his place and standing might be known. They were forbidden to accumulate wealth. Even a slave given freedom is still a slave, "for, of a state

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 130.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 179, 183.

which is natural to him, by whom can he be divested?'' [43] From the time of the appearance of written codes on, the state monopolizes legal tradition, and utilizes it most effectively in controlling the citizens.

The development of law again necessitates the amplification of state organization to administer it. The juridical system results, and the political class engages in the business of arbitrating conflicts and settling disputes among the citizens, in accordance with the law. They see that the disobedient are punished; and the ''majesty'' of the law, which, of course, is only another name for the authority of the ruling class, is vindicated. At first this function is but little differentiated. Yet, relatively early, certain ones of the rulers are made court officials. Presently the juridical institution grows into an important limb of the state. Social control then resolves itself in large measure into what is called the administration of justice. Justice, however, amounts to nothing more than the maintenance of the status of inequality between the surplus class and the exploited masses where questions of the relations of the two are being adjudicated. It is precisely what Plato, in the Republic, pictured it to be—the adjustment of the individual to the political order. This means keeping individuals and classes in their proper spheres; that is, the spheres fixed for them by the state—the slave in slavery, the serf in serfdom, the priest in place of privilege, and the ''natural aristocracy'' in social control. In a word, Plato meant that ''justice is the interest of the stronger.'' [44] And this is what the surplus monopolists mean also. Its character is always a fair index of the relative power of those who are in control; and, if it becomes more ''even-handed'' and approaches the ''square

[43] See Sir Thomas Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, Chapter II.

[44] Ludwig Gumplowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

deal'' as political society matures, perhaps a weakening of the state through factional quarrels or the acquisition of strength on the part of the populace is indicated. Everywhere the juridical organization devotes much effort to manufacturing traditions in justification of the law, of the class that rules, and the established order of things. Such, indeed, is the very genius of legalistic control.

There is, of course, a large field in which justice aims at balancing rights between citizens in conflict. The state arbitrates fairly enough between them where they are of the same class. There is every reason why it should do so. Its prestige is thus enhanced. It is only where its own status is involved in interclass relations that justice takes on other meaning.

Control by law may meet with checks in the course of political history. State regulation is itself eventually brought into abeyance to law. The principles by which this is effected are called the constitution; they define and seek to curb the power of the ruling class. Constitutions arise under several conditions. Sometimes they spring from factional differences within the state-making class itself, which then composes the quarrel in a written compact. Special privileges thus acquired by a few tend to become the law for all. They are passed down from the privileged to the people, from precedent to precedent. At other times constitutions result from pressure exerted directly by the masses, especially those of the cities. Even the strongest of sovereign classes is unable to fully regulate the distribution of energy, and when the populace becomes endowed with enough surplus it threatens the state, and often succeeds in setting limits to its power. This happened to Greece and Rome. But generally it does not happen at all in true political society, and, where it does, it is usually in a very limited way. Nor do constitutions necessarily mean that the ruling class has abrogated any authority.

Its yielding, such as it is, may be mostly pretense, for so long as it has the state organization in hand it is pretty sure to dominate all else, and do about as it will with the social body. But constitution making pertains chiefly to industrial society and we shall not, therefore, pursue the subject further here.

When summarized certain characteristics of political social control are outstanding. The dynamic factor is clearly organization surplus—that institution, which is *per se* an agency of control, called the state, expanding from a band of conquerors engaged in pillage to systematic military, ecclesiastical, juridical, and administrative organization. Mastery of this organization remains the determining element throughout the distinctively political period. No other form of surplus proves so important as this, and, therefore, those who come into control of other forms do not succeed in supplanting the state class. Surplus tradition may spring up; as, for example, forms of the religious; but the class that controls does not become ascendent over society unless it adopts the instrument of the state as its own, or is taken in by the state class. A succession of classes, aristocratic, military, priestly, juridic, plutocratic, controlling one form and another of surplus, may come to power in the course of political history, but they lay their trophies upon the altar of the state whenever they do so. They simply pass under the influence of its method, and obtain control of society only through initiation into the state class, and by making the state organization the agency of their wills. Thus while political control is always class control, the class, whatever it chances to be, undergoes transformation into the state class or an official body before it really achieves mastery.

Withal, political society conforms in a broad way to Spencer's description of military society. It is an all-inclusive, all-pervading compulsory corporation or organ-

ization.[45] The position of the individual is merely one of status, by virtue of class, regimentation, and institutionalization. In fact, the whole political process sums itself up in the struggle for institutions, for structure.[46] The socius, as a result, becomes fixed in a niche of the all-embracing structure which builds itself about him, as an army, as a church, as an economic caste, as a legal system, as a state which comprehends and dominates all. By such means the great mass of individuals are bound and tied, made to conform and obey, pinioned down by rigid forms, and manipulated by the few who create those forms.

The entire control process is essentially a matter of agglomeration and expanding organization rather than one of changing modes of surplus domination. By organization the subordination and regulation of individuals is fully secured, and the utilization of other things readily effected. Finally, in the course of its growth, political organization passes from the direct and coercive method to a more indirect and instigative exploitation.

### Industrial Social Control

Where society becomes industrial rather than political, a new class comes to the fore, made up of merchants, traders, manufacturers, financiers, and other enterprisers dwelling chiefly in the cities. It is known as the bourgeois, capitalist, or middle class as distinguished from the nobility at the top and the peasants, serfs, and slaves at the bottom. It is in possession of the goods of commerce and industry, and money, in contrast to land and serfs, which constitute the wealth of the nobility or political class of the preceding social stage. This wealth, being peculiarly mobile and rapidly multiplying, soon rivals and eventually

[45] *Principles of Sociology*, Vol. II, pp. 603-608.
[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 575, 576.

surpasses landed property in importance, and the bourgeoisie enter into control of the chief economic surplus. Such form of surplus proving to be the most effective and powerful enables the class holding it to master all other forms, and to become rulers of the industrial order.

The master class is always small in numbers, and so is it in this case. In the hands of comparatively few is the wealth concentrated and the pecuniary power held. The ability to manipulate this surplus belongs even to a narrower circle than the one which merely owns. It is an economic oligarchy that really controls. It is the oligarchy of Plato in which men have forgotten honor and become lovers of money and business giving praise, admiration, and office to the rich man, but despising the poor man. The proper name for this is plutocracy rather than oligarchy.

In tracing the evolution of industrial control we need not pause to show how the bourgeoisie acquired the economic surplus, but rather proceed to trace its rise to ascendancy over the other forms of social energy. We may begin by sketching its conquest of organization. For the battle for supremacy raged about organization from the outstart of the capitalistic era. To break the power of dominant institutions was the first task of the economic interests.

In the ancient world of Greece and Rome industrial society made a start. There a commercial class arose which asserted itself and began to dispute the authority of the nobility. While this class never attained social mastery, it nevertheless entrenched rather heavily upon the field of state organization. The development was cut short, else antiquity might have evolved a full-fledged industrial society. As it was, it remained for Europe after the Middle Ages to bring it forth anew, and for the last two or three centuries to push it to an advanced stage. The story of how the ascendancy of the industrial over the

political was achieved is essentially the history of the rise of the city to a dominant position, for the city represents the bourgeois class and wealth.

Capital goods piled up as the city developed. The rate of growth tended to become accelerated as capital multiplied. It touched the earth with its magic wand and lo! wealth grew everywhere. It spanned continents with railways and gathered vast yields from field and forest. It tunneled the bowels of the earth with mines and drew forth immense mineral stores. It dotted all the seven seas with merchant vessels and harvested the wealth of commerce. Gladstone estimated that the first fifty years of the nineteenth century saw as much wealth produced as all the preceding eighteen hundred of the Christian era. If that be a correct estimate, the subsequent generations have added enough more till it is now safe to say that since the opening of that century four or five times as much wealth has been created as in all the other centuries mentioned.

With the accumulation of an economic surplus the commercial cities first displayed their power by demanding of the state-makers certain rights and privileges which involved release from the grip of existing organization. Industrial organization and civic institutions consequently sprang up in opposition to the established order, and clamored for a share in it. This was in part obtained, and marked the genesis of the constitutional movement in its most important phase. It was a movement which, in the end, dethroned organization, and put wealth in control.

By establishing constitutionalism, fostering institutional and structural diversification, promoting division of functions, and furthering extensive voluntary organization, urban-centered capitalism gradually undermined the supremacy of political organization, together with its subsidiary institutions. In a sense, the all-embracing state

was emasculated and dismembered. It lost the legal institution as curbs were set by constitutions at the dictation of the bourgeoisie, and representative legislative bodies were created; it lost its good right wing, the church, through a militant and rapidly differentiating protestantism and religious disestablishment; it lost monopoly of the property institution when land ceased to be the determining economic agent. Notwithstanding certain new acquisitions won under later industrialism, the significant fact remains that the absolute and all-inclusive state which constituted political society has ceased to be. Instead, there is decentralized and more diversified organization. It is of many kinds, largely voluntary and coöperative in nature when contrasted with the imposed and coercive types of political society. The emasculation of the state has thus given greater flexibility to the social structure. Unlike the former, the new order does not assign the individual a fixed place, give him a single niche in the organization, or decree a status whence there is no escape. On the contrary, it permits literally multitudes to be lawless private individuals, unorganized, uninstitutionalized, and unbound save in the smallest degree. There is much freedom; the prevalence of contract rather than status, as Spencer put it.[47]

This decentralizing, diversifying, and loosening up of institutions has been the process by which the capitalistic class has brought organization into subjection to itself. The resulting emancipation of a world from institutional bondage was largely incidental to the transition from one kind of control to another. The shift from control by organization to control by economic power does not, of course, mean that the state is no longer important or that institutions are not still powerful; it simply means that those which once held sway are not any more the major forces,

[47] Herbert Spencer, *op. cit.*, pp. 603*ff*.

the real dynamic. Wealth has become the supreme factor instead, and the state and organization in general the servants of plutocracy. The nobility, aristocracy, state-makers, political class, or whatever name best describes them, have either ceased to exist or to exercise prerogative, and are now responsible to the money masters, "big business," "the interests," "the plutocracy," "industrial barons," "entrepreneur oligarchy," or the class that, answering to a variety of names, holds most of the economic surplus in the hollow of its hands.

Emphasis is given to what I have been trying to say in the following passage from Tawney's recent work. The approach is somewhat different, but the same facts are recognized:

"The natural consequence of the abdication of authorities which had stood, however imperfectly, for a common purpose in social organization, was the gradual disappearance from social thought of the idea of purpose itself. Its place in the eighteenth century was taken by the idea of mechanism. The conception of men as united to each other, and of all mankind as united to God, by mutual obligations arising from their relation to a common end, which vaguely conceived and imperfectly realized, had been the keystone holding together the social fabric, ceased to be impressed upon men's minds, when Church and State withdrew from the center of social life to its circumference. What remained when the keystone of the arch was removed, was private rights and private interests, the materials of a society rather than a society itself. These rights and interests were the natural order which had been distorted by the ambitions of kings and priests, and which emerged when the artificial superstructure disappeared, because they were the creation, not of man, but of Nature herself. They had been regarded in the past as relative to some public end, whether religion or national welfare.

Henceforward they were thought to be absolute and indefensible, and to stand by their own virtue. They were the ultimate political and social reality; and since they were the ultimate reality, they were not subordinate to other aspects of society, but other aspects of society were subordinate to them. The State could not encroach upon them, for the State existed for their maintenance. They determined the relation of classes, for the most obvious and fundamental of all rights was property—property absolute and unconditioned—and those who possessed it were regarded as the natural governors of those who did not." [48]

Just how this class uses organization to impose its will upon men and nations and to shape their affairs to its own advantage needs to be set forth in some detail.

To begin, let us note what use is made of the state. If we study the constitutions of industrial societies they will be found fashioned in such a way as to give every advantage to economic interests. All other things are of secondary importance. The efforts at constitution-making during the past few centuries reveal this. In England, France, Germany, Italy, and America such events have always found the propertied class busily engaged in the enterprise. It is not to their discredit either for they were the reformers of their day; nor is their work to be counted of no social advantage for they were destroying autocracy and winning liberty that was not then enjoyed by citizens in general.

No instance affords better illustration of who made modern constitutions than the case of the United States. The movement which culminated in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was started and pushed through by the moneyed men, manufacturers, shippers, traders, and merchants, all of whom were "informed" says Beard, "by a

[48] R. H. Tawney, *The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society*, pp. 9, 10.

conscious solidarity of interests."[49] The aim of all their endeavors was, as James Madison frankly stated, to secure private property against the majority, and to preserve the spirit and form of popular government.[50] Writing in the tenth number of the *Federalist,* Madison further said: "The chief business of government from which, perforce, its essential nature must be derived, consists in the control and adjustment of conflicting economic interests."[51]

By a careful study of the personnel of the convention, Beard has shown that the capitalistic class alone was present. Five-eighths of them were directly interested in the economic advantages of a union of the states, and profited greatly by that union through the funding of government securities which they held. The rank and file of the people were entirely without representation. In fact, at that time they had no political power, for throughout the colonies such power was universally confined to property-holding and privileged individuals. The convention, therefore, very naturally brought forth such a system of government as would best serve business interests. The instrument was unquestionably a charter of free government drafted by the foremost political liberals of the age. Moreover, it was created for the sincere purpose of securing life, liberty and happiness for the people who should live under it. Nevertheless, the instrument reflected the economic outlook of its makers and was based on the idea that "the fundamental private rights of property are anterior to government, and morally beyond the reach of popular majorities."[52] The same interests that wrought out the instrument at Philadelphia forced it upon the people by economic pressure and various other means of

[49] C. A. Beard, *The Economic Interpretation of the Constitution,* p. 61.
[50] *Ibid.,* Chapter III.
[51] *Ibid.,* p. 15.
[52] *Ibid.,* Chapter XI.

persuasion. It was the urban centers where the industrial class dwelt that voted ratification. The rest of the country was either indifferent or openly opposed. The total number of those supporting ratification did not, perhaps, exceed 100,000 persons out of a possible 160,000 having any political power among 3,200,000 free inhabitants of the nation.[53] By thus laying the foundations of the state itself as they saw fit, the wealthy class set up a social structure which, so long as it endures, will go far to guarantee their ascendancy. That such is the case careful students of our institutions are pretty generally agreed. No less a leader of conservative thought than ex-President A. T. Hadley of Yale has emphasized this. He has declared that the secure status of the property owner cannot be changed except by altering the constitution. In this connection he has called attention to the following facts: "The forces of democracy on one side divided between the executive and the legislative are set over against the forces of property on the other side, with the judiciary as arbiter between them, the constitution itself not only forbidding the legislature to trench upon the rights of property, but compelling the judiciary to define and uphold those rights in a manner provided by the constitution itself." [54]

What was done here has been done no less effectively in one way or another throughout industrial Europe. In their fundamental laws the states all provide for domination by and for the wealth-holding group.[55]

The juridical systems created by constitutions to uphold

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

[54] *The Independent*, files 1908.

[55] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, in *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*, pp. 96, 97, show how the British constitution was formulated by capitalists. Concerning the Combination Laws of 1799 and 1800 they say these acts marked the surrender of the state to the capitalist class. They further assert that "one only of the ancient institutions of the realm the capitalist oligarchy clung to and developed; the law of private property, with its adjunct in legally protected inheritance of wealth by the living from the dead."

law and order are always in harmony with the basic design of the structures, just as Hadley has said of our system. They are manned and manipulated, moreover, by the dependents of the plutocracy, for the legal profession is largely employed by and responsible to capitalistic interests. Those who become judges are generally corporation lawyers strongly prejudiced in favor of the system that has reared them. It therefore follows that the lawyer at the bar and the judge on the bench, quite naturally, and altogether apart from the prejudice of the law itself, regularly uphold the system in its entirety as a divinely constituted one. For it is true, as Charles Kingsley put it in *Alton Locke*, that "everybody fancies that the laws which fill his own pockets are God's laws." Conditions, of course, change, and constitutions are modified but judicial interpretation with few exceptions sees to it that no law seriously jeopardizing the interests of wealth is upheld. With the retainers of the plutocracy filling the seats of justice, the latter turns out to be mainly the everlasting reiteration of sanctions for the rule of the rich. As thoroughly typical of the prevailing juridical attitude, though characterized by unusual directness, a decision recently rendered by Judge Van Orsdel of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in declaring unconstitutional the minimum wage law of the District: "The tendency of the times," said the judge, "to socialize property rights under the subterfuge of police regulations is dangerous, and if continued will prove destructive of our free institutions. It should be remembered that of the three fundamental principles which underlie government and for which government exists—the protection of life, liberty, and property—the chief of these is property. Not that any amount of property is more valuable than the life or liberty of the citizen, but the history of civilization proves that when the citizen is deprived of the free use and enjoyment of his

property anarchy and revolution follow, and life and liberty are without protection."

There can be no gainsaying the fact that this opinion is quite as much the leading voice of industrial civilization as of the legalistic mind. It is not a question whether it is right or wrong, but only whether it is a fact. And the fact is that property does have the prior claim upon our civilization. One may doubt the declaration of Paul Elmer More that it has always been the "main care of advancing civilization" or that it is all that makes life "more significant to us than to the beast" or that "*the rights of property are more important than the right of life.*"[56] But he cannot doubt that the ruling opinion of the world of to-day holds to this view. If, therefore, in the light of this view the wealth possessors mold our institutions and impose their will upon society, they can plead as justification that wealth is a builder of civilization; and they can consequently claim that the fortune making and holding class has thereby won leave to control affairs.

The administrative and legislative machinery of industrial states, though not so obviously as the courts, is no less responsible to the bankers, manufacturers, masters of commerce, and kings of transportation. The most advanced forms of popular sovereignty—our so-called democracy—interpose no insuperable hindrance to their rule. There is, in America and elsewhere, "an invisible empire set up above these forms by plutocracy."[57] Under these circumstances organized government is likely to be "a foster child of special interests,[58] which dictate the laws and the manner of their execution. The power behind all is economic surplus: and the class holding it is not unwilling even to shoulder heavy tax burdens, and to share

[56] Paul Elmer More, *Aristocracy and Justice*, p. 136.
[57] Woodrow Wilson, *The New Freedom*, p. 35.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 58.

profits in order to keep the machinery running by which it dominates. It has gone so far, in fact, as voluntarily to curb its own class by regulating, limiting, and even socializing great profit-yielding enterprises. The less wise, more greedy, short-sighted and anarchistic capitalists have had to submit to the program of the more far-seeing and capable ones in the interest of the class as a whole. Thus a great deal of economic surplus and, in a measure, some of the means of producing it have been voluntarily surrendered. The public has undoubtedly been the gainer, but in far greater measure the plutocracy itself. For its policy of self-control and self-discipline has but multiplied its profits and magnified its power by giving greater public efficiency and welfare.[59]

Control of the legislative and administrative side of free government is by no means so easy or certain as it once was. It is a day of publicity as well as plutocracy. When therefore the light is thrown on the doings of the latter an indignant public will frequently assert itself against vested interests. Again and again has this been done in America. Railway regulation, antitrust legislation, trust dissolution, limitations on the use of money in elections, restrictions and prohibitions of numerous kinds on trade and big business and various other manifestations of democratic activity give evidence that the plutocracy does not always rule. However, the people being "that part of the state that does not really know what it wants,"[60] as Hegel said, rarely get lasting results from their crusades. They will drive the corporate interests from the temple with a scourge of laws and expect them to stay out while they themselves attend faithfully to the worship of their own golden calves. But the corporate interests do not stay out.

[59] This has been ably brought out by Maurice William in his *The Social Interpretation of History*. See pp. 25*ff*. and pp. 115*ff*.

[60] Quoted by R. L. Finney in *The Causes and Cures of Social Unrest*, p. 247.

They always return in one guise or another to the place of power.

The plutocracy would like to divert attention from the rule of the corporation in government to that of the labor union. It avers that the labor union is becoming the dominant influence in control of the state. But though labor organizations are making themselves felt in the government of several countries, it cannot be seriously contended that they have thus far done more than come to grips with the power of capitalism in the struggle for control.

The plutocracy has had the governmental machinery well enough in hand, so that most voluntary organizations daring to challenge its sovereignty could be rendered ineffectual. If not actually outlawed, they have been discriminated against and denied the rights commonly exercised as a matter of course by approved institutions. Thus, under normal conditions, industrial society exhibits conformity to the approved type throughout the general range of its organizations.

The church is another institution said to be under plutocratic domination. But this is not always evident. There are numerous churches, certainly a majority of them in America, where the rich man is a stranger and over which the influence of poverty rather than wealth reigns. And even among the prosperous there are not a few where no signs of subserviency to vested interests can be seen. Moreover, several of the great ecclesiastical bodies have started important movements in behalf of industrial democracy and social justice and have found themselves virtually at war with great corporate interests as a result.[61] In the light of these and other facts that might be cited, the church does not appear to be so much of a bond servant of plutocracy as its critics often allege.

[61] For instance, the Interchurch World Movement's investigation of the steel strike of 1919.

Nevertheless, in a large measure, the church is under the control of wealth. This is especially true of the leading and influential churches of the urban centers. In his book on *Religion and Business* Mr. Babson calls attention to this fact as a condition to be deplored.[62] He insists, however, that the rich man's interest in the church is the cause of his success rather than the result of his success.[63] And he thinks we should point with pride to the fact that most of the church people are prosperous and that most of the poor people are outside the church.[64]

In so far as these conditions obtain they indicate the significant fact of wealth control. For where even two or three people of property are gathered together one can be assured that the attitude of the capitalist will be there. It may be conscious or unconscious but in either case it makes the church an ally of the institution of capitalism.

Where the church is a state organization this is more generally true than where it is disestablished and free. But under both conditions there is pretty sure to issue from the sanctuary, even as from the bank office, the judge's bench, the corporation's board, and the seat of government the same kind of bans against any movement that is subversive to vested interests. Nor could it well be otherwise when it is the same class speaking in both capacities.

Apart, however, from all other considerations the church is fettered by wealth, because it is a victim of circumstances. It is not a productive agency; it must depend for support upon those who have the economic surplus. It can be sustained by widows' mites and workingmen's doles, but that is difficult. It, therefore, covets the silver and gold of the rich and when it gets this, rewards the donors with

[62] Roger W. Babson, *Religion and Business*, pp. 12, 13.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

blessings, praises the power of wealth, and sanctifies the system that produces it.

So religion and business become stanch allies; they are mutually helpful. They aid each other at home and abroad, in war and in peace, in domestic and foreign affairs, and in national development or imperialistic ambition. Said a business man recently in writing about *How Missionaries Help Foreign Trade* in New Guinea and elsewhere: "It is gospel pioneering that is opening the door to business, as it also paved the way for political sovereignty. To the heroic work of the British, Dutch, and German missionaries commerce owes its present privilege of trade with this rich island." [65]

As a matter of fact, the church needs business more than business needs the church. Hence though it may occasionally denounce the worship of mammon and rail at ill-gotten coin, it cannot afford to count any gain dedicated to it as ill-gotten nor adjudge the bringer of such gain who sits in the pews guilty of mammon worship. So very commonly the church is found under the influence of capitalism. And it has come to pass that, whereas the church once ruled wealth, wealth now rules the church.

The educational system quite as much as the religious is acknowledged to be "strongly reactionary against any innovations which threaten the intrenched rights of property." [66] The two systems are indeed alike in that they "are not directly productive of tangible economic goods, yet they depend upon tangible economic goods for their maintenance." [67] And the holders of the surplus supply them, whether the institutions are public or private, supported by state tax or by free gifts. Thus again the principle comes into force that he who pays the bills or gives a

[65] Frederick Simplich in *The Saturday Evening Post*, Sept. 8, 1923.
[66] Paul Elmer More, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
[67] Scott Nearing, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

subsidy rules. The result is that the educational system contains few critics of capitalism. It encourages and rewards defenders of the industrial order and the capitalistic régime, but the others it eliminates or renders harmless. Abundant proof of this appears in the struggle that is being waged for academic freedom throughout America. Although not every case arising involves an instance of wealth domination there are enough that do, to show how the power of money is being used to control education.

The method of control is both direct and indirect. If the first, moneyed men will be found in the trusteeships, issuing orders as from the hiring and firing end of a business office. Their apologists say they are guided by an instructive feeling that "the safety and usefulness of the institutions they control are finally bound up with the inviolability of property which has been devoted to unworldly pursuits and removed from the control of popular passions and hasty legislation."[68] Even if this be the motive it only helps explain an existing situation.

If the indirect method is in force the desire for social prestige will be found at work. He who would succeed in the educational world must retain the favor of the dominant group. To do this he must conform; and so automatically, instinctively, he falls into the commonly accepted practices, and catches step with things as they are, and as plutocracy wishes them to remain.[69]

Nor does this comprehend all of educational control, for there is a persistent endeavor to direct the education of children according to class status, or sometimes to enforce illiteracy as in Czaristic Russia. In behalf of class education there is a movement to segregate trade schools from liberal schools, and to put the working class's children into the former. This system has been in vogue, especially in

[68] Paul Elmer More, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
[69] Scott Nearing, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

Germany, and has been coming into favor in America. Despite the opportunities for higher education supposedly open to all classes in the United States, those who can and do avail themselves of it are chiefly the rich and well-to-do. The masses are but meagerly represented in colleges and universities. These institutions virtually become upper class agencies, and, therefore, in this way, the upholders of the status quo.

Consideration of ecclesiastical and educational institutions suggests the next sphere of control, that of tradition, for these institutions are keepers of a good portion of it; and the state, the court, the industrial corporation are keepers of another portion. If any surplus, any new tradition, rises within the pale of these institutions it can with limitations be disposed of in whatever way the sovereign class sees fit. The social heritage is thus guarded and censored by them. Only so much of it as they deem "safe" is allowed free course; the rest is suppressed in just so far as it can well be. What is passed on to the youth through the educational system is largely what vested interests favor; the doctrines, for instance, that the existing state is a work of perfection, that the capitalistic system is the best possible, that the law of private property *est vox Dei*, that agitation for fundamental change is seditious, and that faith in any kind of radicalism, be it single tax, socialism, communism, or what not, is next to constructive treason, or directly provocative of it. And what the pulpit teaches must also please plutocracy and its retainers if it is to get hearing and command respect. Class harmony, the essential goodness of the existing order, obedience to authority, the righteousness of whatever war is being fought by the nation, patriotic devotion to "my country, right or wrong," adoration of the economically successful, salvation by individual effort, and in lieu of successful effort, submission, sacrifice, and

humility, are, therefore, some of the glad tidings freely proclaimed. It is a gospel whose deity is usually a cosmic autocrat and a god of battles, and whose redemption is too often an other-worldly moratorium declared on all difficulties and debts that should be settled now. To be sure, the gospel of the Kingdom of Heaven and social righteousness is also preached boldly and fearlessly from many a pulpit. But it seems to be a more unpopular gospel to the ears of this age than it was to the ears of those who first heard it from the Mount of Galilee. At least, it makes little headway against the counter currents of modern commercialism and materialism.

Involved in the tradition mediated through school and church is the moral code. This code, includes, of course, more than what flows directly from the two sources mentioned; it includes also standards and ideals of conduct and principles of behavior inculcated by the home and the market place, by literature, art, amusement, etc., and regularly suggested, imitated, and enforced in daily intercourse. Resulting from this is a degree of social self-control no less significant for industrial than for other forms of society. The community is always in part self-regulating. But none the less the regulating tradition itself is largely produced and imposed by the class which radiates the ethical code that the masses have to follow. Some cardinal points of this code are economic success as a goal, acquisitiveness as a virtue, acquiescence in one's lot as a necessity and respect for property rights above all things else as a quality of first merit. Conversely, the thriftless, the contemners of fortune, the nonconformist, and the critics of the social order are unworthy and undesirable citizens. The ideal types are the captains of industry, the financial magnates, the merchant princes, the "sane" business men, the military heroes, the philanthropists, together with the hard-working, meek, and contented

among the ruled. These are the ones upon whom the seal of honor, wisdom, goodness, righteousness, respectability, and nobility is set.

The moral tradition is both old and new, but it is over the new, the surplus in particular, that the dominant class sets its guard, lest something be spread abroad that will disturb and upset the moral order. The wrongness of all challenging codes, and the jeopardy in which society is supposed to be placed because of them is constantly dinned into the public ears by all the mouthpieces of vested interests. Pacifism, communism, anarchism, socialism, internationalism, are to-day proclaimed as the great menaces of civilization. And the rank and file of the people are not slow to take fright at these "isms" so persistently condemned, for the masses are but slightly self-determining and naturally submissive. All the tradition of the past, most of which has influence still, dictates submission to the will of the dominant class. The instincts and habits acquired under ages of serfdom likewise survive to dictate the same thing. So, in the presence of the power and mastery of the wealthy the masses tend to accept what they are told is good and to eschew what is pronounced evil. Thus the wealth-holding class is able to keep the moral code true to its interests. Consequently any one who with a new ethic stirreth up the people rarely succeeds beyond inciting a mob to inflict upon him a martyr's fate.

Outside what we have noticed lie other ranges of tradition. There are current beliefs, feelings, attitudes, opinions and judgments, more or less independent of religious, moral, and educational tradition. What we have in mind is the rest and residue of all that is comprehended under the term public opinion. It is a stream particularly rich in surplus, whose control is accomplished mainly through the press. The press, especially that represented by the metropolitan newspaper, is almost wholly under the domi-

nation of capitalism.[70] It is actually owned in every land by a few small groups. The Rothermere-Beaverbrook combine which controls two-thirds of the newspaper circulation of London is matched in the United States by several equally great syndicates and private enterprises. Allied with them is the Associated Press monopoly gathering and controlling the news at its source. These great concerns are tied up with other commercial undertakings such as banks, manufacturing ventures, public utility companies, railways, mercantile establishments, and other big business corporations by advertising and in various other ways. The advertising pays the bills that make the newspapers possible and profitable. Hence they are run to suit the advertiser and the biases of the rich men who own them. So our great dailies and popular journals, which profess loyally to serve the public, are first of all servants of the money masters. They habitually speak the same things on all fundamental matters. And what they speak is less the truth than what the editors wish the people to believe. On a wide range of questions that do not involve economic, political, or other vital issues the press undoubtedly attempts to publish the truth. To that extent it is reliable and renders society an indispensable service.

In shaping public opinion political, governmental, commercial, industrial, and general social affairs are the consequential ones. What matters is not especially the old warp and woof of society, but the new yarn that comes to the loom, the new schemes of life, innovating ideas, reform proposals, reorganization plans, far-reaching ideals, projected experiments, revolutionizing movements, agitation for change in the economic system, form of government or the social order. In short, it is the surplus that must be kept in bounds. So the newsmongers undertake to provide men with "their thoughts like their provisions only more

[70] See Upton Sinclair, *The Brass Check*.

cheaply.''[71] And the open mouthed, suggestible public avidly devours what it is offered, for in a world so complicated and defiant of understanding, the ordinary citizen finds it a great convenience, and often his only recourse, to buy ready-made notions on all important issues. He buys what he takes to be wine and milk almost without money and without price, only to be poisoned wholly unawares by adulterations concocted to stupefy and paralyze the many.

The business of purveying news relative to questions that affect the dominant class turns out to be little else than organized propaganda. There is poured forth a stream of current events, information, sentiments, ideals, doctrines, and attitudes from the fonts of the Associated Press fraught with perversion and falsehood, prejudice and deception, imposition and fraud in the name of news. This stream is played upon minds that are naturally suggestible. It serves to stir up loyalty to the propertied class, to raise instinctive opposition to change and to awaken fear that the capitalists will impose the penalty of hard times if they are thwarted in their wishes. The public without protection against it, without standards of evidence by which to judge, without criteria of emphasis, without sufficient information for a corrective, and without habits of forming independent judgments, is hoodwinked and led to think and to act substantially as the economic masters wish.

Where the public periodically registers its will as to men and measures at the ballot box, the whole performance, when bared to the bone, reveals a situation little short of what Walter Lippman has appropriately called a ''plebiscite autocracy.''[72] For public opinion so expressed is, in reality, class opinion cunningly imposed through the newspapers. And thus it comes to pass in every western land

[71] Romain Rolland in *Clerambault.*
[72] Walter Lippman, *Liberty and the News,* p. 61.

that the plutocracy may say, as did an official of the German Foreign Office in 1917, "Public Opinion!—Why we create it." [73]

It has been demonstrated on numerous occasions, especially in local affairs, that the autocracy of newspaper-made opinion can be broken. Where campaigns have been conducted from the platform and by privately financed agencies of information the public has frequently acted in direct opposition to the unanimous opinion of the press. Unfortunately, however, such efforts are spasmodic and intermittent. It is difficult to reach in this way a whole state or nation. Hence, as against the daily appeal of the newspaper, the forces of democratic opinion do not generally prevail.

Still another range of tradition lies in the field of science, art, and technical achievement. New discoveries, processes, and devices give a surplus largely fostered and monopolized by corporate industry. Where it rises independently of such patronage, usually capitalization is demanded for promotion, and this causes it to pass under the control of the wealthy. So not much traditional surplusage of this particular kind escapes plutocratic domination.

One more form of surplus remains to be noticed. This is the vital. Plutocracy commands this, somewhat as it does the other forms. Multitudes are dependent upon employment furnished by the wealth-holding class. It can almost say who shall work and who shall not. Thus much human destiny is virtually at its disposal. "Job-ownership," as Nearing has said, "is the foundation of the latest and probably the most complete system of mastery ever perfected." Its driving power is hunger and ambition.[74]

Fixing wages and living conditions, for the most part a master class prerogative, goes far towards determining

[73] Quoted by Graham Wallas in *Our Social Heritage*, p. 104.
[74] Scott Nearing, *op. cit.*, pp. 94, 95.

how much physical and mental energy shall develop, and how much surplus the proletariat shall generate. The ruling class is fearful of idle men, of those with too many leisure hours. It does not want the daily work of the world too quickly done. It does not view with favor a proletariat too intelligent and too well informed, save along purely technical lines. Mental surplusage among the masses renders them anything but servile.

It is not evident that the capitalists have entered into any conspiracy to keep down the vital surplus of the masses. There is no such astuteness and foresight manifested. But the industrial policies shaped by employers' associations and put into force on a wide scale tend to accomplish this end as though by design.

And yet the situation is paradoxical. In spite of all there is a constant release of vital energy. For the plutocracy of every nation faces a dilemma. It cannot continue to make profits and to maintain its place in the struggle with other industrial societies by sapping the strength of its workers. Success demands efficiency and efficiency calls for laborers with energy, for men who are well-fed and something more than mere brothers to the ox in mind. It has, therefore, been necessary for capitalistic interests to adopt benevolent policies and to promote human welfare in numerous and praiseworthy ways. Although this has proved profitable, it has also worked to the disadvantage of the master class. The proletariat under these conditions develops power, and conflict between the two classes is intensified. The proletariat is never satisfied any more than the master class. It has long taken lessons of the latter. Among other things it has learned of them is sabotage. What the capitalists have practised against the public and the workers is not regularly measured to the capitalists in full by the workers. Any gain of energy only causes more aggressive action in behalf of more gain. But just so far

as possible the rebellious, strike-fomenting element is eliminated, and the laboring group disciplined in one way or another till compelled to acquiesce in the rule of capitalism. Some say the troublesome element is eliminated because it is composed of "under men," inferiors, failures, and those who cannot hold their place in the struggle. But such is not the case; it is the "natural aristocracy" of the proletariat or those who have acquired superiority that are the aggressors. Many, of course, accept their lot as natural. They do not resent the domination of the propertied class. Conscious of weakness and overawed by the system, they are faithful servitors and unquestioning supporters of the existing order. While the capitalistic class does not have anything like complete and absolute dominion over vital energy, enough is commanded to render the ascendancy of wealth reasonably secure.

In addition to the means of control already noticed, plutocracy also makes use of economic imperialism. Economic imperialism is the outflow of surplus capital into other lands, especially undeveloped ones, and the effort to grasp and monopolize as many of the resources of the earth as possible. It does not generally proceed at once as did political society to forceful conquest; it invests in mines, forests, railways, mills, loans to governments, and other foreign enterprises, and then tells the people at home that "our citizens must be protected in their legitimate rights and interests abroad." So in behalf of foreign investments national policies come to be formulated. Under a great variety of expressions, as "the white man's burden," "teaching self-government to backward peoples," the Monroe Doctrine, the open door for China, a "place in the sun," the desire for markets, etc., foreign policy takes shape. However started, it has but one motive—that of self-interests—and but one aim, namely world dominion. Nevertheless, publics are easily led by the

opinions they receive from their masters to believe that national welfare is identified with whatever foreign policy is promoted. In this way the imperialistic class can make and does make the people do its will in relation to other nations. It also dictates domestic policies, since they are often largely reactions to international situations. Thus, whereas the other means noticed pertained particularly to the control of individual conduct, this one brings national behavior into subjection. Imperial ambitions clash, and embroilments result; they are even promoted like other industrial enterprises. So wars and armed peace, alliances and counter alliances, conflicts and realignments without end constitute the activities of economic imperialism, in which the nations dance like puppets as plutocracy pulls the strings.

Since industrial society is obviously under control of the wealth-holding class, the validity of economic determination appears certain. It holds, however, only for the industrial stage; neither political nor ethnic society came greatly under its sway.

In conclusion it should be pointed out that while the agencies of control are more numerous at this stage, regulation is by no means as absolute as under the political. A surplusful world grows increasingly difficult to manage, and no class can do more than wield a dominant influence. Wealth affords the dynamic, but its method is as much domination by suggestion and influence as by direct attack. The wealthy class fails to monopolize all the economic surplus, and by no means holds complete domination over the other forms. Some remains to other classes, and plutocracy meets with opposition. The proletariat especially challenges its rule, puts some checks upon it, and seeks its overthrow. The final outcome depends entirely upon the shift of surplus to other classes. This shift, however, will eventually take place, and another form of energy become

the dynamic of control. A new class will then rule, and a new social order be established. Whether this will be for better or for worse no one can say.

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# CHAPTER X

## SURPLUS AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION

The relation of social surplus to the several phases of evolution has been treated at length, but the social process is not fully comprehended under evolutionary phenomena. There is another manner in which change takes place. It is commonly distinguished from evolution and thought of as being antithetical thereto. It goes under the name of revolution, and must be dealt with here.

The two types of change have certain marked differences. One essential difference pertains to the time element. Evolutionary change is accomplished by incremental, persistent, prolonged alteration, while revolution is effected by a sudden, militant, cataclysmic transformation. Another point of contrast, and often a most important one, though not always or necessarily so, involves the extent of change. Revolution generally means more heroic, complete, far-reaching, epoch-making, and radical alteration than evolution would presumably effect. It usually signifies the overthrow and rebuilding of fundamental social structure. In fact, it is not a true social revolution without this. A final point of contrast has to do with social control. Revolution means the transfer of power from one ruling class to another, but evolution does not necessarily go so far. The culmination of every revolution is seen in the displacement of the dominant class by a rival one, the nobility by the tiers état, the bourgeoisie by the proletariat, or some such reversal of parties or classes in relation to the dictatorship of society.

Revolution, let it be noted, takes place only where society has reached an advanced stage of development. It is unknown among ethnic peoples. Political aggregates are the first to bring it forth. The founding of the state is an antecedent condition, for coincident therewith castes, well-defined classes, factions, parties—a more or less fixed form of social stratification—come into existence. There is, indeed, sometimes a beginning of this under the ethnic order, but the development apparently never reaches far enough to greatly disturb the near-equilibrium that obtains. But the political order, built on planes of inequality, inevitably fosters disturbance and revolution. This is an especially pronounced characteristic of states having considerable aggregations of population in urban centers. And when such centers attain a place of practically absolute supremacy in the national life, as they eventually do under industrialism, there comes to be a most favorable revolutionary environment, for the cities are places of the most glaring inequalities and consequently of unrest and rebellion. All states and empires, therefore, have been liable to cataclysmic alteration, and none more so than those of the modern age, with its rapidly changing energy forms.

### The Mechanism of Revolution

Social stratification has its roots in the surplus. Classes, castes, and struggle groups of every kind, as we have tried to make clear are due to an unequal distribution and participation in the social surplus possessed by the nation as a whole. Wherever we find the state, the surplus is unevenly diffused and this stratification appears. There are all degrees of disparity between the various classes as regards the quantity and quality of vitality, tradition, wealth, and organization that is possessed. Some have only the narrowest margin or none of the surplus at all, others have

a little wider and more certain participation in it, still others enjoy a comfortable overplus; but usually one class monopolizes by far the greater part and the most important form of the surplus. In any large component society these unequally endowed classes mean so many unequal energy bodies or areas. They range through varying degrees of power from the almost static and inert to the fully dynamic. The difference in potential thus produced renders the equilibrium of the whole very unstable. This is due, however, not alone and directly to the unequal distribution of the social surplus, but also to the indirect effect of that distribution on the personality of the socii. As pointed out elsewhere, the degree of individuation attained depends upon access to and participation in the surplus. Such opportunity, varying in the most radical fashion, splits all political and industrial nations into personality planes or type groups on the basis of individual freedom and autonomy. There are, in consequence, some groups whose members are but slightly individualized, others in which they are more so, and a few in which they are much so. From this as one cause society becomes inharmonious and unstable. Thus, from what may be called a collateral source, the equilibrium is further disturbed and the social instability reinforced. After this manner in all civilized nations in every age have the forces that produce revolutionary change gathered themselves.

Given a situation such as we have just described, and in obedience to the law of energy behavior, an equilibrium will seek to establish itself. Although in the sphere of human association it never quite reaches the point where a perfect balance is secured, there is always striving to that end. An incessant strain toward it or an actual redistribution will be accomplished either gradually without giving rise to serious clash and cataclysmic disturbance

or else it will come about suddenly with the furor and violence of revolution.

The immediate condition that precipitates revolution may be likened to that which obtains in the physical atmosphere where unequal pressure areas produce storms, provided we do not press the analogy too far, for it is only on fundamental lines that the two phenomena follow exactly the same law. Among the variously energized classes there are some that form static or low-pressure areas and others that make dynamic or high-pressure areas. The class that is gaining energy, absorbing new increments of surplus and so becoming self-assertive, ambitious, readily adaptable to the environment, restive, and aggressive, forms a high-pressure area; while on the other hand a class that is losing energy, letting the surplus slip from its grasp, and consequently becoming self-satisfied, unambitious, passive and supine gives a low-pressure area. When in any society two such have been formed and reach a state where the differential becomes too great, a storm follows with the "fierce beating of blind rebellion against blind obstruction" until the pressure is shifted and possibly an equilibrium is approached, or at any rate until a transference of power from one class or faction to another has taken place.[1]

The presence of such areas of unequal stress giving rise to storms in society are evidenced by many signs. They are class hatred, propaganda, and antagonism breaking forth ever and anon in acts of violence, strikes, and retaliatory measures together with riots and minor clashes on many fronts indicating impending disturbance of far greater moment. Such intermittent conflicts as these are just little eddying gusts, but they may, and sometimes do, grow in volume and extent until whole nations are swept into the whirlwind of revolution.

[1] N. L. Sims, *Ultimate Democracy and Its Making*, pp. 312*ff*.

The revolutionary process as described is obviously largely mechanical and yet slow to come into force. Though often threatening to break forth, it seldom does so. Notwithstanding the fact that situations of the most inharmonious and unbalanced sort usually prevail, a cataclysmic redistribution of the surplus is rare, because easily forestalled by those who dominate. As we carry our analysis of surplus control and manipulation a bit further, this will be made clear.

Let it be recalled that the dominating class in every society monopolizes, and has at its disposal most of the surplus; and so long as this continues it retains supremacy. Its problem, however, is always to maintain the monopoly. In an absolute sense this, of course, is not possible. Nowhere in the universe do we find energy locked up so that it may not escape and will not redistribute itself more or less freely. And certainly no form is much less able to securely lock up energy than a group of human beings surrounded by other similar groups. For social energy embraces numerous elements that are exceedingly varied in nature,—some of them being tangible and others thoroughly intangible and elusive, while all of them undergo constant change both patent and hidden. A firm grip on such conditions is, therefore, difficult to maintain. No class, as a result, has ever been successful in keeping such a hold as to appropriate nearly all the surplus. But it may have come near enough to keep all under groups in a state of virtual impotency. This, as a matter of fact, ruling classes have done throughout long periods, time and time again. They have had to exercise eternal vigilance, however, lest the under classes acquire a sufficient portion to dispute the rights of sovereignty. They have necessarily, in order to be secure in power, kept the masses in ignorance and poverty, in weakness and disorganization, by withholding every opportunity possible. Absolute ruthless, unyield-

ing exploitation and domination have been the only safe and sure methods, for thus the subjects are made helpless, abject, and servile. So long as a dominant class under ordinary conditions pursues this policy, and does not itself become divided into quarreling factions that betray its united interests, and therefore allow the subordinate classes to filch from its control a margin of energy, or so long as no untoward events or uncontrollable mutations take place that play into the hands of the masses, a society with ever so great inequality, and consequently in the most unstable equilibrium, may be held for a long time in what practically amounts to a status quo. Howbeit, few ruling classes of history have had the hardihood to be as near absolutists as possible in relation to the surplus, and none has had the wisdom and foresight to adapt itself indefinitely to the changing phases of the environment so as to thwart every tendency subversive of its powers. All, therefore, have eventually fallen and been superseded by an under class.

Certainly, the wise policy for any class that would perpetuate its rule would be one actuated by no compromise or conciliation, no tolerance or justice, no mercy or charity, no yielding of rights or privileges, no sharing of the surplus in any wise with the subjected and exploited. It should be a policy thoroughly Machiavellian in principle, and, if rigidly adhered to, would give all that ruling classes most desire, and that continued success some have, indeed, enjoyed. By such a policy the ancient régime in France and the Romanoff nobility in Russia were able in each case to maintain a sovereignty of long duration.

In spite of all, though, under classes in one way and another gain surplus. When this happens the position of the ruling class is challenged; and, when the power of the dispossessed becomes ample enough, conflict comes, and a new régime succeeds to the dictatorship. A notion is abroad

that revolutions are made by wretched, half-starved, utterly ignorant, crushed, and destitute masses. The enslaved, the hungry, the "down and out" and the worst exploited are, therefore, considered the dangerous elements of society. But revolutions come not from people in any such state. Karl Marx was fully aware of this. In the *Communist Manifesto* he wrote: "The 'dangerous class,' the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution. Its condition of life, however, prepares it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue."[2] Walter Weyl also gave emphasis to the same fact, and suggested the reason why. "Such men," he says, "are not the standard bearers of revolt, nor the steady carriers of the torch of progress. They are the stuff of which bloody, unsuccessful uprisings might be made, but they are too poor, too ignorant, and, by their very economic dependencies, too inconstant and fearsome, to lead or even effectively to participate in the tenacious long-continued campaigns which must precede any revolutionary change in the bases of modern society."[3]

It is not possible for people to rebel on tripe and carrion. There must be some quail and pheasant. In fact, a sufficient degree of energizing to render them dynamic is an indispensable prerequisite. A deficit must be turned into a surplus; misery must give place to well-being, enfeeblement converted into strength; else there is no power to rise against the sovereign class. In every revolution of history I am certain this has been the case. The under classes have become menacing to the existing régime only where they have attained a high degree of class-consciousness along with vigor, education, material wealth and or-

[2] Engel's Ed., Authorized English Translation, p. 29.
[3] *The New Democracy*, p. 179.

ganization, or a goodly portion of some one or more of these elements of puissance.

When I speak of a class becoming energized, it does not necessarily mean that all or even a majority of those composing it have come into possession of marked ability, a margin of wealth, new tradition, or a superior knowledge, and extensive or especially efficient organization, or any one of these elements. This, indeed, may be the case, but usually it is not. The energizing of a class generally signifies that only a minority has been made surplusful. This minority, an active, resourceful, dynamic faction,—the protocracy of the class, as Giddings would say—is that which gives character to the group as a whole. It is sometimes endowed with one form of surplus, and sometimes with another; but in whatever form or forms its peculiar strength lies, class power largely depends on its energy. The bulk of any class is normally a pretty inert, jellyfish sort of entity. If in misery, it is supine; if in well-being, it takes its ease; if in abundance, it is self-centered or self-indulgent. But a dynamic minority dominating it prods it into self-consciousness, whips it into a psychological crowd with the doctrines of self-interest; makes it into a force by organization, and sets it going on the way to social ascendancy. Any class evolving a protocratic minority may be said to be surplusful; and, as history bears witness, whenever such minority has found the class ranks to which it belongs numerous enough, it has been able to challenge the social order, and not infrequently overturn the same.

Revolutions seem to rise, not from one under class alone getting surplus, but from the energizing of several or all of them at the same time. For the cataclysms of history have all shown a combination of the under classes against the dominant group. In France it was the bourgeoisie, peasantry, proletariat, and clerics in part against the nobility. In Russia it was the bourgeoisie, proletariat, and

peasantry against the aristocracy, and finally the proletariat and peasantry against the bourgeoisie. Such combinations, however, are always dominated by the most powerful of the under classes. And when, if successful in overthrowing the old régime, they enter into the new kingdom they have won, it is invariably only one of the under classes that takes possession and assumes mastery. Revolutions do not often run their course without a struggle between the triumphant classes to determine which shall be chief. The process whereby an under class accumulates surplus is then an important phase of revolutionary movements that needs to be understood, but it is a difficult one to trace with any complete detail.

The fact of compromise on the part of the controlling class has been suggested as one means working to the advantage of the subordinate classes. This, unquestionably, has been of first-rate importance. Martin in his study of crowds makes the significant statement that "a revolution occurs when the dominant crowd begins to weaken."[4] In substantiation of this proposition he calls attention to the social developments leading up to certain historic cataclysms. To quote him further: "A general revolution is not made in a day; each such cataclysm is preceded by a long period of unrest and propaganda of opposition to the existing order and its beneficiaries."[5] This opposition he interprets as evidence of "the progressive disintegration of the dominant party," citing the disturbance in the Roman Republic during the last century and more preceding the Christian era, the century or so of unrest going before both the Reformation and the French Revolution, in proof. Apropos of the first instance he makes the following summary of Roman history: "The Roman Republic began going to pieces about a hundred years before the battle of

[4] *The Behavior of Crowds*, p. 186.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

Actium. The social unrest which followed the Punic Wars and led to the revolt of the brothers Gracchi was never wholly checked during the century which followed. The dominant party had scarcely rid itself of these troublesome 'demagogues' than revolt broke out among the slave population of Sicily. This was followed by the revolt of the Italian peasants, then again by the insurrection of Spartacus, and this in turn by the civil war between Marius and Sulla, the conspiracy of Catiline, the brief triumph of Julius Cæsar over the Senate, the revenge of the latter in the assassination of Cæsar, and the years of turmoil during the Second Triumvirate." The story is that of "one counter-crowd and then another, representing various elements of the populace" trying "issues with the ruling crowd." [6]

Such manifestations as these are, indeed, evidence of an unstable equilibrium tottering to its fall, and they may indicate, too, that the dominant class is weakening; but they do not necessarily do this, nor reveal just how or why the weakening is taking place. This remains for us to discover, and the key to its explanation is found most often in the fact of compromise. I mean by compromise a relaxation of absolute domination and monopoly of the surplus. Such relaxation may be either by voluntary concessions or by inadvertent acts. By either means the under classes gain energy, and if a sufficient amount they become troublesome and bold, clamorous and menacing, and finally openly aggressive and rebellious. The process of transference of surplus from the control of the sovereign to the subjected classes may be slow and long drawn out, and again it may be accomplished in a short space by a sudden spurt, as it were. In fact, the rapid concentration of energy as well as a rapid dissipation of the same is not at all uncommon in human affairs. In case of revolution such rapidity of movement invariably occurs.

[6] E. D. Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 186, 187.

The part played by compromise has in a way been recognized by the author just quoted. His statement in this connection is worthy of notice. "Revolutions," says he, "do not occur directly from abuse of power, for in that case there would be nothing but revolution all the time, since every dominant crowd has abused its power. It is an interesting fact that revolution generally occurs after the abuses of which the revolutionists complain have been in great measure stopped, that is, after the ruling crowd has begun to make efforts at reform. The Reformation occurred in the pontificate of Leo X. If it had been the result of intolerable abuse alone, it would have happened in the time of Alexander VI, Borgia. The French Revolution fell upon the mild head of Louis XVI, though the wrongs which it tried to right mostly happened in the reign of his predecessor." [7]

In the making of the French Revolution the transference of surplus control from one class to the other was an important factor. The "Ancien Régime" under Louis XIV and Louis XV had been absolute enough to check any extensive energizing of the under classes of the nation. And yet it did not prevent a good deal of power from being gathered. The bourgeois class, identified with city life, accumulated some wealth and grew in intelligence, while the peasants acquired land. Thus in several ways, from one source or another, the under classes gathered energy before the advent of the lax and compromising era of Louis XVI. There is much evidence to back this up. Madelin, a late authority on the Revolution, says of the peasant on the eve of the upheaval: "In appearance he was poverty-stricken, indeed. But we must not allow this to deceive us completely. By what prodigy of thrift did these poor creatures contrive to conceal from their extortioners the means of buying their land? For it is a fact

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 185, 186.

that *ever since the beginning of the eighteenth century the peasant had been buying the land.* Almost one-third of the soil of France was already held by French peasants, who certainly combined a genius for economy with their fierce desire to possess land of their own. Recent works have cast a remarkable light on this unsuspected state of things. But this situation, far from satisfying the peasant, only excited his aspirations. What might he not hope to attain, once freed from the crushing burden laid on him by the state and the privileged classes?"[8]

The bourgeoisie were not without vigor, wealth, culture and knowledge. Perhaps the latter constituted their greatest stock of surplus. They were thoroughly steeped in the new social and political tradition of the day. They read Voltaire, Diderot, d'Alembert, and Rousseau. "They worshipped these writers, who served the cause of their own resentments, and who, clamouring like Rousseau for equality, fed their legitimate pride."[9] They became filled to the full, not only with the new social creed, but with the knowledge of its outworking in America. To them it showed the way of salvation. It did much to generate in them the revolutionary spirit. The bourgeoisie were thus undoubtedly much the best endowed class in the matters of enlightenment and intellectual ability. In these things lay their strength. They were "filled with a fierce longing for the power which the conquest of liberty and equality would bring . . . an energetic, intelligent, ambitious and greedy class," says Madelin.[9]

Thus slowly gathering surplus, the under classes came to the days of Louis XVI charged with aspiration and unrest. Then came the yielding policy of the sovereign class in every quarter and the slackening of the grip of control. A rapid concentration of surplus energy in the hands of

[8] Louis Madelin, *The French Revolution*, p. 11.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

the populace, or, more correctly, in the hands of the third estate leading the peasants, took place, while at the same time the power of the régime of the nobility rapidly waned. The coalition of middle class and peasants joined by the proletariat meant the integration of the national surplus under new control. "All this energy, individual and collective, compressed, as it were, by a worn-out machine, was to blow it (the Ancien Régime) into pieces, and overflow for a space of ten years in such a fashion that the world had never beheld such a sight before." [10]

The blame for the whole affair has usually been laid to the compromising policy of Louis XVI. And this in part justly enough, since without his compromises the under classes would hardly have mustered surplus enough to precipitate the storm. None, perhaps, saw just where the blame lay more clearly than the English Tories of that time. Their own sovereignty was even less secure than that of the French nobility, for opportunism had been so long in vogue in England and so many concessions had been made that commonalty had waxed dangerously strong. The Tories, therefore, feared and took counsel together to hold fast to every vestige of control and brook no further compromise or reform that would add more strength to the masses and bring upon the imperial class of England such a fate as had befallen their kind in France.

In a more correct sense than that implied by the term compromise there may be a weakening of the dominant class, a weakening, moreover, that does not mean any transference of energy to the under classes. For there is such a thing as class degeneracy, which brings stagnation and disintegration. Such a weakening, of course, gives to the under classes relatively more power than their inherent energy would alone confer, and, perchance, in a particular situation surplus enough to overthrow the dominant class

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

in its weakened condition. One factor, no doubt, in the French Revolution, was the decay of the nobility. It lost the ability to adapt itself to the needs of the situation, and became thoroughly incompetent. It failed to formulate any administrative, financial, political, or social doctrines such as the changing times demanded. In this failure more than in anything else was its incapacity revealed. For perhaps it is in administration or generalization that we have the real test of ability.[11] Because the nobility failed here it lost its grip on national organization. "Clearly, since the days of Louis XIV," says Madelin, "the King, 'the first nobleman in his kingdom,' had depended on his nobles; yet all his policy inherited from his ancestors tended to the confinement of this nobility within the borders of mediocrity which had enfeebled it. Ministerial functions were bestowed by preference, from Colbert's time down to Necker's, on members of the middle classes, though a discreet scorn for them was always shown. So the King leant on an aristocracy that had been deliberately weakened, and governed through a bourgeoisie which he despised."[12]

The army, for instance, without which the aristocracy consisting of not more than 270,000 nobles was unable to sustain its authority, had suffered from the degeneracy of its masters. For the aristocrats who always officered it were of inferior quality. They were generally men of low grade ability and of a sentimental type, lacking the sternness to impose needed discipline.[13]

Again, many of the nobility drank deep of the new political and social teachings of the age, and lost faith in the right to rule. In fact, they lost confidence in the institutions that upheld their sovereignty. They developed, in-

[11] Brooks Adams, *The Theory of Social Revolutions*, p. 208.
[12] Louis Madelin, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

stead, great faith in the "virtue of humanity," idealized "Man," and became broadly humanitarian. This attitude spread even to the army and undermined it, was carried into political affairs as a vitiating influence, ran through the ranks of the aristocracy and divided it into two groups.[14]

While this tradition, doctrinarian though it was, was good propaganda for the under classes, it was not that kind by which dominant classes are sustained. The nobility of France had not the capacity to see this; it had become so weakened that it was the victim of the environment, and no longer its master.

Withal, the state of the nobility is so splendidly summed up by the author whom we have cited, that we may venture to quote him again in conclusion:

"On February 17, 1798," says he, "Mallet du Pan wrote his conviction that in France at that date, 'by dint of life in cities, epicureanism and indolence, all the rich, all the high-born, all the land-owners, all the men of breeding, were absolutely enervated.' In the old days energy had been both general and splendid; that of the kings had built up France, that of the feudal lords had battled for her, that of her apostles had evangelized her. But these descendants and successors of great men were, as a whole, utterly devoid of energy; and further, seeing that the rights to all good things were reserved for birth and privilege, they barred the way to other men's energy and kept it down. Walpole, who saw these people at Versailles, considered them incurably 'anæmic'." [15]

In the process of energy transference another way by which the under classes may be favored with surplus often opens under the exigencies arising when circumstantial pressure, such, for instance, as invasion or that brought by

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 16, 19.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

a foreign war, besets a nation. At such times new adjustments are forced, new practices have to be resorted to, and new alignments and relationships must be brought into being in order to meet the emergency. All this unavoidably means more or less shifting of forces, release of tradition, enfranchisement of personality—in short, a redistribution of energy in a way that the dominant class stands in danger of losing partial control of the situation. Then it is that the extremity of the dominant sometimes becomes the opportunity for the dominated. The most downtrodden may have a chance at energy hitherto denied them, and suddenly become a surplusful group, ready to dispute the authority of their masters.

Under the stress of the Great War it was something of the sort that happened in Russia and brought about the upheaval there. All the absolutism of the Czaristic régime proved ineffectual in keeping down the subjected classes. For a generation or more their intellectual ability had grown apace. Neither execution nor exile could eradicate from the ranks of the bourgeoisie and proletariat the talented nor the traditions of a better social order produced by them. Power was accumulating in the lower ranks, and the integration of those possessing it was taking place. Evidence of this appeared in the widespread revolutionary propaganda and rising unrest.[16] Such propaganda is always a symptom of swelling power—a sort of growing pain; it indicates the fact that people have ceased to believe in the established order or to give assent to its continuance.[17] It means that the ferment of new tradition is at work. This was its meaning in Russia, and when the Great War broke over Europe, embroiling Russia and upsetting its established habitual ways, there came to the

[16] Daniel Novamirsky, "The Peasant and the Revolution," *The Survey*, Vol. 49, pp. 699-702.
[17] E. D. Martin, *op. cit.*, pp. 191, 192.

under classes a sufficient release and increase of energy to make them a surplusful people. Those who made possible the revolution were brought together by the millions in great armies, and as a result came to feel a sense of solidarity never before realized. Out of local communities, from village and city alike, into camps and battle lines, a people was drawn that hitherto had been but a great, incoherent, inert mass. This new experience, wide and stimulating as it was, served to awaken them and to give them a feeling of mobility. In fact, it swung them out of the most confining sort of existence into what was virtually an international environment. And there multitudes of them were imbued with ideas and ideals of a new and gripping sort. These were very largely the doctrines of socialism. To the many they were new tradition, and as this new tradition became common property among them it galvanized the major part of them into class-conscious unity. Then everywhere they began to assert themselves, and presently a new creation sprang forth—the Soviet. It was a child of the people's awakening, a mobile, flexible organization; and yet as persistent as the thought and will it expressed. Village, town, city, and each unit of the army all formed their local Soviets. Here was an instrument of power never before grasped by the Russian masses—truly surplus organization all their own, at once a volitional, intellectual, and effective organ. By it they appropriated the gains of the incipient March revolution, and rapidly carried the cause of the masses on to the complete triumph of November, 1917.[18]

The center of this newly acquired power was the Sovietized army. Pervaded with the Soviet form and spirit, it became clearly aware that the military organization was nothing other than the regimented proletariat and peas-

[18] Dr. C. H. Wright, "Notes from Bolshevik Ideals and Their Failures," *The Living Age,* Dec. 21, 1918.

antry. It, therefore, declared itself its own master, and as such the servant of the masses, and no longer the instrument of the imperial class. Thus endowed with a new tradition and a new organization giving possession of the military forces, the under classes of Russia were rendered dynamic. And thus were they able to sweep away the old order and to put the nation in subjection to a proletarian dictatorship.

Akin to the shift of energy caused by circumstantial pressure is the displacement that achievement sometimes produces. However completely a ruling class may dominate, it cannot foresee all the results of achievement, and consequently cannot forfend itself against any untoward effects that may follow. Developments, therefore, take place that distribute social energy to the undoing of the master group. The invention of gunpowder did this. It was a bit of knowledge seemingly harmless enough that soon became common tradition. But for the masses it proved to be a tremendously energizing agency, eventually transforming them from servile hosts into formidable rivals of the nobility. A more important development of similar influence was involved in the growth of arts and crafts and industrial technique along with a widening knowledge of the world and its peoples, means of navigation, and the methods of trade and commerce, all of which went to establish an industrial economy. This economy gave rise to the commercial and manufacturing city, centering in itself more and more wealth, tradition, and organization till it held the bulk of power. This power, moreover, was largely possessed by a new class—the bourgeoisie. Thus, achievement had brought about a shift in the social balance, the outcome of which was the clash of classes in revolution.

The latter phase of the industrial movement, ushered in by a series of remarkable inventions giving what we com-

monly call the Industrial Revolution, only accelerated the integration already under way, and quickly carried it to a climax. The new impetus played a part in the French Revolution and in cataclysmic changes elsewhere. Two of these involved our own country. The American Revolution was an effect of the Industrial Revolution. The industrial and commercial classes, sharing in the opportunities it brought, gained in strength till there came a clash with the aristocracy. In that clash the colonial Tories along with their English partisans went down, and the American bourgeoisie came into control.[18a] The second clash was between the bourgeoisie of the North and the landed aristocracy of the South. This came about through the invention of the cotton gin in the first instance, followed by the extensive application of steam to industry and transportation in the North. Two areas of unequal pressure were thus formed, and presently the furors of civil strife broke over the land. The outcome was the sweeping away of the aristocracy of the South and the establishment of Northern bourgeoisie supremacy.[19]

To this point in the discussion we have doubtless left the impression that classes are always closed circles with deep gulfs fixed between them very like those found in cases of well-defined hereditary castes. We have indicated further that between such mutually exclusive groups clashes were bound to occur whenever through surplus the dispossessed become dynamic. This sketch of the situation is not, however, entirely faithful to the facts in all cases. Classes are not always exclusive groups, deeply cleft from one another. They are sometimes open groups, and when they are it makes a world of difference as regards the distribution of energy and the formation of inharmonious areas. The simple truth is that open classes have a profound tendency to

[18a] Brooks Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 206, 207.

foil revolutions. But this pertains to industrialism, and launches us into another phase of our subject.

### Industrialism and Revolutionary Prospects

Open classes generally prevail in the industrial world of to-day, and the survivals of closed ones in industrial society are no longer of the fast-closed sort. The fast-closed kind founded on conquest and heredity belong for the most part to past history. They were feudal nobilities and hereditary social aristocracies, servile peasants and slaves, bourgeois and proletarians in orders pretty much fixed. But in the western world of the present with peasant and proletarian, bourgeois and sometimes nobility, there is a constant passing from one rank to the other. Entrance into the dominating class, that is, that of the bourgeoisie, is no more difficult than fortune getting. Wealth makes any one eligible, and the *nouveau riche,* constantly pressing into its ranks, makes it a rapidly changing group. And where, as in England, an innocuous nobility still persists, it, too, is open to the plutocrat, the politician, and numerous other citizens of varying functions or merits. Its ranks are constantly being recruited from lowly sources, as the nickname "beerage," which the English peerage bears, pointedly suggests.

This characteristic of modern classes is highly significant, for in a measure it operates to forestall revolution. The bourgeoisie draws to itself the proletariat, which acquires surplus; that is, the intellectuals, organizers, and any who chance to engage in trade or have come into modest wealth. They are enticed with positions of trust and honor of one sort and another, some of them in governmental affairs, and are thus corrupted until weaned away from their class. So we hear the proletariat lamenting lost leaders and betrayed causes. In fact the proletariat are "picked over"

"while children passing through the schools to fill the lesser positions of the class above them; they continue to be sifted by the same process all the way up to middle life. The result is a residue often seriously depleted in ability, stability, and initiative, composing the rank and file of the proletariat." [20]

Not only does the bourgeois seek to make bourgeoisie of the proletariat, but there is a natural drift in that same direction by the surplusful element itself. For many reasons it is the line of greatest traction and least resistance. It is said of the English proletariat, for instance, that ever since 1848 it has sought to become bourgeoisie, and has ceased to seek the uplift of the entire disinherited class.[21] This is accounted for in the way already shown, but English imperialism offered peculiar opportunities for corrupting the proletariat. The following, I suppose, is a fair statement of her case: "England, long before the other countries, placed her capitalistic development on the basis of predatory imperialism, and she interested the upper strata of the proletariat in her world dominion. In championing its own class interests the English proletariat limited itself to exercising pressure on the bourgeois parties, which granted it a share in the capitalistic exploitation of other countries. It did not begin an independent policy until England began to lose her position in the world market, pushed aside, among others, by her main rival, Germany." [22]

The author just quoted finds the same influences were at work in Germany. He continues: "But with Germany's growth to industrial world importance grew the dependence of broad strata of the German proletariat on German imperialism, not materially alone but also ideally. The

[20] G. D. H. Cole, *Labor in the Commonwealth*, pp. 64*ff*.
[21] H. M. Hyndam, "Evolution of Revolution," *The Living Age*, July 6, 1918.
[22] L. Trotzky, *The Bolsheviki and World Peace*, p. 214.

*Vorwärts* wrote on August 11th that the German workingmen, 'counted among the politically intelligent, to whom we have preached the dangers of imperialism for years (although with very little success, we must confess)' denounce Italian neutrality like the extreme chauvinists. But that did not prevent the *Vorwärts* from feeding the German working men on 'national' and 'democratic' arguments in justification of the bloody work of imperialism.'' [23]

The defection of the proletariat from its class is fostered in still other ways. The bourgeoisie controls the jobs and all sorts of patronage which are used to reward those who forswear allegiance to under class interests. Thus a legion of men and women whose lot is nothing other than that of proletarians are made in the eyes of many of their fellows traitors to their own class and sharers of bourgeois class consciousness. All such hirelings and ''hangers-on'' fondly hope and confidently expect to enjoy in due time, the privileges of the real bourgeoisie.

Western industrial society, therefore, with open classes has less tendency to the development of revolution than would otherwise be the case. For the facility with which the energized element of the under class can be absorbed by the dominant group is an effective means of dissipating gathering storms. In the face of this the under classes are evolving a propaganda of direct action and violence which has for its object the provocation of a reciprocal policy of ruthlessness on the part of the master class. Thus, they believe a gulf will become fixed between the two which cannot be so easily passed over, that class consciousness will be heightened, that the masses will more readily gather power to overthrow the capitalistic order.

In yet another way does capitalism keep down revolution. I refer to the policies of social reform and uplift so much in vogue in the great industrial states. These policies em-

[23] L. Trotzky, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

brace a wide range of enterprises and activities such as free schools, agencies of public health, institutions that care for the aged, sick and indigent, social insurance of many kinds, and even state-owned industries and utilities which have been taken from private control and profit for the public good. Much of this has been done in Germany, the United Kingdom, and other European states, and no little in the United States. The cost of such undertakings lays a heavy tax on plutocracy. Indeed, the greater part of the national budgets are drawn from its profits by direct taxation. Thus capitalism seems to be voluntarily sharing the economic surplus with the masses. It seems to be imposing heavy tax burdens on the rich in order to help the poor. It seems, moreover, to be socializing industries in order that the few may not profit at the expense of the many. By this the masses have unquestionably gained. They are generally aware of the benefits. The result has been soothing. It has led to a cordiality toward capitalism that would not otherwise exist; it has made many satisfied who might have become rebellious; it has tended to lull them into an optimistic belief in the goodness of "benevolent feudalism," and a faith in the indefinite continuance of a program of reform. Moreover, the masses are disposed to think that it is their own efforts that really coerced the plutocracy into sharing the surplus.

But in this they may be largely deluded even as they are in the belief that there has been any real sacrifice by the ruling class for the public welfare. For all reforms undertaken by the plutocracy have been initiated from motives of self-interest and for its own benefit. Where the public has gained a tithe the ruling class has profited an hundredfold by almost every measure put into force through greater efficiency developed in the workers and through superior facilities for competition with other national groups. Desire for profits was the motive behind

Bismarck's socialistic policies in Germany, and the same motive has lurked more or less behind all similar policies elsewhere. Not all capitalists see it in this light, of course, and so we find many of them bitterly fighting such policies. But the wise and far-seeing ones who have the responsibility for maintaining the present régime hesitate not to advance reform measures; and the ends attained justify the wisdom of the means; since, for a mere sop thrown to the crowd, immense profits inure to the plutocratic class; and, above all, the crowd is kept more than half satisfied under the delusion that its sop is the lion's share. Thus, with great astuteness and singular success the ruling class pursues a policy that tends to maintain the status quo. Meanwhile, however, its control of the surplus is uncurbed and its power remains unabated.

We have called attention to certain characteristics of industrial society which tend to prevent cataclysmic change. Does this mean that revolution is not likely to recur again? By no means, for no society in unstable balance is secure. About this there can be no question, but there are several questions regarding present-day prospects that need to be pondered.

As I interpret the social revolutions of history, they have come about through the development of some new form of surplus, or from the possession of an extraordinary amount of it, operating to energize an under class. Those occurring in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were due primarily to the creation of urban wealth. The ancient régime everywhere was built on a form of organization. The nobility had sprung from conquest whence had arisen the political order. The political order in all it implied was the power that gave them supremacy. This supremacy lasted just so long as political organization represented the preponderance of energy. When, however, commerce and industry grew, and cities became the centers of ac-

tivity, wealth with what it fostered began to outweigh political organization, and then that organization as the agency of social dominion was doomed.

Meanwhile, since 1914 there have been at least two successful revolutions in Europe, one in Russia and the other in Germany. In the latter case it was the bourgeoisie that overthrew aristocracy; while in the former it was first the bourgeoisie that deposed the aristocracy, and finally the proletariat and the proletarized peasant that triumphed over all. The German instance does not differ greatly from the revolutions of the eighteenth century, but the Russian upheaval in its ultimate phase was something new. For it showed the working class rising to the place of dictatorship. What form of energy was it that gave them ascendancy over political organization and capital alike? It was primarily a new form of organization embodying a new social tradition. By this surplus mode all else was overwhelmed, just as previously capitalism had swept away the feudal order in other days and lands.

Perhaps in this we should discern forthcoming events elsewhere casting their shadows. We should at least perceive in it what is probably the surplus mode that will accomplish the downfall of capitalism. This new mode is indeed already fairly well developed among the proletariat of other countries. Its integration is apparently approaching completion in a few. England, for example, has virtually a clear majority of the population of the realm embraced directly and indirectly in class-conscious "vocational organizations." Such organization, despite many differences in the several lands where found, has practically everywhere a common aim, namely, to overthrow capitalism. Within it talent is rising and intelligence is growing till the class, despite its depletion by those joining the ranks next above, is even now often quite the equal of the bourgeois in ability. Significantly, it has brought forth

and is informed by a philosophical tradition opposing that of the existing order at every turn. This tradition runs the entire gamut of theory from theological and ethical to legal and political codes. And, curiously enough whatever may be said of its practical merits, it is the only libation that has been poured to the gods of essential social progress since the rise of the industrial régime. Progress there has been, indeed, both wonderful and good, in the direction of objective science and its applications, but that is practically all. With technical and material achievement those of the bourgeois class have been almost wholly engrossed and fully satisfied. They have monopolized its fruits and gloated over the mastery it gave them. At ease and secure in their Zion they have taken no thought for progress otherwise, so they have made none, nor allowed the vision of any to trouble them. From their materialistic eyes and money-making souls all else has been hidden. They have thought in "terms of money more exclusively than the French aristocrat or lawyer ever thought in terms of caste."[24] But it is written that without vision the people perish, and so, perhaps, shall it be with the bourgeoisie.

Meanwhile, as already said, the proletariat has brought forth traditions of advancement for society in things fundamental. It has a new ethics pulsating with brotherly love, humanitarian motives, and freedom of spirit in place of the slave morals and success codes that hold sway; it has a new theology that sets God to work in this world to save the social order instead of making him a supermundane referee in human bankruptcy; it has a new scheme of laws that would secure equal rights for all and justice for each in substitution for exclusive class privilege and class justice, which spells exploitation for the many; and finally, above all, it has a new politico-economic system offering the

[24] Brooks Adams, *op. cit.*, pp. 208, 209.

boon of universal welfare and happiness through a socialized commonwealth with peace and goodwill among the nations.

Certain details of this body of tradition may well detain us for a moment. One is repudiation of the theory that it is the majority that rules for the principle that it is an active minority instead. This doctrine asserts, moreover, that so-called majority rule is only secret deception, whereas avowed minority control such as prevails should be honest and open coercion of the inert mass. A second noteworthy detail is the rejection of "the convention that a territorial district should be the unit on which territorial power is based" for the principle of vocationalism.[25] These doctrines clearly cast aside that conventional democracy upheld by the bourgeoisie on the ground of its false pretense and failure. They imply that the foundations on which it is supposed to rest, namely, sanction by the vote of the citizens and change by means of the ballot, are but shams. For the bourgeoisie, controlling the means of publicity, education, and livelihood, control the ballot, and so render it just a harmless amusement in which the public may indulge at will, but without ever working any basic change in the social and economic system. That basic change must come by the forcible displacement of the ruling class, is, therefore, a further implication. Vocationalism, whether called guild socialism, syndicalism, Sovietism, or what not, frankly seeks the substitution of class-conscious interest groups for territorial democracy and capitalism.[26]

This body of tradition is the offering of the proletariat to social advancement, just as material and technical achievement may be said to be the contribution of the bourgeoisie. The former, however, is thus far chiefly but

[25] See Graham Wallas, *op. cit.*, pp. 106, 107.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 105.

a tender yet to be put into force. It stands, however, as an opposing energy integration; and, thus, there are two inharmonious areas in every industrial land. Will the power of the under class embraced in this body of tradition and embodied in organization continue to increase, and finally overthrow the existing order? Undoubtedly in due course it will; else we have misread the lessons of history and failed to grasp the essential social process of the ages.

In the leading industrial nations, however, despite the energizing of the under classes, it is exceedingly difficult for them to attain sufficient power to overthrow capitalism. For never was any class so well fortified as the bourgeois has so far proved to be. Its possession of wealth gives command over instruments of force as never before. In the generations of the past technical tradition was almost as effective in the hands of the under classes as in those of their masters. It could be applied without great resources of wealth, but to-day there are agencies of warfare and destruction that only great wealth can command. They lie beyond the reach of the masses, and the masses are altogether helpless before them. Capitalism thus appears to be an impregnable power, proof against any revolution, unless its armed forces mutiny and turn the instruments of destruction upon their masters. Only in this way, or possibly by the general strike, thinks Wallas, can the proletariat prevail against the dominant class.[27] But even these means are within reach of the masses, as recent events have demonstrated. Armies have mutinied in England before the Great War, and in Russia in 1917. Armies will doubtless become class-conscious and will mutiny again at an opportune time in the clash of classes that is gathering. Then will the capitalistic order give place to a proletariat dictatorship, even in such strongholds as England

[27] Graham Wallas, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-138.

or the United States, if meantime the succession of classes is not effected by the gradual transition of evolution.

### The Fruits of Revolution

The main results of social cataclysms, as we have seen, consist in the substitution of one ruling class for another, and the elevation of a new surplus mode to the seat of authority. This, of course, is not different from what the evolutionary process might produce, and need not, therefore, be further emphasized. But the extraordinary conditions attending revolutionary change are usually such as to yield many important incidental results. They give both sweet and bitter fruits.

In any thoroughgoing upheaval there is pretty sure to be much destruction of wealth. The economic surplus may be largely used up, even wiped out completely. Production is hindered, and often greatly curtailed if not practically suspended while the storm rages. Before the new order gets well settled and all readjustments are effected, the nation may suffer material want. Its whole standard of living may be lowered, and many of its people find themselves reduced to a state of existence but little above a bare subsistence level. Even though a nation be brought to such extremities, it is to be noted that the losses which are inflicted are chiefly material. Although economic goods are for the most part energies of tremendous importance, and indispensable to much social power, their loss may possibly be offset by gains in other ways. At least, the revolutions of history seem to indicate that such is the case. These gains, however, are generally ignored or overlooked, and revolutions, being judged by their ruthlessness and waste, are pronounced altogether evil. But let us look at the other side to see the possible good they may accomplish.

The normal state of any society is one of relative rigidity of relations, fixity of structure, and strict adherence to customary ways and habits. The several groups or classes are each gripped by the traditions—moral, religious, political, economic, and philosophical—that characterize them. Every one of them tends to become what has been called a "psychological mechanism";[28] that is to say, a "crowd" or party with set beliefs, doctrines, and attitudes, uncritically accepted and blindly followed. Most men in every nation are found under the tyranny of parties and classes of this nature. It has ever been thus with mankind. The chief difference that is to be discerned from age to age, from primitive times down to our own, is in the multiplication and diversification of groups and classes. Thus, it has become possible for the socius in the truly modern world to pass from one group to another, to make free choice of those he prefers among many options. This is an advantage which the development of traditional surplus in the course of evolution has brought to personality, in that it promotes individuation The growth of individuation, as we have shown, has gone forward along with the increase of surplus from age to age. Accompanying this individuation and rising from the same conditions as it does, there is a liberation of energy. This takes place in ever-increasing degree because of the multiplicity of relations open to the individual and the friction and maladjustment that ensues from his efforts to fit into them. The released energy means a disturbed and unstable situation. So extensive has this become in modern society that one is apt to overlook the fact that fixity is after all the larger factor. Especially does the mechanism of idea or tradition systems continue to prevail, and most men remain its victims.

Even more than in idea systems are people enmeshed in

[28] E. D. Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

organizations and institutions. Personality for great numbers is absorbed almost to the point of monopoly by them. Men are institutionalized; that is to say, they have little or no part of themselves in reserve, no sphere of self that is not appropriated and determined by the social organization about them. Here again in the course of human progress, surplus has arisen; institutions have grown more and more numerous and varied in type, and thus have given a certain relief to personality. The individual has been allowed to escape from the complete domination of his soul by one or two institutions, and now parcels it out among numerous ones. This is especially so if he is a citizen of one of the highly industrialized lands of the western world. While this dividing of the personality under many institutional loyalties and devotions, duties and servitudes, has its merits in contrast to what bygone ages permitted, it has not given complete freedom to personality. For here, too, is a vast mechanism at work that tends to reduce men to mere social automatons. It is only less oppressive and binding mechanization than of old, for in place of a few very exacting institutions the socius is beset on every hand by a veritable maze of organizations of a somewhat freer type that perplex and restrain by virtue of their very numbers and complex nature. This aspect of present-day occidental civilization greatly impressed Rabindranath Tagore in his western tour of a few years ago. He said: "Man is reducing himself to his minimum in order to make ample room for his organizations." He saw personality everywhere crushed by organization. Universal reliance upon it for almost everything apparently seemed to him evil, not only because of the deadly uniformity that it gives but because it induces neglect of the great resources of personality in our social life. There can be little question of the great truth in this characterization of our over-organized life. Society has reared a vast structure which

imprisons its members. They find themselves entangled so they cannot run, and fettered so that the soul cannot be free. This is the other side of the story of increasing organization which, as we have already shown, has indeed had in one respect a pronounced enfranchising effect upon men. Its rise has liberated in one way and yet ensnared in another.

So much for the normal state of the body politic, a state which, withal, holds the individual largely as in a matrix, and tends so to mechanize life that personality is stultified. It is this state that social revolutions radically alter, and by altering may possibly bring forth good fruits. Before noticing just what is brought forth, let us see in what respect alteration is effected. It is in a more or less complete break up of the status quo. This involves throwing down much of the social structure, and unsettling even the most stable institutions. Traditions are also shattered, old dogmas are rudely cast aside, customs are violated, and routine life made impossible. What was once absolute and authoritative proves no longer valid. Things grow confused and chaotic. A general state of fluidity comes to prevail where relative fixity once reigned. Social energy is released and is rendered kinetic. The epistatic factors or those that suppress the power of individuals and groups are broken up. Under these conditions there is rapid redistribution; integration and disintegration everywhere are quickened. When such mobility holds sway individuals have a chance to become most effective. The restraining mechanism is broken asunder, and they are released, and energy in general is released upon which they may exert themselves. The inner life, whatever it chances to be, finds then but meager sanction and little support in external things. The old pillars that have always stood along the customary ways are no longer there to mark the way to be followed or to be leaned against when there is need.

The soul is thrown back upon itself for succor. The old party or class with its fixed place is, perhaps, scattered, displaced, or driven into a position that makes it a less certain refuge than before. Familiar organizations that once hedged about no longer lend any aid, nor interpose any barriers to give a sense of reality to the world. So the individual is delivered from the social matrix and thrown largely upon his own resources for direction and guidance. He is forced to make new adjustments. A state of flux similar to that of the environment overcomes him. Habits, creeds, loyalties, purposes, and principles become flexible and subject to change as, perhaps, under no other social conditions.

What does this signify? What fruits does it yield? In the first place, it signifies a return to the original form and sources of social power, to the fountain head of achievement, to the element whence all has sprung, namely, to personality. Though practically all else should be destroyed, naked personality remaining would restore again the whole creation. And the more nearly any society becomes reduced to this elemental factor, the more personality may freely come into play. Man may then brood anew over the chaos, and cause it to take form once more. Hard as it is for any society to be reduced to such straits, there is, nevertheless, good in it. There is good because of the necessity for building anew, and because of the infinite possibilities of building the new better than ever the old could be, even though the rebuilding be slow and arduous.

What has just been said does not imply the condemnation of social institutions. For it is altogether evident that they are the tools by which man has become effective. They are, indeed, next to his vital endowments, part and parcel of his most valuable social resources. Normally, he works through them and is so handicapped without them that he may be rendered all but helpless. Even so, they may en-

slave him. Hence anything that will set him free for a time and let him be unrestrained is good. Of course, no revolution that works a real good will efface the social heritage from the minds of men. Were any upheaval to go to such lengths, men would fall to the bottom of the long slope of civilization up which they have slowly climbed, and that would be utterly disastrous. But the temporary precipitation of institutions is quite a different matter.

All things, indeed, are to be expected of unhampered personality in reconstructing a chaotic social order. For it is at liberty to salvage all that is good in the old traditions, and upon these as its chief corner stone it is singularly free to erect a structure devoid of the faults of the old and adorned with achievement fresh from its creative efforts. Thus, it is possible to agree with Thomas Jefferson, though, to be sure, for a somewhat different reason than he gave for his belief, that an occasional revolution is necessary.[29] It is necessary, let us say, in order that society may get a fresh start, that it may have a chance to renew itself at the fountain of justice, fraternity, and equality, that it may be recreated. The only question is, does revolution really do what we have claimed and personality measure up to the possibilities of the situation? As a matter of fact, since there is abundant chance for doing either, men both fail and perform nobly under disorganized social conditions. Some become utterly demoralized and succumb to sensuality and crime, while others, becoming wonderfully inspired, rise to rare heights of genius and constructive effort. It is the latter type, however, that seems to sway and give character to the times. Walter Rathenau, the German statesman, having the revolution in his own country in mind, asked: When do people become creative? When does society generate? He an-

[29] Foreman, *Life and Writings of Jefferson,* pp. 296, 297.

swers not from theory but from observation that it is under conditions of disturbance and upheaval. Then society is most originative and formative, for people become most self-conscious and feel responsibility as not otherwise.[30] Many careful students of society fully agree with this opinion. Nor do they err by failing to distinguish between activity directed to the reparation of losses and that giving real advancement. Certainly, no one can look deeply into the Reformation, the French Revolution, or any of the eighteenth century upheavals without being struck by their creative work. From all of them progress received an impetus such as no other times have given. And so it seems to have been in other than western civilizations; in India and China, for example. In the latter country, to cite but a single instance, the end of the Chow dynasty brought a period of revolution and chaos, and the historians point to it as an age of great intellectual initiative and creativeness. It would be claiming entirely too much to attribute the rapid progress and high civilization of the most advanced nations solely to revolutionary causes, but the fact remains that most of them have been swept by such storms. It is also a fact that those which have had no such experiences are the most backward. It is, then, not unfair to assume some causal relation. So clear do the ultimate gains of revolution appear to be that one is almost tempted to say: "Ill fares the land that wholly escapes them."

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# PART III

# SOCIAL PROGRESS

*"A thousand creeds and battle-cries,*
*A thousand warring social schemes,*
*A thousand new moralities,*
*And twenty thousand thousand dreams!*

*"Each on his own anarchic way,*
*From the old order breaking free,—*
*Our ruined world desires, you say,*
*License, once more, not Liberty."*

ALFRED NOYES

*"The Promise of the Society of tomorrow is in the revolts of today."*

G. D. H. COLE

# CHAPTER XI

## SURPLUS DISTRIBUTION

Two outstanding features of industrial society have been noted. They are a fairly abundant surplusfulness and great inequality in the distribution of the same. The facts concerning this distribution need to be more fully presented in order that we may more completely grasp their meaning and get clearly before us the problem of social progress. We shall, therefore, proceed to bring together such materials as will give a general view of distributive conditions.

### Survey of Distribution

*Vital Surplus.*—In the matter of vital energy nothing is more obvious than the fact that it is unequally shared. Men are born unequal, acquire inequality, and also have it thrust upon them. There is the widest variation in native endowment of physical stamina and mental ability, and likewise the greatest difference in acquired energizing capacity and leisure. Certain recent findings by army tests already referred to, reveal much physical unfitness.[1] Of the age group ranging from twenty to thirty years, both in the United Kingdom and in America, there is anywhere from fifteen to twenty-five per cent wholly unfit for any military service. When all age groups eligible for military duty are considered, the number of physical incompetents may run even close up to fifty per cent. In fact it ran over sixty per cent in Great Britain. Only three out of every nine

[1] Chapter I.

men of the military age, 18 to 42 years, were perfectly fit, two were definitely infirm, three were physical wrecks, and one a chronic invalid. Perhaps on the average not less than four per cent of the population of any industrial nation is constantly sick and incapacitated for work. The investigations of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations in 1913-1915 gave grounds for the estimate that the average loss to more than 30,000,000 American wage earners was about nine days per year. On this basis not less than 250,000,000 to 300,000,000 days are lost to the working forces of the United States each year. Fisher estimated that half the American people constantly suffer a ten per cent impairment of energy through fatigue, or what would amount to the total impairment of five per cent of the entire nation at all times.[2] None of these data, however, throws much light on the social distribution of vitality. There has been no census on this all-important matter. Hence we can do but little more than guess as to the status of various groups.

There are data showing something of the distribution of births and deaths. The rate of births in the great cities of Europe and America seems to vary indirectly with the economic status of families. The number of children born is greatest among the people living in the poorest quarters with a gradually diminishing number of births, as surroundings become more and more comfortable in more favorable quarters.[3] On the other hand, the death rate seems to vary directly with the population density or with the degree of overcrowding.[4]

Although it does not certainly follow from this that in urban life a high birth rate is so checkmated by a high death rate and a low birth rate so abetted by a low death

[2] Irving Fisher, *National Vitality*, p. 669.
[3] Arthur Newsholme, *The Elements of Vital Statistics*, p. 75.
[4] *Ibid.*, Chapter XVI.

rate as to give a balance between classes at the extremes, there is apparently some tendency to that end. Nevertheless, the greatest disparity between various levels of the population, occupational groups and social classs, both in the item of births and deaths, remains. A good illustration is found in the differences between the urban and rural people of America. In the following table the facts are presented:

RATES OF BIRTH, DEATH AND NATURAL INCREASE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1910 *

| Division | Birth Rate | | Death Rate | | Rate of Natural Increase | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Rural | Urban | Rural | Urban | Rural | Urban | Total |
| New England ..... | 21.0 | 24.4 | 16.0 | 17.1 | 5.0 | 7.3 | 6.8 |
| Middle Atlantic ... | 25.5 | 26.4 | 14.8 | 16.8 | 10.7 | 9.6 | 10.4 |
| East North Central. | 25.2 | 24.7 | 12.8 | 13.9 | 12.4 | 10.8 | 11.6 |
| West North Central | 28.4 | 22.5 | 10.3 | 12.4 | 18.1 | 10.1 | 15.8 |
| South Atlantic .... | 34.4 | 25.4 | 15.5 | 19.4 | 18.9 | 6.0 | 16.0 |
| East South Central. | 34.4 | 25.4 | 14.7 | 18.0 | 19.7 | 7.4 | 17.8 |
| West South Central | 36.4 | 27.0 | 12.5 | 16.8 | 23.9 | 10.2 | 21.6 |
| Mountain ..... | 31.6 | 25.5 | 10.5 | 15.0 | 21.1 | 10.5 | 17.6 |
| Pacific ..... | 24.6 | 20.4 | 12.0 | 13.8 | 12.6 | 6.6 | 9.8 |
| United States ..... | 30.4 | 25.2 | 13.5 | 16.4 | 16.9 | 8.8 | 13.65 |

*Adapted from J. M. Gillette, *Rural Sociology*, p. 84.

It is quite clear from these figures that vital superiority, in so far as reproduction and survival go, rests with the rural population. Somewhat the same condition is found in Europe also, though the differences are far less striking than in the United States. Therefore, when judged by their net contributions to the succeeding generation, the rural people as a whole and the so-called lower classes of the great cities are possessed of more vital energy than other population elements.

This inequality is somewhat offset, however, by other forms of vital energy which the upper urban classes command in greater measure. Leisure is one of the forms. It is largely monopolized by the upper quartile of the population. At least such is the case in the United Staes, if the evidence can be trusted. For it is estimated that about one-fourth of the people of working age do not regularly toil.[5] Nor does this one-fourth include many of those who are forced into idleness by industrial unemployment. It is mostly made up of men and women who command their time much as they will by virtue of economic independence. In every land the leisure class is normally a considerable one, and from its plane society rapidly slopes away to the lowly levels where dwell the leisureless and drudging hewers of wood and drawers of water. In this country not less than five per cent of the employed toil seven days per week and large numbers of them toil twelve hours out of twenty-four. But here again we have no records of distribution that adequately disclose the details of the situation.

No more have we an inventory of talent distribution except for the crude observations which are daily made to the effect that there are all grades of it ranging from genius down through the highly talented and the normally endowed to various levels of mental inferiority and deficiency. But we do not know the numerical strength of any grade of intelligence, to say nothing about its social distribution. The very superior have been variously reckoned from one in four thousand to four or five in one hundred. The very inferior or subnormal have been calculated at anywhere from four per cent to 60 or 65 per cent of the entire people.

Recently several efforts have been made to classify the American population as to its mentality on the basis

[5] Irving Fisher, *op. cit.*, pp. 740, 741.

of the results of the intelligence tests applied in the army.[6]

Approximately 1,700,000 recruits classified on the basis of certain so-called mental tests applied to them exhibited the following ranges of ability as the results are interpreted and translated by those who have edited and popularized the figures:

ARMY TEST OF 1,700,000 MEN *

| Grade | Per Cent of Total | Mental Age |
|---|---|---|
| A | 4½ | 18-19 (plus) |
| B | 9 | 16-17 |
| C plus | 16½ | 15 |
| C | 25 | 13-14 |
| C minus | 20 | 12 |
| D | 15 | 11 |
| D minus | 10 | 10 |

* Lothrop Stoddard, *The Revolt Against Civilization*; also R. Yerkes, "Psychological Examining in the United States Army," *Memoirs* of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 15, for the original material.

Taking this army group to be a fair sample of the nation, and accepting the findings of the mental tests as approximately accurate measures of intelligence, certain individuals have hastened to calculate the numbers representing each grade of ability in the population. Thus, Lichtenberger, assuming the population of the United States to be 100,000,000, assigns the following portion of it to the various levels given on the following page.[6a]

Attempts have also been made to find out how various occupational groups rank in ability. The classification given

[6] See H. H. Goddard, *Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence; The Distribution of Intelligence in 1,700,000 Recruits of the United States Army;* J. P. Lichtenberger, *Social Significance of Mental Levels,* Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol. 15; Lothrop Stoddard, *The Revolt Against Civilization,* etc.

[6a] J. P. Lichtenberger, *op. cit.,* p. 108.

CLASSIFICATION OF POPULATION ACCORDING TO MENTALITY

| | |
|---|---|
| 10,000,000 | very inferior intelligence. |
| 15,000,000 | inferior intelligence. |
| 20,000,000 | low average intelligence. |
| 25,000,000 | average intelligence. |
| 16,500,000 | high average intelligence. |
| 9,000,000 | superior intelligence. |
| 4,500,000 | very superior intelligence. |

below represents an effort to apply the so-called intelligence tests to some 36,500 men on the basis of their qualification cards. The first column of figures gives the median I. Q. score, and the second the range of scores of the middle 50 per cent in the groups indicated.

INTELLIGENCE TEST BASED ON CLASSIFICATION CARDS *

| Group | Median | Middle 50 Per Cent |
|---|---|---|
| Unskilled labor | 35 | 21- 63 |
| Semi-skilled labor | 40 | 23- 70 |
| Skilled labor | 61 | 26- 95 |
| Business and clerical | 96 | 58-145 |
| Professional | 140 | 98-184 |

* J. P. Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 109, where quoted from W. M. Proctor; *Journal of Educational Research*, September, 1920, p. 537.

The figures presented and the classifications based upon them are declared to be "an approximation of the actual situation" as regards the distribution of intellectual ability among the American people.[7] But is this claim justified, and have we really succeeded in mapping American intellectual levels? Any critical examination of the method of determining mental quality in general and the results of the army tests in particular quickly leads to the conclusion that the claim rests upon flimsy foundations, and that such map-

[7] J. P. Lichtenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

pings of intelligence distribution as have been made amount to almost nothing from a scientific standpoint.

In the first place, no absolute measure of intelligence has been worked out. Neither the Binet-Simon tests nor the Stanford revision of the same really prove to be anything of the kind. They are only devices for discovering within a group gradations of ability measured by an arbitrary norm, the norm being originally created by the successful reaction of an arbitrary per cent of the individuals of an age group to an arbitrary set of problems. The norm or normal intelligence as thus arrived at by the originators of the tests and as worked out among school children for which the tests were designed is specifically the ability of 65 to 75 per cent of the children of a given age group to perform a given set of mental exercises. These exercises are supposed to test intelligence, and the individuals who succeed in performing all the exercises that 65 to 75 per cent of the children of that age originally experimented upon could perform, are counted normally intelligent for their age. But a standard derived as this one was from artificial experiments on a couple of hundred school children in France, a few more in California, together with some four hundred adults "of moderate success and of very limited educational advantages" does not strongly recommend itself as an adequate gauge by which to measure human intelligence in general. In fact, it does not measure intelligence because it does not have any objective standard whatever. It only serves as "an instrument for classifying a group of people." Whether it even tests their intelligence at all, is an open question.[8] For it is fair criticism to say that "no intelligence test is a valid measure of innate mentality unless it is applied within a group whose mem-

[8] Walter Lippmann, "Intelligence Tests," *The New Republic*, Vol. 32, pp. 213, 214, 247 *passim*. This series of six articles is an able criticism of the efforts to grade ability.

bers have had identical or very similar opportunity for gaining familiarity with the materials of the test, and whose members have had not only the same opportunities to learn but the same desire to learn.[9] Certainly, the army examiners had no misconceptions about the value of the Stanford-Binet test. They frankly recognized the fact that it was not a standard by which to grade intelligence, and they even made bold to say that the group from which this standard was derived was "too small to give very reliable results" and was "furthermore probably not typical."[10]

If, then, the so-called intelligence tests are such as we have indicated, no true scientist will hasten to discover the distribution of ability in the nation by their use or by means of any results obtained by their use nor will he seriously consider any classifications of the mentality of the population so obtained.

In the second place, and entirely apart from the merits of mental testing, it is doubtful whether the army data can legitimately be taken as the basis for making calculations regarding the mentality of the population as a whole. For the validity of the data depends partly upon whether the draftees were a fair sample of American manhood. And on this very point the examiners themselves expressed doubt.[11] Again, the validity of the data depends in this particular case upon what the examination that gave the data aimed at, and upon how it was conducted. It aimed at and was hastily conducted with a view to sifting the recruits for material of which to make officers. It got what was sought by applying tests that would show quickness of mental

[9] S. S. Calvin, "The Present Use of Mental Testing," *Educational Review*, Vol. 64, p. 325.

[10] "Psychological Examining in the United States Army," *Memoirs* of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 15, p. 785.

[11] *Ibid.* See also *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 131, p. 259, where Yerkes reiterates the statement that the army was not a typical group of Americans.

response. The tests were timed to determine alertness. "The number of items and the time limits were so fixed that five per cent or less in any average group would be able to finish the entire series of items in the time allowed."[12] The result was that the tests yielded four and one-half per cent of "A" men. But an examination of this sort is no measure of real intelligence, not even of acquired "mental equipment," and should not be interpreted as such.

However much we should like to know just how intelligence is distributed, that knowledge is not yet at hand. The findings of the army tests clearly do not furnish the means of determining it, nor are there yet any methods of measurement that can be applied to the population in whole or in part that will reveal it. At best all that can be done is to guess, and so far the guessing seems to have been exceedingly wild. Perhaps in time we shall be able to do more than just guess. Let us hope so, at least.

In lieu of any complete or adequate data on the distribution of vitality either physical or mental we can, perhaps, do no better than make use of a rough, empirical classification worked out by Professor Giddings. He describes three classes as follows: The high vitality class, composed of those having a high birth and a low death rate, and possessing much bodily and mental vigor; the medium vitality class, made up of those having a rather low birth and death rate with a fair degree of bodily vigor and an unusual amount of mental power; and the low vitality class which embraces those having a high birth and also a very high death rate, with a low degree of both physical and mental vigor. The distribution of these three classes also is indicated. The first roughly corresponds to the better sort of land-owning and land-tilling farmers. It includes also large numbers of business and professional men, mechanics

[12] Yoakum and Yerkes, *Army Mental Tests*, p. 3.

and some laborers dwelling in towns and cities. The second vitality class in like manner roughly corresponds to the business and professional men of the large towns and great cities. The third vitality class roughly corresponds to the ignorant and uncleanly, shiftless and thriftless part of the slum population of the great cities and the marginal people of the towns and open country.[13]

In a very general way this classification shows the distribution of vital surplus at least in America.

When we inquire into the significance of inequitable vitality we are reminded that social stratification had its genesis in this very thing. The best endowed early become recognized as superiors, and were allowed free exercise of their powers. Thus a ruling class soon appeared. And similarly on the basis of other natural qualities or their absence the division of society into functional classes was promoted. Vital endowment always operates as a factor in the formation of social classes. However, other factors greatly complicate the process whenever a people passes from a primitive to a more advanced mode of living. These factors may even all but nullify the influence of the primary one, for social classes once formed along natural lines tend to shift with advancing civilization onto artificial grounds. A truly natural aristocracy, for instance, may be supplanted by those who have acquired tradition giving rise to some cult or to some important art. A priestly or warrior class will then come to power. Perchance it will be the monopolists of organization, giving an official aristocracy or bureaucracy, or, more likely, the possessors of wealth, who will lord it over society. The plutocracy, as we have seen, is the ascendant class in the industrial world, and it is quite clear that natural superiority does not in any exceptional degree characterize it.

Throughout human history stratification has tended to

[13] F. H. Giddings, *The Elements of Sociology*, pp. 105-108.

involve only one form of surplus at a time. Each level, moreover, has tended to share in other forms of surplus only to the degree that it has shared in the dominant form. This, however, has been only a tendency, and not a fixed rule.

So we may say that notwithstanding numerous factors which relieve and modify it, natural inequality always remains a more or less fundamental determinant of the social order. Among other things it is vital inequality that hinders that complete 'meeting of minds'' and that measure of concertedness which is necessary for the best group existence. Inequality makes it impossible for all to participate alike in social thought, feeling, or conduct. The dull of comprehension, slow of heart, and sluggish of movement do not readily get into the game and play a part with the master minds, the keenly sensitive, and the quick to act. Some are so poorly endowed that they are virtually incapable of any effective participation; they are left on the side-lines of life—mere spectators of the grand tournament. Withal, the game is played with many divisions, breeches in the lines, moves at cross purposes, fouls, and blunders because the participants are not equally well fitted to carry on together.

The most serious division in every way is the one separating the superior few from the common many; for the keen, the swift, the strong, set the pace, direct the game, and dominate all. So there are leaders and followers, masters and servants, originators and imitators, rulers and ruled and every kind of relationship that can spring from variation in native endowment. Society, in consequence, does not turn out to be a strictly self-directing, coöperative body, but one that acts under the regency of a few individuals, whose will it does, whose wishes it adopts, and whose designs it executes. Although this regency is not absolute, but hedged about with numerous limitations, the more com-

plex and heterogeneous the group the more opportunity it has and the more dependent upon it associational functioning becomes. In other words, the greater the degree of unlikeness, the greater the necessity for coördinating and organizing activities and the more such activities incline to fall to the lot of a few personalities. For there is likely not to be present among the many a requisite degree of likeness and resemblance for initiating and sustaining coöperative effort.

In practical operation this arrangement might be well enough and the existence of vital inequality be of little moment, were it not for the fact that the domination of the few makes possible abuse of power and leads to exploitation everywhere. The superior prey upon the inferior and the weak. The very possession of superior strength conduces to such conduct. If the surplusful could be trusted to look out for the good of all as well as for their own interests, it would matter little that men are born unequal. But since they do not as a rule serve their generation for naught and cannot be trusted to use their power in a wholly social way, they are really a menace and the situation that plays into their hands and is created in turn by them, may become well-nigh intolerable. Rousseau recognized this, and thus accounted for economic inequality, the state, injustice, and the ills of society in general.[14] Those who advocate the rule of nature's aristocrats rarely appreciate that they can be men, unjust and inhuman, and so dangerous rulers. But nature so endows many of her sons, both among the fit and unfit, and if their fellows elevate the ablest to power, evil consequences are quite as likely to follow as good. Such at least has been the experience of the ages. Those counted "best" before clothed with power have often turned out worst when once invested.

[14] See J. J. Rousseau, *Contrat social,* and *Discours sur l'origine de l'inequalité.*

The natural aristocrat was described by Edmund Burke in his *Reflections* as follows:[15] "A true natural aristocracy is not a separate interest in the state, or separable from it. It is an essential integrant part of any large body rightly constituted. It is formed out of a class of legitimate presumptions, which, taken as generalities, must be admitted for actual truths. To be bred in a place of estimation; to see nothing low and sordid from one's infancy; to be taught to respect one's self; to be habituated to the censorial inspection of the public eye; to look only to public opinion; to stand upon such elevated ground as to be enabled to take a large view of the widespread and infinitely diversified combinations of men and affairs in a large society; to have leisure to read, to reflect, to conserve; to be enabled to draw the court and attention of the wise and learned whenever they are to be found; to be habituated in armies, to command and obey; to be taught to despise danger in the pursuit of honor and duty; to be formed to the greatest degree of vigilance, foresight, and circumspection, in a state of things in which no fault is committed with impunity, and the slightest mistake draws on the most ruinous consequences; to be led to a guarded and regulated conduct from a sense that you are considered as an instructor of your fellow-citizens in their highest concerns, and that you act as a reconciler between God and man; to be employed as an administrator of law and justice and to be thereby amongst the first benefactors to mankind; to be a professor of high science, or of liberal and ingenuous art; to be amongst rich traders, who from their success are presumed to have sharp and vigorous understanding, and to possess the virtue of diligence, order, constancy, and regularity, and to have cultivated an habitual regard to commutative justice—these are the circumstances of men that form what I should

[15] Quoted by Paul Elmer More in *Aristocracy and Justice*, pp. 12, 13.

call a natural aristocracy, without which there is no nation."

This aristocrat of Burke's is obviously more than the biologically fit of which we have been speaking. He is at once the most cultured, the most just, and in every way the most perfect of men. If society really produced his like and could draft him to rule, there would be little occasion for doubt, but it does not produce him or produces him so rarely that he is a negligible factor.

Our concern is with the natural aristocrat or "superior man" as we know him. He is a factor in every nation. The existing social situation is largely created by this superior man of a certain moral type. This type is the dominating and egotistic individual. The sympathetic, altruistic, and righteous are not much responsible for things as they are. They have had little to do with the making of the social order. Only now and then has their influence become pronounced in some protest or movement for reform. Just now such a protest is being made and felt throughout the world. And we are told that it is a revolt against civilization, which has sprung from the inferior elements of the race. These "undermen," it is alleged, have become so numerous and, in trying to meet the demands of civilization, so conscious of their inferiority that they have turned enemies of society. But the diagnosis is wholly false. The revolt as I see it has an entirely different source. It comes from the condemnation of the unrighteous by the righteous. The superior who are men of good will have risen against the superior who ruthlessly dominate the social order, call themselves the natural aristocracy and identify their vested interests, their political and economic dogmas and their selfish privileges with civilization. Were it any other kind of a revolt than this it could scarcely be justified; but so long as civilization is overshadowed by unrighteous superiority the gods of justice are likely to smile their approval upon

the revolt. After all, there is no revolt against whatever is good in civilization; it is only against the authority of those whose evil touch has corrupted it and whose talents have been used to make much of it hideous for all men.

*Tradition Surplus.*—The facts concerning the distribution of traditional like that of the vital surplus is largely unknown. When looked at from the standpoint of technical literacy, not much is revealed by the sort of data available. The 1920 census shows on the average 6 per cent of the population of the United States of ten years of age or over to be illiterate, but this figure is probably far from the true one, since 25.3 per cent of the draftees in the nation's army during the Great War were found to be unable to "read and understand newspapers and write letters home." All told, about 31 per cent of the entire body of recruits was found practically illiterate by the army examiners.[16]

The various racial elements show great difference in the amount of illiteracy. The last census reveals averages ranging from 2.5 per cent among native whites to 13.1 per cent among foreign born whites and 22.9 per cent among negroes.

There are, however, industrial nations that make a more creditable showing on this formal and minimum basis of knowledge than does the United States. The United Kingdom, for instance, in 1912 had only about 2 per cent of illiteracy, while the German Empire showed but .05 per cent. The Latin countries, in comparison, rank rather low. Belgium in 1910 had 12.7 per cent, France in 1906 had 14.1 per cent, and Italy for the year 1911 footed the list with about 47 per cent.

Mere literacy or illiteracy does not, of course, signify very much. The test is too crude and formal to be an index of the individual's real store of tradition. Average

[16] R. M. Yerkes, "Psychological Examining in the United States Army," *Memoirs* of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 15, 1921, p. 100.

length of schooling enjoyed by the citizen affords a somewhat better index, I suppose. The 20,000,000 or so school children of the United States get the most unequal tenures of training. About 13 per cent go no farther than the fourth grade and 69 per cent do not complete the eighth grade. Upwards of 90 per cent of them never enter high school, and but a fraction of one per cent ever get to college. And this, on the whole, is by far the best showing of any nation, since our free schools from the lowest to the highest are equally open to all who are qualified to attend them; while in Europe such is not the case. In Germany and France there has been a good deal of discrimination above the elementary and trade schools against the masses in favor of the classes. In England there is not so much of this legally, but none the less in actual practice the middle class and the aristocracy enjoy superior advantages. The leading industrial nations, however, generally provide elementary schooling for all, and in a measure compel children to acquire it; but beyond this stage nothing is required, and for the great majority little opportunity for education is available. But no country provides a school system capable of passing on more than the rudiments of the social heritage to any save a few. So far, therefore, as schools are maintained and formal education is acquired, a most unequal distribution of the social heritage takes place.

While the amount of schooling the individuals of a nation have received tells us a good deal about how the tradition is shared, it does not, as every one is aware, tell half the story. For the greater part of the heritage is passed on outside the schools. So it is apparent that if we had a complete classification of the population on the basis of schooling received we would not get from it any true idea of the distribution of knowledge.

Perhaps the occupational grouping of the population throws quite as much real light upon participation in the

heritage as do any data. At best, however, it gives an exceedingly crude index, and really does not illuminate very much. But, accepting it for whatever we can get out of it, let us take note of the classification of those ten years of age and over, who in 1920 were gainfully employed in the United States. The 41,609,192 persons involved fall into two great classes, namely, proprietors and salaried employees, and wage earners. The first class is further divided as follows:

CLASS I[17]

| *Occupation* | *Number* |
|---|---|
| Proprietors, officials, and managers | 8,378,398 |
| Clerks and kindred workers | 5,638,144 |
| Public and semi-public officials | 658,351 |
| Professional persons | 2,128,787 |
| Total | 16,803,680 |

The second class is also subdivided into the groups indicated below:

CLASS II

| *Occupation* | *Number* |
|---|---|
| Skilled workers | 4,914,651 |
| Semi-skilled workers | 6,384,567 |
| Laborers | 11,072,171 |
| Servants | 2,434,123 |
| Total | 24,805,512 |

Turning from this general summary to the grouping according to leading industries, we find the following:

[17] *Monthly Labor Review*, United States Department of Labor, Volume 14, No. 5, p. 133. The figures are estimates based on the 1920 census reports, and are probably nearly correct.

CLASS I[18]

*Proprietors and Salaried Employees*

| *Occupation* | *Number* |
|---|---|
| 1. Agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry | 5,501,742 |
| 2. Extraction of minerals | 28,610 |
| 3. Manufacturing and mechanical industries | 660,622 |
| 4. Transportation | |
| Proprietors, officials, managers | 206,352 |
| Clerks and kindred workers | 455,305 |
| 5. Trade | |
| Proprietors, officials, managers | 1,615,823 |
| Clerks and kindred workers | 2,062,884 |
| 6. Public service | |
| Public officials | 216,071 |
| Semi-public officials | 442,280 |
| 7. Professional service | 2,128,787 |
| 8. Domestic and personal service | 365,249 |
| 9. Clerical occupations | 3,119,955 |

CLASS II

*Wage Earners*

| *Occupation* | *Number* |
|---|---|
| 1. Agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry laborers | 5,449,332 |
| 2. Extraction of minerals | |
| Semi-skilled workers | 509,041 |
| Laborers | 553,203 |
| 3. Manufacturing and mechanical industries | |
| Skilled workers | 4,689,126 |
| Semi-skilled workers | 4,247,232 |
| Laborers | 3,215,721 |
| 4. Transportation | |
| Skilled workers | 225,525 |
| Semi-skilled workers | 648,419 |
| Laborers | 1,530,704 |
| 5. Trade | |
| Semi-skilled workers | 355,205 |
| Laborers | 210,442 |

[18] *Monthly Labor Review*, United States Department of Labor, Vol. 14, No. 5.

| | |
|---|---|
| 6. Public service | |
| Laborers | 112,769 |
| 7. Professional service | |
| Semi-skilled workers | 23,677 |
| 8. Domestic and personal service | |
| Semi-skilled workers | 630,993 |
| Servants | 2,434,123 |

From this occupational grouping one gathers a very rough idea of the distribution of technical knowledge among the American people. However, as to other ranges of tradition little is revealed. The gainfully employed portion of the French population is less satisfactorily classified by the census reports of that nation. Yet, taking it for 1914, we find the following, which will throw some light upon our problem:

| *Occupation*[19] | *Number* |
|---|---|
| Agriculture | 8,517,000 |
| Industries | 5,746,000 |
| Commerce | 2,053,000 |
| Transports | 1,543,000 |
| Public service | 1,292,000 |
| Domestic service | 929,000 |
| Liberal professions | 550,000 |
| Mines and carriers | 246,000 |
| Total | 20,931,000 |

One simple fact with reference to the tradition is always patent; namely, the existence of specialization or the fragmentary possession of knowledge. Obviously, no individual or single group of individuals is able to know all things. And the greater the body of the social heritage, the more specialization there is and must be. The questions, then, that concern distribution are, first of all, how far are the individuals of a nation specialized in training and whether

[19] *Annuaire général de la France et de l'étranger*, 1920-21.

or not they are specialized to anything like an equal degree of proficiency; and secondly, how far are they diversified in their knowledge and whether or not they are diversified in approximately like degree. It is obviously exceedingly important that each participates intensively in some portion of the heritage; it is equally important that each shares extensively in the general tradition and that each possesses certain knowledge in common with all. No collected data permit any exact determination of what the situation is in these respects. We know only that there are literate and illiterate, skilled and unskilled, schooled and unschooled, the intelligent and the ignorant, in every country, and that is about all we do know about traditional distribution.

The inequitable distribution of tradition even as of vitality in certain respects works at cross purposes with social well-being. Throughout wide reaches of our modern life specialization in knowledge prevails not only as a necessity but as a very wise and economical arrangement. There results from it an interdependence which, though at times of breakdown tending to jeopardize a part or even the whole of the community, is generally conducive to social harmony and happiness. Such fragmentary sharing of much of the technical tradition, especially that pertaining to the industrial arts, may not be altogether ideal, because not all of it is of equal value, but neither is it on the whole socially disadvantageous. There is another part of the tradition, however, which, because not commonly shared, always creates unfavorable conditions for communal life. These unfavorable conditions are ever arising anew and rendering history, as H. G. Wells has said, "a race between education and catastrophe." I refer for one thing to certain fundamental principles and practices upon which community existence, security and welfare greatly depend. Chief among these are whatever has to do with social self-control, unity, liberty, justice, tolerance, concerted action,

and public policy. Of equal importance are the great cultural instrumentalities, as the art of reading, writing, and calculation, which are so indispensable for intercommunication and for the acquisition of broader knowledge. The want of uniformity of training in these things is surely one of the menacing features of modern civilization.

It is menacing because modern conditions are so diversified and complex that little natural fusion arises. It is also menacing because through the lack of these cultural elements and necessities the way is opened for domination by men who are wise in the knowledge and use of traditions that serve not the public good, just as we showed it to be opened for the domination of the unjust superior where vitality is unequally distributed. In consequence society is all too easily beset with dictators, demagogues, political adventurers, social free-booters, public buccaneers, bosses, intriguing cliques, and exploiters of many sorts seeking to manipulate affairs for personal ends. Great numbers of men not knowing, not thinking, not agreeing, not even having the materials in their experience out of which to reach agreement, and becoming indifferent because they have them not, are like sheep without a shepherd but ready to follow after whomsoever calls them and to whatever fields he may lead. There is, indeed, nothing else for people devoid of the guiding knowledge of any common body of communal doctrines to do but to rally about common leaders, accept their dicta and imitate their examples. But this fact in no wise lessens the dangers of the practice.

An even worse feature of cultural inequality in the particulars mentioned, and especially if crass ignorance and illiteracy abound, is the difficulty of getting any rational reaction in group affairs, and the corresponding ease with which mobmindedness rises and tends to hold sway. Population elements of this sort have unity only in habit or emotion, not in any considerable body of thought. Hence,

when disturbances or alterations are at hand and readjustments are incumbent upon them, they do little but seethe with impulses of fear, hate, intolerance, revenge, irrational enthusiasms, etc. Dewey calls attention to the frequency of crowd psychology of this nature found in modern China and Japan under the influence of transitional conditions now prevailing. He thinks it is even more common there just now than in the occidental world.[20] Maxim Gorky rightly declares "that all the military forces at the Czar's command did not constitute as grave an obstacle to the revolutionary movement in Russia as the lack of education among the masses."[21]

It is an axiom that there can be little rational group reaction without the formation of true public opinion. And this is formed only where discussion is the method of reaching agreement. In the absence of an understanding of the abstract doctrines underlying group life, knowledge of public affairs, or the mental tools for acquiring such essentials, discussion has little vogue, and concerted action is not likely to be deliberately arrived at. Emotional integration, then, takes the place of rational consent, and social choices and conduct become chiefly feeling responses instead of reasoned affirmations.

Mobmindedness, moreover, tends to grow into a veritable "cult of the irrational" among western peoples, especially here in America. It arose, to begin with, among the culturally impoverished elements of the population; then constituted authority both national and local found it advantageous to aid its spread by frequently appealing to passion and by supressing freedom of thought whenever convenient, till now the mobminded mode of reaction is common. Thus out of the darkness of ignorance and

[20] John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 61.
[21] John Spargo, "Russia and the World Problem of the Jew," *Harper's Magazine*, June 1918, p. 67.

superstition a sinister influence has sprung to menace our collective life, even at its noonday of glory and power. This cult would do credit to some dark age, but our age ought to be the day of better things. Political society of the Middle Ages, which had not attained to much individuality or achieved the means of any general public opinion, might well have been characterized by irrationality. But, in the present era of knowledge, with almost every facility for deliberate-mindedness, we ought not to be plunging headlong into a welter of such irrationality. Nevertheless, thanks largely to an improper distribution of the social heritage, we are rapidly moving to that end.

There is one condition lying far down underneath the tendency to mobmindedness that merits further attention. I refer to the lack of a general participation in the traditions of liberty, equality, the spirit of progress and of science together with many other traditions of equal significance. Upon these in the last analysis our institutions rest, and by them they must be constantly readjusted and made to conform to an ever-changing world. But, unless there is something like universal knowledge of and belief in these traditions, the institutions become millstones about the neck of society, and the people flounder in their efforts and waste their energy in helpless despair. We seem to be approaching a state of this sort. There is so great poverty of knowledge with respect to these fundamentals among so many of the people that they are incapable either of defending what is good in their institutions, or of adapting them to new conditions. A generation has arisen that knows not the ideals of the fathers of democracy. They know only the structures left by the fathers. In these structures they rest, upon them they rely, as people thoroughly institutionalized, but devoid of the spirit of the institutions. Therefore, when crises come the people grow panicky and excited to no purpose. They prove helpless to meet the situation.

Illiberal men, even tyrants, rise and pervert the spirit of the institutions beyond all recognition, or alter their essential qualities before the very eyes of the multitude, who scarcely utter a protest so long as the structure retains a familiar look. Thus the nation becomes enslaved by its institutions and by the enemies of its better self through clinging to the forms of the past and missing the spirit that brought them forth. It becomes enslaved by ignorance of the things that make it free.

We may sum up the important facts relative to the distribution of tradition by saying, first, that any state of knowledge which precludes the meeting of minds on the fundamental principles of societal life or which does not give the socii the fundamental principles upon which to meet, renders the group subject to domination by a few personalities, who may, if they wish, readily become its exploiters. We may say, in the second place, that a state of social tradition which prevents or hinders government by discussion and the ability of the people to form rational group judgments directly promotes a reign of irrationality and mobmindedness. And in the last place, we may say that any state of the tradition that leaves the people ignorant of the principles upon which free institutions are builded leads that people to enslave itself in hopeless institutional bondage.

*Economic Surplus.*—The distribution of economic surplus has been approximately determined in the great civilized nations. To be sure, in no case has a complete inventory been made, but enough material is at hand to permit estimates that cannot be far wrong.

Let us see in the first place how accumulated wealth is generally divided. The most reliable calculations so far made for the United States are those by King,[22] in 1915.

[22] W. I. King, *The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States.*

While the great war affected somewhat the distribution of property, it probably did not greatly alter the relative holdings of the various classes. We can, therefore, assume that the conclusions arrived at by King from pre-war data still hold true.

The author referred to divides the population into four classes. They are as follows: the poor, the lower middle class, the upper middle class and the rich. The first class consists of those who have little or no property except a few clothes, personal belongings, and household effects; the second includes those who have not to exceed on the average a thousand dollars' worth of property; the third class consists of the well-to-do whose holdings range from $2,000 to $4,000 of capital which they themselves employ and from which income is derived; and the rich are those whose wealth exceeds $50,000 and who live upon the earnings of their property.[23] The poorest class numbers 65 per cent of the people, the lower middle class fifteen per cent, the upper middle class eighteen per cent, and the rich two per cent. For the United States, as estimated from Massachusetts and Wisconsin statistics, the poorest class, or substantially two-thirds of the people of the United States, own but 5 to 6 per cent of the total wealth; the second class possess even less; the third class has about one-third of the total; while the rich possess nearly three-fifths of the accumulated property. The poorest four-fifths of the population have scarcely 10 per cent of the wealth, while the richest one per cent of the people have almost fifty per cent and the wealthiest one-four-hundredth part of the nation owns one-fourth of the entire store of riches.[24]

In the United Kingdom, Germany and France the situation is not greatly different. The table on page 482 adapted

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 80.
[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 80-82.

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACCUMULATED WEALTH

| Class | Country and Date | Percentage of Total Wealth Owned by Each Class | Average Value of Estates in Dollars |
|---|---|---|---|
| Poorest 65 per cent of population | Prussia (1908) | 4.9 | 153 |
| | France (1909) | 4.3 | 186 |
| | United Kingdom (1909) | 1.7 | 133 |
| | United States (Wisconsin data 1900) | 5.2 | 381 |
| Lower middle class or 15 per cent of population | Prussia (1908) | 5.5 | 743 |
| | France (1909) | 5.6 | 1,052 |
| | United Kingdom (1909) | 2.9 | 979 |
| | United States (Wisconsin data 1900) | 4.8 | 1,524 |
| Upper middle class or 18 per cent of population | Prussia (1908) | 30.6 | 3,445 |
| | France (1909) | 29.4 | 4,602 |
| | United Kingdom (1909) | 23.7 | 6,670 |
| | United States (Wisconsin data 1900) | 33.0 | 8,730 |
| Richest 2 per cent of population | Prussia (1908) | 59.0 | 59,779 |
| | France (1909) | 60.7 | 85,500 |
| | United Kingdom (1909) | 71.7 | 181,610 |
| | United States (Wisconsin data 1900) | 57.0 | 135,715 |

from one of King's [25] gives the figures for these countries in comparison with those from our own.

It is apparent that in four great nations the richest 2 per cent of the people own more than all the other ninety-eight per cent. The English nation, in fact, shows an even greater concentration, since the richest one-fiftieth owns nearly three times as much of the total wealth as all the rest of the population combined.[26] The poorest class nowhere has over a fifth of the property, and in England not more than a sixtieth part of it. The lower middle class has but a small fraction of the wealth. In the United Kingdom it is less than a thirtieth and in France it is about one-eighteenth of the whole. King's conclusion is that "for all practical purposes four-fifths of the population may be rightly pictured as being forced to satisfy themselves with the scraps of wealth cast aside from the table of Dives." [27]

The distribution of income is quite as important as that of accumulated wealth. By income is meant the amount of purchasing power which accrues yearly to an individual, family, corporation, or class. The most recent study made in this field is by the work of the staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research.[28] The findings of this study are based on a considerable body of fairly accurate data, and, where the data are lacking, on other careful calculations. While at best the figures are only estimates, they come near enough the actual facts to give a true picture of the way in which the annual income of the American nation is divided. This income, of course, varies widely from year to year, ranging from the gross sum of 28.8 billion dollars in 1909 to 61 billion dollars in 1918.[29] But

[25] W. I. King, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 97.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 98.
[28] *Income in the United States, Its Amount and Distribution, 1909-1919*, Vol. 1.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATIONAL INCOME OF THE UNITED STATES *

| Personal Incomes | 1910 | 1911 | 1912 | 1913 | 1914 | 1915 | 1916 | 1917 | 1918 | 1919 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tax-exempt incomes ... | 2.57 | 2.56 | 2.47 | 2.40 | 2.46 | 2.51 | 1.98 | 1.85 | 1.94 | 2.12 |
| Over $2,000 per year except farmers ..... | 28.29 | 27.57 | 27.16 | 27.03 | 26.77 | 27.85 | 29.86 | 29.68 | 26.26 | 26.51 |
| Under $2,000 per year except farmers ..... | 52.42 | 55.13 | 55.25 | 54.96 | 56.31 | 52.09 | 47.03 | 45.83 | 52.03 | 52.88 |
| Farmers ..... | 12.86 | 11.86 | 12.34 | 12.61 | 12.92 | 13.09 | 12.75 | 16.33 | 17.02 | 16.51 |
| Total ..... | 96.14 | 97.12 | 97.22 | 97.00 | 98.46 | 95.54 | 91.43 | 93.69 | 97.25 | 98.03 |
| Corporate surplus ..... | 3.86 | 2.88 | 2.78 | 3.00 | 1.54 | 4.46 | 8.57 | 6.31 | 2.75 | 1.97 |
| Total national income... | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |

* *Income in the United States, Its Amount and Distribution,* 1909-1919, Vol. I, p. 34.

the distribution as between classes, while fluctuating somewhat, does not seem to vary in any radical manner from one year to another. The table on page 484 gives the estimates in percentage of the total incomes received.

By disregarding the item of corporate surplus and studying the division of incomes as between all individuals according to whether the amount they received puts them above or below the $2,000 line, the following results are obtained:

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NATIONAL INCOME ON $2,000 BASIS *

| Year | Per Cent of Persons with Less than $2,000 Income | Per Cent of Persons with Incomes of More than $2,000 |
|---|---|---|
| 1910 | 96. | 4. |
| 1911 | 96. | 4. |
| 1912 | 96. | 4. |
| 1913 | 96. | 4. |
| 1914 | 96. | 4. |
| 1915 | 95. | 5. |
| 1916 | 93. | 7. |
| 1917 | 89. | 11. |
| 1918 | 87. | 13. |
| 1919 | 86. | 14. |

* *Income in the United States, Its Amount and Distribution, 1909-1919,* p. 112.

On the average for the ten years, according to the figures before us, ninety-three per cent of the people with incomes of less than $2,000 per annum got about sixty-six per cent of the total, while on the average seven per cent of the people with incomes above $2,000 got about thirty-three and one-third per cent of the total. From 1913 to 1916 alone it is estimated that about one-third of the national income went to the most prosperous one-twentieth of the income receivers. Following that to 1919 the money in-

come of this class increased less rapidly than did the income of the other nineteen-twentieths, so that the share of the most prosperous five per cent fell to about one-fourth of the total.[30]

The distribution of income in other industrial lands is not unlike that in America. In lieu of any studies showing the situation in European countries since 1914 the pre-war estimates will have to be used. These, however, are probably not far out of the way as an estimate of the relative incomes of the present time, meager though the general income be, since the estimates of the National Bureau of Economic Research for the United States in 1918 are not greatly different from the pre-war figures of King. The following table on the money income of different fractions of the population in Prussia and the United States in 1910 is from King:[31]

DISTRIBUTION OF MONEY INCOME BY CLASSES

| Class | Country | Per Cent of Total Income Received by Class | Average Income Per Capita in Dollars |
|---|---|---|---|
| Poorest 65 per cent of population | Prussia | 35.8 | 74 |
| | United States | 38.6 | 197 |
| Lower middle class or 15 per cent of population | Prussia | 12.7 | 114 |
| | United States | 14.2 | 314 |
| Upper middle class or 18 per cent of population | Prussia | 27.0 | 203 |
| | United States | 26.8 | 494 |
| Richest 2 per cent of population | Prussia | 24.5 | 1,656 |
| | United States | 20.4 | 3,386 |

[30] *Income in the United States, Its Amount and Distribution, 1909-1919*, pp. 115, 116.

[31] W. I. King, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

For the United Kingdom we have Money's estimates of distribution in 1908. He makes a little different classification from that used by King. The share of each class based on his figures is as follows:

DISTRIBUTION OF MONEY INCOME IN GREAT BRITAIN BY CLASSES *

| Class | Per Cent of Population | Per Cent of Entire Income Received by Class |
|---|---|---|
| Poor, below £160 ..... | 87.7 | 50.7 |
| Comfortable, from £160 to £700 ..... | 9.2 | 14.9 |
| Rich, £700 and upward. | 3.1 | 34.4 |

* L. G. Chiozza Money, *Riches and Poverty*, 10th Ed., pp. 29, 31.

Thus it appears that "one-half of the entire income of the United Kingdom is or has been enjoyed by about 12 per cent of its population" and more than one-third of the entire income taken by the richest 3 per cent.[32]

With income as with accumulated wealth it is obvious that the bulk of the surplus falls to the few. The vast majority in all industrial lands do little more than subsist. They have no margin to spare at any time, and often not enough income to live in decency and comfort.

The real significonce of the maldistribution of wealth and income needs seriously to be pondered. It is a strange anomaly that the vast accumulation of surplus of the particular form that is most tangible and most easily passed from one person to another has left a large portion of society no better off than it would be had none of the surplus ever been gained. For such is the lot of not less than one-tenth of this very favored American people most of the time, and not less than one-third of the English and other

[32] L. G. Chiozza Money, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 48.

European peoples all the time. Multitudes are "unable to satisfy properly the prime needs of animal life," says J. A. Hobson of the poor of the English cities. "The life of these people," he continues, "is not worth living, so far as measurements of life are possible; they are living a life definitely worse in almost all respects than that of 'savages' in any fairly fertile land, and with hardly more hope of escape or advancement. Take this statement of a recent traveler in Bechuanaland, only one of many similar testimonies: 'I have visited nearly every native town of consequence in Bechuanaland, and I say unhesitatingly that these people are at this moment physically and morally far better off than many thousands of the population of our great cities in Great Britain, living happier and healthier lives by far than seven-tenths of our poor folks at home.' " [33]

It is a curious fact indeed that with so much wealth the lot of so many should be made worse rather than better, that a portion of the social body should starve, rot in misery, and slowly die, while the rest of it waxes strong and mighty. And yet this thing, unheard of among primitive peoples, is the ghost that haunts civilization, and especially that of the industrial nations. The explanation of the phenomenon lies mainly in the fact that social life has become so thoroughly artificial, that is so largely dependent upon accumulated capital, that the monopoly of any large portion of it almost certainly denies to many any sure means of subsistence, and dooms them to wretchedness and extinction.

The inequitable distribution of wealth and income, in spite of all theoretical assumptions to the contrary, is thus a source of weakness to society as a whole. It weakens not alone by denying wealth-power to the many, but by curtailing for them life itself through withholding adequate

[33] J. A. Hobson, *The Social Problem*, pp. 12, 13. The quotation is cited from A. Bryden, *Gun and Camera in South Africa*, p. 129.

nourishment and leisure, and by exacting so great a mead of energy for the daily tasks and so much of worry about the morrow's need that sickness and disease flock in to prey upon them. Moreover, this maldistribution forestalls any just or socially adequate sharing of culture. Poverty relegates to ignorance. The lack of a comfortable income cuts off access to knowledge. The avenues for personal development have always led where Fortune smiles and Mammon glitters. Only the rare individual has been able to filch wisdom and learning from any other source. Social creativeness depends upon a generous economic surplus, and there is every reason for believing that with what measure it is meted out to the people with that measure will they be creative. Conversely, monopoly of resources means national stupidity and relative mental barrenness and inefficiency.

Again there is good ground for thinking that monopoly of wealth retards production and wealth accumulation. Orthodox economic opinion, I am aware, holds otherwise, insisting that the mainspring of human effort lies in conditions of great disparity. Granting that some incentive does come from this source, we must also recognize the fact that such disparity serves in multitudes of instances to deaden all ambition. Moreover, in multitudes of other cases too small a portion of this world's goods is received for a standard of living that will allow efficient or even normal energizing. So, on the whole it is probable that gross inequality of wealth stultifies and prevents from rising quite as much vital energy as it generates. If so, wealth monopoly is to be condemned on economic grounds, because it actually curbs the work power of mankind, and presumably productivity itself.

This monopoly, moreover, has further weakened society by undermining its spiritual solidarity, for it has taken away the sense of a common lot and substituted cleavage

in sentiment between the haves and have nots, between the people who take heavy toll of the national dividend, but toil not, and the people who slave to make dividends, but themselves get only the necessities of existence, between those faring sumptuously every day and those feeding constantly on the husks of life. Primitive tribesmen all feast or starve together; they are sharers in a common fate; they are not often divided by wealth nor severed by the enmity that unequal fortune brings. But, chiefly because of inequalities of goods, men of civil society have largely ceased to recognize themselves as members one of another. So true is this that there has arisen the common saying that one-half the world does not know how the other half lives. And one may add, nor does it care how the other half lives or whether it lives at all.

The existing distribution of capital surplus is at variance with the best interests of society for another important reason, namely, that it tends constantly to lessen the relative share of the social dividend going to the nonpossessing classes, and at the same time operates to increase the cost of living. Professor Taussig states it thus: "An enlargement of the leisure class and a diminution of the proportion of income going to the laborers are the natural concomitants of material progress under the system of private property." [34]

This is explained by the fact that the more capitalistic production becomes, where capital is largely monopolized by functionless individuals under the prevalent system of dividing income into interest, dividends, profits, salaries, and wages, the larger the portion of the total income the capital-holders will take. Industry, of course, becomes more and more capitalistic all the while. It piles up materials in the form of tools, devices, methods, mechanisms,

[34] F. Taussig, *Principles of Economics,* Vol. II, Revised Ed., 1918, p. 207.

plants, etc., in which the energies of dead men repose. These materials represent a tremendous store of human labor once expended. They are the brain and brawn of generations present and past transmuted to usable forms just as the coal, iron, oil, and wood of the earth is spent solar energy locked up in usable forms of another kind. The stored up energies of dead men put to use in the productive process supply the greater part of the world's capital; and the amount of this factor relative to the amount of direct expenditure of human effort becomes in modern industry by far the larger one. Monopolized for the most part by those who render no personal service, it is the means of exacting a share of the product. This share, taken as interest, dividends, depreciation, etc., is the first share, and, everything considered, the lion's share, for the amount of dead men's effort to be replaced and rewarded over and over again is immeasurably larger than the direct effort that gets only wages and salaries. In other words, the indirect cost of production, as cost is now reckoned, so far overbalances the direct labor cost that to the workers falls only a minor share of the gross income. The worker must produce a constantly larger amount of wealth for tribute to capital. For the tribute-takers this means increased incomes, which, in turn, yield increased investments. "Increased investments necessitate the creation and payment of increased surplus. The payment of increased surplus means increased incomes. Thus the circle is continued—with the returns heaping up in the coffers of the plutocracy."[35] And as Taussig sums it up: "The inequalities of income tend . . . to become greater as total income becomes larger. . . . Within the capital-owning class itself, inequalities will not necessarily become greater; for the number of persons owning capital may increase as fast as its amount increases, and ownership may be more concentrated. But the absolute

[35] Scott Nearing, *The American Empire*, p. 122.

amount of income going to this class tends to increase; whereas for the laborers, though their total income may increase, their share of income of society as a whole tends to decline." [36]

Not only does the share of the total income that labor gets grow relatively less under the existing monopolistic system, but its purchasing power also tends to grow less as more monopolized capital enters into the process of production. This comes about from the fact that the more capital there is employed, the greater the cost of goods, or the smaller the purchasing power of income. As one has put it: "The book value of the world's production is continuously growing more and more in excess of the capacity to absorb or liquidate it, and every transaction between buyer and seller increases this discrepancy so long as the exchange takes place at a figure in excess of the total wages, etc., which go to the various conversions of the product; with the result that a continuous rise in the cost of living absolutely *must* take place, apart and above that represented by currency inflation; palliated by intrinsically more efficient productive methods, but leading along a path of cumulatively fierce competition and harder toil to an absolutely inevitable breakdown." [37]

In confirmation of this trend we have the conclusions of several American economists who have carried on studies of the movement of real wages in the United States during the last thirty years. All are agreed that they have steadily declined. H. P. Fairchild has shown how the standard of living declined from 1890 to 1908.[38] I. N. Rubinow has calculated an average decline in the purchasing power of

[36] F. Taussig, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 205.

[37] C. H. Douglas, "The Delusion of Superproduction," from *The English Review* reprinted in *The Living Age*, January 1919, pp. 180-182.

[38] "The Standard of Living—Up or Down?" *American Economic Review*, Vol. 6, pp. 9-25.

hourly wages from the average of 1890 to 1899 compared with that of 1912 of 8.2 per cent, and in full time earnings a decline of 14.7 per cent.[39] A more careful study by H. P. Douglas lends added proof. His findings are summarized in the following: "All the evidence seems to indicate that at the termination of the Great War the return in commodities which the American workingman received for an equal length of time worked (one hour) was from 10 to 20 per cent less than it was in the decade 1890 to 1899 and from 7 to 17 per cent less than it was before the sharp upward movement of prices in 1916. The purchasing power of the established week's work, moreover, was from 20 to 30 per cent less than in the nineties and from 10 to 20 per cent less than in 1915. American labor, as a whole, therefore, cannot legitimately be charged with having profiteered during the war. Rather, like *Alice in Wonderland,* it was compelled to run faster in order to stay in the same place." [40]

Finally the inequitable distribution of economic surplus means the domination of society by the wealthy, and that rarely in the interest of the general welfare, but chiefly to the end that more wealth may be gained by the possessing class. If, in the pursuit of this end, effort were directed only to wresting wealth from nature's storehouse, domination by the rich might not be so bad, but unfortunately the power of wealth is used, as a whole, to despoil other men, to rob productive classes of their just rewards, to reduce multitudes to some sort of slavery, and at the worst to array man against man in international conflict and tournaments of human slaughter. A good part of all this hideous business is due to imperialistic expansion, which, in turn, is due almost solely to wealth concentration. For the rich,

[39] "The Recent Trend of Real Wages," *American Economic Review,* Vol. 4, pp. 798-817.

[40] H. P. Douglas, "The Movement of Real Wages," *American Economic Review,"* Vol. 11, pp. 425, 426.

having the surplus, must dispose of it advantageously, and in striving to do so they impose imperialistic policies upon their nation. Markets, raw stuffs, investments in undeveloped lands are sought, and the government, being under control of capitalistic interests, makes the whole nation an acquisitive agent, not mainly for the general good, but for the private benefit of the rich. Weak peoples are coerced, their territory seized, and wars with rivals for the spoils embroiled, until nations become enslaved by militarism and the lust for conquest and empire. So the fate of every industrial nation virtually rests with the class that possesses the bulk of the wealth, but the fate of no people should be at the disposal of any self-seeking class, and certainly in the light of social experience past and present, not at the disposal of a plutocracy.

*Organization Surplus.*—There is less known about the distribution of organization or about participation in it than about any other form of social energy. There has been no extensive census of it made. Hence no general classification of the population on this basis is possible. However in certain fields enough is known to permit us to estimate how organization is shared. To two or three of these fields let us, then, give attention.

In the vocational field, which is perhaps the most important one of all, the data give a fair picture of the situation. In 1919 the membership of trade unions in the chief industrial nations of the west was substantially as follows: Belgium 750,000, France 2,500,000, Germany 9,000,000, Great Britain 8,024,000, Italy 1,800,000, and the United States 5,607,000.[41] Here we find the United Kingdom taking the lead in organization. In 1920 well over 60 per cent of her adult male manual working wage earners were organized in trade unions. In addition, there were national

[41] *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. 12, No. 5, United States Department of Labor, p. 168.

unions of teachers, clerks and post office workers totaling between 200,000 and 300,000.[42] These trade unionists numbered about 12 per cent of the total population, and undoubtedly constituted the great bulk of all who were vocationally organized. Others in the United Kingdom organized vocationally are those belonging to employers' associations, professional societies, etc. But just how many are so organized cannot be said.

Organization among the employed in Germany is almost as extensive in proportion to the population as in Great Britain.

In the United States it is estimated on the basis of the 1910 census that 7.7 per cent of the wage earners are vocationally organized.[43] On the basis of the 1920 census the percentage may be a little though not much higher. Thus, about 92 per cent of the wage earners of this country are vocationally unorganized. The professional and employing class are, perhaps, somewhat better organized than the wage earners.

France had about 10 per cent of her working population organized in 1914. Figures are also given showing the number of organized employers to be something over 400,000.[44]

Clearly, only a small part of the laboring class of the foremost industrial nations participates in vocational organization of any sort. With the exception of those in England and Germany, the vast majority of workers do not share in this heritage at all.

When we turn to the form of organization under which the controlling industries are carried on, namely, corporations, we find that only a limited few have any part in them.

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[42] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *History of Trade Unionism,* Revised Ed., 1920, pp. 472, 505-508.

[43] L. Woolman, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 69, p. 119.

[44] *Annuaire général de la France et de l'étranger, 1920-21.*

They are chiefly monopolies of a small functionless capitalistic class, from which the working class are almost entirely excluded. Although this form of organization prevails in all the basic industries outside of agriculture, covering most of the pursuits whereby men earn a living, and gives the structure through which the greater part of the wealth is produced, there is absolutely no general distribution of its rights and benefits. A few industrial barons are in control just as feudal lords reigned in medieval Europe. They are quite as autocratic and far more powerful in their monopoly. They brook little restraint and effectively prevent any extensive public sharing of corporate management.

Above the corporation stands political organization or the state. Even at its best one does not find any equal participation in it on the part of the citizens. When its nature is clearly understood this will be seen.

The state, it should be remembered, is only one among several outstanding social institutions. It is of the same order of phenomena as the school, the church, the family, the corporation, etc., all of which are associations in their own rights embraced in the larger community. Because of the all-pervasive ubiquitous character of the state we are likely to think of it as the all-inclusive organization, identical with community or society itself. But such it is not. It is not one and the same thing as national structure; it is perhaps not indispensable to collective existence even among civilized men. It is rather just one part of the social structure that the nation sustains, just one form of organized relationship in which and by which as it turns out, the few dominate the many.

The state is "the political machinery of government" or the institution of social control; not the only agency of government or control, but the chief one. Whether, indeed, it is an agency through which society is subjected to

the control of the few or one that functions as the instrument of social self-control, is the crucial question that demands our attention now.

In its genesis there can be little doubt that the state was an institution of domination. As pointed out in an earlier chapter, it came into being as the result of one group conquering another.[45] The conquered as serfs and slaves formed the subjects from whom the conquering group exacted toil and tribute. The method employed by the conquerors for appropriating the goods of the subjected and for utilizing their labor together with the rules and regulations to which they were made to conform and the machinery employed for enforcing the conqueror's will made up the institution.

In its essential character the state is organized might. Social power reposes in this institution as in no other. Obviously it is not the sum total power, for there is a great deal vested in other institutions, but it is the most concentrated power, and always tends to become omnipotent. Moreover, the state is irresponsible power, amenable to no law save the law of superior force exerted either from within or from without the community. Its entire activity is concerned with the contest for and the manipulation of power. Every policy whether domestic or foreign is a "power policy."

The power of the state manifests itself in a number of ways. One is by levying taxes. That is its first concern. Originally it levied on the person and property of the subjects; it plundered them in the beginning, later it exacted tribute of toil and goods in prescribed, definite payments of money, and finally a rate of payment based on ability to pay or some other principle. A tax, whatever the form, is always a surrender of goods at the behest of state authority.

[45] See Chapter V.

The power of the state manifests itself again in making and enforcing law. In other words, it prescribes such conduct for the subjects as it sees fit. Right and wrong conduct is thus defined, and becomes whatever the state decrees. Justice likewise amounts to such regulation as the state cares to administer.

The power of the state is further manifested in making war. It is the one institution of society dedicated to war as a primary function. It is an institution made by war and war is its "ultimate reason" for being. Whether it actually engages in conflict depends much upon circumstances, but at all times it maintains armaments for that purpose. The object is usually declared to be for defense, but in reality it is much more for offense, for the state wants social power; that is, surplus beyond what its subjects can yield and which can be otherwise most easily got by exploiting other states or other societies, as opportunity presents itself. There are, of course, certain petty states that are not equipped for war because forbidden arms by more powerful ones. So they do not pursue it, and exist almost exclusively by the suffrance and the mutual jealousy of great states. True states, however, gather taxes from their subjects chiefly for the purpose of preying upon other peoples. Fifty per cent, seventy-five per cent, and even better than ninety per cent of all revenues, even in the United States, are gathered for the business of war. This is used to pay war debts, interest thereon, pensions, etc., but also for the object of expanding, grabbing territory and building empire.

Historically the state has been the institution of a class; a conquering group at first, then a blooded aristocracy, and finally a ruling class composed of those having industrial capital. It has been a class exercising power in the several ways mentioned primarily for the benefit of itself as a class. It has never laid tariffs and taxes upon the people

chiefly for the people's benefit; it has never prescribed duties and obligations with an eye single to the public good; it has never made war for the benefit of the nation as a whole, much less has it ever made "any conquest in order to benefit the people concerned, and not in order to benefit itself." [46]

But is it historically correct to say that the state has always remained the organized power of a single class. Has not the power it represents frequently become the power of all the citizens combined? Does it not now usually repose in them and emanate from them to serve them? Is it not, therefore, the agency of self-regulation rather than that of class domination? True, the state, in the course of its history, has in many instances undergone change and very extensive change in the case of the great industrial nations. It has lost certain prerogatives and acquired others. It has, for instance, become an institution of direct property ownership and business enterprise in a new and wider sense than originally. Certain lines of business have been altogether monopolized and others are acquired as it sees fit. It has become an agency for promoting social welfare. In its outer form alteration has been pronounced until it generally appears to be a popular institution instead of a class instrument. It has parliaments of the people, it has executives chosen by general electorates, it has courts answerable to the voters, it has constitutions ratified by public approval. And where these features prevail states are called free citizenships or democracies. But, in spite of all changes of form and all alterations of function, the state remains in operation essentially a class institution, wielding class power for class profit.

This is simply to say that democratic suffrage does not mean that people actually rule themselves, that constitutions duly ratified do not surely guarantee the nature of

[46] G. L. Dickinson, *Causes of International War*, p. 53.

the laws, that parliaments regularly elected do not necessarily secure actual popular sovereignty, that, in brief, the people have not with assurance entered upon the domain to which they have acquired nominal title. The people proclaim themselves rulers, perform the ceremony of voting, which confirms them in the belief that they are actually rulers, and are flattered that plutocracy joins with them in shouting, "Let the people rule!" But, after the tumult and the shouting dies, plutocratic interests either visible or invisible are too often found in charge. The rank and file of the people have then ceased to function, for in so far as they freely function at all, it is only, as Rousseau said, "during the time they elect members of parliament. When these are elected they are slaves, they are nothing."[47] It is the plutocracy that generally sits in parliament even as it sat in the nominating conventions and on the committees to draft party platforms and in the editors' offices to corrupt the public opinion that gave sanction to its work. It is the plutocracy that generally interprets every constitution, presides over every court, dictates the acts of officials, and decrees national policy just to the extent that it finds it advantageous to do so.

Changed in name and appearance, the state remains largely what it has always been, a class institution. And practically this institution reduces to a body of officials. The actual state is officialdom. Even in the most republican commonwealths this is about what it amounts to. Officials assume that the whole course of the future is theirs to determine, that destiny is secure in the prevalence of their ideas and jeopardized whenever any opposing ideas appear to challenge them. It is at bottom irresponsible and high-handed domination by the interests whose servants officials are. Nowhere is this more conspicuously manifest than in executive conduct. Here the affairs of state are car-

[47] *Contrat social*, Book III, Chapter XV.

ried on in accordance with ancient autocratic customs which democracies have not in any wise altered. Policies are shaped in secret, the public duped, spied upon, exploited, victimized by lying propaganda and made to do the will of its official masters posing as public servants. Particularly in its conduct of international affairs the state is to be observed running true to form. As G. L. Dickinson well says: "Whatever the form of government, foreign policy in all countries has been conducted by Foreign Offices, and in secrecy. . . . Even in countries like our own where ministers and the diplomatic services are nominally responsible to a representative assembly, the permanent officials of the Foreign Office have enormous influence. They have the records, the information, the long experience, the tradition, the prestige, the social connections. They form, taken all together, in all states, a kind of diplomatic international, with the solidarity of a professional class. They spring from the well-to-do, for the Foreign Offices have been jealously preserved for the rich, even where other public posts have been thrown open to competition. Thus, they have associated, since birth, exclusively with people who have never known what poverty or ((in many cases) what work is. The world outside presents itself to them as a kind of raw material, sometimes inert, sometimes recalcitrant, which it is their natural mission to keep and direct on the accustomed lines." [48]

What we have attempted to bring out in the foregoing discussion is the fact that there is but limited participation in the wider political organization of society. Democracy, it appears, scarcely more than autocracy, gives the people a share in the organization that controls them except in the small and local areas of government. And, if I read the signs aright, the modern democratic state grows really less democratic with each succeeding decade. It tends to

[48] G. L. Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 63, 64.

reëstablish ancient tyrannies which it is supposed to destroy and to resort to practices which it is designed to prevent. This is easily accounted for in that industrial society grows more and more disharmonious, and so invites the exercises of more and more coercive authority. Obviously, in order "to control dominating power in industry, the power of the state, and with it the tendency of officials to be dominating, is increased." [49]

### Salient Characteristics of Surplus Society

As the result of the inequitable distribution of the social surplus, certain general conditions prevail in industrial society. They may be said to be the distinguishing characteristics of industrialism or the marks of modern surplus society. These conditions have already been indicated in preceding chapters, and need only be summarized in this place. The *first* mark to be noted is the existence of classes, as we have seen how they began to form with the earliest appearance of surplus in the ethnic stage of development, and have grown in significance throughout the whole course of human history under the ever-varying nature of surplus. Each stage of social evolution has given a somewhat different alignment resulting from the nature of surplus inequality peculiar to the stage. So to-day we have vitality classes, personality classes, cultural or educational classes, industrial and economic classes, and political and organizational classes.

A *second* mark is the prevalence of spoliative-exploitive behavior. While such behavior has been in vogue as long as there has been inequality, it has tended to become more widespread under industrialism. The strong prey upon the weak; those with much surplus dominate the less fortunate and the mighty victimize the masses of mankind. More

[49] J. M. Williams, *Principles of Social Psychology*, p. 101.

to-day than ever before is this true, because on a scale hitherto unknown the ancient plan to get who may and keep who can rules the earth.

A *third* mark of surplus society is a chronic state of discord and conflict between groups, classes and nations. Although intergroup conflict runs back to social beginnings, growing surplusfulness has greatly widened its scope during the last few centuries, until industrialism has made it world embracing and practically continuous. The chief nations have settled down in relation to one another to periods of armed peace alternating with seasons of open warfare. And within each nation classes engage one another in almost endless strife.

A *fourth* mark closely related to the third is the constant menace of revolution. Some are in revolt against civilization, and others are seeking to maintain the status quo. A sudden overturning of the established order seems always to impend. It does so because the established order is largely the creation of a surplus monopoly much at variance with the interests of the classes that are largely dispossessed. Whenever, therefore, a serious crisis of any sort overtakes a nation, a social revolution is also likely to befall it. Perhaps, never before this age has society been so thoroughly jeopardized by a situation of its own making.

A *fifth* mark, which is only one phase of the other conditions mentioned, overshadowing all western civilization, is a general state of friction and disharmony. This is immediately traceable to an unlike individuation, which, in turn, grows out of an unlike social surplus distribution. The condition is one largely peculiar to modern society.

A *sixth* mark appears in widespread weakness, infirmity, misery, ignorance, poverty, degradation, and suffering for multitudes in face of the fact that there is probably enough surplus under a proper distribution to mitigate, if not to

eliminate altogether, all such evils. Of course, some of the evils are as ancient as the race, but since they are primarily due to economic and cultural deficiency it is a curious fact that they should persist when in many respects there is wealth and tradition surplus adequate to eliminate them. And it is a still more curious fact that many new evils due to like causes should arise while at the same time surplus is being accumulated. Even though many evils such as plague, famine, and much hideous disease and pain have been under normal conditions banished from civilized lands, a new crop of evils seems to take their places till we wonder if our present state is better than a more primitive one.

Withal, we emphasize, the great industrial societies are extremely menaced by conflict and instability. They have, by all evidence, reached a marvelous stage of development, but at the same time a critical stage quite without parallel in human affairs. Mankind's most pretentious communal house is beset with foes without and with enemies within, till there is good ground for fear that it will go down with a crash unless it can somehow set its house in order and bring peace within its walls. The ways and means that have been proposed for doing this and the problems involved therein remain to be considered in the concluding chapter.

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## CHAPTER XII

### SURPLUS REDISTRIBUTION

Not many are pleased with the existing distribution of the surplus. It is far from satisfying to the great majority in every land. Even the dominant few who defend the existing order and strive to perpetuate it are not altogether content with what it affords. And those who seriously contemplate and write about present-day affairs are letting loose salvos of "Cassandra warnings," criticisms, expressions of dissatisfaction, fears, and alarms regarding modern civilization. One group of thinkers is obsessed by fear concerning the distribution of vital energy. It is alarmed lest the stock become depleted and incapable of sustaining the civilization to which mankind has attained. Another group is equally disturbed over the maldistribution of the social heritage. It is fearful that society is going to go to pieces on the rocks of mobmindedness because of ignorance, moral perversity, and the extinction of creative individualism. Still others are much exercised over the distribution of economic goods. A part—chiefly those who feel that divine providence has given into their keeping the property interests of the world—fear for the safety of the capitalistic system. Another faction has an entirely different attitude. It hates this system of "the dictatorship of the capitalist," as the Webbs put it,[1] and is unceasing in efforts to arouse men against conditions that make and perpetrate it. Finally there is a body of

[1] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*, pp. 54-79.

men whose fears relate to the organization of society. They see western nations overwhelmed and undone by the complexity of local and world problems; and they tell us that unless reorganization is speedily effected so as to bring more just relations not enough of our boasted civilization will be left to make any effort toward salvaging it worth while.[2]

Out of unfavorable reactions like these come proposals and movements which seek to remedy the numerous ills of society. The aim of all such efforts has to do with what is known as social progress. And in taking up the question of surplus redistribution we have to wrestle directly with the problems that come under this category. At the outstart, then, it will be well for us to linger for a brief space over the concept itself.

### The Meaning of Social Progress

Sociologists use the term progress to mean, in general, advancement toward some chosen goal or desired end. The term stands for telic or purposive achievement. In every society there are many ends to which men aspire and for which they are striving. Although many ends are being sought, it cannot be said that there is any general one toward which all of any nation are endeavoring. Certainly there is no specific one upon which they are generally agreed and for the realization of which they are cooperating. Nevertheless the western world sincerely believes that progress is possible, and is busily engaged in promoting and seeking to further numerous lines of advancement. Whether the lines being projected will lead to any general improvement or to any worth while goal for society as a whole is more a matter of faith than of

[2] See articles on these expressions of fear in *The Century Magazine*, by Glenn Frank, September 1922, p. 798; and by G. Stanley Hall, October 1922, p. 830-840.

knowledge. But, regardless of these considerations, we may state in specific terms what we mean by general social progress. This, of course, has been done often enough by other writers, but we wish here to couch the notion in terms of social surplus.

A few of the more important ideas of progress that are prevalent deserve brief attention by way of approach to our distinctive viewpoint. The eugenists, to begin with, say social progress consists in race improvement, by which is meant the elimination of the biologically unfit and the breeding of a superior stock. The moralists put the stress on character. They say it is the development of a better or more social type of personality. The ultimate object of their endeavor is not primarily to make the race biologically fit, but to make it ethically good and just. Then come the educationists, telling us that the chief aim must be greater knowledge and wisdom. If, as they see it, science is being promoted and culture advanced among all classes, society is then on the highroad to the greatest good. The economists, likewise, have their peculiar views; they see progress in terms of increase of wealth and income. Given a continually rising standard of living and the production of ample supplies with which to provide it, and the great social desideratum of economic thought is being realized. Statesmen and administrators also have their special theory of progress revolving as a usual thing around the notion of organization. They see in the more ample, more perfect, and more efficient organization of human relations and activities the end and the way of social advancement.

So run some of the leading notions of progress. Each notion focuses upon a desired end, and each is good in its way, but at most represents only a partial view. In but rare cases has the concept to do with more than a single phase of our collective existence. But all phases must be grasped in one view if the whole rather than its parts is

to be contemplated. And we shall be able so to grasp them if we express the idea in terms we have chosen. Thus, an adequate synthesis of the several factors may be reached. *Social progress may then be defined as an accumulation of social surplus together with such equitable distribution of the same as will best further continual accumulation and promote a sufficient degree of harmony to guarantee evolutionary rather than revolutionary change.* Whenever these conditions obtain, a truly social or general progress may be said to be taking place. Otherwise, advance is only a piecemeal affair. As a matter of fact, most advance that is made is of the latter sort, with many a chance that it will not turn out to the general social good at all. As a rule, forward movements make their way along a single line at a time, and that in ever so halting a manner.

The definition just proposed needs to be elaborated somewhat. It means increase of surplus energy along all lines; that is, in matters vital, traditional, economic, and organizational. It does not stop with mere increase, however, for the accumulation of power alone may react disadvantageously, even disastrously, upon the group unless the several elements of power are shared by the socii so as to give group unity and stability, and thus assure the conservation of all kinds of energy and the continuance of effective and harmonious collectivity. The pursuit of surplus in one form or another without much if any regard to its distribution is likely to be the method of procedure. This, indeed, has been the method among western nations. Although preëminently successful in the quest for knowledge, riches, health and vigorous life together with extensive organization, they have sadly neglected the other half of the problem, namely, the distributive side. The consequences are that industrial society is everywhere riven with disharmony, torn by strife and conflict, and menaced by almost every disruptive force conceivable. So

much so is this that the immediate and pressing demands, as I see the situation, are primarily for a redistribution of the surplus rather than for a more strenuous pursuit of larger acquisitions. Through redistribution, I emphasize, lies the main road by which the western world can increase its surplus and also find its way out of the chaos that is engulfing it.[3] In lands like the United States the margin of energy is already sufficient for great strides ahead through a redistributive process. Whatever justification there may have been in the past for surplus concentration and monopoly among us, there is, generally speaking, little now. There is no longer any need of tolerating such conditions on the pretext that it is necessary to conserve social power or in order to render the nation secure. To be sure, of late the nations of Europe have suffered appalling curtailment of energy. They have destroyed the hoarded wealth of generations, depleted the vital reserve of their biological treasuries, swept away the cultural gains of centuries, and wrecked social structure in wholesale fashion. So far, indeed, have they made inroads upon their energies, that it is often questioned whether any surplus longer remains. Though undoubtedly of low ebb, especially as regards material things, their surplus has not been wholly exhausted. For all of their losses most of these nations are yet somewhat above a mere subsistence level economically. They are still abundantly surplusful in respect to culture and vital energy. Hence for Europe as well as for America, a general redistribution is the great need. Still, at the same time, further surplus accumulation cannot be neglected. In fact, redistribution must always keep in view accumulation, else it will thwart its own ends. In that sense it is to be looked upon as a means.

[3] I do not agree with those who hold that no increase of production is needed to give human happiness nor believe that the right sort of distribution and consumption would alone suffice. Both are needed, only the redistribution must come first.

By means of redistribution society everywhere must seek to establish peace, unity and stability in all relationships, and so magnify its power. Otherwise, if it goes on as now, civilization may virtually destroy itself by continual friction and waste of energy and eventually plunge humanity into worse conditions than any yet witnessed on the earth. Progress, then, for this age, I repeat, involves chiefly redistribution, and redistribution means social salvation if there is any to be found.

How to achieve such a redistribution as will accomplish the things needful constitutes, in my opinion, at once the foremost and most difficult problem of the age. This problem, moreover, is in every way fundamental. First of all, it raises the question whether the surplus is large enough to effect any material change by means of redistribution. Concerning the cultural accumulation no one can doubt that it is sufficient to yield great gains from a more general diffusion. But when it comes to the economic surplus the situation is different. It can be contended with some reason that there is not enough to bring about any radical alterations in living conditions by redivision. The facts with reference to this country will appear further on and will speak for themselves. We may so far anticipate them, however, as to say that they justify in a limited way the expectation that a redistribution would be advantageous. But at the same time they are not so roseate that the masses may be intrigued because of them with dreams of flowery beds of ease.

Unfortunately, the hearts of many are most set on just this material phase where reform promises least. And the irony of the situation is that there is a plane where a few enjoy idleness, elegance, and ease. The sight of this engenders false hopes among the many who do not understand that society is not affluent enough to permit all to rise to this plane. Moreover, the situation is aggravated

by the sight of a plane of great comfort, freedom, and repose without conspicuous luxury for a considerable middle class. This likewise awakens in the lower ranks aspirations that can never be realized. When, therefore, the very modest plane of living that an equitable division would allow is pointed out, it not only does not meet the expectations of the many but is bound grievously to disappoint them.

Certainly no redivision of the nation's wealth and income would relieve the masses of the necessity for toil. The productive process must go on unceasingly else there will be no surplus and presently no income or capital to divide. Suspension of effort even for a short space would invite disaster. Economically, the richest nation is not many months ahead of nakedness and starvation. There can, therefore, be no general surcease from toil. There is no life of leisure any more than one of luxury in store. Only the most modest gains for two-thirds of us at the expense of the other one-third in the matter of free time and material well-being, can possibly be anticipated.

Nor would an equitable division permit any slackening of the struggle for skill and efficiency. We cannot let our right hand forget her cunning, relax our ambition, or fail to uphold standards of honest work, since to do so would mean to lose all economic surplus. For to let the cultivation of skill and efficiency fall into neglect would in the long run prove more destructive of wealth than fire, flood, or earthquake. The belief therefore that equalization would relieve us of any pressure from exacting standards is a delusion and a snare.

A second question involved in the problem of redistribution turns about whether there is enough surplus of any kind to allow experimentation with such Utopian schemes as are designed to effect the desired ends. We have to realize that it costs something to make change in social life and structure. Energy is consumed in efforts at altera-

tion or readjustment. There must certainly be a good margin of energy before society can afford to venture. But this is the very point we are insisting upon, namely, that industrial society has enough surplus to risk the trial of an equalizing program.

The third question relates to our ability to negotiate a redistributive scheme. As Professor L. P. Jacks of Oxford has said, the future of civilization may depend on our ability to change the present social order. Are we equal to that task? Although there is no lack of confidence generally regarding man's ability to do whatever he wills, much or all of it may be mistaken confidence. For civil society has never yet on any wide scale demonstrated its ability to choose havens and successfully steer its course to them. It has been but little governed by the rule of reasoned procedure. Much less capable is it in this respect, perhaps, than are simple ethnic nations. For the latter with little surplus always face a relatively easy task in carrying out collective enterprises, in contrast to surplusful and consequently heterogeneous, highly complex, and perhaps unwieldy industrial societies, which by virtue of such characteristics, develop and maintain general cooperation only with the utmost difficulty. The latter often do passably well in small, local matters, but they fail in large ones. For while simplicity and homogeneity are to be found locally, they are generally lacking on any extensive scale. The nations are broken up into endless occupational groups, economic classes, and social layers that do not freely communicate or reach an understanding. Little getting together in plan or purpose results. Therefore, modern nations neither consistently nor with assurance make much headway in the wider and weightier things of collective life. Indeed, we have argued throughout this book that the social process viewed historically has been at bottom very largely an accidental and mechanical pro-

cedure. That does not, of course, force the conclusion that it will always remain so, but from the present outlook the chances do not appear much more favorable than they have been for any important purposive working out of the social destiny, either on a national or an international scale; that is, for the prevailing social process to be superseded by social progress.

But, be the possibilities for telic effort what they may and the chances for process giving way to progress such as they are, they need not deter us from projecting the possible lines of social advance. All that we shall attempt to do, however, is to indicate and perhaps evaluate some of the ways by which human aspiration hopes for and might find deliverance from our social ills. These suggested ways have grown out of man's longing for the stable and his profound desire for consummation, for finality, for surcease from strife, for rest somehow and somewhere in the midst of a world of change. The best of these ways if tried would under the most favorable circumstances scarcely give all that is hoped from them. They would give only partial and fleeting satisfaction, for all are relative. Nothing, indeed, is final or absolute in human relations. All is change, incessant change, everywhere in the life of society. And so must be the ways of progress. We shall, nevertheless, presently give attention to such of them as seem most worth while as means for equalizing the surplus.

When we translate the idea of redistribution into equalization, as we are about to do, a fourth question is raised. This is the question of the desirability and practicability of equality.

The intellectuals rarely find anything desirable in it. They have long rung the changes on the fact that men are born unequal, that civilization is built on inequality, that men have an instinct for inequality, and that progress is

possible only through inequality. Indeed, it is customary to define progress in terms of liberty rather than equality and to hold, as one has put it, that the latter "is an instrument of amazing aptitude for the obliteration of ability, of liberty."[4]

But, as I see it, the desirability of equality does not depend so much upon what has been or is, as upon what may be. In other words, it is to be decided in relation to progress. And when it comes to this, the preservation of harmonious group life in order that change may be orderly, would seem to be society's first duty to itself. Nor is this duty inconsistent with the pursuit of liberty within the range of harmony. Only liberty no more than equality is to be considered an end in itself. Both are to be looked upon as means to peaceful social order, group perpetuity and welfare but nothing more.

Any program of equality will necessarily obliterate the virtually unrestricted liberty of some. But this it will do in order that liberty may abound for the many. If society rested on fraternity there would be no question of liberty; but, since it rests largely on coercion, domination, and relations of advantage and disadvantage, there is no natural foundation for liberty. Hence, in order to get such a foundation—one of voluntary goodwill, mutual aid, and brotherhood—let equality be established and men held to a common lot till they acquire fraternity and accord each other such liberty as is consistent therewith!

But, as already said, the social problem is not chiefly one of liberty. It is the larger one of stability. If the latter can be had by any means other than an approximate equilibrium of energy within and between social aggregates, that means has yet to be revealed. If security is a physical phenomenon as we have assumed and if it is obedient to the laws of nature in consequence of its being such a

[4] John Corbin, *The Return of the Middle Class*, p. 310.

phenomenon, then the equilibration of its energies is the only way to stability.

Society as it is, is, of course, a moving equilibrium. Its very existence implies that, but it does not imply that its internal forces are in such balance that disruption may not occur. But, if a relatively perfect balance were secured, would not that bring stagnation? In other words, would not equality negate progress? Scarcely so, for among living things no equilibrium can be absolute. The substance of which it is made is too unstable. Energy in such forms redistributes itself with comparative ease.

The practicability of establishing and maintaining equality is a problem which brings us back to the question already faced; namely, whether or not society is able to direct its affairs. It is, therefore, next in order to canvass the proposals for equality put forth by those who believe society can direct its affairs.

### Proposal for the Equalization of Surplus

1. *To equalize vital surplus,* though a matter of primary importance, is by far the most difficult project in the program of progress. What should be done is not so difficult to indicate, but to get society to perform the doing of it is of course the rub. It is pretty generally agreed in the first place that inferior stocks ought somehow to be eliminated. The nations of the world are perceived to be too full of the physically unfit and the mentally incapable and deficient. If these strains were cut off from among the living and procreating stocks, it would be taking a long step toward ushering in biological democracy. Negative eugenics, therefore, seeks measures to prevent them from multiplying. In this way it aims at eliminating in the course of a few generations much of the inferior element, and so to tone up the general stamina and ability of the

race. To accomplish even this much would require drastic legislation, exceedingly wise administration, and vigilant social control. But to segregate, sterilize, and so eventually to extirpate the poor strains, difficult though it may be, is the only practical method of procedure.

However, the vital surplus proper belongs chiefly to those elements of the population that are endowed with superior mental and physical capacity. To increase their numbers or to make such qualities as they possess general, is the real burden of race improvement. Positive eugenics would accomplish this by somehow increasing the relative fecundity of the best stock, till in time it would overwhelm or supplant the mediocre with a type of supermen. In furtherance of this it would carry out a eugenic survey, facilitate the mating of the fittest and encourage them to be very fruitful. But to remake mankind after this fashion is a very ambitious undertaking, and one contingent, first of all, upon the rise of group standards and ideals demanding its accomplishment, in the second place upon the successful creation of a eugenic registry, and, in the third place, upon the adoption of a rigid policy of selective mating by the stock that has for its object the outbreeding of all other strains and the improvement of the race. Although it may be highly desirable that all men shall be made equal and of a high quality, it is but a dream with only the remotest prospect of realization.

Perhaps more certain gains in the direction of vital equality are to be had through the elimination of preventable disease from among wide ranges of the population. There is no nation where unnecessary morbidity does not ravage the people, particularly the poorer and more ignorant classes. Climatic diseases like malaria and hookworm, occupational diseases, and diseases due to poverty and low standards of living are widely prevalent. Enough knowledge of hygiene, sanitation, and medicine is available if

spread abroad and applied, and coupled with wholesome conditions of labor and adequate means of livelihood, to go far toward wiping out a vast deal of morbidity. It is estimated that of the 3,000,000 persons in the United States who are at all times seriously ill, 42 per cent could be saved from illness, and that as a result their tenure of life could be lengthened by 15 years.[5] Weak classes could thus be lifted up and strengthened, and not a little of the vital disparity that now prevails be eliminated. Noteworthy results, in fact, have been achieved during the last generation in this quarter, and still larger ones appear within reach. Added success will mean in the end greater duration of life and increased years of effective service for all who benefit therefrom.

Another step toward the equalization of vital energy could well be taken by providing a more generous distribution of food. Many are undernourished and fail to energize as well fed men habitually do. Graham Wallas calls attention to the fact that although the food supply of London from 1916 to 1918 was short of that in 1912 and 1913, yet because of a comparative equality in distribution during the latter period the physical energy which the food produced was greater. There was nutritional well-being and more than ordinary strength among the masses.[6] Such a means of evening up energy is well within the reach of every western nation if only we could get a more equitable distribution of income.

An extensive monopoly of leisure on the part of the relatively few needs to be dissolved in favor of the masses, for unremitting, drudging toil and struggle for subsistence is devitalizing. No vital equality can possibly be maintained unless leisure is commonly shared. Were all able-

[5] Irving Fisher, *National Vitality,* for the National Conservation Committee.

[6] *Our Social Heritage,* p. 89.

bodied individuals now lounging in luxury, killing time and otherwise shirking their share of work, made to lend a hand, and were all unproductive labor that is now consumed in making useless articles, building armaments, advertising, and doing numerous other futile things eliminated, and were all men engaged in producing necessary and useful commodities, it is probable that the work of the world could be done in five or six hours daily. The rest of the time would be free for other purposes, and all men could enjoy a like share of it.

Just how far along these particular ways of improvement any nation will journey depends in the last analysis upon the development of the right sort of mores and scientific knowledge. It probably depends also upon how much surplus wealth is made common wealth and how much knowledge is generally disseminated.

The lessening of vital inequality would obviously remove one of the causes of social stratification, diminish somewhat the chances for exploitation, tend to allay conflict, forestall in a measure revolutionary change, foster wider individuation and go far toward establishing real social harmony. It would bring homogeneity one step nearer, and so enable coöperative effort and mutual endeavor to go forward more readily. All in all, it would accelerate general social progress by bringing more favorable conditions for conscious, rational, telic effort.

2. *Any equal distribution of tradition* among the citizens of a nation or the establishment of tradition uniformity presupposes equal capacity on the part of all for receiving the same. In other words, it presupposes that men have become nearly equally endowed in their biologic nature. Given such endowment, just what redistribution would be desirable in the interest of social well-being and harmony? In the preceding chapter the governing principle was laid down that such a participation in the heritage should

prevail as will give every individual proficiency in at least one technique, profession, or useful employment, coupled with a like training for all in the essential doctrines and practices of democratic society. This implies that there should be both diversity and uniformity of culture. In fact, nothing else would be feasible, and, in consequence, no uniform solidarity throughout all ranges of association can be achieved. Those having the same vocational training plus the common training suggested for all citizens will form groups having greater solidarity. Their bonds will be at least twofold, while the bonds between different vocational groups will normally be only a single tie. Of course, it must be recognized that many cross-groupings apart from those that any workable scheme of distribution can take into account will always arise and effect numerous unities and diversities among people. Obviously, therefore, cultural equality must be defined in terms of the limitations which the possibilities of human nature and the exigencies of modern living impose.

At best no human being is capable of receiving more than a small portion of the world's knowledge. The enormous mass of technique, science, philosophy, and learning of a thousand kinds leads to specialization in its numerous fields. As knowledge constantly grows from more to more it must become increasingly fragmented in the minds of men. Wherefore divisive tendencies must also constantly increase as the accumulation of tradition goes on. These tendencies are always further augmented by the methods of modern industry which solely for the sake of economy foster the minutest fragmentation of technical knowledge. Industrial standards carry over into numerous other realms of life in harmony with the law that the mores of subsistence go far to determine those of a secondary nature. There being, then, no escape from vocational and professional specialization, the situation must be met by providing

that all citizens be made equally proficient in their respective spheres of tradition. Society must provide the opportunity for such training and see that every child of the rising generation gets the training. This is the first step in the equalization of tradition.

The remainder of the task and, at the same time, the more difficult part, pertains to uniformity. Social harmony is obviously not much secured by diversification. In fact, the results of diversification tend to work the other way, with disharmony increasing as specialization takes place and the multiplication of pursuits grows. Though each group may have its own uniformity and groups in general be made increasingly interdependent, division and cleavage still remain. Hence, without the preparation of some common cultural grounds to underlie all groupings and establish unity amid diversity, the larger social aggregates cannot make much headway in the direction of stability and harmony. In lieu of any adequate grounds of this sort in modern life, it has become true, and will become more so with the lapse of time, that in the midst of palpable and undeniable advancement in the industrial arts, social relations and moral welfare stand still or tend to regress.

It may be contended that habit affords a basis of peace and harmony underlying all else. William James so held. "Habit," he said, "is the enormous flywheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread thereon. It keeps the fisherman and the deckhand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and nails the countryman to his log cabin and his lonely farm throughout the months of snow. It dooms us all to fight out the

battles of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees because there is no other for which we are fitted and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing."[7]

Social habits there are, but are they ample for the needs of the time? Are our common social practices in this nation numerous enough and sufficiently fundamental to give any stable uniformity? Most of the people wear like things, eat similar foods, enjoy common sports and amusements, read the same newspapers, speak one language, and conform to a uniform body of laws and institutions. They imitate the same models and do a lot of things in like ways. Thus we have social habit on an extensive scale. But have we in consequence a people like-minded and strongly bound together? Without in any wise minimizing such solidarity as arises in this manner I deny that it gives much unity. The existing conditions of strife and disharmony belie the contention that unity is securely grounded in habit.

For the most part our common customs do not go deep enough. They lie too much on the surface to give abiding results. The uniformity that is essential must be more fundamental. It must rest in deep conviction relative to the ideals of living together and in habitual reactions favorable to them.

Uniformity of feeling or emotion is not enough, for whatever value these have, unless they are concomitants of fundamental beliefs, they are likely to be dangerous. Uniformity of actions built on superficial imitation of customs will not suffice, for these have too shallow a root. Uniformity founded on the knowledge of a few great principles, ideals, and doctrines of collective welfare is the thing needed.

Whatever else the national life of to-day may boast,

[7] *Principles of Psychology.*

there is all too little of the uniformity of which I speak. Just here our civilization is seriously wanting, and it seems to be steadily growing in the deficiency. There is the greatest disparity of knowledge pertaining to the fundamentals of democratic life among the people who cherish democracy as a vague ideal. The problem, therefore, in so far as tradition is concerned, is how to train all citizens in at least these fundamentals. Along this way real progress is to be found, for such equality of knowledge will tend to produce harmony and unity.

Obviously the redistribution of tradition is the problem of education. As regards specialization, it involves the adjustment of individuals to that field of knowledge or technique for which they are best fitted by nature. To discover natural fitness in so far as it exists and can be discovered constitutes the first procedure of education for citizenship. After that it remains to provide the training. To sift the stock and find how nature has assorted it in this regard, and then to subject it to the nurture that most accords with the inclinations of each individual is the great task. By such sifting more of certain types would probably be discovered than society has any particular need of. Perhaps, however, it would be revealed that a great many are equally fitted for any one of several lines of specialization, or that positive bent comes more from nurture than nature. If so, there will arise no serious difficulty in distributing people to carry on the world's activities.

The implication lies in what has just been said, that society ought to know what kinds of work it wants done, and how much of it. But society does not know, and perhaps never can know with any certainty under conditions of constant change. In this as in so many respects it must blindly grope its way rather than shape its course. Hence it cannot be expected that any nation will ever satisfactorily distribute the vocational tradition. Only a static

order of things would permit an entirely satisfactory distribution, and status is not characteristic of surplus society. New tradition will always upset any approximate equilibrium that may be established. But barring a great deal of uncertainty that must always exist, any nation, if it will, can determine within a fair degree of accuracy how many followers of this, that and the other vocation are needed, and it can train its citizens accordingly. So far, however, the purposeless, planless method of nature remains in force, and we have scarcely advanced beyond the state of affairs that inspired Plato to write upon the question in the *Republic*, except to become worse tangled in the maze of a thousandfold greater tradition. The problem of adequately specializing all citizens in accordance with the distribution of the work of society still awaits solution.

The more difficult undertaking in my opinion is to educate for uniformity, for the natural development runs counter to it. In this as in all efforts for equality, something artificial is being sought, and it is hard to obtain. The lines of uniformity especially needed were briefly alluded to in the preceding chapter. Now they may be more adequately set forth.

We shall take for granted that the citizens have in common a considerable body of folkways, and that they are also equipped with what are usually called tools of the mind; that is, the knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic. In addition, they must be thoroughly and equally grounded in those underlying principles of democratic association of which we have already spoken. Specifically, these are in the main the doctrines and habits of liberty, equality, decision by deliberation, coöperation, and orderly change.

Liberty means the right and "opportunity for continuous initiative."[8] As a doctrine and rule of conduct it involves matters of conscience, speech, press, assembly, and

[8] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

freedom of action in general. It is the first requisite for harmonious living together. All citizens must be nurtured in it. They must be taught the doctrine on the assumption that if they know the truth concerning freedom it will make them free indeed.

Because they have not been taught it men are unfree, and being unfree they know not the ways of true social concord. No fact is more patent than the one to which Norman Angell calls attention when he declares that "All bright hopes of past efforts at a really new order have been wrecked upon this rock; human lust for the coercion of those of contrary opinion. Mankind has failed in these efforts because men do not yet love freedom; do not believe in it; do not understand its need or the ground upon which it is necessary to preserve it."[9]

Many are being nurtured and indoctrinated in these days with the ideas and principles of religions that foster no freedom of belief, by industrial systems that allow no freedom of action, by urban social environments that dictate conformity, and by militaristic policies that destroy individual initiative till the torch of liberty throughout Europe and America not only fails to burn with its former brightness, but bids fair to be extinguished altogether. Fascism in one form or another flourishes, and many a Mussolini is in effect echoing the words of that Italian himself in saying: "Fascism is not afraid to declare itself illiberal or anti-liberal. It has already, and if necessary will pass again, without the slightest hesitation, over the body, more or less decomposed, of the Goddess of Liberty."

Such an attitude is only the wisdom of anarchy and the natural fruit of conditions that have negated liberty in the experiences of multitudes of men. It is the price society is paying for not taking steps to counter the untoward influences that have subverted the spirit of free-

[9] *The British Revolution and American Democracy.*

dom. There is but one remedy and that is for society somehow to teach its members to know and to love liberty as the rock of its salvation.

Can liberty be taught? There are those who doubt it. They hold with Montesquieu that liberty is "the birthright of strong, self-mastering peoples, and of them alone."[10] If this be true, the principles and practices of liberty can hardly be taught. But there is no sound reason for thinking that it is true. Some truth there may be in it, but not so much that one can say that liberty is altogether or in any large measure the exclusive birthright of particular stocks such as for instance that of the purely mythological "Nordics" of present-day vogue. It is quite as much a matter of the tradition and the other forms of the social surplus apart from the vital element. At least three-fourths of it derives from factors outside the vital and to that extent it can be taught.

Equality is a doctrine and practice no less indispensable for social stability. It covers such things as opportunity, privilege, rights, possession of goods, etc. Its spirit has never been better expressed than by Whitman in the following lines:

> I speak the pass-word primeval—I give the sign of democracy;
> By God! I will accept nothing which all cannot have their counterpart of on the same terms.
>
> . . . . .
>
> As if it harm'd me, giving others the same chances and rights as myself—
> As if it were not indispensable to my own rights that others possess the same.

Liberty if left to itself tends to abuse, but curbed by the principle of equality provides that none shall have what all may not enjoy. The day was when the modern demo-

[10] John Corbin, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

cratic movement was motivated by the ideal of equality. Philosophers taught it, publicists advocated it, and statesmen promoted it by law. But with the growth of industrialism, the unprecedented concentration of economic surplus, and the rise of urbanocracy equality was forgotten. The doctrine of inequality took its place. In every quarter it began to be taught that the natural and social orders rested on inequality, whereas it was formerly believed that equality was the foundation of all. The weight of truth, no doubt, lies largely on the side of the present viewpoint, but so many interests wish it to remain there and have done so much to carry inequality to the utmost extremes that they have caused the forces of disruption to rise on every hand. Unquestionably, to idealize inequality and to establish human relationships upon it is in harmony with the social process, but for all that it is to build on instability and invite disaster. And if disaster is to be staved off twentieth century society, the doctrine of equality must be reaffirmed and taught anew as an ideal worthy of pursuit.

The principle and habit of arriving at social decisions through discussion must be taught to all if they are to carry on sanely together. Tolerance of opinion is best secured and conserved by this custom. Self-government has no other means of existence and mobmindedness no more deadly enemy. Unfortunately modern industrial and urbanized society does not foster this habit. Under a rural and domestic economy small groups in face to face contact freely discussed their work and whatever else concerned them. By that means they reached decisions and formulated opinions. But the factory system and large scale production of every sort has practically brought this to an end. Discussion has been eliminated among the masses. Decisions are no longer reached to any considerable degree in this way. Executives now deliberate, decide, and dic-

tate. In almost every particular has urban society reduced these functions to a star chamber procedure participated in by the few only. In large measure this is the case even with special agencies of opinion. In place of the assembly and personally mediated ideas that by interchange integrate into public opinion, has come the commercial newspaper and the impersonally mediated ideas of the editor's office poured out to overwhelm the people with what somebody wishes to impose upon them. Thus vast numbers of citizens have been set under authority and discussion has given way to dictation, till the custom of social decision by the deliberative process has practically been lost. To revive it in some form and cause it to function again is one of the important things that needs to be done in the interest of traditional unity.

The tradition of coöperation is another tenet of the greatest significance in the training of all members of the body politic. All citizens should possess a living faith in the power of group initiative and should become versed in the art of expressing that faith through coöperative action. Although traditions of teamwork have not yet been established in all the relations prevailing in the industrial order, in so far as they have arisen, they must be taught to all.

Belief in orderly change must also be generally inculcated. Every citizen should understand that change is inevitable and that orderly change is desirable. And yet a strong current of belief is running in the opposite direction, and well-organized efforts to propagate this contrary belief are being made. Here is a sample from the mouth of a spokesman of an influential organization: "We need to teach," he says, "that those who are attempting to change our form of government through changes in our constitution are just as great enemies of the country as those who bear arms against it." But such counsel has in it only the

wisdom of the Bourbons and nothing more. It has brought a deluge more than once in the world, and will bring it again. The true statesman says to all such "patriotic thuggery": "The educational principle of suggesting to children that social and political institutions are perfect in wisdom and goodness, that their country is beyond compare, that their city is all a city should be, is very dangerous. . . . Would it not be wiser as well as more honest if we taught children from the beginning that they live in a world which may be bettered, but which is bettered only in so far as men will to better it, and that they too will have a share in that great and difficult task, no easy entrance into an inheritance fully prepared? Would it not save something of the disillusionment and cynicism which in certain cases is the rebound from the placid lessons of perfection too often learned in early youth?"[11]

As to this there can be no doubt among socially wise men. Scarcely any doctrine is more vital for the modern man than belief in the necessity for alteration. He should learn to expect it, to desire it, to foster it rather than blindly oppose it. He should seek if possible to direct it rather than to drift on the unguided currents that sweep us whither we know not. Half the instability and disharmony of the age comes from stubborn resistance to inevitable alteration!

There are many other principles that may be quite as important as the ones we have insisted upon, as for instance the doctrines of racial equality, human brotherhood, the rule of reason rather than force, etc., but at least these we have stressed must be commonly shared if there is to be any adequate social unity. The universal inculcation of cardinal doctrines of this sort is what I mean by tradition equalization in one of its important aspects.

In the light of the program here projected it will be well

[11] R. C. Maciver, *Community*, p. 189.

to examine some of the educational theories and practices now in vogue. There is the "bread and butter" theory of education, which would provide vocational training, but nothing more, for the masses. Other lines of culture it would reserve for the upper classes. This notion is the so-called practical business man's idea as well as that of the dominant class generally. It has wide vogue in the United States, though its influence is not absent from European thought.[12] Vocational training is, of course, desirable, though only as it is for all, not when used to make distinct classes. By itself, however, it is not enough. There must be something broader if the best interests of group life are to be conserved.

A cultural theory of education stresses the importance of certain broad general lines of tradition to the neglect of all others. It ignores the universal need for vocational knowledge and spurns with equal adroitness the demands for socialization. Its cue is taken from the leisured class to which it caters. It is a theory without merit in the program of social advance.

Other theories give attention to the uniqueness of individuals, and would cultivate this uniqueness to the utmost. They require some sort of specialization in the tradition. The emphasis is correct; but the aim tends to overlook the opposite side of the problem, that is, to lose sight of the fact that members of society must be socialized as well as individualized.

Another theory of education holds that training must be for citizenship, that its object should be to adjust the child to the existing order. Vocational specialization as well as uniformity of training is advocated. The latter, however, is predicated not on any dynamic idea of associational life but on the concept of a static social order. The mores that gave rise to the prevalent institutions mat-

[12] See John Dewey, *Schools of To-morrow*, pp. 313-315.

ter little, but conformity to existing structural forms is sought. It is not the spirit of the laws but the letter that is to be respected. No doubt solidarity can thus be secured, though it will prove resourceless and supine in the face of crisis and inevitable change. But that is just the kind of solidarity the chief proponents of this kind of education desire. They want to canonize things as they are, thwart progress, and solidify the power they hold in the social order. Hence the great objective is not harmony through more equitable relations, but harmony through submission to control. Pressed to its logical conclusion, this is substantially all that training for citizenship amounts to, as it is currently interpreted.

If none of the widely prevalent theories of education meet the needs of the problem it does not follow that we have a poverty of ideas regarding the subject. Far from it, for many have grappled with it and in a thoroughly democratic spirit. Acceptable theories there are, but the difficulty lies in converting them into popular programs, since education has become so largely a political function. Being such, any program has therefore to become a state policy and therein lies the barrier in its way.

However much history may be a race between the right sort of education and catastrophe, the prospects of society providing what democratically-minded men believe to be the right sort are rather remote. The ruling element in the nation would almost as leave have catastrophe as such education. No existing state, as a result, will hardly establish a public school system to teach the tradition uniformities upon which real democracy rests. It will supply facilities for technical training and for the teaching of reverence for the past, respect for existing institutions, conformity to the present order, loyalty to the group, together with many other things, both good and bad, and call it democratic because offered equally to all, but beyond these limits the

existing state will scarcely go. Only what contributes to the ends of political control, not what contributes to the ends of progress is likely to have place in its program. So long and so far, therefore, as education remains under the direction of the industrial state it will be handicapped from the truly democratic viewpoint. Nor is it to be expected that the state will look kindly upon any extensive educational movement of a private nature contrary to its program. Hence the only assured way ever to get education for democracy will be to get a democratic political order in sympathy with such education.

3. *Economic surplus,* because the most tangible of all social energy, ought to be the most easily redistributed. However, "the establishment of a perfect equality may be," as Bentham said, "a chimera; and all we can do is to diminish inequality."[13]

When the equalization of wealth is up for consideration, it is well to remind ourselves what progress in respect to it involves. In general we have thought of progress as the furthering of surplus gain accompanied by redistribution such as will promote harmony. Where wealth is at stake, maximum accumulation is certainly not the goal, but only such additional accumulation as will best serve human welfare. More goods are always desirable, but only in so far as their production is consistent with the acquisition of all other forms of surplus, and above all with the growth of harmonious social relations. Not maximum production, then, but maximum well-being first, and then production is the great desideratum.

If the present wealth of the United States were equally distributed there would be an equivalent of about $2,800 per capita or about $11,000 per family. On the basis of pre-war estimates a similar distribution in European countries would give per capita for the United Kingdom

[13] Jeremiah Bentham, *Theory of Legislation,* p. 120.

$1,549, for France $1,476, for Germany $1,188, for Italy $623, and for Austria-Hungary $589.[14]

If thus distributed, would production still go forward to the extent that more and more surplus would accrue? Possibly equitable division would bring about decentralization of resources to such a degree that industry would be crippled. If so it would be highly disadvantageous, and the ends of economic progress would not be fully served. Somehow the concentration of productive capital must be preserved, and any scheme of redistribution in ownership must guarantee that. Possibly a third of the wealth of America could be redistributed and dissipated without seriously retarding industry. This much would represent the surplus in the stricter sense. However an equalization of ownership could be effected that would not necessarily involve the dissipation of capital control and consequently would not necessarily jeopardize the continuance of production involving the extensive pooling of capital. Hence such an equalization might well be ventured with entire safety.

If, then, productive interests are to be conserved, equalization will have to be effected by some method of socialization by which each citizen will be given title to his proportionate share, but not the right to do with it as he pleases. A number of schemes have been proposed. One seeks to extend certain methods that are already being followed by modern governments. I refer to reform projects limiting private ownership by governmental control of industrial agencies, such as transportation and communication, and the practice of redistributing consumable wealth by means of direct taxation and social insurance. These practices have undoubtedly tended to bring about some modifications of wealth inequality. They have made available to many somewhat better opportunities for getting a living and for

[14] *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. 82, p. 491.

acquiring property. Governmental ventures in the field of industrial control and ownership have brought numerous advantages to the general public. Direct taxation of inheritances and supertaxes on large incomes has taken from the rich and, through pensions, social insurance, and public benefits, given to the poor. Other reforms have checked exploitation in many quarters, and become the means of putting goods into the consumer's hands at fairer prices. Nevertheless these measures, though tending toward the equalization of wealth, have been chiefly palliatives designed to quiet discontent, while at the same time frequently assuring larger profits to the class that rules, but they are not intended to work fundamental changes. Although improving the well-being of the masses, they have not reduced by so much as a fraction the relative inequality of wealth and income in any land. If carried far enough they might do this, and many have every confidence that they will eventually prove adequate remedies.

Some think the remedy would be adequate if only the basic industries of our national life, which are already monopolized were taken over by the state. These would include mines, railways, telephones and telegraphs, banking and insurance, and such others as from time to time assume monopolistic proportions. All other enterprises would be left to private initiative. Thus, it is argued, would society conserve the development of energy in the field of private endeavor. At the same time the public at large would reap the benefits of that initiative in whatever was socialized.[15] The merits of this limited socialism consists in its preservation of the capitalistic system as the foundation of the industrial order.

Another proposal would abolish all proprietary rights of functionless owners, or, to use Veblen's phrases, "the legitimate right to something for nothing." These rights in-

[15] J. A. Hobson, *Incentives in the New Industrial Order*, pp. 91, 92.

clude claims to royalties, ground rents, returns from shares in corporations, numerous kinds of bonds and securities, inheritances, and divers other liens on the products of industry. They involve, in fact, all property that "may be called passive property, or property for acquisition, for exploitation or for power, to distinguish it from the property which is actively used by its owner for the conduct of his profession or the upkeep of his household." [16]

Such property, doubtless, embraces the greater part of the wealth of industrial society.[17] It is estimated that at least 29 per cent of the national income of the United Kingdom is claimed by property of this sort.[18] Subsequent to the Great War it has probably taken even a larger share. About one-third of the income of the people of the United States is similarly appropriated.[19]

Were passive proprietary rights abolished and only the users of property allowed any share in the products of industry, it would go far toward converting property from an agency making the majority of men servants of a few idle possessors, to one existing merely to aid the labor of human beings.[20] It would thus end a vast deal of social parasitism. Above all, it would bring about radical equalization.

This plan does not question the validity of private property as an institution; it does not aim directly at limiting holdings; its primary object is to make ownership functional. Inevitably, however, ability to use does not differ so very widely; the result would be that the workers of the world would enjoy approximate equality.

Society does not readily respond to programs of this na-

[16] R. H. Tawney, *The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society*, pp. 33, 34.
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] This is H. Dalton's estimate for 1911. See *Some Aspects of the Inequality of Incomes in Modern Communities*, p. 208.
[19] See *Income in the United States, Its Amount and Distribution*, Vol. 1, National Bureau of Economic Research, p. 145.
[20] R. H. Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 54, 55.

ture. Opposition rises not only from those who hold wealth for acquisition, for exploitation, and for power, but from a great many with small savings, and even from the propertyless, since the average person habitually looks upon property as a means of security.[21] It is indeed the only available means of protection against the days of sickness and old age. Even though the vast majority of men are never able to provide such security, they cherish till late in life the hope of so doing, and generally uphold the institution in which their trust is centered. Antecedent, therefore, to a favorable reception of this program, some system of social insurance adequate to protect the propertyless against the vicissitudes of sickness, accident, unemployment, and old age will need to be established as a means of breaking down the property-motive and convincing men that they may be protected without having passive property rights. The only practical endeavor directly in line with this program is the single tax movement. So far as it goes, single tax appears sound, but if put into force would probably not abolish all functionless proprietary rights. Single tax, however, has made little headway.

The economic program most in favor is state socialism. It proposes public ownership of the means of production and would bring all workers into the service of the commonwealth. By this scheme capital would remain concentrated, and its control become a public function. All men would be dependent upon society and equal sharers in what they together create.

But would they create anything like the present output? The objection is commonly made that socialism would paralyze or greatly retard production. In proof attention is

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 39. It is believed that the wage earners of the United States do not receive over 8% of all their income from investments or sources other than wages. See *Income in the United States, Its Amount and Distribution,* Vol. 1, National Bureau of Economic Research, p. 107.

usually directed to the slowness and inefficiency of government work. Certainly if socialized industries should fail to maintain production at practically the level reached by private enterprise, they would not prove satisfactory and would speedily become impossible.

It is usually contended that such a system would remove the great incentive which the hope of private gain gives to effort. But it may be questioned whether the motive of private gain is as fundamental to the productive process as many are wont to assume. Certainly, under prevailing conditions, it is a powerful incentive; but if the necessity for it were removed and some other security given, does it follow that men would turn mere idlers? By no means. They are driven to exertion by too many other motives, just as strong as the acquisitive. As it is, not many have a chance to acquire anything beyond daily bread anyhow, and yet they labor on, despite their unsuccess. The successful as a rule do the same. So it does not appear that the economic motive is the determining one. Much of the work of the world is done less, perhaps, in response to the economic impulse than from habit, desire for the "feeling of effectiveness," and the necessity for expending surplus energy. Work is not ordinarily repugnant to civilized man except it be of a disagreeable nature, too arduous, or so prolonged that it becomes overwork. "Overwork," as Kropotkin well said, "is repulsive to human nature—not work. Overwork for supplying the few with luxury—not work for the well-being of all. Work, labor, is a physiological necessity, a necessity for spending accumulated bodily energy, a necessity which is health and life itself. If so many branches of useful work are so reluctantly done now, it is merely because they mean overwork, or they are improperly organized." [22]

For the masses a socialistic régime would, I suppose, afford about as much incentive to effort as capitalism does.

[22] P. Kropotkin, *Anarchist Communism.*

Under representative instead of autocratic control and with a stake for every man in the game, it might do even better than capitalism. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that an equitable division of the product would be the means of so heightening vital surplus that greater productivity would normally be effected. Still it is not unlikely that socialism would have to conscript some citizens, inasmuch as it is possible that certain classes of men, whatever the economic system, will feel little obligation to exert themselves persistently. In lieu of conscription it might withhold more than the bare necessities of life from the few who are indolently inclined. As for disagreeable work it would be possible to offer special inducements to get it done. Thus it is reasonable to think that socialism could maintain production sufficient to provide a fair standard of living and under favorable conditions be able to raise that standard to higher levels.

Marked advances in one way and another have been made toward state socialism. Considerable municipal and less state ownership have already come into existence. Most great economic reforms of the day seem to look in this direction; and if one may judge of the future by the trend of the last half century, the socialists' program stands a fair chance of winning much ground, if not leave to redistribute the goods of the world.

Syndicalism and guild socialism offer other plans for equalizing wealth. The former would have unions of workers by industries rather than by trades take over the means of production to be owned and operated by them collectively.[23] Guild socialism would vest ownership in the community at large but otherwise give the guilds or unions by industries complete control of the productive process.[24] In

[23] G. D. H. Cole, *World of Labor*, pp. 212, 213.

[24] G. D. H. Cole, *op. cit.*; Bertrand Russell, *Proposed Roads to Freedom*, Chapter III.

either case the collective income of each industry would be divided among the workers belonging to the guild. Pure syndicalism would appropriate all, while the guild form, acknowledging the community as owner, would pay a tax or rental to the community before dividing the income. Each coöperating group would control the distribution of its earning as it deemed fit. Presumably an approximately equitable division would be the rule. At least no radical variation from such a method would meet with approval by any collective body.

Although within the limits of each industrial group or guild economic equality could readily be established, the national income as a whole would scarcely yield to equal distribution in this manner. All industries do not create or command a like portion of the national dividend. The share of each is not proportionate to the number of workers enrolled. This being so, the earnings when equally shared that the members, say, of the transportation syndicate would receive, would be greater than the earnings of the members, let us say, of the mining guild. Under such circumstances there would have to be some balancing of accounts between industrial groups if real equality were to be obtained throughout the nation. Pure syndicalism does not seem to make any provision for eliminating such disparities. Guild socialism, by providing for the payment of a rental by the guild to the community for the use of the means of production, could easily adjust matters by fixing a differential tax.[25]

Either guild socialism or syndicalism would seem to possess some advantages over state socialism as means of economic redistribution. For one thing they do not require any great readjustment of motives and habits, since the rewards of efforts are more immediately apparent. Again, the problem of management would be much more simple.

[25] Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

Above all the autonomy of small interest groups would be preserved and much coercive authority be escaped.

Coöperative ventures looking toward some method of distribution of this kind are rising throughout the industrial world. In Great Britain the coöperative societies have gone far. They are conducting five to six per cent of the nation's business. Some four out of ten million families are enrolled in them. The general success of these undertakings is commending them to wide ranges of society. But whether the people of any nation will apply the method to industry as a whole remains for the future to show.

In the light of these proposals it appears that society is not wanting either in ideals or programs of economic progress. Their relative merits as purely economic measures depend upon how far they would, if put into operation, maintain production as well as effect an equitable distribution of income. The important thing, as we have emphasized, is not to dissipate capital, but rightly to divide the product.

How much is there to divide, and what would its equal division mean, are the pressing issues. The average annual per capita income for the past ten years in the United States has been nearly $400. Australia, estimated on the basis of pre-war figures for a single year, has had the next best with about $263. Similar calculations for the United Kingdom give $250 annually, for France $190, for Germany $150, for Italy $115, and for Austria-Hungary $105. Allowing an average of 4½ persons to the family, it would give for each family in the United States near $1800 per annum. In most other nations if pre-war conditions were restored it would just give a comfortable living, but not much more. But bearing in mind the distribution of income now prevailing, an equitable division would be a great boon everywhere, for even in the United States it appears that nearly 94 per cent of the families receive less

than $1800 while about 61 per cent normally get but half that amount.[26]

It does not appear that an equitable redistribution of the annual dividend, even in most prosperous America, would be adequate to give great material luxury or suffice to satisfy all human wants. It would certainly not make all men happy, but it would end galling poverty and make multitudes much happier than they have ever been. It would give a wholesome simplicity to living for those who have been plethoric with riches, and fill life's cup to the brim for many who have barely eked out existence. It would thus go far to usher in a reign of peace and harmony and goodwill hitherto unknown among men. Nor is there good ground for believing, as did Victorian economists, that the last condition would presently be rendered worse than the antecedent one from a greatly increased birth rate following upon the improved well-being of the masses, since the evident influence of prosperity is all the other way. The birth rate to-day tends downward as people improve their economic conditions, and a universal improvement of the economic well-being of the masses would probably not reverse this tendency.[27]

In the socialization of wealth and income, some principle other than the criterion of absolute equality should govern, if the greatest social welfare is to be secured. Mere equal division of income would under no circumstances mean equal well-being for all. The principle of distribution according to deserts is one often advocated. This may mean distribution according to value of work done, provided that equality of opportunity is first secured, or it may mean distribution according to the value of work done in the existing state of society.[28] In either case it falls short of

[26] W. J. King, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
[27] H. Dalton, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

the ends to which distribution ought to minister. A more generous principle would be division according to needs, since the needs of individuals and families differ considerably. As the maxim has it, "From each according to his power, to each according to his needs." These needs cannot be standardized, but unless they are met with some regard to their varying demands, well-being cannot be secured. The principle of need modified by the more fundamental one of equality would seem to be ideal.

What shall be counted needs, and by what principle shall they be met? These are really hard questions to answer in general terms, but if distribution is to be according to needs, answers should be found. I suppose it may be said that needs involve the elementary necessaries of life, such as the food one ordinarily desires and must have to gratify the cravings of nature, the clothes that sufficiently provide for health, comfort and respectable appearance, the shelter, fuel, and like commodities that enable people to live in comfort and decency, the services that medical and allied professions supply as occasion demands, and the minimum spiritual satisfactions that give zest to life. In providing for the elementary necessities the principle of demand could well govern in all cases, where demand has natural limits, as it often does. These cases would normally cover a considerable range of needs, though not all.[29] Those not so covered might be met on the basis of fixed allowances standardized according to various classes of conditions.

Against such equitable distribution of income economists will generally raise the objection that the means of accumulating new capital would thus be destroyed and industrial progress stopped. And the facts seem to support this view, for it appears that from two-thirds to three-fourths of the total savings are the undivided profits of private and

[29] Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 98, 99.

corporate enterprises.[30] The remainder comes from individual savings. If, therefore, the capitalists were eliminated it looks as though industry would languish for the want of nourishment.

J. A. Hobson denies that such would be the case. On the contrary, he argues that instead of the great incomes of the rich being the source of industrial development they are the cause of "needlessly low productivity."[31] He explains that under present conditions so much more capital is set aside for reinvestment than industry demands that over-expansion results and periods of depression follow. Such periods mean stagnation and the reduction of both employment and production.[32] He thinks, if income were redistributed and the surplus taken out of the hands of the few, speculation would cease and industry become stabilized. Moreover, the equitable distribution of income would enlarge the demand for commodities, produce a much greater national dividend, and so provide a larger quantity of new capital. This amount would be much less than under existing conditions, but enough for the needs, since it would give a conservative view of investment and favor thrift.[33]

Two general methods of realizing the program of economic democracy are widely entertained. One looks to cataclysmic change, the other to processional alteration. There is a growing sentiment in favor of the first—of taking the kingdom of economic justice by force. There is direct action, the general strike, and violent measures of various sorts. The struggle that is going on at the point of production frequently tends to become intensified to a revolutionary pitch. However, social revolutions are not readily made. They are immeasurably less the products of

[30] David Friday, *Profits, Wages and Pieces*, pp. 62-64.
[31] J. A. Hobson, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 60.

studied effort than the slow, uncontrolled shifting of the surplus. Karl Marx realized this, but not many in the thick of the conflict see it thus. In so far, however, as they do not, they are apt to strive shortsightedly, and largely in vain.

The more effective method is, doubtless, the processional, or the persistent struggle to gradually improve the distribution of income. By this means, the majority gain surplus and build up power. In so doing they slowly transform the economic system and prepare conditions for a complete socialization—even for a successful cataclysmic change if in the end it needs must come that way.[33a]

We have already suggested some of the benefits of wealth socialization. One was the wholesome influence that the elimination of poverty would have upon community peace. Even greater would be the effect produced by the abolition of human exploitation. Perhaps all exploitation would not end with the downfall of wealth monopoly, but certainly most of it would. The result would be the ending of the hatred and unrest rising therefrom. Greater still would be the gains from checking the imperialistic expansion of nations, for thus would much international jealousy, rivalry, and conflict be forestalled. Economic surplus would be largely consumed at home and give blessing where now it brings curse upon the earth. This economists are beginning to realize. One has put it thus: "If competition was displaced by combinations of a genuinely coöperative character in which the whole gain of improved economics passed, either to the workers in wages, or to large bodies of investors in dividends, the expansion of demand in the home markets would be so great as to give full employment to the productive powers of concentrated capital, and there would be no self-accumulating masses of profits expressing

[33a] See Maurice Williams, *The Social Interpretation of History*, especially Chapter VI.

themselves in new credit and demanding external employment.[34] Finally there would be a harvest of spiritual freedom with the good will it entails through the extinction of caste rule and industrial slavery. Withal the socialization of wealth would give far greater social stability.

4. *Progress in organization* requires that participation in the essential forms, at least, be more general and equitable. Much depends upon this, for all redistribution resolves in the last analysis to the problem of social reorganization. Among organizational forms the industrial and political are the two most essential. So we shall confine our attention to projects for advancement in these fields.

Schemes designed for democratizing the industrial system are often identical with the ones aiming at the redistribution of wealth. Those emanating from capitalistic sources are few, and are pretty much comprehended under the notion embodied in recognition of the union, in plans for shop committees, or, in rare cases, workers' representation on the board of directors, or some other device giving to a minor degree "a voice in the management." Now and then, of course, far-reaching plans for the democratization of enterprises under their control are inaugurated by philanthropic capitalists. But on the whole, meager fragments, at most, are all that are ever offered by the captains of industry as a class to the workers. About all that the arrangements they foster amount to is to lessen somewhat the friction of the existing system; they do not bring about any reorganization of the system itself. The vision of reform in the eyes of modern capitalism rarely includes any plans for bringing all workers into vocational organizations, and more rarely still any that would unite in one structure for the social good, the corporation and the labor union.

Even if capital should generally grant to labor an equal voice in the management of industry, would that suffice?

[34] J. A. Hobson, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism*, p. 262.

Not, if as in certain plants the "equal" voice is to be heard only in matters directly affecting the operation of the plant and the conditions of work while capital retains control of buying, selling, and financing. Nor yet if that equal voice is to be heard even in these matters, unless it can also secure for the workers an equitable participation in the surplus profits of monopoly. But, when it does that, it means that capital has virtually lost control, that it may as well abdicate and acknowledge the supremacy of a new system.

The great proposals therefore for fundamental reorganization of industry have all arisen outside of capitalistic circles. Mention was made of several of these in discussing wealth redistribution; and it would be wearisome to set them forth again. However, it may be worth while to dwell further upon what seems the most practical of these schemes. I refer to Guild Socialism. In its main features this calls for the organization of workers by industries for the purpose of taking over and managing production collectively. All factories or enterprises in a given industry would be federated into a national guild. A joint committee would have control of marketing and the general interests of the industry. Each local enterprise, however, would be free to control its own productive process without let or hindrance from other bodies. Over and above all, national guilds would sit in a guild congress for the purpose of handling all matters of interindustrial import. Thus, coördination of production would be effected. Coequal with the guild congress would be a general parliament of the nation representing the interests of consumers. In these two bodies the interests of producers and consumers would be reconciled and the general welfare of the community at large preserved.[35] The guild plan would thus vest ownership of all means of production in the community

[35] Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-83.

as a trustee, and requires each industry to pay a rental for their use. Yet the fact that local control is vested in the guild and the major part of the income is retained by the guildmen, makes ownership practically a guild affair.

Such a scheme, if put into operation, would undoubtedly effect a pretty thorough democratization of the industrial system. There would be an equitable and an active participation of each person in the "conduct of those portions of the structure of society with which he is directly concerned." The workers would thus be "the source and sustaining spirit" of industrial organization.[36]

The steady growth of labor unionism may be interpreted as a development toward a syndicalistic or guild organization of industry, for, as strong and fairly comprehensive workers' unions arise, it is not unlikely that they will champion some such movement. The experience of union activity will teach coöperation, with the result that integration into larger and larger units along industrial lines will naturally take place. At the same time there will tend to develop a common economic purpose that will look to large reconstructive measures. The sense of power of such organization will lead them to focus on political action to carry the measure through.[37] This integrating development is already becoming evident, and where it has gone far a demand for some form or other of the guild or syndicalist system has in a number of cases become manifest. In the coal industry of both England and America and likewise in the railway transport industry of our country, such proposals for reorganization have recently been made.[38]

Schemes for political reorganization adopt one of two attitudes toward the state. They seek either to reform and preserve it or to abolish it altogether. The general move-

[36] G. D. H. Cole, *Social Theory*, pp. 113, 114.
[37] Frank Tannenbaum, *The Labor Movement*, Chapters X-XII.
[38] See "The Plumb Plan" with reference to American railways.

ment for political democracy that has been in vogue especially during most of the last two centuries strives to make the state responsible to the people. It wants to secure a fair distribution of power among all citizens, and thus give to each as large a measure of liberty as possible. Political liberty and equality are, in fact, its watchwords. Just now the specific proposals designed for the furtherance of these ends are numerous. A few may be mentioned. One calls for a more extensive use of the initiative and referendum, so as to cover most legislative and executive acts. Of like import is the suggestion that all judicial decisions of first-rate importance be made subject to popular approval before they shall become effective. Another plan advocates the use of the recall by the electorate, in respect to all public officials from the chief executive down. Agitation for proportional representation and interest group representation, as substitutes for the present territorial basis, is also in the air. Several others might be indicated, but most would share with those enumerated one common quality, namely, that of being relatively superficial remedies for fundamental political evils.

There are those, I am aware, who look upon such alterations as anything but superficial. They see in them changes affecting the basic principles of government rather than just its methods. They see indeed representative government giving way to socialism.[39] However, in so far as the American government is concerned, the wiser opponents of these reforms do not have many fears. They do not believe it possible to rear any new system on the old foundations. Thus, President Nicholas Murray Butler, addressing himself to this subject declares: "If every elected and appointed officer of an American commonwealth were tomorrow to declare himself an adherent of the socialist

[39] Alleyne Ireland sees it in this light in *Democracy and the Human Equation,* pp. 202, 203.

program, neither he nor all his colleagues together could do one single thing to substitute the collectivist's state for our representative democracy, save through revolution and the subversion of the constitutional principles on which our civilization and our government rest. It is worth while remembering this fundamental fact. There is no possible way in which a socialistic state can be developed out of our representative American democracy." [40]

Obviously, therefore, the limitations set by the existing system will not allow any radical reform. Hence, despite a pretty strong desire for real self-government among the people, it is not an assured thing under the existing state.

Nevertheless, in spite of the shortcomings and failures of the democratic movement to bring good government, faith in it remains strong, because, superficially at least, it seems to give self-government. So in many quarters, its program is being vigorously pushed, and with hopes undaunted that ultimately the state will really be brought into subjection to the community. At the same time, increasing numbers are turning away from the conventional democratic cause in disgust; they are staking their hopes on more thorough measures.

The most common resort is to state socialism. The program of orthodox socialism involves substituting one kind of state for another. In the words of Karl Marx, "When in the course of development class distinctions have disappeared and all production has been centralized in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so-called, is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another." [41] In place of the political or capitalist state the socialists see the coming of a socialistic state

[40] Quoted by Ireland from Butler's *Why Should We Change Our Form of Government?*

[41] *Communist Manifesto*, p. 22.

or the "Distributive State."[42] This will be ushered in by socializing the means of production on the assumption that the nature of all institutions including the political is determined by the economic system. The socialistic state, in contradistinction to the political, would be one devoid of class rule; and its advocates believe it would give every individual an equitable share in governmental authority, and to all men a full measure of liberty. They believe, in fact, that were their program carried through and the seven devils of industrial capitalism now possessing the state cast out, this institution would become a fit temple for occupancy by the "association of the whole nation." It does not seem to occur to them that possibly the last state might be worst than the first.

I suggest, however, that this is possible but in full consciousness of the fact that the merits of a socialist state can only be discovered by trying it. *A priori* judgments about it, as about most things, are usually more wrong than right. Nevertheless, one may indulge them for what they may prove to be worth. The basis of my fears for the socialist program is one entertained by a good many thoughtful men, namely that it unduly magnifies the state. To load upon this institution the conduct of all industry would be to overload it, and virtually cause society to fling itself into the arms of an autocratic power, rivaled only by the old time political state at its worst.

The stupendous task of managing affairs would fall upon officials of ordinary flesh and blood, few of whom would be endowed with any genius for it. Those who might succeed would probably do so by becoming dictators. Indeed, I scarcely see how it would be humanly possible otherwise. In order to perform the task at all, men of the best intentions would naturally resort to mechanical methods and arbitrary ways. And, since the very nature of the state

[42] Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

conduces to the enhancement of power once given, officials of the socialist state, quite as much as those of the political state, would fall victims to its influence. They would assume unwarranted authority and dominate in an irresponsible manner.

"The love of power," as one has said, "is an impulse which, innate in very ambitious men, is chiefly promoted, as a rule, by the actual experience of power." [43] No position in the world gives larger experience of power than official position in the political institution; and this is the chief reason for believing that the socialist state with the extraordinary prerogatives it would confer upon officials and the great opportunities it would give them would be a particularly dangerous kind of state. Under it the traditional modes of state behavior would freely foster the dictatorial qualities of men, till these would be asserted in extraordinary degree. I quite agree that it would be much as Bertrand Russell has delineated it in the following: "The rulers of the state, then, will bear as little resemblance to the present Socialists as the dignitaries of the church after the time of Constantine bore to the Apostles. The men who advocate an unpopular reform are exceptional in disinterestedness and zeal for the public good; but those who hold power after the reform has been carried out are likely to belong, in the main, to the ambitious executive type which has in all ages possessed itself of the government of nations. And this type has never shown itself tolerant of opposition or friendly to freedom." [44]

If the new order could only devise some other means of government all this might be obviated, but socialism proposes merely to transform an old form by putting new content into it. The old vessel would remain, the state

[43] Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

would still be the state, officials officials, and bureaucracy be elevated into a tempting throne for autocracy to sit upon. Thus, if our reasoning be correct, the socialist commonwealth would turn out no better than the organization it seeks to supplant.

Regardless of all the fault that may be found with it, it must be acknowledged, nevertheless, that the outlook for political reorganization on the lines of socialism is perhaps the most promising one of the times. The current of new tradition is setting strongly for it. Rising from the wellsprings of Marxian thought this current goes sweeping on, actually cutting the channels of a new system. Flowing crosswise of the general stream of tradition though it does, its course in some respects appears less obstructed than that of any other movement for democracy, since, by magnifying the state, socialism does not run counter to the great political traditions and habits of thought and action of the race that has known no society without the state from time immemorial.

The Marxian formula of social process may be mostly wrong, and events fail to follow the course laid down, but this does not argue that an inevitable redistribution of surplus is not going on which may lead to something very like what Marx predicted. The indoctrination of the masses with the socialist ideal which is taking place is itself a phase of the social process, even as Marx conceived it. In my estimation, it is the most important phase, for it means that the proletariat are acquiring the very form of surplus necessary for the inauguration of a new political order. All efforts to promote the socialist doctrine and to achieve reforms in line with it are, of course, only so many efforts toward progress, but they are, none the less, quite as much grist to the mill of social process as the concentration of wealth, the growth of antagonistic combinations of men, and the increasing frequency and severity of in-

dustrial crises under the Marxian formula would be. In as much, then, as the socialist program coincides in a measure, with the social process, it is always to be reckoned with as a very real possibility.

Dissatisfaction with the existing democratic state and fear of the socialist state have given rise to the desire to eliminate the state altogether. This is involved in the proposal of anarchism. Contrary to the common belief that anarchism stands for the destruction of all government, its truest exponents desire only to end coercive government, whether it be that of a majority or that of the whole community, and to abolish the state as the chief instrument of such government. Thus, Kropotkin, distinguishing between state and government, says: "State and government represent two ideas of a different kind. The state idea implies quite another idea to that of government. It not only includes the existence of a power placed above society, but also a *territorial concentration* and a *concentration of many functions of the life of society in the hands of a few or even of all.* It implies new relations among the members of society." [45]

With the state out of the way, it is contended that all government needful could be taken care of by coöperative agreement in all important affairs. Numerous industrial groups would enter into such arrangements voluntarily and regulate their social functioning without resort to any coercion whatever. On this point Kropotkin again says: "Each economical phase of life implies its own political phase; and it is impossible to touch the very basis of the present economical life—private property—without a corresponding change in the very basis of the political organization. Life already shows in which direction the change will be made. Not in increasing the powers of

[45] *The State*, p. 4.

the State, but in resorting to free organization and free federation in all those branches which are now considered as attributes of the State." [46]

Thoughtful students of social conditions recognize certain merits in anarchism as a reform measure. They appreciate the fact that greater freedom from political authority and more opportunity for voluntary coöperation for which it seeks are objects greatly to be desired. They admit that the anarchistic plan, if put into practice, might accomplish much in these directions. It generally fails, however, to make a convincing appeal because it is entirely too idealistic. Although it might restore to men individually that power of self-government which they ought naturally to exercise, it is not believed that they would or could carry on such government successfully through agencies resting alone on voluntary agreement. Experience seems to argue that a system dependent upon voluntary groups having no coercive power over their constituents and devoid of all means save free consent for coördinating the larger interests of nations, would carry within itself the seeds of disorder and self-destruction. There can be little doubt that most of the forces of domination and exploitation now operative would still hold sway. The will to power in certain men would assert itself to the hurt of many others. Nothing would hinder free associations with predatory designs from devouring those of good intent.[47] So it is believed that the evils which the political system now inflicts would come back in private form, and, no force being provided to curb them, would speedily work wholesale disruption.

The immediate ground for believing that such would be the outcome is the fact that liberty, unrestrained by force, has never yet established harmony and equality among men.

[46] *Anarchist Communism*, p. 29.
[47] Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

Indeed, it has always done just the opposite. The difficulty seems to be that human nature even when freely expressing itself does not run altogether to the good. But anarchism holds that however much this may be true under the present order where men never escape the bad influences of coercion, it will not be true when force is removed and the utmost freedom allowed.

But there is, for all its merits, a fatal fallacy in this argument. It springs from a false assumption regarding the source of human nature. That source is assumed to be the social environment. On this is based the further contention, logical enough when the major premise is granted—that if all the evil forces were expunged from the environment, men would become mutually kind and helpful. The particular forces that bedevil men are conceived to be inequality of goods, lack of knowledge, exploitation, and especially the compulsions that institutions and laws inflict. By purging society of these, anarchism would redeem mankind and so make the world safe for liberty and government by mutual agreement. But unfortunately for the cause of anarchism, human nature is not wholly derived from environmental sources. It is partially a matter of innate qualities. Hence, were the environment to be made ever so favorable, men would not necessarily turn out as anarchists expect they would. There would still exist men with dispositions innately domineering, vicious, and otherwise unsocial, whose conduct would be at variance with the kind of behavior that would have to prevail if anarchistic society were to flourish.

Suppose we admit, for the sake of argument a proposition that is by no means a fact, that the inherited nature of most normal men is good. We will then be compelled to acknowledge that in so far as they become evil it is due to the corrupting influence of the social order. Even then, there must be faced the problem of abnormal types, which

no environmental reordering can solve. These types, entirely apart from any social influences, are the products of highly variable and unstable stocks; and they are apparently numerous enough and often enough of the vicious kind to wreck any anarchistic Utopia that might be tried. Provision for some coercive force would, therefore, seem indispensable, even for a society that would like to be non-coercive if it is to maintain itself against the violence of those who are born abnormal and incapable of either self-control or of free association. Of course, if a biologic equality through eugenics were established, the situation would be materially different and the basis for anarchism greatly strengthened.

Pure anarchism, eschewing all coercive governmental organization, is then apparently impossible. As a plan for redistributing political power it signifies disorganization rather than reorganization. French syndicalism, which is usually classified as a variety of anarchism, has been called "organized anarchism." This name is given because it looks to strongly organized industrial bodies for all the functions of government. The validity of coercion is not denied, but there is no place for the state nor any other general agency of control. In this it fails like the purer form fully to reckon with forces that cannot be ignored, and that must be taken into account in any practical plan for political reorganization.

One other significant proposal for political reconstruction remains to be noticed. This is guild socialism. We have already dealt with it both in relation to wealth redistribution and to the reorganization of industry, but its distinctive political aspects now merit consideration. Just what are they?

In the first place, and as previously mentioned, all national federations of industrial guilds would be coördinated in a guild congress or a "democratic supreme court of

functional equity.''[48] This body would be constituted of representatives from the national guilds, that is, be a congress of vocations, and would have as its chief purpose the adjudicating of matters between the guilds. Administrative and legislative powers, though not wanting, would be subordinate to the juridical power.[49] All obedience-compelling authority over industry, in so far as not exercised by the guilds and federations themselves, would repose in this supreme body.[50] In the second place, there would be a national parliament based on territorial representation. This body would be equally supreme over all matters pertaining to public consumption, but would have nothing to say about production. Two great congresses would thus govern, one over each of the two main spheres of social life. What could not be managed by them separately would be handled by a joint committee composed of an equal number of representatives from each.

Such, in outline, is the plan of political reconstruction advanced by guild socialism. Its object is to place the functions of government directly in the hands of those concerned. This it would accomplish by taking from the state a very large part of its power, and giving it to coöperative industrial associations. Deprived of all control over industry the range of power remaining would not be extensive enough, however used, seriously to interfere with individual liberty. Thus, by dividing and redistributing the more important part of the governmental functions the advocates of the guild plan would conquer and transform the state.[51]

The proposal is preferable either to state socialism or to anarchism, for in the one case the danger of augmenting the state is avoided and in the other the hazard of abolishing all coercive power is obviated. As a solution it calls

[48] G. D. H. Cole, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] G. D. H. Cole, *Self-government in Industry*, p. 98.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 91, and *Social Theory*, p. 70.

for less extreme and heroïc changes, demands less of human nature to bring them about and consequently stands a better chance of success.

But would it accomplish what is desired and at the same time be free from the perversities of the present system? In large measure, no doubt, the desired participation of the people in political control would be secured. By turning over that part of government pertaining to the productive function to the organized groups carrying on the work of society, the masses would thereby become direct participants in political organization covering the major activities of government. Their relation to the remaining activities might not be much altered, though it is reasonable to assume that the nature of the territorial government would be altered by the general reconstruction. The economic motives for domination would no longer prevail, and the territorial parliament, not being pervaded by them, would be in a fair way of becoming a real instrument of democratic government.

All the perversities of the present state might not be escaped. Even the proponents of this system do not blink the possibilities of their reappearance.[52] The parliamentary part of the government would still retain the state form, and give opportunity for officials to become autocrats. Those elevated to leadership in the guild congress might develop similar tendencies also. It is even conceivable that on occasions officials in the two governing spheres might combine to lord it over the nation.[53] At the same time the system would not lend itself so readily as the present one to such developments. Moreover, it would permit the erection of barriers against them in a way not now possible. The reasons, therefore, for believing that guild socialism could safely be relied upon for political reorganization are

[52] Bertrand Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 186, 187.
[53] *Ibid.*

two. First, because wealth, or the right thereto, being redistributed, could no longer use the state as an agency of control for the benefit of plutocracy, and secondly because there would be no plutocracy, and the masses controlling the wealth would build much of their governmental system from the bottom up. Its structure, moreover, would be such that power would diminish in rising to the top instead of decreasing as it now does in descending from the top to the bottom of the social scale.

The outlook for guild socialism, like all proposals for fundamental change, is uncertain. Moderate though the proposal is, it calls for a partial abolition of the state. But the state is a most jealous god in defending his kingdom, and the habits of men incline them to his favor. This has been demonstrated in the case of Russia, where the effort to substitute a Soviet system for the state does not appear to have been any too successful. Setting out to abolish this institution the proletariat raised up dictators who seem to have reëstablished in most respects the object of their hatred. At least they have fallen into many of the modes of state control in the use of armies, forced taxation, dictatorial policies, and extensive suppression of personal liberty. Outside pressure has, no doubt, been largely responsible for this, and yet there were also inherent forces at work. The natural tendency of leaders with power, however pure their motives, to resort to customary ways of using it was there, and the usual acquiescent and dependent spirit of the masses was there also. And these will perhaps always menace reconstructive movements.

In any struggle involving the existence of the state, however, the chief menace will always be from without, unless the improbable happens and the movement shall simultaneously become a universal one. A world of capitalistic states is jealous of all rival systems. It will brook no defections from its ranks, if they can possibly be prevented.

If any nation tries radical reform it will have the whole pack upon it in a trice. They will tear it asunder and devour it, or make it abandon its dangerous ways, if they can. The interests of all states is in maintaining the present régime, and any nation assaying to put an end to that régime in its midst, jeopardizes the whole world order. Hence, the bitter and unrelenting hatred of all for the revolting nation and the machinations of all states against it, as it was in the case of revolutionary France, Russia, and Hungary.

So political reorganization on the plan of guild socialism would certainly encounter difficulties. Still it is not an impossible nor an improbable line of progress; and should the great Russian experiment to which it is somewhat akin eventually work itself out as originally projected and prove to be good, the cause of guild socialism would receive an impetus that might eventually carry it into force throughout the industrial world.

With respect to any and all proposals and movements by which we are seeking to progress or to attain in anywise unto the democratic ideal, let it be said that their value and effectiveness will always depend much upon how far they are consistent with the general social process. By this I mean how far they are in agreement with the basic method of social change; that is, with surplus accumulation and redistribution. Any program, therefore, that is instrumental in promoting the rise of surplus in any dispossessed, disfranchised, disqualified, or otherwise disadvantaged class or section of society either by generating the surplus anew, by releasing it, or by drawing it from surplusful and dominant classes, must be considered sociologically sound and practical. On the other hand, no proposal or movement can be considered sound or likely to succeed merely because we wish it would succeed or even because we take steps to further its ends, unless the steps

we take are such as will bring about some accumulation or redistribution of the social energy. Most reform ventures do, indeed, attempt in some measure to facilitate accumulation or accelerate redistribution. That is what they are started for, but many of them also try to make bricks without straw or at least without enough straw to make bricks.

At best, the effectiveness of even the soundest of programs is qualified by a multitude of inexorable and uncontrollable conditions. Energy redistribution does not necessarily depend upon any guiding hand and it goes on whether we take notice of it or not. And wise indeed are the social movements for advance if they can discern the natural drifts and launch their barques upon them, and thus manage to ride with the process and hasten its ongoing.

## Society Democratized

I suppose the ultimate goal toward which the agencies of progress just canvassed are striving may fairly be described as the complete democratization of society. Perhaps not all would express it in these terms but no other interpretation really does it justice. Essentially this is the meaning of all proposals and movements that are concerned with the redistribution of the surplus. Such is the meaning of eugenics or race betterment, of euthenics or personal improvement, of eutechnics or cultural advancement, of euolbionics or material enrichment, of eupoliteanics or organizational readjustment, and of eudemics or all these several reforms combined, which further means the general welfare, or what is implied in the idea of a democratic society.

In bold outline such a society would present certain striking features. There would be abundant surplus, par-

ticipated in by all with an approximate degree of equality. There would be no castes or classes, no functionless individuals or exploiters. The socii would be characterized by full and free personality, unrestrained by forced relations of domination and submission. There would be a thorough and relatively frictionless coördination in all things spiritual as well as functional and structural. Harmony would be manifest. There would be stability, peace, and happiness in the midst of readjustment and change. Withal, there would be sufficient release of energy to secure a highly creative life. And any people attaining unto this ideal would be good neighbors to the nations and friends of humankind everywhere.

Such are the outlines of a fully democratized society. The finished picture with the necessary lights and shadows would perhaps be less roseate for the only medium in which it can be done has limitations and faults of quality. There might be a rather too commonplace background, and certainly numerous scenes of sordidness, monotony, sorrow, and even tragedy. In many respects it would be much as in any genre that might be painted of life as it is all about us, for it is hardly possible to imagine, much less actually to have, human society without the weaknesses, flaws, and displeasing phases which characterize human beings under whatever condition you find or place them.

The full significance of surplus redistribution can hardly be appreciated unless we observed how international relations would be affected thereby. Although the effects are readily to be inferred from what has gone before, they merit brief statement in the present connection. No really adequate statement can be given, however, without raising the whole question of surplus redistribution in all its international aspects. But to consider that question would lead beyond the limits of this volume, hence we shall attempt

only to suggest the international bearings of national democratization.

There is every ground for believing that fully democratized nations would live together in far greater accord than nations customarily do. For the more nearly they are able to reach an equitable distribution of their energies the less aggressive will they tend to become. This is due not to the elimination of disparity from among them nor to the removal of the differential, but to the lowering of the aggressive potential. As we have tried to show, the rise of this potential is caused by the concentration of social surplus. Within nations its integration in the ranks of a ruling class gives a will to power and the dominating attitude and outreach that characterize all surplusful states. But in case of an equitable distribution the overcharged dynamic energy areas may be so dissipated that the expansive and imperialistic *Drang* will become checked if not entirely nullified. The truth of this principle might easily be demonstrated with reference to industrial nations where the concentration of wealth surplus gives rise to social conduct whence spring most of our international woes. But the principle holds true equally for all other forms of concentrated energy, since vital, cultural, and organizational surplus have been at one time and another the source of the aggressive potential, as they even now play their part.

Redistribution along democratic lines, then, would profoundly influence world society. It would not do away with weak nations and strong ones, nor for that reason render the social process of no effect among them, but it would pave the way for more abiding peace. For every nation thus to set its house in order is the beginning not only of domestic unity, but of world concord. Stability and harmony through national democratization should first be secured as a condition antecedent to any seeking for abiding peace in the world of nations.

The democratized society we have delineated is obviously highly Utopian. It reaches way beyond the probable grasp of any nation. Therefore something less idealistic, more tempered to the prevailing disposition of man, and coming more within the range of manifest human capacities is all that should be expected.

The basic pattern for such democracy seems especially to have been laid down in those proposals which have taken account of the new unities that have become so significant in modern society. These unities as pointed out in Chapter V, are those founded on vocation and interest bonds instead of on area or territory. They are the distinctive groupings of industrial society. As such they afford a really natural basis for reorganization on democratic lines.

Such groups may properly assume the ownership and control of the means of production. By so doing, an equitable division of the product among the workers in each industry could be readily secured.

Under an economic system of this sort the political phase of society would also take on a different constitution. It would grow largely out of the economic organization and be a function of interest groupings, instead of operating as something apart from and imposed upon them. Thus, there would be responsible government by and for the governed. The government would presumably be vested in a bicameral congress. One chamber of this would be composed of delegates from the various groups. In the other would sit representatives of territorial districts, inasmuch as every nation has problems that are distinctly territorial as well as industrial. These coequal congresses would not deal directly with the productive process. That would be a function of the groups. The chief work of the congresses would be to coördinate and make adjustments of differences and inequalities among the industrial and interest groups and so unify the parts for the service of the whole nation.

Thus, the state would be so far limited and derivative that it could hardly get out of the control of the people.

With society organized in this manner the democratization of culture would be made possible. But compulsion would probably have to be yoked with opportunity in order to reach all, for the human family has an element in it that does not thirst for knowledge. The cultural level could be just as high as the nation's resources would allow. It could be equalized however only in so far as a minimum equipment for a vocational pursuit and a responsible citizenship demand.

Beyond the scope here outlined, one can not well imagine any society venturing. For to essay the remaking of the race, however much any secure equality may hang up it, is far too difficult a task. It would be a sufficiently masterful achievement to establish democracy in the social structure.

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